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Abstract 
This thesis examines Acehnese women's role in maintaining their 
household livelihoods during violent political conflict, and covers the following 
issues: How do women survivors of violent political conflict maintain their 
household livelihoods? What were the choices they made and the strategies they 
adopted?, What resources did they have at their disposal?. This study is based on 
field work conducted in the period of July 2003 to August 2004, during which 
time the region was initially under Martial Law and later began the transition to a 
Civil Emergency periods. 
I maintain two main arguments in this thesis. First, Acehnese women were 
caught in the intersection between the longstanding violent political conflict and 
their household livelihoods. Second, in such a situation, they became active 
survivors and the backbones of their household livelihoods coping strategies. The 
second argument challenges scholarly works on women and conflict that tend to 
view women as either passive victims or active combatants. This argument' s 
theoretical framework is developed from the existing relevant theories in three 
main conceptual areas of women, coping strategies, and household livelihood 
sustenance, which are placed in the particular context of violent political conflict. 
Considering the conflict to be a multi faceted phenomenon, this thesis employs a 
mixture of economic, anthropological, sociological, and historical approaches. 
To date, there have been limited studies, on violent political conflict in 
Aceh which focus on how the people, especially women, survive in terms of their 
day to day living. The neglect of women and their livelihood issues in studies on 
the region actually parallels with the neglect of this issue in Conflict Studies in 
general, as noted by some scholarly works (Moser and Clark, 2001 ; Berger 2001 ; 
and Sharoni 1995). This study offers different perspective on the way women 
cope with the effects of the conflict on their daily lives and households 
livelihood. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1 Scope of the Study 
This thesis discusses the issue of women in the 'intersection' of 
household livelihood and the violent political conflict1 in Aceh, currently 
known as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), one of the troubled provinces 
in Indonesia. The study investigates women's coping strategies to maintain 
their household livelihood in the conflict situation of Aceh. The term violent 
political conflict is deliberately used to refer to the manifestation of political 
conflict in violent actions, in the form of either physical (anned and/or non-
armed) or non-physical confrontations which occur habitually and pervade the 
everyday lives of the people. Violent political conflict has occurred off and on 
in Aceh since Indonesia gained its independence in 1945.2 While I take into 
account the earlier history of violent political conflict in Aceh, l particularly 
focus on the recent conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka),3 well known by its abbreviation- 'GAM', and the government of 
Indonesia. In this thesis, I use the terms Aceh violent political conflict, the 
Aceh conflict, and the conflict interchangeably. 
Focusing on married women and their households, this study attempts 
to examine the way women cope with the effects of the conflict on their daily 
lives and their households' livelihood. This study describes and analyses 
women's perceptions and experiences of, and responses to, the effects of the 
1 Jongman (200 I), focusing on the death toll, classifies four stages of situations of violent 
conflict: High-Intensity Conflict (HIC), Violent Political Conflict (VPC), Political Tension 
Situation (PTS), and Stable Peaceful Situation (SPS). 
2 See Chapter 6 for the history of the Aceh-violent political conflict. The word 'Aceh' refers 
to the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province and the Acehnese people (mostly in the areas of 
Aceh Besar, Pidi, and North Aceh), the ethnicity of most GAM fighters. 
3 The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is an Acehnese independence movement established and 
led by Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, an Acehnese leader, in 1976. The movement has a central 
office in Sweden where most of its high ranking leaders live. It is a well organised body with 
local representation in several other countries and in Aceh. In August 2005, GAM signed a 
peace dea l with the government of Indonesia and changed its armed political struggle to a non 
armed political struggle. Some scholarly works on GAM are, among others, Schulze (2004), 
Sukma (2004), Ross (2003), Basuki (2003), !CG (2002), Siapno (2002), and Robinson (200 I). 
violent political conflict on their role and positions, especially concerning 
their households' livelihoods. 
In analysing the recent conflict between GAM and the Indonesian 
government, I deliberately use the term 'GAM soldier'. This follows the 
argument of my key informant on the importance of differentiating between 
the 'on the ground' (I: orang bawah) GAM members (including so ldiers) and 
the 'on top' (I: orang alas) GAM members and leaders that reside in foreign 
countries (such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Sweden). The ' on the ground' 
GAM conducted their gue1Tilla fight against the government in the province, 
and the 'on top' (I: orang alas) GAM made important decisions for GAM's 
policies. It has been argued by some local Acehnese and in some ICG reports4 
that there were often some missing links of command between the ' on the 
ground' (I: orang bawah) and the 'on top' (I: orang alas). Consequently, 
what happened on the ground did not always represent what was decided 'on 
top'. The concerns of thi s thesis are with the 'on the ground ' GAM members, 
who will be referred to as 'GAM soldiers', and the 'on the ground' impact of 
the vio lent political conflict of Aceh, 
Concentrating on the day-to-day lives of Acehnese women, this study 
provides an angle which is lacking in many other studies: the local level of the 
confiict and its impact on the daily lives of the Acehnese. lt attempts to 
capture the ordinary people's perspective on the nature, causes and 
consequences of the conflict. 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) refers to the particular 
administrative area of the province in which, apart from the Acehnese, many 
other ethnic groups live. The name was given in 2001 to the former Special 
Province of Aceh (Daerah Istimewa Propinsi Aceh) through law no 18/2001 
on the Special Autonomy ofNanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province (Annex 1). 
This is part of the effotis of the central government to calm down the 
Acehnese demand for independence. Thus, 'Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam' is 
itself a symbol of the dynamics of the violent political conflict in the region. 
4 See for example !CG, Asia Report, No 17, 200 I, p.8 ; ICG Indonesia Briefing, 27 March 
2002, p.3 
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Without any attempt to disregard the 'narne-politisation ', in thi s thesis, I use 
'Aceh ' and ' Aceh province' interchangeably for convenience to refer to NAD. 
It is worth noting that, since I conducted my fieldwork between July 
2003 and August 2004, two significant events have occurred. These are the 
Tsunami that severely hit the region on 26 December 2004, and the 15 August 
2005 peace deal signed by the government of Indonesia and GAM leaders, 
concluding the GAM conflict that cost over 9,000 lives between 1976 to 2005 
(JCG, 2005, p.1). While not overlooking the important changes brought about 
by these two events, J have limited the scope of my study to the period before 
the 2004 Tsunami. I am fully aware that these important events, in particular 
the fact that Aceh now enjoys more conducive non-armed conflict 
circumstances, have made new data and information available. This might 
require a different approach that possibly affects my analysis. However, I 
have not attempted to offer a picture of current (2006) Acehnese society but 
rather a historical account of the society in which violent political conflict was 
a dominant feature. As stated by Levi-Strauss (1992, p.7): 
I do not doubt for a moment that further in formation already availab le or as 
yet unpublished wi ll affect my interpretation ... No matter; in a subject such 
as this, scientific knowledge advances haltingly and is stimulated by 
contention and doubt ... For this book to be worthwhile, it is not necessary in 
my view that should be assumed to embody the truth for years to come and 
with regard to the tiniest details. r shall be satisfied if it is credited with the 
modest achievement of having left a difficult problem in a rather less 
unsatisfactory state than it was before. Nor must we forget that in science 
there are no final truths. The scientific mind does not so much provide the 
right answers as ask the right questions. (Levi-Strauss, 1992, p.7) 
In this thesis, I intentionally use pseudonyms and do not specify 
villages where I conducted my research, for the purpose of confidentiality of 
my research subjects and key informants. This is also part of the commitment 
I gave them when I obtained their verbal consents at the time of my fieldwork. 
According to the Australian National University's Human Research Ethics 
Committee, later known as the Ethics in Human Experimentation Conunittee,5 
the protection of research subject is mandatory. 
5 The Austral ian National University established the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HR EC), later recognized as the Ethics in Human Experimentation Committee, in 1986. This 
is in line wi th the Australian 'National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving 
3 
2 Why Aceh? About the Research Sites 
My encounter with the issue of the conflict in Aceh started in my 
fourth and fifth year of primary school in the late 1970s in Indonesia, under 
the nationalist history curriculum of Suhaito's New Order regime. The history 
of Indonesia was a compulsory subject from elementary school to high school, 
through which we learned about the state ideology and the presumed 
insurgencies from different factions and regions, including Aceh.6 My 
understanding of the Aceh conflict was deepened during an assignment with 
UNFPA Jakaita office from the end of 1999 to early 2002, in which 1 was 
responsible for the humanitarian progran1 for the troubled areas of Aceh, West 
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Maluku, Maluku and the former East 
Timor provinces. 
Through these experiences, I have come to understand that the violent 
political conflict of Aceh has a longstanding history which has significantly 
impacted on the society. The people have suffered economically, socially, and 
psychologically. This understanding influenced my decision to conduct 
research in the region. I believe that it is not only significant as an academic 
research but also important in contributing to the wellbeing of the Acehnese 
society. 
With armed conflict predominant in its history, Aceh has always been 
known as a troubled region and considered a high-risk area. As indicated by 
Table 1-1 , in the contemporary period Aceh falls within the high conflict area 
Humans', the code of ethics in research in all disciplines. The National Statement was 
adopted in 1999 with the aim of protecting the welfare and rights of research subjects. It 
regulates the establishment of human research ethics committees at universities to review all 
research projects involving human participation. (source: 
http://www.anu.edu.au/ro/ORl/human.php accessed on 19 September 2006). 
6 The insurgencies mostly resulted from political disputes based on different visions for the 
form of the Indonesian nation. A critical account of the history of political disputes in 
Indonesia can be seen from, for example, the work of van Dijk (1970). In his analysis on the 
Darul Islam/Indonesia Moslem Military (Darul lslam/Tentara Islam Indonesia - 01/Tll) 
insurgencies, van Dijk revealed how the different factions of guerrilla fighters during the 
independence struggle transformed into two strong opponents of the official Republican 
military, and that the 'irregular units', mostly locally based, operated in a 'well-defined area', 
and possessed a local ethnic-ideological character, often with a religious orientation. 
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of Indonesia, with the second highest number of casualties after Maluku, a 
province in the eastern part of Indonesia which suffered communal clashes 
between Moslems and Christians in early 2000. At the time of my research, 
Aceh was also the only region in Indonesia where martial law was imposed 
for one year from May 2003 - June 2004 (Annex 2). 
Table 1-1. Classification of conflict areas in Indonesia, 1990 - 2001 
Province Number of Incidents Number of deaths Dominant 
Total With min Total Per 100 Category 
1 death thousand 
pop. 
High Conflict Area 
Maluku 165 138 1949 93.4 Comm unal 
Aceh 464 341 1238 32.2 Separatist 
( 100%) 
Central Kalimantan 16 13 440 27 Comm unal 
Medium Conflict 
Area 
Central Sulawesi 15 10 334 17.2 Communal 
Jakarta 55 16 1230 13.5 Communal 
West Kalimantan 17 9 442 12.2 Communal 
Papua 41 29 136 7 Separatist 
(97 %) 
South Kalimantan I I 124 4.3 Communal 
East Nusatenggara 14 8 55 1.5 Communal 
Riau 17 4 26 0.7 Communal 
West Nusatenggara 12 6 24 0.7 Communal 
Low Conflict Area 
Bali 9 5 14 0.5 Communal 
North Sulawesi 3 I 9 0.3 Communal 
South Sulawesi 14 3 20 0.3 Communal 
West Java 88 28 71 0.2 Communal 
Lampung 20 5 11 0.2 Communal 
Central Java 52 17 42 0.1 Communal 
North Sumatra 24 7 11 0.1 Communal 
East Java 32 IO 29 0.1 Communal 
Yogyakarta 9 2 2 0. 1 Communal 
West Sumatra 6 1 I 0.1 Communal 
Jam bi 7 
South Sumatra 7 
East Kalimantan 4 
Southeast Sulawesi I 
Bengkulu 
Total 826 580 60 12 3.2 
Source: Tad1oeddm in Varshney, Ashutosh, "The Re levance of International Research on Ethnic 
Conflict for Indonesia: Some Refl ection". Working Paper 02/05, UNSFIR, Jakarta, June 2002 
Note: In the original data, there were some miscalculations which I have corrected. 
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The region has always been one of the most conflict-prone provinces 
in Indonesia. Cribb (1990, p.23) states that the history of Aceh holds a number 
of instances of the ' rapid and ruthless elimination of political opponents.' 
Ross (2003, p.2) argues that the province was perhaps the only area in the 
country in which civil war7 existed. 
Although Indonesia has freq uently suffered from vio lent confli ct, the civil 
wars in Aceh have been the country ' s only civil war since 1960, if the 
standard definition of civil war is applied .. . 8 
From the period of resistance to the Dutch to the late 20th century, the 
region has never experienced sustained peace for more than eight or nine 
years at a time, resulting in about one-eighth of the population being killed or 
becoming displaced (Siegel, 1979). Annex 3 supp011s Siegel's statement and 
clearly indicates that during the last 60 years, there were five major peace 
agreements in the region: in 1948, 1959, 1962, 2002/2003, and 2005, 
following the devastating Tsunami on 26 December 2004. None of them, has 
been sustainable, although the last that is still in force. 
Historically, the Aceh violent political conflict is a longstanding 
phenomenon that can be traced from the Aceh War (I: Perang Aceh) (1873-
1903) of the Dutch colonial era9 to the recent conflict between the government 
oflndonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (1976 - 2005), and can be 
7 There are debates among scholars and practitioners on a workable definition of civil war, 
due to the Jack of clarity and precision on what constitute a civil war in international law 
(Carrillo-Suarez, 1999; Lopez, 1994). Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary ( 1997, 
p . 197), however, provides a simple definition of c ivi l war as ' armed con t1 ict between 
members of the same state or political entity'. 
8 In 1965/1 966 Indonesia suffered from the presumed coup d ' etat of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (G30S/PKJ) in the context of the Cold War when between 600,000 and two 
million people perceived as affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party were massacred. 
The killing was a mutual responsibility of the military, under Suharto's leadership, and 
'civil ian vigilante gangs ' (Cribb, 1990, p.3) of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Hindu-
Balinese youth groups. Hundreds of thousands were imprisoned without trial for many years, 
and " ... often to1tured, starved, and lawlessly deprived of their property'' (Anderson, 200 I, 
p.11; see also Ashutosh, 2002 ; Cribb, 1990). In this episode, Sukarno, the first pres ident, 
trans ferred his presidential mandate to Suharto, the second president of The Republic of 
Indones ia, with the issuance of The I I 1h of March Command Letter (Surat Perintah Sebelas 
Maret - Supersemar). Debates on the history of G30S/PKI and existence of Supersemar were 
quite prominent among scholars, and in fact there are several versions in the Indonesia 
archives, some of which were banned from Indonesia during Suharto's era. The Supersemar 
letter itself is mysteriously mi ssing, wh ich interestingly no one in Indonesia has ever seriously 
raised special concerns about. 
9 The Dutch admitted that the Aceh war ( 1873- 1903) was the longest and costl iest in the 
Dutch East Indies, now known as Indones ia (Annex 4). 
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grouped into three major periods. 10 These are the Aceh War (J: Perang Aceh) 
period during the Dutch occupation from 1873 to 1904, 11 the Darul 
Islam/Islamic Indonesian Military/Islamic Indonesia State (I: Darul 
Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia/Negara Islam Indonesia - DI/Tll/NII) period 
from 1953 to 1961 , and the Free Aceh Movement (I: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka -
GAM) period from 1976 to 2005. 
Islan1 persistently underlay the moral fibre of these am1ed struggles, 
evident from the Aceh War (I: Perang Aceh) (1873-1903) to the most recent 
conflict between GAM and the government oflndonesia, as exemplified 
further in Chapter 5. The Aceh War was considered a holy war (J: Perang 
Sabil),justified by the belief that fighting against the infidels (Ac.: kaphee) , 
the Dutch, is obligatory for any Moslem. The monotheistic spirit oflslam re-
inspired the ulama (I, Ac.), the religious leaders, and their followers, who 
opted to join Indonesia to fight against some of the uleebalang (Ac.), the 
aristocrat leaders, who were against Indonesia, in the Cumbok War (I: Perang 
Cumbok) (1945-1946). Similarly, Islamic vigour motivated the Darul 
Islam/Indonesia Islamic Military/Indonesia Islamic State (DI/TII/NII) (1953 -
1961 /1962) movement in Aceh, led by one of the prominent Acehnese ulama, 
Teungku Daud Bereueh (1898 - 1987).12 In the most recent violent political 
conflict of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) (1976-2004), the adoption of 
Shari 'a Law13 articulates the incessant Islamic force in the 'everlasting' 
10 This excludes the presumed Communist coup in 1965-1966 that cost approximately 3,000 
deaths of Acehnese alone (S iegel, 1979). For fu11her details on the history of confl ict and its 
macro effect on the society, see Chapter 5 . 
11 According to the Dutch, the war ended in 1904, but history shows that the Acehnese 
resistance against the Dutch continued to 1945. 
12 Due to his reputation as a good ulama, Daud Beureueh ( 1898 - 1987) was a vital figure and 
had an extensive influence on the Acehnese society. As a result, he was utilised by the central 
government and some politicians, including Hasan Di Tiro (the GAM leader) to obtain 
support from the Acehnese in 1976. The New Order, for example, took advantage of 
Beureueh's good reputation to mobi lise the ulama to allow the ru ling functional group pa11y 
(Golkar) to win electorally in Aceh in the 1980s. Hasan Di Tiro, in the early stage of the 
GAM movement in the 1970s also tried to gain Beureueh's support in order to gain the wide 
support from the Acehnese. 
13 This basically means the Law of Allah as given by the Qur' an and Sunnah. It covers not 
only religious rituals but all aspects of life, including politics, the economy, banking and 
business, and social issues (Salim and Azra, 2003, p.xviii). Shari'a means ·path .. . to life in the 
hereafter and proper conduct in the temporal world' (Hooker and Hooker, 2006, p.137). There 
are different ways of writing the term, including Syariah, Shariah, Shari 'a and Syariat. I use 
' Shari 'a' due to its closeness to its root word 'Shara 'a,' which links to the idea of 'spiritual 
law' and 'system of divine law; way of belief and practice ' in the Qur'an (Wikipedia, 2005, 
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conflict of Aceh. Although the higher level GAM leaders never declared their 
support for the adoption of Shari'a Law in 2001, contained in law no 18/2001 
on the Special Autonomy of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province (Annex 1 ), 
considering it to be a political manoeuvre by the government of Indonesia to 
calm down their demand for freedom, they did not openly came out against it. 
In fact, evidence on the ground shows efforts from GAM fighters tried to 
ensure that Islamic tradition was maintained in the society. 
The continuous fortitude of Islam in these armed struggles may be 
explained from the long history oflslam itself in the society. As an entry point 
oflslam to Indonesia perhaps as early as the 7th century (Al-Chaidar, 1999, 
p.15),14 Aceh has always been well-known as an Islamic region. Having been 
practised for generations, Islamic values are well-integrated into the 
local/indigenous traditions to the extent that the Acehnese believe that the 
Islamic law and the local traditions are inseparable, akin to a substance 15 and 
its intrinsic essence (Ac.: adat ngon huk6m lagee zat ngon sifeut). 
Due to its strong nuance oflslam, the region is referred to as 'the 
veranda of Mecca' (Ac: Seuramoe Mekah; I: Serambi Mekah). 16 Evoking the 
name of the traditional Acehnese dagger (I: rencong), the region is also called 
the land of rencong (I: Tanah Rencong). The idea of rencong is co1mected to 
the idea of Islam. It is believed that the shape of the dagger originated from 
the form of the first Qur'anic letters: Al if Lam Mim 17 or the calligraphy of 
Bismillahirahmanirrahim 18 (In the name of Allah the Most Gracious, The 
Most Merciful). Plate 1-1 shows that the shape of rencong is very similar to 
the calligraphy of Bismillahirahmanirrahim. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia - accessed on 17/ l 0/2005). See chapter 3 for details on 
Shari'a law. 
14 Al-Chaidar (1999) refers to the Islamic kingdom of Perlak, which was located near modern 
Langsa, East Aceh (Reid, 2005, p.5) 
15 
'zaL' is also trans lated as (l) being, existing; (2) substance, matter, agent, essence; (3) 
essence (of God) (Steven and Schmidgall-Tellings, 2004, p.1101) 
16 The term can be traced as far back as 1641 in 'Bustan al-Salatin' (Ar.) (the [spiritual] 
Garden of King) written by Nuruddin al-Raniri, the advisor of Sultan lskandar Thani ( 1637-
1644). It contains extensive moral lessons and wisdom for the proper conducts of kings and 
court officials and referred to as the 'spiritual garden of guidance' (Harun, 2004, p.28). 
17 
'A/if Lam Mim' is the first letter in the second and longest chapter of Al Qur'an, surah Al-
Baqarah (The Cow Chapter). It is believed that this letter is one of the miracles of the Qur'an 
and only Allah knows its meaning (See Surah 2, Al Baqarah, The Noble Qur'an) 
18 The Moslem 's shortest prayer for God's blessings and guidance usually said before 
performing any activity. 
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Plate 1-1. Rencong - the Acehnese Traditional Dagger and 
The Calligraphy of Bismillahirahmanirrahim 
From the late 1990s, the region began to be labelled the bleeding land 
(I: tanah bersimbah darah). Reid (2006) named the region 'Verandah of 
Violence'. These new labels exemplified the violent political conflict between 
the government oflndonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (I.: Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka - GAM), which had dominated the region for almost 30 years. The 
two labels, however, have only been used recently, especially amongst human 
rights activists to refer to the harsh military operations conducted by the 
Indonesian military. 
At the time of my research, apait from Islam, the conflict also 
concerned the local economic struggle. Aceh has suffered from economic 
exploitation. Natural resources were exploited for the benefit of the central 
government, with limited benefits to the region. At the micro level, the arn1ed 
clashes between the Indonesian military and GAM fighters often resulted in 
disturbances of the day-to-day living of the people. This was especially true 
for villagers in the 'hot spot' areas, in the districts in which the research was 
carried out - Pidie, Bireuen, Aceh Besar, East Aceh, and North Aceh. The 
'hot spot' areas are those classified by Indonesian military as having a heavy 
presence of GAM and requiring the strong presence of Indonesian military. 
These areas hence had more armed clashes between the Indonesian military 
and GAM soldiers. 
Quite a number of conflict studies have been conducted on the region, 
especially after the re-emergence of the Aceh violent political conflict in the 
9 
1970s. These studies, however, are concerned with the nature and causes of 
the conflict, human rights violations, political analysis, and the state-civil 
society power relations. This is particularly true for studies conducted after 
the late 1990s, when the conflict reached its peak (cf. Siapno, 2002). To date, 
there are limited studies which focus on how the people, especially women, 
have survived the Aceh conflict, in terms of household economy. 
3 Acehnese Women: In the Intersection of Violent Political 
Conflict and Household Livelihood 
In this thesis I argue that during violent political conflict, Acehnese 
women were situated in the intersection of the longstanding conflict and their 
household livelihoods. The tem1 'intersection' relates to the fact that the 
violent political conflict and its daily effects faced by Acehnese women 
necessitated the tactical development of coping strategies to maintain their 
household livelihoods. It is widely acknowledged that the effects of a violent 
political conflict in generating poverty and vulnerability may be more 
damaging than other conflicts. This is because a violent political conflict is 
often characterised by deliberate destruction of political, economic, social and 
environmental systems. It also involves weakened or absent public 
institutions, contested state legitimacy and statehood, an informal or illegal 
economy, extensive violence, life threatening situations, involuntary 
displacement, deliberate destruction of livelihoods, and political 
marginalisation of certain groups (Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, pp.1-3). The 
violent situations which were evident in Aceh have consequently led to the 
'loss of livelihood' (Ohlsson, 2000, p.1) of the affected local community, 
especially those residing in the black areas (I: daerah hitam), 19 the 'hot-spot' 
conflict areas. 
The violent political conflict of Aceh exemplifies the unhappy 
relationship between the centre and the periphery within Indonesia. The 
conflict is about the exercise of unequal power of an authoritarian central 
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'Daerah /-lit am' (I) are areas indicated as having heavy presence of G AM (see Chapter 6 
for details) 
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government and the locals for whom obedience and loyalty should be the 
main virtue. In such a system, rebelling would be considered an ' unforgivable 
sin' since it manifest doubts concerning the authority's right to institute norms 
and its dictum that the norms are established in the best interest of the society. 
As stated by Fromm (1947, p.6): 
The source of irrationa l authority ... is about power over people. This power 
can be physical or mental, it can be realistic or only relative terms of the 
anxiety and helplessness of the person submitting to this authority. Power on 
one side, fear on the other are always the buttresses on which irrational 
authority is built. Criticism of the authority is not only not required but 
forbidden ... Irrational authority is by its very nature based upon inequality, 
implying difference in value ... (p.6) 
It is imp01iant to note, however, that the conflict in Aceh was 
transformed in such a way that the GAM fighters who claimed to represent the 
oppressed Acehnese became another 'irrational authority' towards the 
Acehnese. In such a situation, obedience and rebellion were perplexing for the 
civilians. What was considered as obedience by the GAM fighters would be 
perceived as rebellion by the govenm1ent, and vice versa. Due to the punitive 
nature of the irrational authority, Acehnese civilians were consequently 
sandwiched in between these two repressive parties. 
The conflict clearly indicates the mixture of both physical and 
symbolic (psychological) violence perpetrated by both conflicting parties. 
Robben and Suarez-Orozco (2000, p.5) refer to this violence as ' hard' and 
'soft' respectively. Physical ('hard ' ) violence can be easi ly identified, named. 
and measured, and therefore methods to prevent such violence are more 
visible. Symbolic ('soft') violence is problematic for it is indefinite, cannot be 
easily measured, and has a long term indeterminate effect. Differentiating the 
two types of conflict, however, is not advisable. " ... Like the lines in many 
maps, such division would be artificial, arbitrary, and even dangerous .. . " 
(Robben and Suarez-Orozco and, 2000, p.5). 
My thesis does not attempt to make a distinction between the two 
'irrational authorities' and between the 'hard ' and 'soft' types of violence. It is 
the interconnectedness and multiplier effects of both types of violence 
perpetrated by the two ' irrational authorities' which are central to the study, 
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which focuses on how Acehnese women cope with their daily household 
needs in a situation of violent political conflict. As previously stated, this 
study offers the local experiences of the ordinary Acehnese and the 
consequences of the conflict on their daily lives. 
As many studies on the violent political conflict of Aceh focus more 
on the conflict itself or adhere to the genealogy of conflict, the issue of 
women and household economy affected by the conflict in Aceh has been 
rendered almost invisible. This parallels the absence of these vital subjects in 
conflict studies and development studies in general. The extensive literature 
on violence and armed conflict is mostly gender blind, with women's 
participation not being recognised appropriately, in either analytical or 
theoretical aspects (Moser and Clark, 200 l ). This is despite the ' gendered 
effect', the different consequences of violence and conflict on women and 
men, as argued by some scholars (such as Berger, 2002; Sharoni, 1995). 
A few recent studies have attempted to integrate gender analysis into 
their theoretical frameworks, but concentrate more on men as 'perpetrators' 
and women as 'passive victims' (Moser and Clark, 2001). Consequently, they 
fail to perceive women as ' active agents'. In my study, I argue that women, in 
violent conflict circumstances, often have to assume responsibilities for 
household sustenance and become 'active survivors' who strive for a better 
state of affairs for their households. Much research indicates that women 
often assume responsibility for maintaining their household livelihood in 
poverty conditions, unstable environments, or where male family members are 
absent due to chronic violent political conflict, all circumstances which 
require women to become the cornerstone of a household's coping strategies. 
The link between violent political conflict, the decline of the socio-
economic wellbeing of the people and the increase in poverty is also missing 
in development studies, the framework under which studies on household 
livelihood sustenance are usually conducted. Development studies, designed 
and developed within a basic assumption of political stability and normal or 
non violent conflict situations, have not to date adequately addressed women 
and household livelihood sustenance in violent political conflict 
circumstances. Development studies tend to take little notice of the fact that 
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whilst the conflict occurs, women carry on with their lives, and development 
assistance continues. However, the development assistance may be 
inappropriately designed and delivered because of the lack of fit between 
models of assistance and the conflict situation. 
The aforementioned practical and theoretical concerns have motivated 
me to focus on how Acehnese women and their households cope with the 
effect of violent political conflict in their day-to-day lives. I have based the 
theoretical framework, key concepts, and empirical indicators for the study on 
existing relevant theories that cover the three main concepts of women, 
coping strategies, and household livelihood sustenance, incorporating them 
into the particular context of violent political conflict. A mixture of economic, 
anthropological, sociological, and historical approaches are used in the study. 
The four approaches are consolidated using the economic approach as the 
core. Therefore, the investigation is more about how the household economic 
activities of the Acehnese were formed and evolved within a violent political 
conflict situation rather than focusing on how the particular Acehnese culture 
and society shaped and evolved. 
4 The Underlying Ethical and Methodological Concerns 
Conducting research under complicated circumstances of Islamic 
traditions, violent political conflict, and ethno-nationalist construction of the 
Acehnese, the research confronts some fundamental ethical and 
methodological concerns. This section describes these problematical 
situations and their challenges for the conduct of the research. 
4.1 On the Question of Morality: The Fundamental Ethical 
Issues 
Research for the current study took place between July 2003 and 
August 2004, 20 when the province was under Shari 'a Law (implemented since 
20 Prior to the conduct of the study, preliminary research was performed in March and April 
2003. 
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2001), and martial law (from early-July 2003 to mid-July 2004), followed by 
a transition to the civil emergency period (mid-July 2004 to August 2005). lt 
was also a time of rising Acehnese ethno-nationalism, forming through 
antagonism towards the Javanese which started as early as 1999/2000.21 The 
Javanese were considered to be outsiders, associated with the ' foreign' 
government oflndonesia, and a 'new colonialist' after the Dutch (Annex 5). 
The research was thus conducted under complicated circumstances of Islamic 
traditions, violent political conflict, and ethno-nationalist construction of the 
Acehnese, of which practical experiences wi ll be further explored in Chapter 
2. 
These three interrelated contexts of Islam, violent political conflict and 
ethnic antagonism entailed the practical and ethical issues underpinning my 
research. The practical issues concern with security and proper Islamic 
conduct especially considering my ethnic Javanese background, gender, and 
reality of not practicing Islam. The fundamental philosophical/ethical and 
methodological issues relate to questions about the morality and moral 
obligations of the researcher towards the research subjects. 
This question of morality is raised by Scheper-Hughes (1995) in her 
work in a shantytown of Alto do Cruzeiro in Northeast Brazil in l 982 through 
which she was transfo1med from an 'objective' or disengaged researcher to a 
politically and morally engaged researcher. For Scheper-Hughes, researchers 
should be ethically grounded, and she criticizes the insincere, superficial, and 
fleeting commitment of researchers towards their research subjects. 
Another important consideration was the gender issue. Being a 
woman, travelling alone in the troubled Islamic region of Aceh was both a 
true asset and a challenge. Similar to Siapno's experiences (2002, p.xv), I 
found the liberal Islamic character of the general Acehnese society allowed 
ample opportunities to move freely in the region. Neve11heless, the 
enforcement of Shari 'a law by the government and the 'elite' Acehnese 
Moslems limited my mobility as a woman. This was especially true because 
21 Under the GAM regime, apart from antagon ism to the Javanese, Acehnese identity was 
constructed with reference to its ' golden age', a period in the 16th and 17th century when Aceh 
was an Independent Kingdom. See Chapter 4 , Section 1.3. 
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of the fact that Shari 'a Law was disproportionately understood as placing 
more control over women by making what is supposedly individual choice 
into compulsory conduct, such as the Islamic dress code.22 The ' raziajilbab' 
(I), also locally known as ' sweepingjilbab' (I), is a Shari 'a police raid to 
coerce women to wear the veil. In Addition, some 'raziajilbab' were 
conducted extra-legally by vigi lante groups. Siapno (2002, p.36) refers to this 
as ' forcibly veiling women' . The 'raziajilbab' was often done without 
courtesy and they tended to harass women so that some Acehnese women 
tem1ed it 'street harassment' (Siapno, 2002, pp.36-39). It exemplifies the male 
political control over women's bodies and sexuality, and serves as a tool for 
reclaiming Acehnese women from the bad influence of what is termed the 
'Madonna23 factor' (I:faktor Madolllla), the local term for Western values, 
and returning them to the 'authentic' Islamic traditions of the Acehnese. 
The uneasy and complex circumstances that prevailed in Aceh during 
my fieldwork placed me in a di lemma. On the one hand, I was enthusiastic to 
thoroughly pursue my research. On the other hand, I faced practical questions 
of whether I should change the research topic or area due to fear of the 
possibility of being trapped within the 'political' troubles in a manner that 
might also compromise my research subjects. Luckily, my local contacts in 
Aceh, whom J had met on my official trips to the region during my 
assignment with UNFPA, kept on encouraging me and succeeded in 
convincing me that the research result would, in some way, contribute 
positively to the future of the region. 
Looking at other scholars' experiences of working in violent conflict 
areas, such as Siapno (2002), I understand that this dilemma is a not-so-new 
phenomenon. Such violent situations limit the range and intensity of research 
practice, as well as hindering the researcher' s physical movements. However, 
it does not mean that research cannot be conducted. In fact, much valuable 
12 According to the Qur' an, Moslem women were indeed required to be modest, but it is a 
very personal choice for a woman to opt for a strict Moslem dress code. Entrenched in this 
choice is a moral commitment of a Moslem woman to adopt the Is lamic way of life. 
23 Madonna is a well known pop singer from the United States whose song lyrics and dances 
are perceived as antithecal to Islamic values. See Chapter 3, Section 2.2. for further details on 
the ' Madonna factor. ' 
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information can be obtained from such limiting circumstances, especially with 
regards to the nature and characteristics of the conflict, and how people 
strategise to cope with the milieu of violent political conflict. Research in 
violent conflict areas challenges a researcher to possess sound research skills 
and capabilities, and to employ appropriate strategies that are sensitive in 
regards to the time, place, and categories of research subjects, as well as 
foregrounding pressing ethical concerns related to the vulnerability of 
research subjects. My research approaches and strategies developed in 
response to these challenges consider four significant related issues. These are 
gender, the nature of the conflict, political colour and affiliation, and the 
practical implications of the research results. The situation, however, has 
allowed me to learn and personally adopt the local coping strategies expressed 
in the phrases 'Push the boat when the tide is high' (Ac.: Tulak Jalo watee ie 
paseung) (Siapno, 2002, p.18), that is waiting for the right time to make the 
right move; and 'playing beautifully' (I: bermain cantik), keeping a 'safe 
distance' from both conflicting parties through avoiding too much contact and 
affi liation with one another of the conflicting parties to maintain neutrality.24 
As I further elaborate in Chapter 5 and 6, these two local strategies were quite 
apparent among my research subjects, especially those from the hot spots. 
4.2 Practical Concerns: Method and Strategies 
One of the major obstacles that I had to face in conducting my 
research in Aceh was my fear of getting into trouble and, more importantly, 
the impact of this on my research subjects. I was always reminded of the case 
of the Australian scholar who was caught by the local government for 
conducting research in Aceh without a proper visa in September 2002. The 
consequences of this incident did not stop with the depo11ation of the foreign 
scholar, but continued with the 'displacement' of the local translators who 
were forced to flee in the initial phase of martial law. The consequences were 
thus more severe for the local translators than for the foreign scholar. 
24 See chapter 2 for deta ils on these two local coping strategies. 
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In the context of the violent political conflict in Aceh, which involved 
the two opposing sides of the government and the GAM, locating myself as a 
researcher was indeed a significant challenge. ' Playing beautifully' sometimes 
became problematic, especially when I was asked direct questions, such as 
how I perceived the Acehnese. Are they rebellious and subversive? What do I 
think about the future of Aceh? These questions required careful answers, as 
otherwise they might be wrongly interpreted. It was relatively easy to answer 
when I had enough background information about the person, but it got harder 
when those questions were unexpectedly raised in the middle of an interview 
with my research subjects or in the context of a simple social conversation 
with villagers. 
Discussions on day-to-day economic livelihood could not be simply 
detached from the issue of violent political conflict. Consequently, isolating 
research in the neutral zone of economic and culture was not easy. The issue 
of conflict would always come up, and careful consideration and response to 
this issue was always required. I needed to always concentrate on keeping the 
conversations focused on the household economic situation. This was more 
difficult than simply avoiding too much contact and affiliation with one of the 
conflicting parties. 
In my approach, I adopted Mahmood ' s (1996 cited in Rodgers, 2002) 
argument on the importance of understanding the full complexities of 
violence, in which the purpose, all sides and dimensions of the violent 
practices, and their overall impact on the affected society are examined. To 
achieve this, I adopted a historical approach in order to situate household 
coping strategies, with particular attention on the role of women, within the 
wider context of violent political conflict and its overall multifaceted 
dimensions that framed households in terms of developing and exercising 
coping strategies. The historical approach embraces the personal and the 
broader regional history of the society and the violent political conflict in 
Aceh. 
Given that the Aceh conflict was (and is still) considered to be a 
sensitive issue, at the personal and household level, I used the historical 
approach to the extent that it was possible, in the sense of security and 
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convenience, for research subjects to share their personal history. Some 
research subjects, indeed, willingly shared their personal history, while others 
declined to speak about themselves and their history beyond their cuiTent 
situations. I respected their decisions on the matter. 
An historical approach, especially the personal history, required a 
' verstehen' or interpretative understanding that relied on intimacy with the 
research subjects. For this purpose, pa1ticipant observation, an intimate 
familiarity of research subjects through intensive involvement with them in 
their environment, has been identified as the best strategy (Rogers, 2002). 
Therefore, this method was also employed here. It was well understood, 
however, that in the context of Aceh, the method was problematical for both 
myself and the research subjects. Anyone could be seen as being affiliated 
with a certain conflicting party and become the target of violence. I thus faced 
a difficult situation. On the one hand, I was well aware of the importance of 
avoiding a one-sided study. On the other hand, interviewing the survivors of a 
military operation, who often were perceived as partisans, could have caused 
me to be seen as 'affiliated' with GAM. This would, in tum, have resulted in 
limited mobility in the region and might have led to my other research 
subjects, who were perceived as neutral , also falling under suspicion of 
partisanship. 
In order to limit the possibility of these consequences occurring. the 
method was modified to 'limited participatory-observation'. ' Limited' here 
means the research was not conducted with my full participation in the daily 
lives of my research subjects but only in selected activities which were 
determined by taking into consideration the security situation, type of 
activities, areas or regions where the activities took place, and the identity of 
the participants involved in the activities. These various aspects were always 
considered in discussion with my local contacts. 
Besides direct observation, I also conducted a survey of households in 
several conflict and conflict affected regions of the province using the 'snow 
ball' sampling method. This sampling began with information from friends at 
local NGOs about their local women's groups and which members were 
approachable for the research, and then continued with information from these 
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local women. The 'snow ball' method seemed the most appropriate method 
for accessing women from the 'hot spot' areas. Using this method, the names 
of persons I previously contacted became a 'verbal recommendation' for 
others whom I contacted afterwards, and provided as a 'security guarantee' 
that I was trustworthy. Thi1ty-two households were surveyed, some of which 
were approached further for in-depth interviews and limited participatory 
observation. In addition, three formal Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)25 
were conducted with women from conflict and conflict affected areas. I al so 
interviewed relevant key informants, for example government officers, formal 
and informal leaders at province, district, village and gamp6ng (Ac.), part of 
village, levels, UN staff at Jakarta and Banda Aceh office, as well as local and 
international NGO workers. In addition to these techniques, I also took part in 
informal conversations26 that occurred in and around the village where I 
stayed, at shops, markets, eating places, government offices, university 
campuses, and on publ ic transpo1t. 
Additional data were also collected from scholarly literature and other 
secondary data sources. The literature study was particularly important for the 
historical approach of the research project in order to understand how the 
Aceh violent political conflict had evolved, how it affected women and their 
households (especially in terms of the household's structure and composition), 
and how household coping strategies were exercised and developed into more 
systematic coping strategies. 
Analysis and presentation of the research results also requires care. It 
is necessary to carefully look at how to present the research findings without 
doing harm to the research subjects and key informants. As maintained by 
25 A formal FGD can be defined as "A research technique that col lects data through group 
interaction on a top ic determined by the researcher." (Morgan, 2002, p. 141 ). lt is typified by a 
pre-set time and place; a small group of8-I 0 participants led by a moderator; formal 
structure, content and process; a defined subject, content, and process; in-depth discussion 
summarized at the end to invite participants to confirm or modify (Khan and Manderson, 
1992). This is different from Informal FGD characterized by an opportunistic discussion, 
varied number of participants, participants define the topic of discussion, possibility for 
including other activities, no fi xed time period, consensus at the end of discussion (Khan and 
Manderson, 1992). 
26 According to Khan and Manderson ( 1992, p.59) " ... conversations occur whenever a 
researcher is in the fie ld ; she or he walks around the vi llage, greets, stops, and chats to those 
who live there. On the move, it is possible to maintain sing le casual conversations and 
informal interviews, but settled on a house step or on a mat, this is less likely ... " 
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Robinson (2004, p.379), writing is " ... part of the ethical responsibility of the 
(ethnographic) writer, including principled responsibilities of authors to the 
people whose own understandings are contained in the account". Writing is, 
therefore, another post fieldwork problematic situation to deal with. Some 
people from whom I sought advice admitted that it is indeed a tricky situation 
to write results ofresearch undertaken in an area that involves violent conflict 
between the state and rebel groups. It is especially true when the conflict has 
been played out for a long period of time such as in the case of Aceh. Not 
revealing names, for example, will not guarantee the security of research 
subjects if locations and other information are not properly disguised. The 
challenge, then, is how to properly address all the issues without giving away 
any inforn1ation that may put people at risk. 
5 Organisation of the Thesis 
My thesis is divided into seven chapters, including this introductory 
chapter. Chapter 2 portrays the research process, elaborating on the 
methodological issues of conducting research in the context of the Islamic, 
violent political conflict, and etlmo-nationalism construction of the Acehnese. 
Chapter 3 outlines the debates and issues around the theoretical 
framework used in this thesis, in which I examine what I term the ' triangular 
ignorance ' and the 'triangular contextual analyses' in my study. The 
' triangular ignorance' refers to the lack of recognition of the important issue 
of women as 'active survivors' in conflict studies, women's studies, and 
development studies. The ' triangular contextual analyses' applies to the 
stressors, actions, and expectations that frame women in developing and 
exercising their coping strategies. 
Chapter 4 provides the societal context of the research tlu·ough 
describing the region, its society, culture, social-demography, and economic 
characteristics. This chapter grounds the analysis in a historical narrative of 
the Acehenese, and gives consideration to gender relations. The historical 
account is employed by considering the earlier era of the Acehnese Sultanate 
as the starting point of analysis. This is based on the fact that the golden 
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history of the Sultanate has often been used as a point ofreference for 
Acehnese pride, in particular by GAM, as the basis of not only independence 
but a lso of Acehnese identity. The socio-demographic characteristics and the 
economy of Aceh are included to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
the society. 
Chapter 5 explores the history of Aceh violent political conflict: its 
nature, causes, and consequences at the regional (province) level, with 
particular attention to the people's livelihoods. Together with chapter four, 
which has explored ethnographic and Islamic contexts of the Acehnese 
society, chapter five provides the context in which the contemporary coping 
strategies of women and their households' livelihoods can be situated. The 
historical accounts are looked at from the point of view of economics, politics, 
and anthropology. In chapter five I argue that the longstanding hi story of the 
Aceh violent political conflict has provided a 'cultural template' of violence 
for generations (Juris, 2005, p.415). Together with the existing trauma, the 
'cultural template' may have fostered and regenerated the conflict. l argue 
further that there are three important consequences of the prolonged conflict 
that have, on the whole, been overlooked by scholarly works on Aceh: the 
'extended-regenerated collective trauma,' the awkward 'sandwiched position' 
of Acehnese civilians between conflicting parties, and the deprivation of the 
local economy, known locally as penghancuran ekonomi local (I). 27 
Chapter 6 provides the main findings concerning the coping strategies 
women employ to deal with the difficulties of maintaining their household 
livelihood and other day-to-day problems brought about by the violent 
political conflict situation. It further exemplifies the impact of the conflict on 
household impoverishment; examines the social assets or capitals which were 
avai lable, and choices made by women in using or abandoning these assets for 
27 This is the jargon used by local NGO activists to describe the devastating effect of the 
confl ict on local livel ihoods. However, I found the usage of 'penghancuran' in explaining the 
s ituation is rather too strong. Embedded in the term is the notion of total destruction. The 
military actions of both GAM fighters and the Indonesian military aimed at or resulted in the 
hinderance of civilians in performing their livelihood activ ities rather than a tota l destruction 
of the ir household economies. For this reason, I have chosen to render this term as 
'deprivation' - wh ich better illustrates the loss, dispossession, removal, destitution, hardsh ip, 
and stress, experienced by Acehnese households - to bridge the gap between the jargon and 
the factua l si tuation. I thank Silvia, my local contact, who suggested the term to me. 
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their household coping strategies; and depicts the ' conflict poverty 
entrapment' of households, in other word, the poverty trap resulting from the 
conflict. A case study ofNur' s family, who escaped from the conflict in their 
vi I !age of origin only to be trapped within another f01m of poverty in the slum 
area of Banda Aceh, is presented to further illustrate the impact of conflict at 
the household level. 
Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the research findings, and discusses 
the research implications, both theoretically and empirically. Based on this, I 
highlight some recommendations for future research and development 
intervention in situations of violent political conflict. 
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Chapter 2 Amid Martial Law, Shari'a Law, and 
Ethnic Identity Antagonism 
This chapter describes the conduct of the research in the three milieus 
of violent political conflict, Islamic society, and ethnic-identity construction. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section describes the main 
and contingency plans developed for the research considering the violent 
political conflict in the region. The second section demonstrates the overall 
stages, processes, problems and challenges of conducting research w ith people 
from a region stigmatised as a ' rebelling province.' The third section portrays 
the results of my precarious field work journeys in the region, in which the 
influence of the three aforementioned milieus are presented. The fowth 
section illustrates some conclusions on several pertinent issues of conducting 
research in the melange of three important milieus of Islamic, violent political 
conflict, and ethnic identity construction. 
1 Research In an Area of Violent Political Conflict 
When I commenced my PhD project in 2002, and conducted a pre-
field work trip from January to April 2003, in both Jakarta and Aceh, 1 Aceh 
was unstable. However, the situation for the people had gradually improved in 
the sense that the world donor community had started to pay serious attention 
to the region and its problems. The international community was al so able to 
compel the Indonesian government to take a more peaceful and non-military 
approach to the region. Results of this international attention were evidenced 
by the efforts of both the people and government to reach a more peaceful 
resolution such as the All Acehnese Women Conference (Ac.: Duek Pakat 
1 I did my pre-field work through working as an in tern with the Save the Chi ldren US in the 
Banda Aceh office and UNDP Jakarta office. 
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Inong Aceh)2 from 20 to 22 February 2000 and the Humanitarian Pause 
agreed to by the Wahid3 government. In December 2002, several donors made 
a joint effort to have both the central government and GAM freedom fighters 
conduct peace talks. Facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HOC), a Swiss-
based NGO, both parties finally signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 
(CoHA) on 6 December 2002 (Huber, 2004).4 The agreement caused the 
people who had suffered during the long conflict to hope that a solution was 
in sight. 
Given these circumstances, in addition to the plan of directly going to 
the region to conduct the research, I designed a contingency plan. This plan 
contained three scenarios, based on observations and consultations with local 
contacts during my pre-field work visit and long distance observation and 
personal communication with contacts after the pre-field work trip, from May 
to July 2003. 
The first scenario was based on the assumption that although the 
CoHA period was unstable, it showed the willingness of both conflicting 
parties to have peace talks towards ending the conflict. Nevertheless, it was 
well understood that armed conflict was still evident, especially in the 'hot 
spot' areas. In this scenario, the research would be mainly conducted in the 
municipality of Banda Aceh and District of Aceh Besar. 
The second scenario was based on five linked events. First, the CoHA 
would be broken. Second, both conflicting parties would refuse to have peace 
talks to end the conflict. Third, tensions and armed clashes would increase in 
the 'hot spot' areas, such as East Aceh, Central Aceh and North Aceh. Fourth, 
2 This Congress, initiated from a meeting held by approximately 200 women of 68 
organisations in Aceh to commemorate Mother' s Day (Hari !bu) in December 1999, is 
monumental for three reasons. Firstly, it was the first occasion that Acehnese women could 
independently share their concerns on the conflict in the public sphere. Secondly, it was an 
inclusive and democratic congress indicated from the diversity of its participants. Thirdly, it 
was successfully conducted despite some threats and an a llegation that the Congress was 
merely a political tool of the central government to undermine the Acehnese demand to 
determine their own future. Bianpoen (2000) notes that the organizers were intimidated by 
both conflicting parties to deliver an outcome that was favorable to them. The congress, 
despite the threats, interestingly came out with justice and peace restoration as their main 
concern for the future of Aceh. 
3 Abdurahman Wahid (commonly known ' Gus Dur' ) is the second president of Indonesia in 
the post-Suharto era, succeeding Habibie, came into power following the fall of Su harto in 
May 1998 (Reid, 2006, p.350). See Chapter 5, Section 1.3.4. for details. 
4 See Chapter 4, Section 2. 1. for details 
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the Indonesian military would implement a limited martial law that would 
apply for certain regions only, especially for the ' hot spot' areas. Fifth, any 
activities would need security clearance from the Indonesian military 
headquarters. In this situation, the research would only focus on the 
municipality of Banda Aceh with a security clearance from the Indonesian 
military headquarters in Jakarta. 
The third 'worst-case ' scenario assumed that there were severe 
tensions and armed conflicts in the overall region of the NAO province, which 
would lead to heavy and very tight control and no permission for any 
activities except those that fell within the ma1tial law. If such a scenario 
occurred, the research would be conducted in Jakarta among Acehnese who 
had relocated to Jakarta due to the conflict. 
As the situation deteriorated in the fourth and fifth month of its 
implementation, the Co HA was finally ended with the declaration of martial 
law on 18 May 2003 (Annex 2). During that time, I was waiting for the result 
of my application to the Australian National University' s Human Research 
Ethics Committee for approval for my research proposal and aimed to leave 
Australia as scheduled on 1 July 2003 . 
The worsening situation made me Jose faith as I thought I would not 
able to get the ethics clearance. One did not need to be a political or military 
specialist to know that my chance of going to the region was very slim, almost 
impossible. It appeared that the Indonesian military was likely to implement 
tight security checks in order to identify and isolate GAM fighters from the 
populace. The Indonesian military, at that time, had lost track of most of the 
freedom fighters for two main reasons. Firstly, in the euphoria of reformation 
in the whole country, the people enjoyed the freedom they had not enjoyed 
during the Suharto period, e.g. the freedom to speak and stand up for civil 
rights. Secondly, following the euphoria, President Wahid's promise that the 
people of Aceh could determine their own future was understood by the 
people, taking the East Timor case as a precedent, to mean/imply that a 
referendum would be held. During this time of euphoria, the Indonesian 
military had limited movement due to the strong call from the civil society to 
'get back to barracks' (I: kembali ke barak), so many GAM fighters were able 
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to simply merge with the civil society with new identities and could not be 
easily traced. 
The implementation of martial law in May 2003 raised further 
question about the feasibility of my research. As tensions in the region 
intensified, so did the fears and suspicions of my research subjects. In 
addition, my Javanese ethnic background was a key factor to consider. 
Through 'categorical thinking' my research subjects perceived me as a 
Javanese, an outsider and an associate of the central government. While the 
ethnic categorisation might not be as severe as in other armed conflict 
situations such as in Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi (Malkki, 1995), with 
the re-implementation of the military approach to the region, I understood that 
such sentiment might intensify and limit my research activities. 
However, contrary to my expectations, on 21 May 2003, a few days 
after the announcement of the implementation of martial law by the 
Indonesian government, I received clearance from the ANU Human Research 
Ethics Committee. Prior to the conduct of the research in Aceh, l then dec ided 
to spend approximately two to three weeks observing the situation from 
Jakarta. This observation period turned out to be valuable as it gave me a 
clearer picture of the situation and helped me to determine what to do next as 
explained further in the following section. 
2 From the 'Wait and See' To the 'Losing of Faith' Periods 
In the conduct of the research, I went through four different stages that 
illustrate the dynamics of the research and also the development of the 
conflict in the region. This section details these four stages: the 'wait and see' 
period, the adoption of the third contingency plan, the 'losing faith' period, 
and the return to the original plan. 
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2.1 'Tulak Jalo Watee le Paseung': Waiting For the Right 
Tide To Launch the Boat (July To August 2003) 
'Tulakjalo watee ie paseung' (Ac.) is an old Acehnese proverb, 
which Siapno (2002, p.18) translates to as 'Push the boat when the tide is 
high. ' I first heard it from my local contact in Aceh when s/he described how 
local NGOs conducted their activities in the difficult circumstances of violent 
political conflict in Aceh. S/he argued that given the unpredictable situation 
and the persistent volatility, they often had to simply be quiet and wait for the 
right moment to make a move. It was about silent observation, critical 
analysis, and making the right judgment on the situation, especially about the 
timing. This was analogous to Napoleon Bonaparte's strategy of 'wait and 
see' which well suited my situation at the time. 
The assessment performed during the 'wait and see' period in Jakarta 
was conducted through interviews with several key informants and secondary 
data analysis. My key informants were from the Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences (I: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia-UPI), the key policy 
research institute in Indonesia, colleagues from some universities, as well as 
my contacts from both the Indonesian military and Police Headquarters, some 
non government organisations (NGOs), and my international NGO friends. 
The secondary data was collected from mass media such as newspapers and 
television broadcasts. 
The assessment raised several pertinent issues: firstly, the importance 
of a local or national institutional affiliation demonstrated by an official 
letter.5 The letter would be considered as a legal document to justify my 
presence in Aceh, which was crucial and more important than my national 
identity card (I: Kartu Tanda Penduduk-KTP). This was especially true during 
the implementation of martial law when the authorities were restoring security 
through separating and isolating GAM and its partisans from the rest of the 
5 This followed the general procedure in Indonesia. There was actually no c lear rule on the 
types of documentation required for Indonesians to enter the province in the initial period of 
martia l law. This was different to the case of international workers, where clear policy was 
applied. The central government issued a special document for international workers (mainly 
from the UN agencies and International Development Agencies such as SIDA, AusAID, and 
USAID) which was generally known as a 'blue book'. 
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civil community.6 At this stage, a new identity card was issued for those 
domiciled in the province, and ID checks, better known as 'sweeping7 KTP', 
were often conducted. The new identity card was different from the regular 
one that applied to the rest of the country and was well-known as the 'Red-
White ID' (KTP Merah Putih) for its two colours of red and white, 
representing the National flag, with the picture of an eagle (I: Burung Garuda) 
as the national symbol, and the national ideology (I: Pancasila),8 on the front 
and back pages respectively. The new Acehnese identity card was passport-
sized and signed by three authorities: the head of the sub district (I: camat), 
the military commander at sub district level (Komandan Rayon Militer -
Danramil), and the head of police office at sub district (Komandan Polisi 
Sektor - Kapolsek). 
6 The isolation ofGAM members from the civil society was the second phase of the Security 
Operation conducted by the martial law authority. The Indonesian military acknowledged this 
as the most difficult phase (Kompas, 18 June 2003) 
7 Stevens and Schimdgall-Tellings (2004, p.978) in 'A comprehensive Indonesian-English 
Dictionary' explain that the term derives rrom the English word and translate it as 
' swiping/sweep (by police/groups seeking to oust foreigners, etc.) The word was indeed 
commonly used in Indonesia for any actions or operations conducted by either vigilante 
groups or security forces (such as the Indonesian military and police) to pursue particular 
groups to eliminate them by expulsion or other means (such as killing, putting in custody. 
etc.). The term actually illustrates the thinking that the particular group is not welcomed and 
is considered to be 'dilt' or 'contaminated,' and need not be a llowed to exist in the concerned 
community. It is also used for checks on identity cards and official documentation, such as 
driving licences and vehicle registration. 
8 Pancasila, proclaimed by Sukarno on June I, 1945, denotes the Indonesian five principles of 
national ideology: (I) belief in the one and only God (I: ketuhanan yang Maha Esa); (2) a just 
and civilized humanity (I: kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab), (3) the unity of Indonesia (I: 
Persatuan Indonesia), (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out 
of deliberations among representatives (I: Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat 
kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan perwaki/an); and (5) social justice for the whole of 
the Indonesia people(!: Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia) (Stevens and 
Schmidgall-Tellings, 2004, p.700) 
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Plate 2-1. The Red-White 
ID (KTP Merah Putih) 
(left) and The Ordinary ID 
(KTP Biasa) (above) 
issued by the authority 
from the respective areas 
of The NAD province and 
DKI Jakarta. 
This ID card differed from the normal or regular ID which was white and 
yellow, with no national symbol and no description of ideology, and was only 
signed by head of sub district (I: camat). 
In the 'sweeping KTP', those who had no 'Red-White ID' would have 
to go through another identification process at the closest military post or 
office. Those from out of the region like myself, who happened to travel to 
the region, were therefore required to provide a formal letter from an affiliated 
institution in which the purpose and period of visit was mentioned (I: 'Surat 
Jalan' or 'Surat Dinas'). Being present in, or visiting, the region without 
proper (national) documentation would raise suspicions and would possibly 
lead to trouble with the martial law authority. Being in a region under martial 
law would itself immediately appear suspicious, especially for purposes of 
conducting a research. 
These fears were proved well-founded when I finally was able to visit 
the region in December 2003 to January 2004 and stayed with a friend in 
village A of Aceh Besar District, located on the border of Aceh Besar District 
and Banda Aceh Municipality. Identity and security checks were often 
conducted in front of the house or around the comer of the Banda Aceh -
Medan road, where I stayed. Late one evening, at around 09.30 pm, together 
with a friend who forgot to bring his/her identity card, we were caught in the 
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' sweeping' conducted by the military (the army). The soldier who checked 
and questioned us was quite polite and nice. He was more interested in 
questioning me on why and for how long I was visiting Aceh, than in 
investigating my friend who had not brought his/her ID. But then his 
commander, who looked tired and a bit distressed, started to yell impatiently 
at me while pointing his flash light directly at my face: 
The Army Commander: This again! What a reason. Visiting a friend in 
Aceh ... don ' t you know that this area is under martial law, uh!? 
Don 't you know this area is under martial law!?! / /ni lagi. Ada-
ada saja. Menengok teman di Aceh ... apa tidak /aim ini darurat 
mi/iter, ha'? .. tahu tidak ini darurat militer!?! 
Me: Yes, Sir. /Tahu, Pak. 
The Army Commander: So why have you come to Aceh? .. where is your 
ID? .. where is your ID? .. show it.. where are you from! ? I Lantas 
kenapa datang ke Acelzf? .. mana KTP? .. mana KTP? .. coba kasih 
lihat .. dari mana asalnya'? 
Me (showing my required ident ity card): From Jakarta, Sir I Dari Jakarta, 
Pak. 
The Army Commander: When did you arrive from Jakarta!? I Kapan 
datang dari Jakarta!? 
Me (telling him a lie): Two days ago, Sir I Dua hari yang Latu, Pak. 
The Army Commander: When w ill you leave!? I Kapan pulang'? 
Me (told him a lie again): Tomorrow morning, with Garuda [the 
Indonesian flight) I Besok pagi pak, dengan Garuda. 
The sold ier who first investigated us (speaking to himself in a suspicious 
tone of voice): Only two days in Aceh then you are going back? 
I Hanya dua hari di Aceh terus pulang? 
Me (telling him lies): Well I went to Medan first then came here I Khan 
saya ke Medan dulu baru kemari. 
The Army Commander (glaring at me): Is it true you are leaving 
tomorrow? I Benar besok pulang!? 
Me: Yes, Sir I Ya Pak. 
The Army Commander (a little bit calmer): Where are you coming from 
and where are you going to go? I Dari mana dan mau kemana 
ini tadi? 
Me : From home to the city I Dari rumah mau ke kola. 
The Army Commander (raised his vo ice again): Where and what are you 
going to do in the city at night time? I Kemana dan mau apa ke 
kola malam-malam!? 
Me: Just go ing into town Sir I Ke kola, Pak. 
The Army Commander (impatiently): Yeah , in which part of town? 
.. Where in the city and what do you want to do there!? I Yake 
kola itu di mananya? .. kemana ke kola itu dan mau apa ke 
sana!? 
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Me: To Rex,9 Sir, to have dinner I Ke Rex, Pak, mau makan ma/am. 
The Army Commander (giving me my ID, and sounded like talking to 
himself): Women, hanging out at night time! You may go 
now ... I Perempuan, malam-malam ke/11ar!. Sudah sana ... "' 
This interrogation clearly shows that movement in the region by 
someone not from the region created suspicions. However, a short itinerary 
may lessen any suspicions. The inten-ogation also illustrates how these army 
personnel perceived the morality of women who were supposed to be at home 
at night time, as otherwise they would certainly not be 'good women' (I: 
perempuan baik-baik) but ' naughty women' (I: perempuan nakal) or 'night 
women' (I : perempuan malam). The interrogation, the underlying 
presumption of ' good women' as opposed to 'naughty women', the presence 
of three army trucks, the soldiers in their dirty uniforms and their guns, and 
the flash light pointed on my face, which allowed them to see me but not vice 
versa, created mixed feelings of fear, anxiety, suppression, and annoyance. 
The second issue to consider was that my attachment to an Australian 
university could have led to me being perceived as a ' foreign spy' by both 
conflicting parties, especially the martial law authority. My contacts in the 
Army and Police Headquarters advised me that this affiliation, as shown in the 
'To Whom It May Concern ' letter from the Head of Department in Australia, 
might not be favourable for me. Although I am an Indonesian citizen and 
would not fall under any kind of restrictions in the region at that moment, the 
fact that I was affiliated with an Australian university might have raised some 
'suspicions' from the authorities. Both of my contacts refe1Ted to the case of 
an Australian scholar who came to the region without a proper visa and met 
with GAM fighters. She, with her two local contacts, was caught in one of the 
sweepings and was later held in custody on two serious charges of misusing 
her visa and having a link with GAM fighters. My key informant from the 
police head quruiers suggested that I become attached to a national or, 
preferably, a local university, such as the State University of Syiah Kuala 
9 Rex is the local term for the dining stalls area in Aceh where people usually go to dine or 
simply to get together for some light meal s or drinks. It is located at the centre of the city and 
was one of the favourite ' hang-out' places for the locals. 
10 This ' interrogation ' was not recorded, but 1 wrote it down immediately after we reached 
Rex. 
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located in Banda Aceh. This would be beneficial as the locals would know 
how, when, and where I would be able to do my research activities. This is 
because the conflict situation in Aceh was unique, and only the Acehnese, or 
at least people who had lived in the region for some period of time, would 
know the best strategy for performing any activities. I was basically advised to 
wait until the situation calmed down a little, which was anticipated to happen 
in November or December 2003, when it would be safer for me as a Javanese 
to move around the region. 
The third issue that arose from this initial assessment was the 
discrepancy between the formal 'policies and regulations' and the ' actual 
situation. ' On paper, there was no law restricting research activities or 
people's mobility in the region at that time. However, for the first 3-4 months 
of the implementation of martial law, anyone from outside who wanted to 
enter the region needed to seek permission from the office of The 
Coordinating Ministry of Social, Political, and Security Affairs (Menteri 
Koordinator Sosial Politik dan Keamanan - Menkosospolkam) in Jakarta. 
Given the fact that I was not attached to any local or national institution or 
university, most of my contacts advised me to stay in Jakarta for a while and 
wait until the situation improved. Several operations had been planned by the 
martial law authority, and if things went as intended, by November or 
December 2003 the situation was expected to improve. By that time, it would 
be easier for me to move around the province and visit local institutions in 
order to negotiate my affiliation for the conduct of my research. 
The fourth issue was the feasibility of working under a situation of 
martial law. Most of the people in Jakarta I talked to, my key informants and 
friends, responded to an explanation of my research interests with, 'It is 
fascinating but would that be feasible?' The main reason for this statement 
was the ' security issue'. Most of them questioned the worth of putting my life 
at risk for the purpose of an 'academic exercise' like research. The Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (I: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia - LIPI), for 
example, had advised its researchers not to do research in the three conflict 
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areas of Maluku, Central Sulawesi, and Aceh. 11 Should conflict studies be 
my area of concern, they strongly suggested that I do my research in Maluku, 
which was considered far less risky than Aceh. 
2.2 From the Third Contingency Plan Back To 'Wait and 
See' (September- October 2003) 
Based on my assessment on the situation, and the suggestion of my 
supervisor, I decided to focus on the third contingency plan: to conduct 
research on the Acehnese who had relocated to Jakarta due to the conflict in 
Aceh. A number of them had moved to Jakarta since the conflict, especially 
in the early 1970s and late l 990s.12 Unfortunately, in interviews with 
Acehnese in Jakarta, I had to face the deep suspicions of the male members of 
the families. Their suspicions were clearly evident from their body language 
and questions directed towards me. 
These suspicions were based on their fear that my research had 
something to do with the cun-ent political situation of the region. The very 
first question that usually emerged was "does it have something to do with 
politics?"/"Jni ada hubungannya dengan politik tidak? " or "There is no 
political interest, right?"l"Tidak untuk kepentingan politik khan?." Even 
when I had already told them that my research had nothing to do with politics, 
but was purely about household economics, they still showed their reluctance 
by not answering my requests for their families to be my research subjects. I 
think this is understandable considering the fact that my research was taking 
place at the very initial stage of martial law. It was, therefore, logical for them 
to be extra cautious. 
Male dominance was another problem that I faced. Women usually 
turned to male family members, such as husbands or brothers, to answer my 
question. A woman that I met in the western part of Jakarta politely refused to 
11 At the time, no formal letter to this effect had been issued by LIPI. The decision was made 
at a LIPI staff meeting. 
12 Unfortunately there were no statistics available on the exact number, but they can be 
classified into two main groups, i.e. the 1970s and 1990s groups. The 1970s group were those 
who resided in Jakarta due to the DI/Tit/Nil conflict (see Chapter 4 for details); the 1990s 
group were those who fled to Jakarta due to the GAM conflict. 
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be my research subject by asking me to talk to her brother instead, even 
though I had clearly explained that my research was about Acehnese women 
and not men. The men, who usually came forward to show that they were 
protecting their women, talked to me warily. It was clear that the husband' s or 
male family members' consent was essential ifl wanted to approach the 
women. Even when I was able to obtain the male's approval, I was not able to 
satisfactorily obtain the information that I needed as women tended to speak 
with me hesitatingly. 
Although it was quite disappointing for me, I understood and did not 
feel offended by the situation. To me, it was understandable given the fact that 
I was simply a stranger that had arrived from ' nowhere' and was attempting to 
enter their 'social circle'. This implies an attempt to become fami liar without 
being kin or acquaintance and without sharing any basis for a relationship. 
For them, I could be 'anyone' that could put them in danger. l could be a 
military spy (Ac.: cuak) 13 or worse than this, a military soldier (Ac.: si pai). 14 
The fear and suspicion that I thought would not be so apparent in Jakarta, was 
greater and more evident than in Aceh. Similarly, the male dominance that I 
faced in Jakarta was, interestingly, not so evident in Aceh. 
Their reaction may have been due to several factors, namely the 
trauma of previous military operations, the need to protect their fam ilies, and 
the internalised distrust and suspicions. The implementation of martial law in 
Aceh caused these displaced persons to be extra cautious in relating with 
others, especially with Javanese. At the time, there was also an influx of 
people from Aceh to Jakarta whom I tenned 'political internally displaced 
persons'. These were political and human rights activists who were targeted or 
13 This is the local term for a spy of the Indonesian mi litary. For the Acehnese th is tenn used 
to carry strong cultural implications. An Acehnese who is considered cuak would not be well 
accepted by society and, worse than this, would not be considered as a non Acehnese. 
14 This is the local slang for sold ier ( I: tentara), which was usually used by the pro-
independence movement to call the Indonesian military soldiers. The term carries strong 
hatred against the Indonesian military, especially the Army. There was no firm explanation 
on the meaning and origin of' Si Pai '. The word may referred to 'pai', the lowest rank of 
soldier in sultanate era (Zainuddin, 1961 ). Some Acehnese, however, believed that it is the 
abbreviation of Anti Islam Soldiers (I: Pasukan Anti Islam - PAI), the label used to refer to 
the Indonesian Armed Forces sent to Aceh during the Dl/Tll/N ll clash (Saleh, 1992). The 
term, with the ' attitude' impl ied in it, is socialized and culti vated not only in the adult 
population but also the children. See Chapter 4, Section 2.2. 1 
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believed they would be targeted in the operation due to their activities. The 
mass media coverage of the initial phase of the implementation of martial law 
and the comprehensive operation in Aceh, in which the military played a 
major part, may have given these political IDPs the impression of the serious 
stance of the Indonesian government and have contributed to their fear. 15 
Apart from the fear, they also suffered from 'stigmatization' in their 
surroundings. They carried the stigma of coming from a part of the country 
seen to be in a state of rebellion. I met a Minang family from West Sumatra 
who happened to be the neighbours of a group of Acehnese who were living 
in Jakarta due to the conflict. When we sat down together one evening, they 
started to make a joke about the Acehnese being GAM members and fighting 
for freedom. This san1e joking stereotype emerged amongst the Javanese who 
I met during my flight to Banda Aceh in December 2003. These jokes not 
only illustrated the stereotyping and stigmatisation of a rebelling ethnic group, 
but also signified the presumption that the 'rebels' lacked a sense of 
nationalism, that is a sense of belonging and togetherness as Indonesian 
citizens. The nervousness the Acehnese showed towards me mirrored the 
nervousness other Indonesians felt towards them. 
From that experience, I learnt several valuable lessons. First, 'timing ' 
is important. My timing was obviously not right. Interviewing or even 
approaching the people at the ' hot time' of the very initial stage of the 
implementation of martial law was not a wise move. Second, internal contacts 
are vital. Having a contact and being recommended by someone from their 
inner circle is essential for gaining access. Contacts facilitate the 
establishment of a more relaxed and trustworthy relationship and helped 
overcome the idea that I was 'unknown' and 'suspicious', and therefore an 
' unwelcome' outsider. 
15 Some of these activists said that they had been informed by internal contacts in the 
Indonesian military and police that their names were in the military and police list. Some 
others did not receive any information on whether or not they were on the list but believed 
that they would be targeted because of their history of activities. Two local activists who 
opted to stay in the province during the martial law period labelled those who were not I isted 
but decided to flee as suffering from 'activist paranoia' or being paranoid for being an 
activist. 
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The aforementioned situations frustrated and upset me; especially 
knowing that time was slipping by. I then decided to go back to the 'wait and 
see' strategy, with some hopes of being able to go to the region itself. I 
focused on collecting secondary data from any possible sources such as UPI, 
UN agencies, and NGO friends. I attended an UN-NGO-INGO coordination 
meeting on Aceh, and collected clippings of the news and articles from 
national and local newspapers. There were several national newspapers in the 
country, and I choose the Jakarta metropolitan daily, Kompas, which is well-
known and considered to be a relatively reliable source of news. On its fifth 
and sixth page, for several months Kompas dedicated a special section to the 
issue of Aceh. I also chose Serambi, the only Acehnese newspaper accessible 
to me in Jakarta. 
2.3 Losing Faith: Diverting My Research Interests 
(November - Third week of December 2003) 
As time passed, the frustration did not disappear but instead increased. 
This Jed me to look at two other conflict areas, Poso, in central Sulawesi and 
the Maluku islands. Both areas were interesting and, although the nature of 
conflict was different, 16 these two areas still fitted with my research 
framework of conflict and household coping strategies. I also managed to 
establish some contacts in both regions. I was seriously thinking of changing 
my research area from Aceh to either Poso or Maluku. I spent almost one 
month learning about the conflicts and their development in both areas, 
always bearing in mind the concept of 'coping strategies'. 
Compared to Maluku, Poso seemed to be more interesting as the 
conflict was re-emerging during that time. Maluku, on the contrary, had 
steadily developed into a more conducive situation. Poso appeared to better fit 
my research interests on the 'coping strategies of women within conflict 
situations' . I decided to change my research area from Aceh to Poso, and 
16 Both areas suffered from re lig ious based socia l unrest which differs from the vio lent 
polit ical conflict in Aceh. Neverthe less, this research proved useful in analys ing my results 
from Aceh. 
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started to write a position paper that explained my overall arguments for my 
supervisory panel. 
However, while I was writing, something inside kept on telling me 
strongly that I would be better to focus on Aceh, as I would eventually be able 
to go to the region. The echo of my inner voice was so strong that I decided to 
go back to my original research area. 
2.4 Returning to the Original Research Topic (Fourth Week 
of December 2003 to August 2004) 
The decision turned out to be wise. In the second week of December I 
was informed by my local contact that the situation was conducive to my 
going to Aceh. I was told that the Indonesian military and police security 
checks were still tight, especially for visitors from outside the region, but it 
was much less stringent than before. My NGO friends, whom I met on my 
official trips to the region during my assignment with UNFP A, came up with 
the excellent suggestion that I use the excuse of visiting family and friends, 
and no one would be suspicious of this as it was a holiday period. 
I immediately booked my ticket to Banda Aceh and contacted friends 
in the region, especially requesting them to find a place to stay for me. 
Booking a ticket to Banda Aceh was not an easy task as it was the time when 
the intense negotiations on the release of Ferry Santoro and Elsa Siregar, two 
Indonesian Journalists who were kept by GAM as hostages, was taking place. 
The flights to Banda Aceh were usually full with negotiators from Jakarta. I 
was finally able to get a flight to Banda Aceh in the fourth week of December 
2003. 
I had visited Aceh a couple of times before beginning research and had 
previously stayed there for periods of 1 week to 3 months. These visits were 
conducted during my previous assignment with UNFP A in 2002 and during 
my pre-field work in the early 2003. Given this experience, I did not feel 
uncomfortable flying alone to the region. I knew that a friend who worked for 
a local NGO in Banda Aceh would pick me up at the airport and that further 
increased my confidence for the visit. 
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3 The Precarious Excursion 
During my one year research period, I visited Aceh four times, with 
visits ranging from periods of two weeks to 1.5 months. Dming these visits, I 
frequently travelled, especially from Banda Aceh to Aceh Besar. On one 
occasion, I also travelled further to North and West Aceh. Travelling in Aceh 
during martial law was a true challenge requiring constant attention to the 
security situation. On each visit, the security situation improved. In 
conjunction with martial law, Shari'a law was also implemented. As further 
described in Chapter 5, the adoption of Shari 'a Law was actually part of the 
politics of the central government to dampen down the Acehnese demand for 
independence. This section illustrates the conduct of the research in both the 
Islamic and conflict contexts. 
3.1 Snapshots of the Region: From Martial Law to Civil 
Emergency 
During my field visits, I learned that secmity was the main issue: I 
always needed to be alert, and make the right decisions at the right time. I 
once tried to go to Tapaktuan (South Aceh District), for example, but decided 
to stop at Meulaboh for security reasons. During this trip I observed several 
alam1ing signals: the fact that there were only four passengers, 17 myself, a 
friend who was on a return trip to Medan, and a mother and her son (of 8 or 9 
years), who were picked up from their house and seemed very familiar with 
the driver; the driver did not pick up passengers who hailed the car along the 
way, 18 the usual way of catching these pub I ic vehicles; the driver refused to 
speak in Bahasa Indonesia19 and always used his co-driver as translator. He 
also stopped more than the usual practice, as if he was trying to lengthen the 
trip. 
17 According to the co-driver, the car usually carried around I 0 passengers. 
18 In responding to my question on why the driver refused to take more passengers, the co-
d river answered that he did not know as it was the decision of the driver and not his. 
19 He actually could speak Bahasa Indonesia because I once asked him directly in Bahasa 
Indonesia about the name of the place where we had a second stop and he could understand. 
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It was apparent that the driver purposively limited the number of 
passengers to avoid being stopped at the army ' s and police' s security check 
points which were established every 300 to 500 meters along the main road 
from Banda Aceh to Medan. Approaching these check points, the driver 
usually slowed down to allow the army or police officers to see that there 
were only three women, one boy, and two men (including the driver) in the 
car. While other cars were stopped at some of these check points, we passed 
through without being stopped. These signs caused me to cancel my trip to 
Tapaktuan since I did not feel comfortable with the situation. I estimated that 
when we approached Tapaktuan, it would be around 7pm. At around this time, 
we would pass through some forests and mangroves areas, where kidnappings 
often took place. Judging from the driver's behaviour and the estimated time 
we would enter the forests and mangroves areas, I considered the trip too 
risky to continue. 
Each time I visited Aceh, however, it was apparent that the security 
situations were becoming less and less stringent. Arriving on Monday 
morning, 17 May 2004, on my second visit to the region during the period of 
martial law, I observed that there was a less tight security check at the airport 
than on my previous visit in December 2003. This was evidenced by the 
decreased numbers of security personnel at the airport. On the way out, 
however, there was still an army post, and as usual, we had to open the 
window screen and smile or wave at the young army troops in the post. But 
unlike my previous trip, they looked much more relaxed and did not stop us. 
According to the friend who met me at the airport, his/her brother was once 
stopped and ordered to get out of the car for not opening the window screen. 
He was then ordered to read the sign in front of the post which stated that any 
cars passing through the gate had to have their window screen opened. The 
airport was located in the Aceh Besar District and the road to the airport used 
to be considered unsafe, especially during 200011. According to the UN 
security management, the road to the airport was under security phase III at 
that moment, while the District itself was under security phase IV.20 Both 
20 Interview with a UN officer in Banda Aceh in April 2002. 
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security phases require restricted movements and a security clearance from the 
UN designated official in Jakai1a. The highest security phase is V, indicating 
the most unsafe situation with a UN presence is not allowed, and travel 
requires a security clearance from UN Headquarters.21 
The immediate impression was that the atmosphere of conflict had 
decreased since my last visit in December 2003. People carried out their 
activities as if under normal circumstances. We passed through a local market 
where people were trading as if there was no armed conflict in the region. It 
was as busy, jostling and noisy as other markets in Indonesia. In the city, the 
situation looked ' normal ' , with people out on the streets and going about their 
daily lives. 
Everyday activities were taking place. Youths were hanging around in 
the city, and the public offices, schools, hospitals, shops and markets were 
running on no1mal working hours like in many other parts of Indonesia. 
Public transport, including motorised rickshaws (I: becak motor), city public 
transport (Ac.: labe-labe), even inter city buses which operated at night time 
were running on normal timetables. The small burger stalls, which had 
mushroomed especially during CoHA period (16 December 2002 to 19 May 
2 1 The primary responsibility for the security and protection of UN staff, their dependant 
families, and properties as well as property of the Organization actually rests with the host 
government, but for various reasons the host government has not always been able to assume 
this responsibility (UN 2003 , p.135). Responding to the increased number of casualties of UN 
personnel in the early 1990s, on 9 December 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Convention on the Safety of Un ited Nations and Associated Personnel 
(http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r059.htm accessed on 6/07/2006). There are five 
security phases outlined in the UN Field Security Handbook which are standards for all UN 
duty stat ions and must be included in their security plan (Peace Keeping Best Practices Unit, 
2003; the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of the United Nations Personnel, 
2003, pp.34-35). Phase I (precautionary phase) necessitates caution to be applied and all 
travel to the duty station require a c learance from the Designated Official (normally the UN 
Resident Coordinator). Phase 11 (restricted movement phase) indicates a higher level of alert 
with major restrictions for staff members and their fam ilies to remain at home unless 
otherwise instructed. Phase Ill (relocation phase) denotes a s ignificant deterioration in the 
security s ituation that may necessitate the relocation of staff members or their e lig ib le 
dependants. Phase IV (programme suspension) is usually applied to enable the Designated 
Official to recommend to the Secretary-General the relocation outside the duty station of all 
remaining internationally recruited staff members except the emergency or human itarian 
re lief personnel who are considered to be essential to remain in the duty station. Phase V 
(Evacuation) is the highest phase which can only be declared upon approval from the 
Secretary-General. This phase signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that 
all remaining internationally recruited staff members should leave. This was applied in West 
Timor during the East Timor/ West T imor Crisis, following the kill ings, conducted by mi litias, 
of UNHCR officers in Atambua, Belu District, West T imor in September 2000. 
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2003), were operating as usual along the main road of Banda Aceh city 
leading to the Darussalam Sub-District. They mostly operated between 3-4 pm 
until 10-11 pm local time. They could be easily identified by their red tents 
and red lanterns along the road. The coffee shops (Ac.: keude kopi, I: warung 
kopi), which were popular in Aceh and considered to be part of everyday life, 
were also open during their normal working hours of around 7.00 a.m to 
11.00 p.m. Even the famous Keude Kopi Solong at the 7 road intersection 
(Simpang Tujuh) in Ulee Kareng, well known as a GAM area that people 
usually avoided after 9 pm, was operating. Rex, the dining centre in town, was 
also doing business during its daily opening hours of around 4 pm to midnight 
(some said it was open until 02.00 am). Rex was one of the favourite places in 
town for evening social life and was always full of people having dinner or 
simply meeting up with friends. 
In the countryside, along the way from Banda Aceh to North Aceh, the 
evidence of conflict had become less obvious. Farmers worked normally in 
their paddy fields, either to harvest or start ploughing. Some areas were ready 
to harvest while some others were already harvested and ready for the new 
planting cycle. The locals, mostly women, worked in their fields as if there 
was no conflict at all. They smiled and even waved their hands when I filmed 
them. Schools also functioned normally. I saw a group of students walking 
along the dike (I: pematang sawah) in Aceh Besar District after school. It was, 
according to my local contact, an unusual scene from 1999 to 2001. In that 
period of time, in areas that directly suffered from the conflict, students often 
had to skip their classes for security reasons. 
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Plate 2-2. The Acehnese Everday Activities 
Clockwise: 
'Forget about the conflict, I have 
to go to school anyway' - Students 
from a local village in Aceh Besar 
in late 2002 (photo from local 
NGOs, with written consent; title 
from own field notes). 
'Of course we are afraid of being 
trapped in the armed clashes, but 
we have to eat' - Women from 
Aceh Besar in late 2002 (photo 
local NGO's documentation, with 
written consent; title from own 
field notes). 
' I wish Aceb could be at peace so 
that we can continue our lives and 
normal daily markets' - Women 
in 'Pasar Aceh', Banda Aceh in 
2003 (Own Documentation; title 
from own field notes) 
The only visible sign of martial law that distinguished the province 
from many other provinces in Indonesia was the large number of army 
personnel and police officers who were well armed and often moved around 
the region, even in the city. It was a common scene in the city of Banda Aceh 
during the hectic morning hours of around 7 .30 - 9 .00 am, to see the traffic 
police (Polisi Lalu Lintas- Poltas) accompanied by army personnel while 
directing the traffic. However, compared to my previous visit in December 
2003, the number and frequency of patrols were reduced. The number of 
security checks along the roads of Banda Aceh leading out of the city was also 
reduced. On the way to Lhokseumawe in North Aceh, for example, I passed 
several army check points that were no longer occupied. 
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The lifting of martial law and its downgrading to a civil emergency, 
announced by the local government on 19 May 2004 at 01.00 pm, however, 
was perceived by the local people as a 'camouflage' only, especially when the 
military announced that the number of troops would remain the same and that 
the security operation would continue. People perceived that martial law still 
existed and was 'disguised' in the different clothing of the civil emergency. 
This was especially true for the conflict zone areas, particularly villages close 
to the mountains and hills, such as village N in Aceh Besar District, which 
was only around 1 hour from Banda Aceh. Security checks and ' sweeping' of 
vi II ages were still being conducted, and villagers were often ordered to leave 
their villages to live in temporary camps provided by the martial law authority 
for a week or so, depending on the situation. On a return trip from 
Lhokseumawe, for example, I met a convoy of I 0 army trucks and a tank, plus 
an apparently private vehicle with its front window wound down displaying 
the guns held by the persons inside, whom my local contact identified as 
Indonesian intelligence. The locals usually could easily identify 'who are with 
which side' or 'who are from what sort of institutions'. There were several 
signs that the locals had learnt from past experiences, some of which were 
types of car, windscreen, and physical appearance. 
Interestingly, around a week before the lifting of martial law, a group 
of people demonstrated against this change. There were varied opinions in the 
civilian community concerning this action. Some people, especially NGO 
activists, believed that the demonstration was 'engineered' by the army using 
local people. Nevertheless, my interviews with research subjects indicated that 
many preferred to have martial law rather than a civil emergency. The general 
view from the ordinary people was that they were not ' ready' to enter the civil 
emergency. A woman from a conflict zone told me that people from her 
village felt so unsafe after entering the civil emergency that they asked the 
army to stay when they were ordered to relocate22 from thei r village. 
The people are afTaid to die. We do not agree with the civ il emergency. We 
are frightened I Masyarakat takut mati. Kami tidak setuju darurat sip il. 
Masyarakat was-was (An interview on 29 May 2004) 
22 The Indonesian military's soldiers were usually relocated to another post after every three 
months. 
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Interestingly, the civilians usually identified the patty that they were 
afraid of as 'OTK' (I: Orang/Organisasi Tak Dikenal), an unidentified 
person/organisation, or sometimes 'orang tu' (I) or that particular person 
without specifying who or which party these two terms referred to, leaving it 
open for interpretation. This was due to the absence of any claims of 
responsibility for violent actions. The 'OTK' and 'orang tu' could be anyone: 
GAM soldiers, police, army, or any other unidentified person or group. To 
outsiders who were not used to the current situation and did not share 
common knowledge about the conflict, it was not easy to judge who the 
'OTK' might refer to. Only after some time getting to know the context and to 
obtain skills to understand and pick up the main idea of the conversation could 
one guess which party or person these two terms might refer to. 
Learning from past experiences, the villagers usually knew who 
belonged to which side and who could possibly conduct a certain action. 
Perpetrators of an assassination, for example, could be determined from the 
type of wound, guns or equipment used. Over time, however, it became harder 
to identify the perpetrator as both sides learnt tactics and strategies from each 
other and tried to mislead by using the enemy's tactics. The word OTK (I: 
Orang/Organisasi Tak Dikenal) was then developed to refer to the 
unidentified person or organisation behind the incidents. 
Embedded within this te1m OTK was the assumption of knowledge 
and understanding of the nature of violent political conflict of the GAM 
versus the government in the region. I asked various women from different 
villages to specify who or what OTK referred to, and their answer remained 
the same "well, that person" (I: ya, orang tu). The bottom line of this short 
answer was as simple as 'you know what I know and that we are not 
supposed to mention it' . Embedded here is the presumption that everyone 
should have the knowledge of the situation to determine who might possibly 
conduct a certain action. Naming the perpetrator, however, should be avoided 
since it carried the risk of false accusation, and might lead to a punishment 
from the arraigned party. 
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The usage of ' OTK' and ' orang tu ' was quite widespread in the 
region, and can be seen as part of their coping strategy. One woman from a 
different conflict zone, however, implied in the following statement that the 
police were a source of her fears. 
The army still have manners. [They are] Still wi lling to ask. Stil l willing to 
listen to what we say. But the police, there is no way for them to listen . .. 
orang tu (those people) only know how to beat us ... and we're finished .. ./ 
Tentra itu masih ada sopan-sopannya. Masih tanya kita. Masih mau dengar 
apa kata kita. Tapi polisi, mana mau dengar ... orang tu taunya bak buk bak 
buk...habis kita ... (An interview on 29 May 2004) 
The civil emergency implied the restoration of the authority of the 
civil government, and the return of the responsibility for security in the region 
from the military to the police. In this woman's understanding, the situation 
would be worsened if the police took over. 
The general feeling was that the martial law had not been ' completed. ' 
Most of my contacts said that if martial law has been chosen to resolve the 
problem in Aceh, then it should have remained in force for longer. This was 
also the general opinion of village women, as exemplified in the following 
statement of a woman from a village in Aceh Besar, an area considered to be a 
' black area· , classified by the military as having heavy presence of GAM and 
therefore in need of a heavy military presence. 
It [martial law] should have been conducted totally and not partia lly like this. 
We are the ones who will suffer later .. I Mestinya sekalian saja,jangan 
tanggung-tanggung seperti ni. Kita yang susah nanti khan ... (An interview 
on 29 May 2004) 
Frustration, confusion and fear clearly showed not only on her face but 
also on the faces of her fellow villagers. It was not because she approved of 
the military that she said this, but she was tired of feeling ' sandwiched' 23 in 
between two conflicting parties. Therefore, she considered it better to let the 
stronger party, the army, complete their operation so that villagers would feel 
safer and less fearful. If they had to suffer fear, she said, it was better to fear 
only one side and not two sides. There was no further explanation of what 
' complete' refers to here. Some villagers, however, suggested that it meant 
23The 'sandwiched position,' as I further elaborate in Chapter 4 Section 2.2.2, was one of the 
s ignificant effects of the confl ict that women had to deal with daily. I thank my supervisor, 
Dr. Robinson, for this term which helped me to articulate the difficult position of the 
Acehnese who were trapped between two conflicting parties. 
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eradicating GAM and not maintaining and prolonging24 the conflict. There 
was quite a widespread opinion that the conflict had actually been prolonged 
by the military, in particular, so that poorly paid military personnel could 
corruptly seize assets and income from the people. 
These are the voices of women civilians whose main concern was 
merely to continue their daily lives and be free of fear in living in their own 
villages. This may indicate their limited education and understanding of the 
wider causes of the conflict, such as the unequal political-economic power 
between the central and local government, resulting on the impoverishment of 
the people, or ignorance of a civilian's rights in general. However, the 
difficult circumstances that they referred to were those they had been facing in 
their daily lives for years. With their limited information and education but 
abundance of fearful experiences, they knew that what they were currently 
facing was nothing more than choosing the best among the worst, in which 
case, they would prefer the Indonesian military. However, this should not 
mislead us to underestimate their strong hope of being free of fear and 
suppression from the Indonesian military. 
In contrast to the voices of these village women, the middle class and 
the elites were more in favour of the civil emergency, for they understood that 
the military approach would never solve the problem in the region. In fact, 
according to them, the longer the military operation was conducted the more 
resistance the government would face from the Acehnese. They claimed that 
the GAM was under 'everybody's tongue,' meaning that everybody supported 
the movement. The conflict, for them, was about minds and spirits, and not 
guns, and therefore should be solved with a more peaceful persuasive 
approach. It is important to note, however, that these elites Jived mainly in 
towns which were far safer than villages located in the rural areas. With their 
good educational background, they possessed better economic status and did 
not have to face direct attack in their neighbomhoods. They also better 
understood the macro political context. 
24 The original term used in here was actually ' diproyekkan ' or making the conflict a project 
for one's own financial benefit. 
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As for local NGOs, although they were very sceptical of the civil 
emergency, they did hope for a better environment in which to work. It was 
well-known that under martial law, local NGOs had to obtain a 
recommendation letter from the martial law authority and send reports to them 
regularly. Some NGOs were able to obtain the letter while others were not. 
Most of the groups that were unsuccessful worked on issues of human rights, 
civil education, and legal advocacy. Some of the NGOs denied permission, 
however, actually focused on economic empowerment or children's 
education. It was their activities in areas that were considered 'hot spots' that 
made them unable to obtain the recommendation letter. Understanding that 
these areas were in need of assistance, these NGOs opted to take the risk of 
secretly continuing their work without permission from the martial law 
authority. No data on the number of local NGOs working under martial law 
was available, but according to local NGO contacts, the number had decreased 
significantly from the pre-martial law period. This was not only due to the 
limits imposed by the martial law authority, but also due to limited funding as 
many donors, especially from foreign countries, stopped supporting projects 
in Aceh. 
3.2 On Women and Shari'a Law: The Silent Backslider 
Being a woman travelling alone in the troubled Islamic region of Aceh 
was simultaneously an asset and challenge. Nevertheless, Shari 'a law 
enforced by the government and supported by the modernist Islamic group 
placed certain limitations on my mobility as a woman. 
The Shari 'a Law was narrowly understood as being the Islan1ic dress 
code for women. In order to show that the Shari 'a Law was implemented, the 
Shari 'a police in Aceh often conducted 'veil raids' (I: raziajilbab or 
sweepingjilbab) which tended to harass women. In practice, a ' veil raid' went 
beyond requiring that women covered the parts of the body that according to 
Islam should not be exposed (I: aurat). Once, when travelling with other 
female passengers, we were shouted at by the Shari 'a police to get out of the 
public transport (Ac.: labe-labe) because we were wearing trousers. Our 
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names were listed in their logbook due to either our tight trousers and/or tight 
and short tops/blouses. We were told that it was our first warning (I: 
peringatan) for breaching the law and that this would be tolerated only three 
times. After the third warning, an official letter would be sent to us for a 
tribunal or court session. Not surprisingly, most of the police were men, who 
considered that they possessed higher moral values than us (women). 
Although we were wearing veils, we were wearing trousers, which are 
supposed to be men's clothes, instead of suitably ladylike long dresses.25 
The local women cynically called this enforcement of the women's 
Islamic dress code ~jilbabisasi' (I), a systematic attempt to force women to 
wear the veil,26 which targeted the women's body and sexuality. The male 
voice of the Shari'a law, interestingly, also referred to the morality of woman. 
Shari 'a law was perceived as a tool for reclaiming Acehnese women from the 
bad influence of the 'Madonna factor ', the local term for western values, and 
returning them to the authentic Islamic traditions of the Acehnese, as 
illustrnted in the following pop song: 
May peace be with you, Acehnese women I Assa/am Mualaikum hai inong 
Aceh 
I would like to say a little about you/ Bacut Ion cukeh keu kawom hawa 
Please take care ofyour morality/ meujaga akh/akgat abeusaheh 
Don't let it be underm ined by women from out of the region/ bek di peu e/eh 
lee inong luwa/ 
You are flowers, not just flowers/ Nyoe bungong, kon sembarang bungoeng/ 
You are flowers, strong flowers/ nyoe bungong, bungoeng teu seubeh/ 
You are women, not ordinary women/ Nyoe inong kon sembarang inong/ 
You are Acehnese women/ nyoe inong, s i inong aceh/ 
Since the beginning you have the pre-eminence/ Yohjameun phon ka luwan 
/eubeh 
Acehnese women are well-known for hav ing good morality/ Nyan inong 
aceh beu he' ngon ahklak mulia 
You have fa ith and are full of courtesy/ kong iman sopan ngon santoen 
What a fragrant magnolia/ leupah that harom si bungoengjeumpa 
Religion is the primary guidance/ agama teuma jeut keu peununtun/ 
Immediately met by devoted women/ meu samboet langsoeng ngon inong 
setia 
(Lyrics written by Said Ayuzar)27 
25 Trousers are actually part of the Acehnese traditional dress for women, but they are usually 
covered up by long blouses which go down to the knees. 
26 T he term denotes a forced process of making the Is lamic dress code(l:jilbab) compu lsory 
for women. 
27 This song was in the album 'Rapai House Atjeh' ofa local pop gro up, Safa' i. It was not 
c lear what year the song was composed in, but the album cassette was released in early 2000 
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Interestingly this was the predominant view of Indonesian men in 
general, not solely amongst the Acehnese. My interrogation by the Indonesian 
soldier described on p.30 clearly illustrates male control over women's 
morality. A good woman would stay at home and not move around in the city 
at night. Siapno (2002), in her analysis of women's agency (by using their 
femininity) in dealing with the army soldiers, depicted the male authority's 
conception of good women and how male officials showed respect and were 
helpful to women who demonstrated 'the traditional models of good 
behaviour,' exemplified in the following citation: 
... Male persons of authority seemed to be much more willing to give favours 
to women who can perform and cultivate the deferential , predictable 
traditional models of good behaviour, as good daughters, good wives, good 
mothers ... (Siapno, 2002, p.18) 
Women in Aceh silently rebelled against the control over their body 
and sexuality by, for example, simply not wearing the veil unless in public 
places such as schools, markets, and government buildings. Some women did 
not wear the veil even in public places, but they always had shawls ready, 
often put over their shoulders, to immediately turn into a veil whenever they 
encountered a veil raid. This exemplifies women's agency in negotiating their 
position within their society. Knowing that protesting Shari 'a Law was 
unfavourable, they conducted 'silent protest' by not veiling when they did not 
want to do so. 
The Shari 'a Law does not entirely represent the daily practice of Islam 
in society, as it merely represents politicised Islamic values at a policy level. 
These were different from Islam's actuality in the day-to-day lives of the 
people. Far from the general picture of being militant and fundamentalist, the 
Acehnese society was actually quite moderate and accommodating of other 
values. This can be clearly observed from, for example, the physical existence 
of churches, and Buddhist and Hindus temples. Most of my local friends were 
not concerned about my constant non-observances of the five times a day 
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prayers. They considered this to be a personal relationship between me and 
God (SEA: hablu minallah). I was simply perceived as having not yet been 
enlightened by God (I: belum menerima hidayah). They often said that once I 
got the 'hidayah' (I), I would automatically perform my personal duty as a 
good Moslem without being asked to do so. The implementation of Shari 'a 
law did not affect or limit my research in the way that the violent political 
conflict situation did. 
3.3 Obtaining a Research Permit: The Confused Authority 
One of the main difficulties of conducting research in the area under 
martial law was the ' legal status' of my presence in Aceh province. The 
' sweeping KTP' I described in section 2, exemplifies the need for a proper 
legal status in accordance with the martial law authority. A research permit, 
therefore, was essential.28 This pennit, however, was not easy to obtain due to 
unclear policies of both the martial law authority and the local civi l 
government. I had to go through a lengthy bureaucratic process due to the 
lack of clarity on where and how to obtain the necessary research permit, in 
early 2004. 
The confusion was evident within the martial law authority29 as well as 
at the local civil government office. I remember obtaining a letter from the 
University of Syiah Kuala one day at around 2 o' clock. Immediately, I went to 
28 I spent some time thinking about whether or not I needed to obtain a research permit, and 
the consequences of attempting to research without one. Having a research permit in hand 
wou ld enable me to move around and avoid trouble with the martia l law authority. However, 
this a lso carried the risk of being seen as a government spy by GAM and would certainly limit 
my contact with my research subjects, especia lly those from the conflict zones. Following the 
suggestions of my local contacts, I started to apply for a research permit from the local 
authority in March 2004. I was provided with a notification letter by the head of the Research 
Institute of Syiah Kuala University, which was supportive and gave me an immediate 
response. T he letter stated that I was truly a student of the ANU planning to conduct research 
in the NAO province, purely for academic purposes, and that the university supported the 
research as long as it was conducted in accordance with the existing rules and regulations. 
29 Prior to going to the University, I went to meet an Army official from the martia l law 
authority responsible for, among other things, information dissemination on the martial law 
policies. He gave me the overall policies on activities conducted in the region by non 
government organisations and journalists, but there seemed to be no indication of any rules 
relating to academic research, as in my case. He suggested that I visit the civ il government 
authority (Pemerintahan sip il daerah). According to this Army official, things not regulated by 
new reg ulations or policies issued by the martial law authority would follow the existing local 
civi l government's regulations and policies. 
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the Governor's office to obtain a research permit. I was asked to come again 
the next day as the office was about to close (I: hampir tutup). I knew that 
would be the response as this is a very common 'delaying mechanism' in 
many goverrunent offices in the entire country, but I just tried my luck. On the 
next day, I went back to the office to seek information on how to obtain a 
research permit and I ended up with several different answers. This gave me 
the impression that there was no clear policy on which section was 
responsible for issuing the permit. I was then directed to the General Section 
(I: Bagian Umum). I entered this small dull office that was full of staff. Some 
of them were chatting, some were reading the newspaper, and some looked to 
be seriously writing, working on a spread sheet, or reading at their desks. 
They did not really pay attention to me when I entered the office. However, 
once I said that I was a student from the National University of Australia, a 
foreign university, and looking for some advice on where to go and what to do 
to obtain a research permit, they suddenly changed their attitude. Their 
attentiveness may have been due to their local tradition of respecting guests 
(Ac.: peumuliajamee). 
This changed attitude was clearly shown when they were suddenly 
busy giving me advice, which seemed to be more of a discussion and debate 
among themselves. I immediately regretted my decision to obtain the research 
permit. I was thinking that if only I had known that there was no clear policy 
on this, I would not have spent my time trying to obtain the permit and risking 
not getting it. But since I was already there, I prepared myself for a long 
process that would take up much of my time and energy. Besides, ifl could 
get the permit, it could really simplify my research. I was then advised to 
leave the letter with them and to come back the next day. 
I turned up at the office early the next day as I knew I would have to 
wait in tum in several other sections. I was met by the Head of the General 
Section (Kepala Bagian Umum) who asked me several questions, mainly on 
what my research was about, the purpose of doing it, why Aceh and not 
another region, whom I had been in contact with, had I met with the martial 
law authority and what did they say about it. Considering my research topic 
was about women, he gave me a disposition letter (I: surat disposisi) and sent 
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me to the Women Empowerment Section (I: Bagian Pemberdayaan 
Perempuan). With the letter in hand, I went upstairs to the third floor. A lady, 
who was the chairperson of the women's section, immediately received me at 
around 2 pm after she arrived from a meeting. She was a bit confused about 
how to proceed with my letter and asked advice from her staff. She then gave 
me another disposition letter to the Special Section for The Province of NAD 
(I: Bagian Kekhususan Propinsi NAD) which was on another floor. The Head 
of this section finally gave me a clearer directive on how to obtain my 
research permit. He directed me to one of his staff who was responsible for 
permits, who then passed me on to another of his staff, a friendly young 
official who had just arrived from the Philippines to study for his masters ' 
degree. 
I was then requested to hand in a copy of my research proposal in 
English, as well as a list of the questions30 I would be asking. 1 was re-
interrogated,31 with questions similar to those I had received from the head of 
the General Section. This was called ' staff investigation' (1: investigasi staff), 
one of the standard procedures applied in the office, based on which the 
official would advise his head of section, who would write a recommendation 
Jetter to the First Secretary of the Governor (Sekretaris I Gubemur) with 
whom the final decision lay.32 
Three days later I came to the office and met with somebody else who 
advised me to wait, as once it was approved, the letter would be sent to my 
address in Banda Aceh. With a big question mark in my mind, I simply 
followed the suggestion. After a few days of hearing nothing, I had lost my 
faith. I decided to concentrate on the meetings with local NGOs that I had 
been conducting while waiting for the letter to come. Later on, around two 
weeks after I left the region to return to Jakarta for the general elections, I was 
informed that the letter had finally arrived (Annex 6). 
30 This questionnaire was more important that the proposal itself, as it wou ld show exactly 
what kind of data I planned to collect. 
31 In Bahasa Indones ia people tend to use 'interview' rather than ' interrogate ' to avoid the 
militaristic sound of the term ' interrogation'. 
32 According to him, when there were no objections from the staff investigation level, the 
letter would most likely be approved. He asked me to come again in two or three days. 
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The aforementioned chain of events clearly indicates the uncertainty 
about policies and regulations with regards to research permits resulting from 
the unclear policies of the martial law authority. Although most of the 
government officials whom I met demonstrated their support for the research, 
which they perceived as not merely research but an education,33 the absence 
of guidelines, rules, or policies on the matter prevented them from speeding 
up the process. 34 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the letter I eventually received 
from the governor's office did not clearly mention that I was granted a 
research permit. Instead, it stated that the provincial governor's office 
supported the research to be conducted in the province as long as it followed 
the existing policies. This became problematical considering the absence of 
policies on conducting research in the province under martial Jaw. Although 
this lengthy process indeed hindered my research activities, it allowed me to 
learn more about the violent political conflict circumstances and its effects on 
the lives of people in the region. I also learnt how to conduct myself and my 
research under such circumstances in a ' beautiful way', as further exemplified 
in the next section. 
3.4 'Bermain Cantik': Adopting Local Coping Strategies 
While waiting for the official letter to be issued, I tried to use my time 
to meet local contacts and some research subjects. I knew that getting to the 
region was quite an extraordinary thing as not many people from outside Aceh 
could get there easily and, therefore, I needed to maximise my use of the 
JJ In Aceh, I often heard general statements made regarding research being equal to education, 
and education being important. This illustrated the serious concern of these government 
officers at NAD province for education . 
34 A student from the local university, who happened to be also conducting research for her 
BSc, to ld me that she did not encounter any problems from the authorities, although she did 
not have any research permit. Unfortunately, with different research topics, we faced different 
s ituations. Her research topic was not on the effect of conflict but on small firm management 
in Banda Aceh, and therefore did not require travel to ' hot spot' areas or meeting affected 
members of society. Even when travel was required, she had a proper JD, the Red-White ID 
(I: KTP Merah Putih). In my case, my research req uired me to travel to ' hot spot' areas and 
meeting the affected community. In addition, I did not have the Red-White ID. The research 
permit was, therefore, crucial, especially as the Indonesian military and police often 
conducted their sweeping operations in the ' hot spot' areas. 
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available time. However, with no proper letter in hand, I admit that I was both 
nervous and afraid, especially when meeting with the local people. Luckily, a 
friend who worked for local NGOs allowed me to work closely with their 
organisations. These NGOs had received some funds from a US based 
international NGO for women's economic empowerment activities in the 
District of Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh Municipality. Through these local 
NGOs, I was able to meet up with two groups from Aceh Besar District and 
Banda Aceh Municipality respectively, as well as with other local NGOs, and 
so conducted my interviews with them. 
Two good Acehnese friends always advised me to 'playing 
beautifully' (I: bermain cantik),35 which basically meant taking both the 
conflicting parties and their dynamics into account to maintain neutrality. This 
is done by keeping a 'safe distance' to the conflicting paiiies and by being 
tactful in responding to queries. In my case, it was about isolating research in 
the neutral zone of economic and culture as much as possible, and avoiding 
too much contact with, and affiliation to, one of the conflicting parties. 
Nevertheless, ' playing beautifully' was not easy. With the guen-illa 
setting as the context, determining the affiliation of particular groups or 
contact persons involved, at the very least, careful observation and adequate 
information. Observation and information are intermingled in that good 
observation can provide adequate and proper information, and the 
appropriately adequate information can then lead to careful observation in 
terms of what and how to observe. 
However, meaningful information only resulted when a trusting 
relationship could be developed and maintained with local contacts. Once 
trust was established, information would then be more readily collected. 
Nevertheless, sometimes, some doubts appeared in my research subjects, 
especially in regard to my intentions, identity, and motivation as a Javanese 
35 This was a common strategy of civilians in their 'sandwiched position' between the two 
conflicting parties. Embedded in the ' play beautifully' (I: bermain cantik) concept were the 
old (traditional) concepts of' muslihat' and 'lheukjago meuleut ·.These three concepts had 
become the coping strategies of the Acehnese in dealing with the impact of conflict on their 
daily lives in order to survive and continue their 'normal' lives. The three concepts cannot be 
easily translated in one single phrase without elaborating the cultural context. Discussion of 
these three local concepts, however, can be found in Chapter 4 Section 1.2 and 2.2.3. 
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interested in the Acehnese. They also questioned the source of funding for my 
research. Although resentment towards the Australian government was not as 
strong as resentment against the American government, the suspicion was 
there, and quite strongly. In responding to such concerns, I usually referred to 
my prior humanitarian activities with the United Nations in conflict areas 
including Aceh province in 2000-2002 to demonstrate that I am basically a 
humanitarian minded person who would always certainly work for those who 
are in need regardless of their religion, ethnic background, or political 
affiliation. This created connectedness with my local contacts as most of them 
were NGO workers. 
Moreover, in a guerrilla setting in the province, it was not easy to get 
adequate information as sometimes even trusted local contacts had their own 
agenda with regard to my research, an agenda related to their political 
affiliation. Some perceived that my status of a foreign university researcher 
would provide a means of disseminating information about the Aceh conflict 
to the international community. 
This required me to always be critical of, and respond diplomatically 
to, any demands made. I remember one of my conversations with a local NGO 
activist who questioned my decision to include, among my research subjects, 
women from the 'other side', i.e. those whom s/he referred to as not 
suppo1ting the dream of the Acehnese. According to this friend, the answers 
of these women would make my research biased. In his/her view, taking other 
angles, sides, or groups into account in my research would negatively 
influence my findings. We had a lengthy discussion on this, and I had to 
explain in a delicate manner what bias in research actually means, i.e. taking 
one side only would be considered ' biased' as I would fail to capture the 
overall picture. In responding to this problem, I triangulated data from 
different sides by cross-checking with other sources. 
Another difficulty that I encountered was the authorities' wish that I 
confine research to the neutral zone of economics and culture. In practice, 
political issues unavoidably arose in conversations which, in some cases, 
limited the scope of these interviews. For example, during an in-depth 
interview that I conducted with one of my key informants on the society and 
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culture of the Acehnese, s/he enthusiastically spoke about the rich culture of 
Aceh and how different regions or even villages may have different traditions 
and customary habits (I: adat istiadat). Suddenly s/he showed reserved body 
language when I asked about how the violent political conflict had affected 
these local customs and traditions. It was obvious that s/he was hesitant to 
answer, and whens/he did, s/he was very diplomatic, saying that whether or 
not violence exists, traditions will always change in one way or another as 
they involve interactions between human beings. Although I wanted to pursue 
the issue, her/his reserved body language convinced me not to press him 
further. This might only have resulted in disruption to the good 'probing' that 
I was able to develop in the interview. 
Nevertheless, this reluctance was not always the case. Discussion of 
such issues could be easily conducted with most of the women's groups, 
especially those in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar, with whom I had frequent 
contact. They usually approached me 'secretly' when they had something that 
they wanted to talk about in private. ' Secretly ' here meant approaching me in 
a way that was not too obvious to other group members, and in a way that was 
not easily identified as having a private conversation. Sometimes it felt odd 
when these women came to see me individually, with something in their 
hands: food, their children's toy, or their handicraft (I: kerajinan Langan) that 
they were working on, silently sat next to me and whispered to me while their 
eyes stayed fixed on their hands which were busy playing with, or working 
on, the particular thing that they had brought along, as if we were talking 
about that and not the violent political conflict situation of Aceh. The topic 
would suddenly change completely when somebody else approached us. 
The ' clandestine gesture' of these women clearly demonstrates the 
fear, distrust, and suspicions that prevailed in the society. The general mind 
set was that 'everyone can be anyone' , and therefore self consciousness was 
paramount. One of the women said that even walls have ears (1: bahkan 
dindingpun bertelinga). This 'extra carefulness' , which does not appear in 
other regions oflndonesia, was quite evident in Aceh. This clearly signifies 
that the bermain cantik was not only applied to the conflicting parties but also 
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to neighbours, friends, and even relatives. It truly amazed me to see how 
people could relate to each other under such circumstances. 
The ordinariness of 'play beautifully' (I: bermain cantik) suggests that 
the situation was perceived as part of the normality that had to be simply 
accepted and lived in. Bermain cantik had also become a code through which 
people were expected to interpret each others' actions and statements. This 
had, certainly, brought some changes in the people's attitudes and behaviour. 
Given the fact that they had been in a situation of conflict for more than 20 
years, these changes significantly affected their culture and traditions as 
well.36 
4 Conclusion 
From my experience, conducting research under martial law was 
certainly not an easy task and demanded certain strategies which allowed the 
research to be done while maintaining the safety of both research subjects and 
researchers. It was, however, a privileged opportunity for me to be able to 
conduct the research regardless of these difficult circumstances. The 
following are some conclusions that I have drawn about conducting research 
in an Islamic and violent political conflict setting. 
First, institutional status for the research that can be obtained through a 
local or national institutional attachment is important. This basically refers to 
an official letter (I: surat dinas) which gives a clear legal status to the research 
and researcher. This was true despite the difficulties I encountered because of 
the unclear policy on the conduct of academic research under the period of 
martial law, the first martial law declared in Indonesia since 1965, which 
placed me in a problematic situation, and the requirement to follow the 
existing vague rules and regulations of the Province. 
Second, socio-political and socio-cultural issues need to be carefully 
addressed. At least five such issues arose during the conduct of the research: 
36 Such changes might be an inconvenience for some people, such as the aforementioned key 
informant. This may also explain whys/he gave me such a strong sign not to elaborate the 
issue further. 
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how male dominance affected women's voices; suspicions and fear that 
resulted in 'hesitancy to be a research subject' ; unclear regulations on research 
permits; my ethnic background; and the implementation of Shari 'a Law, 
which impacted more on 'women' because of veil raids. 
Third, the unstable and unpredictable security situation hampered my 
research. Armed clashes could emerge at anytime and anywhere. Killings and 
kidnappings had become part of 'normal life' in the region. Under such 
circumstances, the how, when and where to meet research subjects needed 
careful planning. To organise an interview, a thorough discussion with local 
contacts was needed. Nevertheless, in many cases, I followed my inner voice. 
The 'intuitive feelings', which might have been fortified by learning to read 
signs of danger and neutrality that I developed during the fieldwork, became 
essential here. 
Fourth, varying strategies needed to be developed and adopted to 
conduct the research according to the situation. No single fo1mula was 
sufficient. Several basic principles of humanitarian activities in complex 
emergencies were adopted. The followings are seven strategies that I 
employed in the field, some of which were developed due to the situation: a 
' do-no-harm' approach; impartiality; limited participatory approach (in terms 
oftime, place, and persons involved); gaining updated information on where 
and when the armed conflicts were and would be, in many cases collected 
from coffee shops (Ac.: keude kopi) and text messages; 'playing beautifully' 
(I: bermain cantik); data triangulation; and personal judgement, especially on 
security issues, which often relied on personal feelings and intuition. 
The ' do-no-harm' approach relates to the adoption of an impartial 
attitude in order to maintain security and reduce the ri sk of informants being 
perceived as supporting one particular party in the conflict. As in many other 
conflict situations, security and impartiality were two important 
interconnected issues for the conduct of the research in Aceh. Impartiality, in 
particular, determined not only my safety but also the safety of my local 
contacts. This is true not only for those from the affected areas but also in 
relatively safe areas such as Banda Aceh where fear, distrust, and suspicion 
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were also evident. The adoption of these approaches further opened up access 
to the local women from both directly and indirectly affected areas. 
Limited participatory observation was undertaken in consultation with 
the research subjects and key informants, particularly those from the ' hot 
spot' areas. In contrast to research in non- violent political conflict situations, 
negotiations about time, place, and the other people to be involved in the 
survey, interview, participatory observation, or focus group were vital. Often 
these research activities depended on the availability and the security situation 
of the research subjects. 
The 'playing beautifully' (I: bermain cantik) approach involved 
paying attention to the 'dialectic ' between good observation and accurate 
information. 'Playing beautifully' should not to be understood as presenting 
oneself as supporting one party, but as displaying an impartial attitude through 
word and/or action in responding to queries from the field. My previous 
experience as a humanitarian worker for a UN agency in Jakatta was an asset 
for this. 
Data triangulation was employed to minimise the possibility of 
providing information that served political interests; being affiliated with a 
foreign university caused me to be often seen as having the potential for 
disseminating information to the international community. Personal 
judgement was also often needed, not only to determine how the research 
could be conducted while maintaining the security of research subjects, but 
also to decide questions of what, when, where, and how my research activities 
were to be conducted, especially when travel to 'hot spot' areas was required 
and security was a serious issue. I often relied not only on the accuracy of 
information, but also on personal feelings and intuition about the situation. 
Lastly, research in violent political conflict circumstances necessitates 
the 'wait and see' strategy that requires patience to wait for the right time 
and a good judgement on it. The old Acehnese proverb 'tulakjalo watee ie 
paseung' (Ac.), translated as 'push the boat when the tide is high' (Siapno 
2002:18), well explain this 'wait and see' strategy. The proverb refers to 
making the right move at the right time. Implied in here is the need for skilled 
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observation and the ability to judge political situations in order to achieve the 
best result with the least action. 
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Chapter 3 On Women, Household Livelihood, 
and Violent Political Conflict: Some Theoretical 
Debates and Issues 
Thi s chapter examines the debates and issues surrounding the theoretical 
framework used in this thesis. It contains four sections. Firstl y, I address the 
' triangle of ignorance', by which I mean the lack of recognition of women as 
'active survivors' in violent political conflict situation in the three areas of 
Confl ict Studies, Women's Studies, and Development Studies. 
Section 2 discusses the existing theories of violence and how they 
contribute to an analysis and understanding of situations of vio lent political 
conflict in general and in Aceh in patticular. It also considers the gendered impact 
of violent political confl ict on the overall political, economic, social, and 
environmental situation. This examination serves as the context for the multi-
faceted framework to examine the aforementioned three core issues of the 
research , i.e. women, cop ing strategies and household li velihood. 
Section 3 rev iews the literature on coping in order to provide some 
theoretical considerations on the use of the 'triangle of contextual analyses' of 
economic stressors, actions, and expectations as the main tool of analysis in this 
research. The word 'contextual' here implies the vio lent political confli ct 
situation with its overall socio-cultural and socio-economic c ircumstances that 
frame women as they develop and exercise their economic coping strategies to 
susta in their household li velihoods. In addition, a gender perspective, with 
parti cu lar attention to women, is also employed in the theoretical framework as 
wel I as the overal I research process. 
Finally, I consider approaches to studying household livel ihood and 
coping strategies, and discuss the key concepts and empirical indicators derived 
from the theoretical frameworks. T h is section presents the indicators of I ivelihood 
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coping strategies, developed on the basis of a household's assets, used in this 
research . 
It is worth noting that the concept of violent political conflict employed 
here is rather different from that proposed by Jongman (2001 ). 1 Focusing on the 
death to ll , Jongman defines violent political conflict (VPC) as an armed conflict 
that causes less than 100 deaths (not necessarily battle related) in a year. It is 
characterised by conflicting parties gradually moving from non-violent to violent 
strategies, starting from small-scale violent confrontations to terrori st movements 
with an action-oriented leadership, and the government's legitimacy is in 
question. In this thesis, I argue that regard less of the number of deaths, once the 
conflict involves both physical and non-physical violence, it should be considered 
as a violent political conflict. Together with other types of casualties, the death 
toll signifies the degree of violence rather than violent action itself, which 
certainly needs to be analysed in conjunction with what types of violence 
occurred. 
1 The Triangle of ignorance 
Studies on violence and armed conflict are largely gender blind, with 
women ' s participation under-recognised, in both analytical and theoretical terms 
(Moser and C lark, 200 I; Date-Bah, 2001 ). This is regardless of the fact that most 
victims of violence and armed conflict in the world are women and children 
(UNHCR, 2001 in Berger, 2002) and the reality that violence and confli ct affect 
women and men differently (Berger, 2002; Sharoni , 1995). Women suffer the 
anguishes of physical, economic, and mental distress as illustrated in the 
following letter from 11 women in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
expressing anger at their gender-specific experience of war: 
1 Jongman (200 I) uses number of deaths per year to classify conflict in five di fferent stages. 
These are: High-Intensity Conflict (HI C), when the death toll reaches more than 1,000; Low-
Intensity Conflict (LIC), with I 00 to I ,000 deaths; Violent Political Conflict (VPC), causes less 
than I 00 death; Political Tension Situation (PTS), in which the parties in conflict start to adopt 
mi litant but non-violent strategies; and Stable Peaceful Situation (SPS) in which state and society 
are in harmony. 
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Too much is too much, we mothers are angry, outraged. We pay the high 
price of this dirty war. We become widows prematurely, we suffer rape and 
violence, and economic burden ... What are you seeking men of war, who 
get drunk on blood? Why this endless provocation, what do you hope to win 
with this blood bath ... ? (Doubl e Agony for Women Refugees, in Ochieng, 
2001). 
In order to counter these gender blind studies, some recent studies by 
Kelly (2000), Pankhurst (2000), Yufal-Davis (1997) and Burguieres (1990) have 
tried to incorporate gender analysis in their theoretical frameworks (Moser and 
Clark, 200 I, p.3). Some works of Benjamin and Fancy (1998), Turshen and 
Twagiramariya (1998), and Bunch and Cari ll o (1992) have also tried to include 
discussion of the abuse of women's human rights during conflict, women 's roles 
as mothers and wives, and their vu lnerability in displaced situations. 
However, as observed by Moser and C lark (200 I), these limited studies 
carry a strong assumption of armed conflict as a male domain, and present a 
simplistic po1trayal of women as ' passive victims', 'particularly of sexual abuse 
and forced abduction', with men as perpetrators. In contrast, analyses portraying 
women as ' active agents,' have defined them as 'perpetrators ' or 'combatants,' 
wh ich means that the women are also actively involved in the vio lent, including 
armed, conflict. Consequently, the greater number of women who are neither 
'active participants' nor 'passive victims' of the conflict has been overlooked. 
The majority of women in violent conflict situations, take responsibility 
for household sustenance and become ' active survivors' that strive to sustain their 
household and , as much as possible, struggle for better conditions, especially for 
their children and elderly household members. They often become the backbone 
of the household, having to cope with poverty, unstable conditions and the 
absence of male family members in chronic violent political conflict 
circumstances. In such environments, wh ich in most cases include some armed 
clashes, households wi ll unavoidably face not only the aforementioned state of 
affairs but also instability and insecurity. In such situations, women often become 
the anchor for the household's coping strategies. 
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As noted above, the link between household li velihood difficulties and 
violent political conflict situations is not only missing in Conflict Studies but also 
in Development Studies. Studies of household livelihoods have typica lly been 
conducted with an assumption of political stabili ty. However, with the mounting 
level of global conflict and political v io lence, as well as the many ongo ing 
national-level confrontations, development theorists and practitioners are 
currently facing critical challenges in both their studies and practices of 
development (Moser and Clark, 200 I). That is, conflict is becoming part of the 
normative environment for development practice. 
In this context, a more suitable approach to examining ' household 
li velihood ' in v iolent, including armed, conflict areas is needed. Some limited 
studies have been conducted in thi s context, such as the Political Economy of 
Conflict and Livelihood project of the Overseas Development Institute 
(Collinson, 2003). However, whil st there is an emerg ing recognition of the need 
for a new (or revised) tradition in Development Studies, there is limited room for 
discussion of this issue in conflict studies,2 in e ither theoretical debates or 
practices. 
The above discussions clearly show that Development Studies, Confl ict 
Studi es, and Gender Studies have all ignored women's active roles in deve lop ing 
their household coping strateg ies in vio lent pol itical conflict situations. In this 
thesis, I term this ' the triangle of ignorance' since it involves three d isciplines, 
and point out the need for further study on the cross-cutting issues of women, 
household li velihood, and situations of vio lent politi cal conflict. Such study is 
requ ired to contribute to a more adequate and appropriate theoretical or 
conceptual framework on the issue. T his is important both theoretical ly and 
practicall y since it wi ll provide proper tools and frameworks for well -equipped 
human itarian and development programmes that a im at addressing the overal l 
needs of women in chronic violent, inc luding armed, conflict situations. Hence, 
th is research is situated in, and aims to contribute to, the current limited works in 
thi s a rea in Development, Conflict and Gender Studies. 
2 See Ohlsson (2000) 
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2 Theorising Violent Political Conflict: Its Nature, Causes and 
Effects 
Writing from the perspective of psychology, Muro-Ruiz states that (2002, 
p. I 09), up to now, " ... there is no synthetic, general theory of violence able to 
integrate the less complete theories of violent behaviour .. . " Muro-Ruiz (2002) 
suggests that two generations of theories of vio lence have attempted to capture 
the cause and nature of the violent behaviour of human beings. The two 
generations represent the debates between those who believe that violence 
emanates from intrinsic factors and that social factors induce violence to 
materialise, and those who believe in the rational choice, a 'consdous and 
instrumenta l act,' of violence(Muro-Ruiz, 2002, p.110). On closer examination, 
the development within and across these two generations of theories of violence 
exemplify the shift from the essentialist to social constructionist points of view. 
In this section, I attempt to present these debates and the sh ift in the orientation 
fo r these theories on violence, and my standpoint on the importance of a multi 
approach framework in my research. 
2.1 The Theoretical Debates: From the Essentialist to Social 
Constructionist 
Focusing on the ' instinctual forces' of human beings, and perceiving 
violence as a reaction to, and expression of inner forces or motivations of vio lent 
behaviour, the first-generation theories of violence clearl y exemplify an 
essentia list standpoint. Implied in this theory is the assumption that human 
beings are naturally aggressive. The three theories of violence developed in the 
first generation - psychoanalytical instinctual , aggressive drive, and social 
discontent theory - have their foundation in the work of Sigmund Freud ( 1856-
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1939), particu larly his 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'.3 In this particular work, 
Freud modified hi s theory on ' instinctual forces' 4 with the ' dialectical 
relationship ' between the ' li fe instinct' (Eros) and 'death instinct' (Thanatos),5 in 
which the 'death instinct' is perceived as the ' individual's own innate self-
destructive li fe' (Muroz-Ruiz, 2002, p.1 10; Suarez-Orozco and Robben, 2000). In 
contrast, the second-generation theories - psychological, rational choice and 
social learning theories- are prone to the constructionist point of view. These 
theories, especially the last two, w ith the ir focus on the 'conscious and 
instrumental act' of violence and the reciprocal ties between the psychological 
forces and the political and social contexts. The second-generation theori es, 
concentrating on the reciprocal ties of internal forces and socio-political context, 
offer a more complex explanation of vio lent political context. Hence, the second-
generation theories are better known amongst political scientists and group-
behavioural sociologists than the first-generation theories. 
Although the first-generation theories of violence do not wel I explain 
violent political conflict, they have had a fu ndamental influence on the theory of 
vio lence.6 Th is is especially true for the social discontent theory, instigated by 
Gurr ( 1970) and further developed by Schwartz and Burton (Muro-Ruiz, 2002, 
pp.111-112). Gurr proposed 'grievances-induced social di scontent' wh ich placed 
the individual in a w ide po litical, economic and social framework. Gurr (1970) 
differentiates three stages of the emergence of political v iolence in ind ividuals: 
3 This work is a modified theory of hi s original argument that human instinct was basically 
regu lated by two main principles for discharging tension, namely the 'pleasure principle', which 
is the driving senses of'immediate', ' impulsive', as well as 'wish-fulfilling gratification', and the 
' reality principle', that is the toleration of delay and satisfaction postponement. In Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, Freud attempted to explain the internal driven forces of the European war 
(Muroz-Ruiz, 2002, p. 11 0). 
4 This theory was developed after the WWI, when Freud became frustrated with human nature and 
came to a belief that the ultimate need of human beings is death. 
5 Thanatos is from Greek Myth. It personifies death. He is the son ofNyx (God of night and the 
offspring of Chaos which is perceived as the shapeless and disordered mass that occupied all 
space before the creation of living beings). He has a twin brother, Hypno, who personifies sleep. 
6 Although Freud's theory was widely criticized for its lack of evidence of the internal drive; his 
theory was used widely. This is especially true for scholars who attempt to elaborate the 
destructive acts of terrorists and terrorism, such as Morgan ( 1989) who, in her Chapter 2 on the 
analysis of the compartmentalisation as the positiveness of patriarchy system, clearly illustrates 
the use of the ' dialectical relationship' between, for instance, intellectual vs. emotion and sex vs. 
love. 
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the development of di ssati sfactions, the politicisation of these dissati sfactions, 
and its materialisation in a form of political violence.7 As cited by Muro-Ruiz 
(2002), Schwartz argues that political alienation results from a psychological 
conflict of an individual ' s value hierarchy and contradictory values s/he believes to 
be functioning in the political system, leading to a revolutionary outbreak. 
Therefore, political violence occurs from psychological dissatis faction since " ... the 
values that guide the behaviour of the regime are perceived by the citizens as 
violating their own individual values" (Muro-Ruiz, 2002, p.112). Burton ( 1975), 
supporting the ' structural violence' concept of Galtung (1969), argues that political 
violence emerges when societal institutions suppress human needs of personal 
status, recognition and identity satisfaction. Burton bases his argument on the 
assumption that human needs demand constant satisfactions (fulfilment), are 
inherent in human beings, and that these needs are cultural and universal. 
Social suppression resulting from a culture of dominance instituted by a 
certain ethnic group will lead to unequal access to political , economic, and social 
resources for different ethnic groups (Collier, 2001). Although this (cultural) 
ethnic-based inequality does not necessarily result in severe violent conflict 
(Langer, 2005), the possibility for it to lead to do so unavoidably exists. Th is is 
especially true when cultural differences can be the basis for mobilisation in a 
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society where inequalities are quite evident, such as 
the case of Indonesia. This is in line with the following statement of Stewart (2002, 
p.3): 
... where there are such inequalities in resource access and outcomes, 
coinciding with cultural differences, culture can become a powerful 
mobilising agent that can lead to a range of political disturbances ... 
In such situations, violent conflict can take the form of horizontal conflict 
among different segments of the society, vertical (political) conflict between the 
state and society or segments of society (the suppressed ethnic group), or a 
combination of both. The combination of horizontal and vertical violent conflict 
was apparent in the case of Aceh where grievances were rooted in the 
7 Gurr's theory, however, suffered from the same problem of lack of empirical verification since it is 
theoretically developed from the frustration-aggression theory. 
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asymmetrical relations of the state and Acehnese society, manifested in the 
unequal access to political, economic, and social resources of Acehnese and, 
especially, Javanese ethnic groups. In addition, there was a longstanding conflict 
and imbalance of power among political el ites in Aceh. As described in Chapter 
5, the violent political conflict of Aceh re-occurred from time to time due to three 
main correlated reasons: the people's discontentment with the central 
government; a struggle for greater recognition of their culture and identity as a 
great society with a fine history of a strong Islamic Sultanate, especially under 
Sultan lskandar Muda (1607-1636);8 and the power struggle among the elite 
groups, particularly between the religious leaders (I, Ac.: ulama) and aristocrat 
leaders (Ac: uleebalang), and their descendants. 
Violent political conflict often appears as extensive, and not individual, 
conflicts and reflects the political beliefs and aspiration of a large segment of 
society (Muro-Ruiz, 2002). The second generation theories of violence, especially 
the rational choice and social learning theories thus propose a more useful 
theoretical framework since they view violence as 'a conscious and instrumental 
act' to attain certain goals, which commonly transpire at the instigation of small 
and tightly organised groups rather than at the hands of unorganised crowds 
(Muro-Ruiz, 2002, pp. I 09-110). Among the three theories developed in the 
second generation, rational choice and social learning theories are more useful in 
explaining the Aceh conflict than the psychological theory. This is because the 
psychological theory generally used to explain the phenomena of terrorism and 
t ied to internal mechanisms of perpetrators who are believed as individuals with 
" ... a damaged self-concept that has never fully integrated the good and bad parts 
of the self. .. " (Muro-Ruiz 2002, p. I 13). 
The rational choice theory views violent political conflict as a display of 
' collective rational ity' in which " ... groups employ violence strategically as a 
means to produce their joint goods" (Hechter, 1995, p.62 in Muro-Ruiz, 200 I , 
p.114). Political violence is a rational means of pursu ing extreme interests in the 
8 Scholarly works on the history of Aceh Sultanate include Lombard ( 1967), lbrahimy ( 1993), Lee 
( 1995), and Said (1981 ). See also Reid ( 1969) and Siegel ( 1969). 
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political sphere, a well calcu lated instrumental action carried out to deliberately 
achieve a purpose that goes beyond hurting and injuring others. Among those 
suppo1ting rational choice theory are Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly 
Conflict (1997), Keen ( 1998 in Ohlsson, 2000, p.4), and Blok (2000), who argue 
that violence should not be understood as ' irrational.' Chaos, created by 
perpetrators, is readily exploited for economic purposes by segments of e lites 
whose aspirations to ascend to a powerful position in society have been thwarted 
by competing elites. This was also the case with the GAM of Hasan di Tiro9 that 
was rooted in the competition between elites in sharing political power and 
resources in the province. Keen (1998 in Ohlsson, 2000) fu1thermore argued that 
conflict represents more than the breakdown of the social order as it also 
comprises a method for creating new business that generates profit and power. 
This further indicates the multi-faceted phenomena of violent political conflict as 
a rational act with rational underpinnings, causes and impacts. 
The social learning theory argues that ' psychological functioning' is best 
understood in terms of the continuous reciprocal interaction between behaviour in 
a social setting (Muroz-Ruiz, 2002, p.115). It examines individual violent 
behaviour in a social context with the basic premise that such behaviour is 
learned from role models and life experiences, both consciously and 
unconsciously. 
Violent political conflict can also be" ... a changing form of interaction 
and communication, ... a historically developed cu ltural form of meaningful 
action" (Blok, 2000, p.24). In some situations, violent political conflict can 
become almost completely symbolic (Derrienic, 1972, p.370) and instituted in a 
' conflictual interaction ' of collective 'political ethos' (Jenkins, 1998; see also 
Knox and Monaghan, 2003). In the light of the 'breeding theory' of vio lence 
proposed by Gal tung ( 1969), in which he argues that structural violence and 
personal vio lence often breed other violence, either individually or in conjunction 
9 The Sweden-based leader ofGAM; for details see Chapter 5, section 1.3 
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with each other, 10 violent political conflict can extend over generations. Th is is 
illustrated by the work of Dickson-Gomes (2002) on the ' transgenerational ' 
cultural impact of violence among the post war Salvadorian families where 
trauma has been socia lly and culturally transmitted over generations in simi lar 
manner to the way" .... cultural beliefs are transmitted from parents to children ... " 
and consequently create continuing vio lence in the society (Dickson-Gomes, 
2002, p.434). 
The rational choice and social learning theories readily explain the 
emergence of young GAM sold iers in the vio lent political confl ict in Aceh, who 
joined GAM due to what they had witnessed, experienced, and learned from the 
devastating impact of the Military Operation, 11 as well as the poverty of their 
circumstances. With an approximate month ly salary of Rp 200,000 or US$ 2212 
as a GAM soldier and the promise for a better nation, joining the movement can 
be considered a rational choice. In their propaganda in villages, especially during 
the Cessation on Hostility Agreement (COHA) 13 period, GAM promised that 
once they gained independence there wo ul d be no unemployment and no poverty, 
because the new state would ensure that everybody was employed and that those 
who were unemployed wou ld receive support from the state every month until 
they found a job. This suggests the adoption of a social security system for the 
people, offering a better option for the poor and unemployed. The monthly salary 
and the promise of a new state with a social security system certainly played 
important roles as social rewards. These rewards were apparently perceived as 
higher than the social pun ishment of being captured, being stigmatised as rebels, 
and/or getting injured and killed in battle. Moreover, these two theories also 
10 It is worth noting, however, that Galtung's theory on personal and structural violence has 
problems of the ' internal coherence of the conceptual frameworks, and relations between th is one 
[the conceptual framework] and current ideologies on violence ' (Derriennic, 1972, p.362), wh ich 
consequently limit its application in explaining violence in different cultural contexts. Different 
cultures may embrace different notions of violence as argued by Knox and Monaghan (2003, 
p.198): ' ... the meaning of violence is closely bound to its social context.' What considered as 
symbolic violence in one culture may not be so in another culture. 
11 See Chapter 5 for more details on the adopted hatred and trauma. 
12 With US$ I = Rp 9,000 
13 The Cessation on Hosti lity Agreement was the first peace agreement signed between the 
Government and GAM in late 2002 to early 2003, facilitated by Henry Dunant Centre - A 
Sweden-based International NGO. See Chapter 2, Section I and Chapter 5, Section 1.3 .4. 
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support the analysis of the link between the Asian Financial Crisi s that severely 
hit Indonesia in 1997 and the increased support of the Acehnese to GAM around 
1998 to 2000. 
In addition to the breakdown of social order, violent political conflict can 
also result in new businesses that generate profits and power in political , 
economic and social spheres (Keen, 1998 in Ohlsson, 2000; Moser, 2001 , p.36). 
This further indicates the multi-faceted phenomena of political violence as a 
rational act with rational underpinnings, causes and impacts. While theoretically 
it may be easy to distinguish different forms of violence, in reality these are 
usually intertwined (Moser, 2001). It is possible for political violence, for 
example, to take the form of economic violence or social vio lence, or vice versa. 
This wil l lead to political, social, and economic violence to emerge at the same 
time. As happened in Aceh, the conflicting parties imposed war taxes on the 
society that were often followed by threats, terror, and even physical violence, if 
the people failed to pay these taxes on a specified date. Nordholt (2000) argues 
that in conflicts in Indonesia, these three different types of violence (political , 
social, and economic) may indeed become overlapped, especially when they 
benefit for each other. 
The gender dimension adds to the complexities of violent politica l 
conflict. In many cases, political conflict is sexualised (Olujic in Jenkin, 1998). 
The conflict is engendered in such as way that women are often victimised due to 
their womanhood and have to employ coping strategies, which basically reflect 
the extended gender stereotypes of domestic, nurture, and self-sacrifice; and 
experience the gender-imbalanced power structure (McLean, 1999). 
The multi-faceted complexity of violent pol it ical conflict defies the mono-
causal explanation proposed by Margold (1999). 14 The intricacy and multi-
dimensiona l phenomena of vio lent political conflict are clearly suggested in both 
the first and second generations of theories of violence (Muro-Ruiz, 2002; 
14 Margo Id ( 1999, p.65) defines political violence as " ... a set of practices that manipulate cultural 
understandings through performed displays of threat ... " Through this, she proposes a one-facet 
approach and suggests a mono-causal explanation on violent political connict. Consequently, she 
leaves out other considerations; the cause, nature, manifestation and effects of violence in 
different forms and at different levels, as well as their inter-relatedness. 
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Suarez-Orozco and Robben , 2000). Jn this thesis, I argue that a multi-faceted 
framework, including the gender dimension of the power structure of the society 
in conflict, is essential in examin ing violent political confl ict. Furthermore, 
fo llowing Blok (2000), violent political confli ct needs to also be viewed from the 
fo llowing aspects: the 'instrumental' (the means), ' expressive ' (the symbols and 
language), 15 and its magnitude. 
2.2 The Multi-Faceted Framework to Violent Political Conflict 
The multi-faceted framework to or the emergence of violence is derived 
from the 'ecological model ' (Moser, 200 1) and used by fem inist theorists to 
explain gendered violence. The framework suggests fou r different levels -
structural, instituti onal, interpersonal, and individual - that play ' mutually 
reinforcing roles.' Gender is a cross-cutting issue which encompasses women ' s 
and men 's experiences of violence, e ither as perpetrators or survivors (Figure 
3- 1 ). 
Figure 3-1 Framework for causal levels of gendered violence 
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This multi-faceted framework assists in understanding the most recent 
Aceh vio lent political conflict between the GAM and government of Indonesia, 
15 On symbolic violence see also Ballard (2002), Jenkins ( 1998), Scheper-Hughes ( 1995), Suarez-
Orozco ( 1990). 
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which operated at structural, institutional , interpersonal, and individual levels. At 
the structural level, the framework helps to identify the macro-level of political, 
economic, and social-structure issues that have been employed as tools of the 
confl ict in the region. Examples of these tools are the policies for special regional 
autonom/ 6 and Shari 'a law from the government, and the policies for 
establi shing their own administrative and taxation systems from the GAM. These 
tools, especially the Shari 'a law, to a certain extent have shaped the gender norms 
and ideology of the society. 
At the institutional level, the framework is valuable in identifying how the 
gendered forma l and informal institutions and organisations as well as the social 
networks of the society have been utilized by the community to cope with the 
effect of violent political confl ict in their day-to-day liv ing. It was generally true 
of the region, for example, that women's organisations wou ld be less suspected 
than men' s organisations, by both conflicting parties, and that men found it easier 
to move around the region during the conflict period if they were accompanied by 
women and/or children. The perceived gender norm that women were less 
harmful than men was apparently crucial in people's coping strategies. 
At the interpersonal level, it is important to explore how the norms of 
gender relations reflect different situations with regard to the violent political 
confl ict. At the time of research, in the ' hot spots' or conflict zones areas, women 
tended to assume heavier responsibil ities than women in relativel y ' normal ' 
areas. Women would stay at home and face the government sold iers during the 
'sweeping' operations to seize GAM soldiers. T hey would also confront the 
military and other authority figures to find the corpses of their fami ly members 
after armed clashes. The behaviour of a strong woman that clearly demonstrates 
her agency, however, was not what I discovered in seemingly normal areas, such 
as Banda Aceh, the capital city of the province. As described in chapter 6, in such 
areas, women tended to adopt the patriarchal system and were more compliant to 
their male counterparts. 
16 See chapter 4 section 1.3 for details on the special regional autonomy for Aceh. 
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At the individual level, the multi-faceted framework was essential for 
elaborating women's personal history. However, the framework was employed 
only to the extent it was possible, especially with regards to making the research 
subjects fee l secure and comfo11able enough to share their personal hi stories. In 
this connection, the genealogical factors, as suggested by Blok (2000), was not 
elaborated in my research since they require a thorough exploration on the 
personal history. Apart from the risk of creating inconvenience and insecurity to 
my research subject, the ontogenetic approach is also beyond the scope of my 
study. 
2.3 The Sources of Violent Political Conflict 
Before considering theories about the source and cause of conflict, one 
needs to distinguish between 'political violence' and ' armed conflict'. Many 
scholars define 'poli tical violence' as closely linked to, or even interchangeable 
with, 'armed confl ict' (Moser and Clark, 200 1). In practice, however, 'political 
violence' does not necessarily mean 'armed conflict' and vice versa, for violence 
does not always imply physical and armed action . Moreover, referring to the 
armed conflicts in several regions in Indonesia, Nordholt (2000, p. I) maintains 
argument that 'armed confl ict ' covers inter-ethnic and inter-faith clashes in 
addition to political violence. 'Armed conflict' typifies a mixture of political , 
economic and religious factors. It cannot be used interchangeably with political 
violence without taking into account the context. 
Furthermore, one needs to not overlook the possibilities of violence 
arising from a mixture of political violence, armed conflict, and ethnic clashes. 
The violent political confl ict of Aceh, for example, which began as a political 
conflict, has developed in the direction of ethnic clashes between the Acehnese 
and Javanese, with hundreds of Javanese settlers being forced to leave the region 
in the late 1990s. 
Bearing in mind the aforementioned discussion, in thi s research I use the 
term ' violent political conflict' to describe the incidence of violence, which 
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ranges from non physical to physical (that can be armed and non-armed) 
conflicts, resulting from pol itical disputes or conflicts which are motivated by a 
desire to obtain or maintain political-economic power. As shown by some studies 
in the late 1990s on the causal mechanism of civil war, much of the chaos of civ il 
wars was created by 'excluded elites' and the marginalisation of a segment of the 
population for economic and pol itical exploitation (Keen, 1998 in Ohlsson, 2000, 
p.6) . This also characterises the Aceh violent political confl ict, in which po litical 
marginalisation began in the 1950s and 1960s with at least two important policies 
issued by the central government: first ly, the abolition of Div isi Gajah Putih, the 
army division of the Acehnese guerril la fighters who fought against the Dutch; 
secondly, the incorporation of Aceh Province into the North Sumatra province 
with Medan as the capital city.17 The latter entailed an economic margi nali sati on, 
with development funds invested more in Medan than in Banda Aceh, regardless 
of the fact that Banda Aceh played a more s ignificant role during the 
independence struggle of Indonesia. 18 Further economic issues were the 
extraction of local natural resources in the 1970s with I ittle benefit enjoyed by 
local people. 19 Economic a lienation also took place at the micro level , with the 
isolation and strict control of the ' hot spot' villages that led to the local economic 
deprivation (I: penghancuran ekonomi lokal). 
The term 'v iolent political conflict' thus refers to 'violent conflict' o r the 
set of violent practices, from threats to physical and armed vio lence, as well as 
the economic alienation, due to polit ical disagreements between the conflicting 
political parties for poli tical-econom ic purposes. Violent political confl ict 
manifests in several forms, such as guerrilla conflict, param ilitary conflict, 
po li t ical assass ination, armed confl ict between political parties, genocide, ethnic 
c leansing, rape and sexual abuse. In the case of Aceh it a lso involves political and 
economic alienation. 
17 See Chapter 5, Section 1.2, for detai ls. 
18 Aceh was referred to as the source of capital (I: aceh daerah modal) by Sukarno, one of the 
prominent figures of Indonesia during and after the Independence struggle period. See Chapter 5, 
Section I for details. 
19 See Chapter 5, Section 1.3, for details. 
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The source of violent political conflict may vary and involves a 'multitude 
of causa l factors' (Moser, 200 I, p.39).2° Conway and Kishi (2002, p.6) suggest 
that three variables contribute to confl ict escalation, namely 'structural factors', 
'accelerators', and 'triggers'. 'Structural factors', also referred to as ' root causes', 
form the pre-conditions of crisis situations and include systemic political 
exclusion, shifts in demographic balance, deep-rooted economic inequalities, 
economic decline and ecological decline. Some qualitative studies have shown 
that horizontal economic inequality, i.e. inequality across regions or groups, is 
one of the major factors accelerating violent conflict (Humphreys, 2002). 
'Accelerators', also referred to as 'precipitators', are factors that work upon root 
causes in order to increase their levels of significance. The existence of natural 
resources, such as the case of Aceh, for example, may be used as an incentive fo r 
third parties (states or corporations) to promote vio lent conflicts (Humphreys, 
2002). 'Tri ggers' are sudden events that act as catalysts generating a cris is of 
conflict, such as the assassination of a leader, election fraud, or a po litical 
scandal. Conway and Kishi (2002) a lso argue that to analyse the emergence of 
conflict, it is important to understand how crisis develops to a conflict. 
According to Davis (2000, p.4), there are three factors that generate 
vio lent conflict. Firstly, the reasons stimulating a collective group action include 
the loss of political autonomy and active political, economic, and cultural 
discrimination. Secondly, the group capacity for collective actions encompasses 
identity vigour and militant mobilization. Thirdl y, the opportunity for co llective 
action to occur must be present, such as recent regime transition and the backing 
of kindred groups, also contributes in the likelihood of violent conflict. 
2.4 Violent Political Conflict and Its Impact on Livelihood 
Whatever factors cause a violent poli tical conflict, the effects will be more 
devastating than other conflicts as such conflicts are also characterised by the 
deliberate destruction of poli tical, economic, socia l and environmenta l systems. 
20 See also the work of Date-Bah (200 I) 
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Such conflicts are often characterised by weakened or absent public institutions, 
contested state legitimacy and statehood crises, an evident informal or illegal 
economy, wide atTays of violence, life threatening situations, involuntary 
di splacement, deliberate destruction of livelihoods, and political marginalisation 
of certain groups (Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, pp. 1-3). Evidence from Sierra 
Leone, South Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Kosovo and East Timor clearly show that 
conflict imperils the foundation of local economies, exempl ified in the 
followings: deterioration of employment and income sources; high inflation; 
eroded productive assets; obliterated informal and formal work places; weakened 
labour market; and increased number of female headed households (Date-Bah, 
200 I, pp.2-14). Consequently, violent political conflict threatens the livelihoods 
of the affected communities and leads to the ' loss of livelihood ', as seen in the 
case of the local economic deprivation (1 : penghacuran ekonomi lokal/1 of Aceh, 
which unfortunately is frequently neglected in discussions of conflict and its 
impact (Ohlsson, 2000, p. I). 
The destruction of livelihood often serves as a tool of destruction for the 
targeted communities. The impact on livelihood can be experienced at both macro 
and micro levels as shown in Tab le 1 (p.70), and can lead to a rapid descent into 
poverty from stable conditions. 
Table 3-1 The Macro and micro economic consequences of violent political 
conflict 
Macro-economic consequences Micro-economic consequences 
• Scarcity of basic goods • Insecurity may result in restricted mobility 
• Collapse of economic regulation and rules • Reduction in land cultivati on . 
of exchange • Restricted grazing mobility 
• Reduced investment • Fluctuation in market prices 
• Falling incomes, food production, exports • Asset depletion 
and imports • Increasing levels of debt 
• Declining tax revenues, ris ing budget • Blocked access to markets 
deficits 
• Abandonment of traditional livelihood 
• Geographical and economic fragmentation strategies to become involved in war 
• Biased price structures and exchange rates economy 
in favour of politico-military forces • Displacement 
• Hyperinflation 
Source: Jaspars & Shoham, 2002, p.6 
21 See Chapter 5, Section 2.2 and Chapter 6, for details. 
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In Aceh and other confl ict areas, such as several African countries and 
Kosovo, the impact of war on economic livelihoods is significant and has left a 
highly depressed economy, with a particularly serious effect on women (Ochieng, 
2001 ; Ohlsson, 2000; Jaspars and Shoham, 2002). These effects include a decline 
in household property; disruption of economic activ ities such as farming, trade 
and farm-based marketing activities; severe loss of livestock and household 
ability to sell cattle and other livestock to meet basic family needs of health , 
shelter, and education.22 
... loss of livelihood marks a rapid transition from a previous stable 
condition of relative welfare into a condition of poverty or destitution. It is 
the rapid process of change resulting in a sudden fal l into poverty, more 
than the endem ic condition of poverty ... (Ohlsson, 2000, p. I) 
T hese severe impacts result from the adoption of conventional military 
strategies in violent political conflict situations, including the destruction of the 
adversary's supply lines such as agricultural, electricity and transportation 
systems. These strategies are often used by the conflicting parties to deter 
movement and reduce the stabi lity of their enemies, but these strategies also 
affect the people 's wellbeing especially when they invo lve destruction of the 
socia l systems and network, by killings, kidnappings, or displacing the population 
(Lautze, 1997). In the province of Aceh, route checking, electricity cuts, and 
bridge destruction are examples of these conventional army strategies. Adding to 
these are burning down villages; kidnappings; killings; threats and terror to civil 
society; as well as forced displacements. These strategies were not on ly employed 
by the Indonesian army but also by the GAM fighters. 
T he nature of violent political conflict also determines the extent of 
exploitation of certain groups, which includes extracting the assets of 
marginali sed groups through looting, forced labour, and illegal taxation (Le 
Billon, 2000 in Jaspars and Shoham, 2002). In such circumstances, historicall y 
marginali sed and oppressed groups perceived as supporting the opposition 
become the most vulnerable. This was also the case of Aceh at the time of 
research. where villages classified as ' black areas' or vill ages with a strong 
22 See Chapter 5 for details. 
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presence of GAM fighters, such as Village S of Aceh Besar District (the Great 
Aceh District), were isolated with restricted movement for the people. Moreover, 
the more protracted the violent political conflict, the more likely people wi ll find 
ways of obtain ing benefit from it. Examples of this are taxation and diversion of 
relief assistance by rebel movements (Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, p. 7) 
In the case of the conflict in Aceh, the vu lnerable included: the poor; the 
Acehnese vi llagers in the hot spots, especially local businessmen who became 
important targets for illegal taxation; the Javanese settlers who were a lleged to 
represent the central government and to be the ' new colonisers'; and the NGO 
activists who were targeted for illegal taxation since they were believed to be 
obtaining foreign funds. As Jaspars and Shoham (2002, p.7) point out, power, 
representation, and inclusion in violent political conflict situation are often 
determined by ethnic as well as political affiliation This also demonstrates the 
way ethnicity is politicised, with traditional minorities and hi storical ly 
marginalised groups subjugated by state and non-state violent actors. 
The destructive effects of violent conflicts on the overall political, 
economic, social and environmental systems also weaken the economic 
autonomy of local communities (Lautze, 1997). The destruction of public 
facilities such as schools, roads, and health centres, for example, cuts people's 
access to these supporting faci lities. At the same time, the fractu re of the social 
system also exacerbates people's vulnerability. As a consequence, people have to 
strategise their livelihood and find ways of coping. In such c ircumstances, 'self-
sufficiency' becomes a critical survival strategy for many people (Lautze, 1997, 
p.6). 
It is evident in many conflict areas that local informal structures are 
crucial in the coping strategies of the affected communities. Included in these 
structures are civic, religious, and ethnic institutions (Jaspars and Shoham, 2002). 
T hese institutions often become sources of support and sometimes assume tasks 
that are usually government responsibilities, such as providing public services. 
Thi s is especially true when government structures have been weakened by the 
conflict, with their authority questioned by the rebel groups. Local institutions 
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can play constructive roles in maintaining public order, such as the case of 
Somalia with its customary law and shari'a court (UNDP, 200 1 in Jaspars and 
Shoham, 2002). 
T he important role of local informal institutions was also evident in the 
province of Aceh at the time of research. The people turned to the alternative 
public service providers, the NGOs and self help groups, for assistance. However, 
th is was not only due to a lack of trust in the government, but also because of the 
rivalry between the government' s structure and GAM's structure wh ich 
sandwiched the Acehnese people in between the two competing institutions. In 
add ition, the government system was often paralysed due to the violent political 
confli ct activities. 
Nevertheless, although it was apparent that people tended to become ' self-
reliant' for their livelihood sustenance and rely more on their own local informal 
structures, the government still had a role as public service provider and 
protector. Jn this case, reciprocal ties between the local government and NGOs 
were automatically established, especially when the government needed them to 
deliver their public supplies (such as medicine, rice for the poor, small credit 
scheme). The lack of access to target benefici aries was met by NGOs who had 
good access to, and wel l-established relations with, the target beneficiaries, but 
were themselves short of supplies. It was not uncommon for the local 
government paramedics in Aceh province to request help from NGO activists, 
mostly women, to deliver assistance to villagers, who were mostly women and 
chi ldren. 
T he above discuss ion clearly demonstrates how violent political conflict 
should not be isolated from its overall impact on political, economic, social and 
environmental systems, and that it shou ld be viewed as a ' gendered continuum ', 
in order to have a holi stic view and analysis. This is in line with what has been 
found by Moser and Mcilwaine (2001) in the Colombian and Guatemalan 
societies, where they perceived viole nce as ' highl y complex ', ' context-specific ', 
and ' interrelated' with many other factors, and viewed the severe economic and 
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social impacts as more problematic than the political violence that perpetrates 
them. 
3 Coping with Violent Political Conflict: Women, Coping 
Strategies, and Household Livelihoods 
Violent political conflict often carries tensions, terror, trauma, and 
intimidation perpetrated by parties involved in the conflict which may destroy 
quality of I ife. The devastating impacts are experienced by society at the level of 
community, household, and individuals, encompassing all aspects of life. The 
conflict, especially an armed one, may cause the breakdown of the fabric of daily 
I ife, its interlaced economies, its material systems of care and support, and its 
social networks (Cockburn, 2001, p.21; Date-Bah, 2001). The physical quality 
of life may be devastated as, in such circumstances, women and children find 
themselves in vicious, dangerous, and confusing situations. Such situations 
necessitate women and their household to establish their coping strategies as 
described in the following sections. 
3.1 The Affected Women: From 'Passive Victims' to 'Active 
Survivors' 
Impacts of violent political conflict differ between societies, regions, and 
contexts. However, in most cases, women experience a more shattering impact 
than their male counterparts. Women in Aceh experienced the grief of having lost 
their husbands, and being subjected to and witnessing terror and torture. Some 
studies (such as Ochieng, 2001; Date-Bah, 2001) suggest that women have to 
shoulder major burdens, such as the case of children and elderly, that prevent 
them from improving their status even in post conflict situations. The findings of 
this research support other studies (e.g. Berger, 2002; Meerten , 200 I; 
Ohlsson, 2000; Sharoni, 1995, p.63; and Ochieng, 2001) in that 
women typically experience the economic problems of being the 'main source of 
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income' in the absence of their husbands, or in situations where their male 
counterparts have lost their source of income and are still trying to find suitable 
men's jobs. The ravaging impact of conflict affects women's capacity to perform 
their daily economic activities. 
In this context, women often become ' active' by assuming the 
responsibilities for sustaining their household and, if possible, striving for a better 
situation for their household members. Parallel with findings of other studies 
(e.g. Meerten, 200 I; Ochieng, 200 I), this study also found that women survivors 
have reconstructed their social and economic initiatives by quickly adapting 
themselves to the situation. This proactive approach to findin g and establishing 
informal support networks, and in meeting their families' daily needs is 
exemplified by women organising themselves into groups and starting income-
generation ventures, as well as forming associations for substituting the ruptured 
fam i 1 y system and social supports. Meerten (200 I) stresses that women tended to 
be swifter than men in adapting to changed situations and assuming the 
responsibilities of meeting their fam ily's needs. This differs from the portrayal of 
men, who often end up being 'i nstitutionally dependent'- re lying on 'working 
women' and quite often turning to alcohol (Meerten, 200 I; Ochieng, 2001 ). In 
Aceh, where a lcohol is banned, men tended to spend their time in small shops (I: 
warung) or coffee shops (Ac.: keude kopi) with their male counterparts. A man 
from North Aceh argued that spending time in coffee shops does not necessaril y 
equate to leisure t ime as business deal s often conducted in here. A young man 
from vi llage I of Aceh Besar, however, said bitterly "Yes, we farm, plant, and 
have a good yield . .. at the coffee shop . . . " (1.:"Ya, kami bertani, menanam, dan 
panennya bagus .. di warung kopi .. ") . Nevertheless, this does not merely illustrate 
the ' run away' strategy of coping for the men, but also the insecure circumstances 
that limited men's mobility more than that of women's, for men were more often 
suspected of involvement in the GAM than women. Nonetheless, it supports the 
thesis than women were the backbone of the household and were more active 
than their male counterparts in their household coping strategies. 
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The term ' active' therefore implies that the women actively make 
deci sions to undertake certain courses of action to develop and exercise their 
personal coping strategies which are essential to sustain their households. Women 
are therefore not viewed as ' passive victims' but as ' active survivors ' with their 
overall roles in social, economic and po litical spheres. 
Mee1tens (200 I) similarly found , in the case of the di splaced people in 
Colombia, that women show great resilience in unfavourable conditions, 
challenging their picture as vulnerable, passive victims, and becoming actors of 
their survival. Meertens (200 I) states that, in contrast to their male counterparts, 
Colombian women immediately started to seek and develop available support for 
the disp laced people, whilst men tended to concentrate on formal supports only. 
3.2 Coping Strategies: The Contextual Model 
The study of coping originates in psychology was only formally 
operationalised in the late 1960s by psychologists such as Lazarus, Moos and 
Pearl in (Zeidner and Norman, 1996; Parker and Endler, 1996; Stone et a ll , 
1992).23 There have been two broad approaches to studying coping, namel y the 
' trait ' (or style) approach and the ' process' -oriented approach (Porter and Stone, 
1996). T he first approach examines coping styles from the perspective of 
personality di spositions that surpass the influence of the current state of affairs or 
time. This approach suggests coping is a static phenomenon (Porter and Stone, 
1996, p.1 33). In contrast, the process approach defines coping as" ... speci fie 
thoughts and behaviours that are performed in response to stressful situations and 
that change over time and s ituations." (Porter and Stone, 1996, p.133) 
The two approaches exemplify the ongoing discussion on whether coping 
is an adaptive strategy or an unchangi ng strategy. While some scholars argue that 
23 The concept has been in the psychological literature for decades. The study of coping began 
with the study of the role of stress in illness. In the 1970s, a number of books and articles 
proposed that coping can be studied separately, rather than as part of psychology (Folkman, 1992, 
p.3 1). 
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situational factors are important in determining adaptive responses, more recent 
evidence proposes 'cons iderable stability' in coping styles (Kohn, 1996, p.185). 
Regardless of the debates between the two approaches, both suggest that coping 
carries certain positive outcomes (Ursin and Hytten, 1992, p.174; Lazarus, 1996; 
Cohen, 1987 in Carpenter 1992, p.175). In th is regard, coping can be viewed in 
terms of coping responses and resources (Lepore and Evans, 1996). Coping 
responses refers to behaviours and cognitions, including skil ls that are obtained 
from past experiences, used to adjust to a stressor in order to manage and resolve 
the stressor. Coping resources24 are defined as the overall assets that can be 
accessed by individuals to enable them to respond to stressors. These assets can 
be individual (e.g. skills and educational background), material (e.g. land and 
other capital such as money), environment (e.g. social support), and/or physical. 
Coping, therefore, may be defined as the collection of positive strategies 
to face stressors, the sources of pressures (either from threats or cha I lenges). with 
positive outcome expectancies, using available resources (individual , material, 
social and physical environment). This definition indicates three interrelated core 
concepts of coping: stressors, actions, and expectations. 
The term stressor refers to the physical and social environmental 
conditions which are perceived as potentially threatening, damaging, harmful or 
depriving (Lepore and Evans, 1996, pp.350-351 ). There are five general 
categories of stressors: cataclysmic events, major life events, dail y stressors, 
ambient stressors and role stressors. Each of these stressors is interrelated and 
comprises a wide range of combinations. Cataclysms, for example, often bring 
some major life changes that people have to cope with. The combination of both 
cataclysms and major life events stressors, in turn, may act as daily stressors in 
24 In their Conservation of Resources Theory (COR), Hobfoll et al (1996, p.324) suggest four 
general resources: (a) object resources which include physical objects such as house, j ewels, cars, 
and clothing; (b) condition resources, which refer to conditions that are valued by people or that 
facilitate attainment or protection of valued resources such as seniority, stabl e jobs, and a good 
married life; (c) personal resources, which include the overall characteristics and skills possessed 
by individuals such as job ski lls, social prowess, and sense of personal efficacy; and (d) energy 
resources, which are defined as resources that facilitate or allow access to other resources, such as 
money, credit, owed favours, and knowl edge. 
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people' s lives. Stressors, therefore, usually take multiple forms through a 
' cascade effect' (Lepore and Evans, 1996). 
Table 3-2 Five general categories of stressors and their characteristics 
Category Typical Characteristics Examples 
Cataclysms Sudden, tumultuous, irrevocable Natural disasters, such as tloods, 
events that impose great adaptive hurricanes, and earth-quakes; 
demands on many people. technological or human-made 
Cataclysms tend to be severe catastrophes, such as nuclear 
stressors to the average person. accidents, war, plane wrecks, 
collapsing bridges or buildings. 
Major life events Episodic and often irrevocable Social losses through divorce, 
events that tend to impose great death, relocation, or other I ife 
adaptive demands on one or a few transitions; j ob loss; criminal 
individuals. Major li fe events tend victimization; serious ii lness or 
to be severe stressors to the average disabil ity. 
person. 
Daily stressors Constellations of related and Financial problems, such as 
ongoing stressors experienced in inability to buy basic necessities; 
day-to-day life. Daily stressors can bureaucratic inefficiencies; trouble 
range from being re lati vely minor getting work done because of 
to severe to the average person. interruptions. 
Ambient stressors Often intractable environmental Noise, crowding, pollution, traffic 
conditions that impose ongoing congestion, extreme temperatures. 
demands on people. Ambient 
stressors can range from relatively 
minor and unnoticed to severe to 
the average person. 
Role stressors Ongoing difficulties related to Competing role expectations and 
fulfilling role obligations. Role demands, excessive workload, role 
stressors are typically severe to the ambiguity, too many 
average person, especially when responsibili ties for people or 
they occur in personally important objects, lack of social suppori or 
roles (e.g. marital or work roles). cohesion, lack of control of 
appropriate decision latitude. 
Source: Lepore and Evans (1996, pp.352-353) 
Violent poli tical conflict is considered to be a 'severe stressor' (Hobfoll, 
et al, 1996, p.323; Lepore and Evans, 1996, p.353; Miku lincer and Florian, 1996, 
p.556) and fall s under the category of ' cataclysm' (Hobfoll , et al 1996, p.323) 
which may become a ' foca l stressor' . Focal stressors produce a cascade effect by 
triggering other stressors, such as ' major life event stressors' which often occur in 
violent political conflict situations. In such extremely stressful situations, the 
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coping abilities of individuals, fami lies, and communities, are greatly 
r 
challenged ' (Hobfoll, et al, 1996). 
The focal stressor and its cascade effect may result in the depletion of 
social coping resources. When people rely too much on their social network for 
support, for example, they may exhaust the network members and lead to the 
possible withdrawal of support. This may also create tension between support 
seekers and providers that leads to even greater social support depletion. Several 
studies have shown that increased social tensions in crowded households 
commonly result in a diminished level of social suppo11 between household 
members and the depletion of material and financial resources, causing greater 
vu lnerability (Coates, Wortman and Abbey, 1979 in Lepore and Evans, 1996, 
p.366). 
It is worth noting that embedded in the stressor-action-expectation 
re lationship are two underlying assumptions. The first is that coping is an active 
choice and the decision-making process is consc iously performed by ind ividuals, 
households, and communities, with certain expectations of positive results 
(Carpenter, 1992, p.17; Holahan, Moos and Schaefer, 1996, p.25; Frieze and 
Bookwala, 1996, p.3 14). The second is that coping is exercised within a certain 
social context26 and is part of a social process dynamic (Folkman, 1992, pp. 33-
34). 
The theoretical framework of coping employed in thi s research takes an 
economic, rather than psychological approach, as this research attempts to 
concentrate on women 's cop ing strategies for maintaining household li velihood 
in violent political conflict situations. The core of the analysis is at the househo ld 
level with particular attention to women in relation to other household members 
and the overall socio-cultural context. This approach is used to capture the 
interrel ated coping behaviours of women as individuals, members of the 
25 Hobfoll et al {1996) note that most research on 'extreme stressors' tends to look at resources 
that underlie the coping behaviour and not the coping itself. Therefore, as an interesting area of 
study, not much has been done in this area. 
26 Pearling ( l 985a in Carpenter and Scott, 1992) suggest that certain demographic or socio-
economic characteristics may also determine coping strategies of the people and therefore may be 
considered as the particular context of coping. 
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household, as their most immediate socio-cultural context, and members of the 
community at another layer of socio-cultural context. In this light, I use the 
contextual model of coping that takes account of the pa1ticular context of 
household and society during violent political conflict situations. This follows the 
argument of Hob foll et al (1996), on the important role of the community or 
social context in disaster situations. I thus consider the extent of community 
disruption, regional centrality (i.e. core areas of violent political conflict), the 
setting of the community (e.g. rural or urban), and the community's arrangement 
of disaster responses (e.g. the immediate social networks) as" ... an impo1tant 
mediator of indiv idual outcomes following exposure to extreme stress ... " 
(Hobfol l et al., 1996, p.340). 
The contextual model is also used to capture the 'multiple realities' that 
affect the way women cope. As argued by Parpart and Marchand ( 1995 in Moser 
and C lark, 2001, p.5), the experience of armed confl ict is not built upon a single 
discourse and is experienced differently by different people in different contexts. 
The ' multiple realities' encompass the overal l diversity of geographical, religious, 
and social contexts, wh ich certain ly play major roles in women's coping 
strategies. 
Based on this and the three important core concepts of 'stressors-actions-
expectations ' in coping mentioned earlier, I use a 'contextual triangular analysis 
of stressors, actions, and expectancies' to examine the research problem (Figure 
3-2). Furthermore, this contextual analysis also serves as a tool for understanding 
the gender differentiation and local construction of gender roles in the 
asymmetrical power relations between men and women in violent political 
conflict situations in Aceh. As noted earlier in section 3. 1, women encounter 
gender specific experiences in violent political conflict situations that illustrates 
the need to investigates their particular problems, needs and interests. 
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Figure 3-2. The Contextual Triangular Analysis 
<====> I Expectations I 
Household 
The findings of this research suggest that in the violent political conflict 
situations in Aceh, women and other affected community members cope 
adequately with repeated shocks and incidents of threats, terror, and armed 
clashes. Together with their children and elderly household members, women fl~~ 
to safer ground and return only when the dangers have subsided. Parents may 
send their children to extended families or trusted friends in safer areas. Traders 
postpone their trading activities, but still provide 'tax money' to the conflicting 
parties to sustain their trading activities. Farmers reduce production and the 
diversity of storage techniques. People of working age may choose to migrate to 
work outside Aceh and send back remittances to help the household cope 
economically. Households may use more inter-household remittances and loans, 
sell properties or increase their petty commodity production. 
Coping strategies vary from one household to another and from one 
period to another. However, when repeated hazards become common, the coping 
may also become systematic and adapted to the situation (Lautze, 1997, p.13). 
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This argument suggests some similarities of household coping strategies in 
paiiicular contexts or societies. This is parallel to the case of vio lent political 
conflict in the province. With the conflict lasting for over 30 years, system ic 
coping strategies have emerged among the Acehnese. 
4 Household Livelihoods And Coping Strategies 
4.1 On the Concept of Household 
The household has been an important concept for analysis of local 
economies s ince the 1970s (Wolf, 2000, p.85). Beginning from 1960s, 
anthropologists have contended that the idea of the nuclear family was a product 
of European history resulting from the Industrial Revolution and not a cultural 
universal (Saptari, 2000, p.10). Feminist scholars, in particular, questioned the 
role of family as the means of 'social solidarity and support,' arguing rather that it 
is a machinery for female subordination. There is, however, a close link between 
both the concept of family and household, with domestic units regulated by 
different combinations of kinship and residential patterns (Saptari, 2000, p.11 ). 
Nevertheless, feminists argue that the close link of the concept of household and 
family does not necessarily means that both concepts are identical. 
Family, defined by biological and kin relations, is primarily characterised 
by its procreative and reproductive functions, whilst household is a social unit 
consisting of a set of individuals living together in one house and carrying out a 
set of ' domestic' activities (Saptari, 2000, p.1 1 ). A household is also sometimes 
characterised by a common pot, a unit in which household members pool 
resources and share domestic tasks (Rapp, 1981 ). Thus, the concept of household 
is commonly adopted as the fundamental unit of analysis on the economy of 
society and understood as a ' basic, communal , multi-purpose, social-economic 
uni t' (White, 1980, p.9). The household is an important site of 'subsistence, 
social reproduction and daily practices' (Wolf, 2000, p.97). 
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Within households, gender relations and women' s agency are mediated 
(Saptari , 2000). Households become the first scene where women exercise their 
' agency' , their capabilities to respond to and a lter their circumstances. In many 
cases, challenges to household economic survival allow more room for women to 
exercise their 'agency', especially in maintaining the livelihood of their 
households. As discussed in section 3 above, in the difficult circumstances of 
violent political conflict, women are the backbone of the households' coping 
strategies and often become the main providers of income. 
Investigating househo ld , however, require a ' beyond-household ' analysis 
(Tiwon, 2000; Wolf, 2000). Understanding state ideology and hegemony over 
women and their households becomes essential. This is especiall y true in 
Indonesia where households have been a too l of state control for generations, and 
womanhood has been part of the national construction in both colonial and post 
colonial eras (Tiwon, 2000). In the case of Aceh, not only the state needs to be 
taken into account, but also the GAM authority. Unlike households in other 
relatively ' normal ' areas in Indonesia, Acehnese households had to face a ' double 
hegemony.' In addition, Islam and customary law (I: adat) are other institutions 
that shape intra and inter-household relations. 
4.2 Livelihoods, Coping, and Crisis Strategies 
Approaches to studying livelihood have been developed within the 
context of stable and non conflict situations, but have also been recently applied 
in chronic emergencies (Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, p.1 ). The approaches were 
originally developed from Sen's entitlement theory, which states that ' famines 
occur as a result of people not having food rather than there not be ing enough 
food' (Sen, 198 I in Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, p.15). Livelihood is defined as the 
fo llowing: 
A livel ihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and 
social assets) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, whil e not undermining the 
natural resource base. (Chambers and Conway, 1992 in Jaspars and 
Shoham, 2002, p.12) 
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The framework for investigating livelihoods contains five general 
components (Carney et al., 1999 in Jaspars and Shoham, 2002): 
• Vulnerability context: resources, infrastructure, economic, political, 
environment, shocks and stresses. 
• Resources or assets: financial , human, natural, physical , social and 
political assets. 
• Transforming structures and processes (pol icies, institutions, and 
processes) - government, non government, private sector 
organ isations, and laws, policies, cu lture and institutions. 
• Livelihood strategies: assets, production and income, processing, 
exchange, marketing, and consumption activities. 
• Livelihood outcomes or goals. 
Strategies for gaining and/or maintain ing a livel ihood are usually analysed 
in terms of livel ihood capabilities (h uman capital), social capital , economic 
cap ital (stores and resources), and political capital (determined by connection to 
power). In violent political conflict situations, these strategies become limited and 
their goals may be reduced from meeting basic needs to safeguarding livelihoods 
(Jaspars and Shoham, 2002). In drought, households tend to adopt coping 
strategies to protect their livelihoods, i.e. the food and economic security of 
households. This coping strategy refers to temporary responses to diminishing 
food entitlements, which are characteristic of structurall y secure livelihood 
(Davies, 1993 in Jaspars and Shoham, 2002) and comprises insurance and crisis 
strategies (Corbett, 1988 in Jaspars and Shoham, 2002). 
An insurance strategy anticipates uncertainty and insecurity. It inc ludes 
building up resources and diversifying sources of income, which can be done 
through, for example, migrating, collecting available natural resources, and 
modifying the structure of household expenses. These strategies are performed in 
three different stages, i.e. accumulation, adaptation, and coping strategies 
(Devereux, 1999 in Jaspars and Shoham 2002, p.9). 
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Crisis strategies, also termed 'survival strategies' (Devereux, 1999 in 
Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, p.9), respond to a prolonged crisis involving the 
depletion of essential assets and impoverishment (Corbett, 1988 in Jaspars and 
Shoham, 2002). Such strategies, therefore, carry the possible consequence of 
damaging the household economy because households use their productive assets 
to survive. This suggests a differentiation between coping strategies and crisis or 
survival strategies. Coping strategies aim at preventing destitution and therefore 
do not damage household economy and livelihoods, whilst surviving strategies 
aim at subsistence and often lead to household resources depletion . 
In this thesis, however, I do not differentiate between the two strategies 
because, in reality, the distinction between coping strategies and surviving 
strategies is thin and shifts between the two often occur. Households 
interchangeably use the two types of strategies and frequently move from one to 
the other. Furthermore, under repeated shocks, coping strategies may transform 
into survival strategies and therefore lead to depletion of resources. Added to this 
is the fact that in a violent political conflict situation, households often have to 
cope with a lack of state services, the destruction of pub I ic services and access to 
them, the growth of an illegal/ informal economy, and the destruction of assets 
that may have arisen over a longer period of time. 
The coping strategies employed in a violent political conflict can be 
grouped into four types: return to a subsistence economy; engagement in a 
parallel or informal economy; violent or illegal activities; and cultural-morally 
degrading activities (Jaspars and Shoham 2002, p.9). The following Table 3 lists 
various strategies commonly adopted in armed conflict situations. Some people 
have to face a limited choice of marginal activities. Often they have to revert to a 
subsistence mode of life. Petty trade often becomes an important component of 
livelihood strategies such as the case of Somalia, which experienced a boom in 
trading activities after the 1990s (UNDP, 200 I in Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, 
p.9). 
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Table 3-3 Strategies generally adopted in response to violent political 
conflict 
• Falling back on subsistence farming 
• Revival of old crafts 
• Petty trade 
• Seeking relief 
• Increasing indebtedness/borrowing 
• High reliance on remittance from 
relatives abroad 
Source : Jaspars and Shoham, 2002, p.9. 
• Engaging in informal economy 
• Theft and looting 
• Joining local militia 
• Overcoming social taboos 
• Prostitution (including child 
prostitution) 
• Chi ld labour 
The economic activities can also be grouped in accordance to scale 
(macro, meso, and micro) and the degree of illegality or criminality (Le Billon, 
2000 in Jaspars and Shoham, 2002). There are four categories suggested: ' legal ' 
(manufacturing, trade, subsistence farming), a 'grey area' (large-scale extraction, 
informal trade, small-scale smuggling), ' illegal' (government corruption, asset 
transfer, taxation by armed groups), and criminal (capital flight, forced labour, 
robbery). In general, approaches which assess livelihoods do not incorporate a 
macro-level analysis of the processes that cause risks to livelihoods and political 
vu lnerabi lity, such as war, political economy, governance environment, and the 
power dynamics in violent political conflict situations (Jaspars and Shoham, 
2002, p.14). These approaches also neglect the illegal and criminal economic 
activities due to access and security issues. 
4.3 The Assets Base 
Lautze ( 1997) and Moser (200 I, p.41) suggest that asset bases are 
fundamental to exploring household livelihood coping strategies. A basic 
understanding of the composition of assets held by households will help to 
analyse coping strategies. Moser also proposes taking into consideration the links 
between exclusion, vulnerability, and assets ownersh ip. The more assets that an 
individual, household and commun ities acquire and the better they manage their 
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assets, the less vulnerable they wi ll be. In contrast, the fewer assets (which can 
also mean the more assets eroded) and the more difficulties in managing them, 
the greater the insecurity will be. Assets can be classified into four types: 
physical ; human; social; and natural. 
Physical assets refer to man-made assets and consist of equipment, capital 
and other valuable goods. Some studies show that women and men tend to hold 
and accumulate different types of assets. Women tend to hold more liquid assets 
such as jewellery, whilst men have more control over non-liquid assets such as 
land, houses, and vehicles. When violent attacks occur, they often erode physica l 
assets or obstruct access to these physical assets. This was the case in Aceh where 
Acehnese households often had to flee and became displaced in safer areas out of 
their villages. They often also had to release their non liquid assets, which were 
either taken by GAM soldiers to substitute for the 'war tax' (Ac.: pajak 
nanggroe) that the Acehnese had failed to pay by the due date, or by the 
Indonesian soldiers who asked for 'small presents'27 to take home upon 
completion of their duties in a village. This, in turn, limited the people's 
economic activities and influenced their coping strategies. 
Human assets include education, health, and the nutritional status of 
individuals. It was common for the state's teachers and health providers to be 
targeted by GAM soldiers (as part of their protest against the government) and, 
therefore, the former could not perform their tasks. Such actions affect the overal I 
education , health, and nutritional status of individuals, mostly women and 
ch ildren, as it reduces their access to health and education services (Moser, 200 I, 
p.42). Bad health and nutritional status limit women's capacity to work, which 
leads to lower income and decreased nutritional status of their children and other 
household members. This drags women into the vicious cycle of poverty, which 
demonstrates the linkage of conflict and poverty. 
27 I myself experienced this several times during my stay in Aceh when soldiers called me on my 
mobile phone, the number having been revealed when I passed through some of their 'check 
points.' These soldiers, arguing that their period of duties in Aceh would soon end, asked me for 
• oleh-oleh' (I) to bring home. I usually answered that I could not give anything since I would also 
be leaving soon and needed 'oleh-oleh.' The tem1 'oleh-oleh' literally means small presents, but 
it is often used to refer to a small ' bribe.' 
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Natural assets comprise stocks of environmentally provided assets that 
people can access for their household, like land, water, and forest.28 In rural 
settings, land is an important productive asset. The destruction of natural capital 
influences women and men differently depending on their original division of 
labour as well as their roles and responsibilities in their households. The different 
impacts are also determined by place of origin, i.e. urban or rural areas. Amongst 
rural communities, where land is a critical asset for economic activities, the loss 
of and I imited access to land certainly affects households more than in urban 
communities. 
Social assets include all social structures, arrangements and institutions 
that support the household livelihood coping strategies, such as social support, 
coalition building, social joining (and disjoining), and social protection. These 
assets encompass of the overall rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust 
entrenched in social relations (Moser, 200 I, p.43). Both the 'size and density' of 
social institutions and the ' nature of interpersonal interactions' of social networks 
significantly influence the efficiency and sustainability of deve lopment processes 
(Moser, 200 I, p.43; see also North, 1990; Putnam, 1993; and Olson, 1982). 
Social assets are, therefore, important in both identifying women's coping 
strategies and providing some insights into the practical relevance of thi s research 
for development projects. 
In this research, I used the four types of assets - physical , human, social , 
and natural assets - to analyse the women's coping strategies at the household 
level in Aceh. I do not on ly focus on household level, but also consider both the 
formal and informal structural and institutional systems at community levels, 
including government-implemented structural and institutional systems and the 
social practices and arrangements of the traditions (I: adat kebiasaan) of the 
Acehnese community. 
In this study, gender relations are at the core of analysis at the household 
level, where gender and age structures play major and significant roles. Gender 
28 Although natural capital may be important for household livelihood sustenance, it also plays an 
important role as one of the rebel group's funding sources (Humphreys, 2002). 
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power relations, for example, determine control over household resources, the 
division of labour, and deci sion making processes - especially who has the final 
say. This, in turn, influences household coping strategies, where women play the 
major role. In a v iolent confl ict setting, women are often responsible for the 
coll ection of resources essential for self-sufficiency (Lautze, 1997). 
5 Conclusion 
Violent political conflicts and coping strategies are both multi-faceted 
phenomena. Studying violent political conflict requires, a combination of rational 
choice and social learning theories that recognises the reciprocal ties between 
individuals and their social milieu, taking into account the role of gender 
construction in a violent political conflict and its effects on women and their 
household livelihood. Studies of violent political conflict therefore need to cover 
the following crucial issues, at both pragmatic and symbolic levels: the need for 
localising or contextual ising the violent political confl ict into the pertinent 
conflicting social groups; the different societal layers (structural, institutional, 
inter-personal, and ind ividual), bearing in mind the three factors that escalate 
conflict, i.e. ' structural factors ', ' accelerators', and 'triggers' ; gender inequality, 
taking into account the underlying assumption of unequal ' power-relations' over 
resources at both community and ho usehold levels as suggested by scholars such 
as Cockburn (cited in Moser and Clark, 2001 , p.6), Moser and Clark (200 I), and 
Norldhold (2000); and the devastating socio-economic effects of violent po litical 
confli ct. 
As noted in th is chapter, violent political conflict is considered to be a 
' severe stressor' and fall s under the category of 'cataclysm' (Hobfoll, et al 1996, 
p.323; Lepore and Evans, 1996, p.353; Mikul incer and Florian, 1996, p.556), 
which may become a ' focal stressor. ' This focal stressor has a cascade effect that 
triggers other stressors, such as ' maj or li fe event stressors ' wh ich often happen in 
a violent political conflict situation. 
96 
In such situations, women need to be perceived not merely as ' passive 
victims' of violence but as 'active survivors', who assume the responsibilities of 
sustaining their households, including ch ildren and the elderly. This study found 
that women survivors have rebuilt their social and economic initiatives by quickly 
adapting themselves to the situation and becoming pro-active in finding and 
establi sh ing informal support networks, especially in meeting their families' daily 
needs (see Meerten in Moser and C lark, 200 I; Ochieng, 200 I). For example, 
women have organised themselves into groups, have started income generation 
activities, and formed associations as substitutes for the ruptured family system 
and social supports. ln this sense, the term 'active' also implies that the women 
actively make decisions to undertake certain actions in the development and 
exercise of the ir household coping strategies. 
In scrutinizing household livelihood coping strategies, exam ining asset 
bases is fundamental (Lautze, 1997; Moser, 200 I, p.41 ). In th is regard, a basic 
understanding of the composition of assets (physical, human, social , and natural 
assets) held by households is crucial. The links between exclusion, vulnerabil ity, 
and assets ownership are also essential: the more assets acquired by individuals, 
households and communities, the better these assets are managed and the less 
vu lnerable households will be. In contrast, the more assets are eroded and the 
more difficult assets are to manage, the greater household insecurity will be. 
The effects of violent political conflict are especially devastating for the 
civ ili an population since this often include the deliberate destruction of political , 
economic, social and environmental systems. With its eminent features of wide 
ranging violence, li fe threatening situations, involuntary displacement, intentional 
destructions of livelihoods, and poli tical margina lisation of ce1 ain groups, violent 
pol itical conflict threatens the livelihoods of affected communities and often leads 
to a ' loss of livel ihood' (Ohlsson, 2000, p. l ) . However, adequate cons ideration of 
th is aspects are frequentl y absent from discussions of confl ict and its impact. 
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Chapter 4 Women and Acehnese Society: A 
Historical Review 
Adat bak Po Te11me11re11hom: 
Hukom bak Sjiah Kuala: 
Meudjeulih kanun bak Putroe Phang; 
Resam bak Bentara1 
Custom and Tradition from the sultan 
Judicial law from Sj iah Kuala2 
Civil Rules and politeness in marriage (Muslim Administrative Law) 
from the Queen 
Customary habit and practice [at local level] from the Commander 
(laksamana, or panglima or bentara) of each kaum or region (negeri) 
This chapter describes the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
region, its demography, society and culture, to provide the societal context of 
the research. It grounds analysis of contemporary Acehnese society and 
culture in historical context, and gives particular consideration to gender 
relations. The historical account is employed by considering the earlier era of 
the Acehnese Sultanate as the starting point of analysis. The golden history of 
the Sultanate has often been used as a point of reference for Acehnese pride, 
and in particular put forward by GAM3 as the basis of not only independence 
but also of Acehnese identity. 
1 In the contemporary acehnese citation ' resam' was written as ' reusam'; ' kanun' as 'qanun'; 
and instead of bentara it uses the term laksamana. Kanun was added in this saying only after 
Sultan lskandar Muda (1607-1636) married Putri Kamalliah (Putroe Phang) from Pahang, 
Malay kingdom (Zainuddin, 1961 , p.3 13) . Reus am or resam in Stevens and Schm idgal !-
Tellings (2004, p.827) is translated as 'customary usage, natural hab it, mode, constitut ion. 
2 Sj iah Kuala refers the famous Acehnese ulama Abdul Rauf A l Fansuri ( 1593 - 1695), who 
was also called Sjiah Kuala. He was one of the students of the previous wel l-known ulama 
Nuruddin al-Raniri, who originated from the province of Gujarat in India, who wrote 'Bustan 
al-Salatin ' (The Garden of Kings), the famous book on Islam ic guiding principles on state and 
statecraft in the 16111 century (Harun, 2004, p.28). 
3 See chapter 5 section 1.3 for detai ls 
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In this chapter, I argue that four important factors need to be taken into 
consideration in analysing contemporary Acehnese society. Firstly, Acehnese 
society is heterogenous, being composed of several cultural linguistic groups 
with each group possessing a distinctive identity. The heterogeneity has 
become more sharply delineated in the context of violent political conflict. 
Secondly, the heterogeneity of the Acehnese corresponds to the diversity of 
Acehnese identity that has also developed due to changes brought about by 
Islam (Ac.: Eseulam),4 a market economy, and violent political conflict. 
Thirdly, experiencing a long period of violent political conflict has 
resulted in certain dynamics in the Acehnese society that might not have 
occurred in other part of Indonesia. The longstanding conflict has infiltrated 
many different dimensions of the people's day-to-day lives. Indonesia state 
supremacy, freedom fighters, military operations, Shari 'a law5 
implementation, civil society movements, and the presence of international 
relief organisations and their workers, including the United Nations, have all 
had an impact on the contemporary situation in Aceh. Fourthly, the old 
Acehnese saying 'the law and tradition, is like a substance and its innate 
qualities' (Ac.: 'Adat ngon hukom, lagee zat ngon sifeut') which depicts the 
close link between traditions and Islam as described in section 2.2.2, needs to 
be critically taken into account when considering the overall changes in 
contemporary Acehnese society, while still bearing in mind the differences 
between norms and reality. 
This chapter comprises four sections. The first section describes the 
geographical characteristics of the region. The second section provides a 
description of Acehnese society and culture, using an historical account of 
Acehnese identity, to look at the sources of basic principles in the society as 
well as some contemporary changes that have occurred. The third section 
examines the socio-demographic characteristics and economy of the region, 
4 See Daud and Durie (1999, p.128) 
5 See Chapter I 
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and pays special attention to poverty and its relation to the current conflict 
situation.6 The fourth section draws together some concluding remarks. 
1 The Geographic Characteristics 
Geographically, Aceh province is located on the tip of the north-
western part of Sumatra, with an area of approximately 57 ,365.57 km2 or 
about 2.89 % of land area of Indonesia.7 It is surrounded by the Malacca Strait 
in the north, North Sumatra province in the east, and the Indian Ocean to both 
the south and west. The capital city is Banda Aceh, which means the capital 
or trading mart of Aceh (Hurgronje, 1906, p.24). Banda Aceh was also known 
as Kutaraja or Bandar Aceh8 Dar-es-Salaam and (its' 'soubriquet' banda) 
implies town-bred or civilised (Hurgronje, 1906, p.24). The term still existed 
at the time of my research. I was often asked whether or not I was from Banda 
(Ac.: ureueng banda; I.: orang banda). 
At the time of the field work (July 2003 -August 2004), the province 
was divided into 16 districts (I: kabupaten) and 4 municipalities (I: 
kotamadya), which was an increase over the eleven districts and 
municipalities which existed in 2000. Each district and municipality was 
composed of several sub districts (I: Kecamatan). The sixteen districts were 
Simeulue, Aceh Singkil, South Aceh (Aceh Selatan), Southeast Aceh (Aceh 
Tenggara), East Aceh (Aceh Timur), Central Aceh (Aceh Tengah), West Aceh 
(Aceh Barat), Great Aceh (Aceh Besar), Pidie, Biruen, N01ih Aceh (Aceh 
Utara), Southwest Aceh (Aceh Barat Daya), Gayo Lues, Aceh Tamiang, 
Nagan Raya, and Aceh Jaya. The four municipalities were Banda Aceh, 
Sabang, Langsa, and Lhokseumawe. 9 
6 See Chapter 5 that provide a thorough description and analysis of the conflict s ituation of 
Aceh using an historical approach. 
7 Unpublished information from the Regional Development Planning Board, Province of 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2003. 
8 Some sources, using the old spellings (I.: Ejaan Lama) of Bahasa Indonesia write this as 
' Atj eh ' instead of ' Aceh'. The meaning is identical. 
9 See Table 4-1 , p. l 03 for details. 
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The region is culturally diverse. It is occupied by several ethnic and 
language groups. The major ethnic group is the Acehnese who are distributed 
throughout Aceh. Apart from the Acehnese, the indigenous groups are Gayo 
(in the central and eastern parts), Alas (in the south-east), Tamiang (in Aceh 
Tamiang), Aneuk Jamee (concentrated in the south and south-west), Kluet, 
Singkil, and Simeulue (on Simeuleu Island). In addition, there is also some 
Chinese population, especially the Hakka, who came to the region mainly in 
the 1870s and 1880s, either as traders or as cheap labour for the Dutch 
plantation (Reid, 2006, p.6; Reid, 2005, p.194). 10 
From the Population census in 2000, in which respondents were asked 
to self-identify their ethnic background, however, Aceh Tamiang and Aneuek 
Jamee were not mentioned (Figure 4-1 ). This is regardless of the fact that 
some Acehnese that I met clearly identify themselves as Tamiang and Aneuek 
Jamee with their distinct dialects that are close to the Malay language. The 
exclusion ofTamiang and Aneuek Jamee may be due to their insignificant 
numbers and hence they may be included in 'others' . Figure 4-1 shows 
Acehnese (50 %) was the major ethnic group. Apart from the Acehnese, other 
indigenous groups specified in the census were Gayo Lues (5 %), Gayo Lut (7 
%), Alas (4 %), Singkil (3 %), and Simeulu (2%). There were also quite a 
significant number of Javanese (16 %) and Batak Tapanuli (2%). 
10 The Chinese population is usually located in certain areas in cities and is noted as 
influential in business and financ ial activities. 
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Figure 4-1 Proportion of the Population in Aceh by Ethnic 
Background in 2000 
Balak, Tapanuli ; 
39,146 ; 2% ---.. 
Simeulu; 42,803; 
2 % 
Gayo Lues; ...; 
81,172 ; 5% J 
Gayo Lut; 
117 ,509 ;7% 
Javanese; 
274,926; 16% 
Others; 193 ,550; 
11 % 
Ace h, A-Tse, 
Achin, Akhir, Ur; 
871 ,944; 50 % 
Data Source: Population of Nanggroe A ceh Darussalam, Results of The 2000 Population 
Census. BPS, Statistics Indonesia . Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Note: Pie chart is made by Author. 
The total population of Aceh in 2000 was around 4 million, hence the 
region comprised around 2 percent of the total population of Indonesia. 11 
Table 4-1 clearly indicates that North Aceh was the most populated area in the 
province in the period 1999 to 2000, and was estimated to remain the most 
populated area in 2001-2004. This is well explained by the industrial growth 
in the region, especially since the discovery of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
in East Aceh was followed by its exploitation that led to the development of 
North Aceh as a new industrial area in the 1970s (Ross, 2003, p.11). 
11 The year 2000 was the latest data available. However, there are different figures for the 
population of Aceh province. According to the central office of Statistics Indonesia the 
population in 2000 was 3,930,905 people, whilst the regional office claimed 4,010,860 
people. 
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Table 4-1 Population by Regency/City in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
Province,1999- 2004 
Number of Population in Each Year (000) 
Regency/City 1999 2000 2001* 2002* 2003* 2004* 
I. Sirneulue 65.8 57. 1 57.6 58.4 59.1 71.5 
2. Aceh Singkil 120.4 12 1.7 123.2 124.8 144.7 
3. Aceh Selatan 390.1 302.3 192.8 195.3 197.7 185.7 
4. Aceh Tenggara 197 .7 207.7 147 .0 148.9 150.8 168.2 
5. Aceh Timur 729.2 656.1 323.4 327.5 331 .6 312.0 
6. Aceh Tengah 234.9 263.1 265 .7 269.1 272.5 285.6 
7. Aceh Barat 449.5 422.7 190.2 192.6 195.0 160.5 
8. Aceh Besar 302.2 285.6 288.6 292.3 296.0 30 1.6 
9. Pi d i e 468.2 499.8 504.9 511.2 5 17.7 469.9 
I 0. Bireuen 349. 1 352.6 357.0 361.5 348. 1 
1 I. Aceh Utara 1,036.0 667.2 5 10.8 517.2 523.7 487.5 
12. Aceh Barat Daya 11 2.5 113.9 115.4 111.1 
13. Gayo Lues 64.8 65 .6 66.4 68.3 
14. Aceh Tarn iang 2 19.4 222.2 225 .0 229.5 
15. Nagan Raya 140.4 142.2 144.0 110.5 
16. Aceh Jaya 96.4 97.6 98.8 79.2 
17. Banda Aceh 245.9 2 16.1 2 18.3 22 1.1 223.8 239.1 
18. Sabang 25.0 23 .7 23 .9 24.2 24.5 28.7 
19. Langsa 11 9.8 121.3 122.9 135.2 
20. Lhokseurnawe 163 .2 165.3 167.4 138.7 
Total 4,144.5 4,070.9 4, 114.0 4, 166.0 4,2 18.5 4,075.6 
*) Estimated number 
Source: BPS ofNAD Province, http://aceh.bps.go.id, accessed 12 August 2006. 
Note: Th is is a corrected table from the original data, which miscalculated the total number of 
population for 2000 (4,073.0) 
The population has tended to increase each year in every region except 
in 1999 to 2001 , when there was little increase in any region, and sharp 
declines in population in Langsa and North Aceh (Figure 4-2). The most likely 
explanation of the decline is the intensified violent political conflict in the 
region, followed by the resumed military operation conducted by the 
Indonesian military and the expulsion of Javanese migrants by GAM soldiers, 
in around 2000. 
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Figure 4-2.Population by Regency/City in Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam Province, 1999-2004 
Source: BPS ofNAD Province, http://aceh.bps.go.id, accessed 12 August 2006. 
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At the time of my research, many former Javanese migrants still 
resided out of the region. As an example, in village S, near P.T. Arnn (the 
LNG plant), many houses were still empty, left by their owners, the Javanese 
workers on the plantation who had been forced to flee in the late 1990s to 
early 2000s. A former (Acehnese) worker on the plantation told me that GAM 
soldiers sometimes checked the compound to ensure that the Javanese 
migrants had not returned. The total population of North Aceh, however, 
remained the highest in the province, which may be explained by the presence 
of internal Acehnese migrant workers from other districts in the province. 
In terms of population density, Banda Aceh was the most densely 
populated area, with a density above three thousand per km2 in 1996 - 2000 
(Table 4-2). This far exceeded any other area in the province in this period, 
and most likely continued to be the case during the next four years after 2000. 
This is possibly because Banda Aceh is the capital city as well as centre of 
economic activities and education. Apart from that, the conflict influenced 
some people to migrate from the hot spots to Banda Aceh for security. 
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Table 4-2 Population Density per Km2 of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
Province, 1996 to 2000 
District/City Population Density {person/km2) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
I. South Aceh (Aceh Selatan) 42 43 43 44 43 
2. South East Aceh (Aceh 
Tenggara) 20 20 20 20 21 
3. East Aceh (Aceh Timur) 83 85 87 88 86 
4. Central Aceh (Aceh Tengah) 39 40 40 41 40 
5. West Aceh (Aceh Barat) 42 43 44 45 44 
6. Great Aceh (Aceh Besar) 105 107 110 113 115 
7. Pidie 110 111 11 2 113 115 
8. North Aceh (Aceh Utara) 182 186 189 193 181 
9. Simeuleu 3 1 3 1 32 32 28 
I 0. Banda Aceh 3,666 3,777 3,891 4,005 3,568 
11. Sabano 209 210 2 11 21 1 199 
Total 69 70 71 72 70 
Source: Sadan Pusat Statistik, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province 
Note: In early 2000, there were only 11 districts and municipalities in the province 
2 The Society and Its Dynamics: Origins, Basic Principles, 
Kinship System, and Gender Relations 
In order to understand the contemporary Acehnese society, one needs 
to take into account the diversity and complexity of the society, as well as the 
effects of the conflict on the society. This section discusses the apparent 
homogeneity of the Acehnese people that belies the underlying heterogeneity 
by using an historical account. This section also describes the sources of basic 
principles and moral values of the Acehnese, their kinship system and gender 
relation dynamics. 
2.1 The origins 
Scholarly debates on the Acehnese heritage indicate lack of agreement 
about the origin of the Acehnese speaking people. These scholars, following 
different theories, are divided. Some historians such as Zainuddin (1961, p.15) 
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and Jamil (1968 in Hasjmy, 1983, p.141) 12 referred to the Mante people. 
Mante is the Acehnese term for Mantra (Mantir), a group of Mon Khtner from 
Mon Khtner (Burma) who can also be found in Thailand and Vietnam 
(Zainuddin, 1961; Hasjmy, 1983; see also Bakker, 1993). In Aceh, the Mante 
resided in Seumilek (Ac.), which literally means broad land, which was also 
well known as the twelve houses (Ac.: Rumoh Dua Blaih), located between 
Jantoe, Aceh Besar District and Tangse, Pidie District. The Mante people 
migrated from one place to another within Aceh Besar and finally spread 
across the whole region. In Central Aceh, the Mante mixed with the Gayo 
people, who originated from Batak, while in Southern Aceh, they mixed with 
the Minangkabau. In line with this, Jayawardena (1977) argues that the 
riverine plains of Aceh Besar and Aceh Pidi were the original homeland of the 
Acehnese, who then mixed with other societies in different parts of the region. 
However, Hurgronje (1906, pp.18-19) argued that there was little evidence for 
a distinct group called the Mante, but supported the idea of shared foreign 
elements (in Acehnese society), including Arab, Persian, Tmkish, Egyptian, 
and Javanese. 
At the time of my research, popular knowledge among the people 
maintained that the origins of the Acehnese could be traced from the word 
'ACEH', which was understood as an acronym for Arab, Cina (the Chinese), 
Eropa (the European), and Hindu (the Hindu Indians). 13 This popular 
knowledge may be the best explanation for the origin of the Acehnese society 
as it corresponded to the four kaw6m-based classifications of society made 
during the era of Sultan Alaiddin Rajat Sjah Alqahar ( 153 7-1568), as further 
12 There were various small states in the coastal area of Aceh which were unified as a single 
entity under the Sultan Ali' Moeghiijat Sjiih ( 1514-1528), who is known as the initiator of the 
Islamic Kingdom. The kingdom was then expanded and reached the climax of its power under 
Sultan lskandar Moeda ( 1607-1636). 
13 At the end of the I I th century, due to a war which coincided with the expansion of Islam in 
India, there were massive movements of Indians to Aceh (and other patts of Sumatra Island) 
(Zainuddin, 1961, p.19), whilst in around I 075, the Arabs and Farsi arrived in the region, 
especially in Peureulak, Pasei, and Pidie (Zainuddin, 1961, p.19). The influence of India in 
Aceh can been seen from the use of several Sanskrit words in kinship, literature, art and 
songs, animals' names, agricu lture, metal and jewellery, household equipment. (Said, 1981) 
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described in section 3.1. The Acehnese word kaw61'n 14 (I: Kaum), also named 
aneuk sukee (I.: anak suku), can refer to their race, tribe, clan or ethnic group, 
and is sometimes used to refer to politically associated groups or classes 
(Steven and Schmidgall-Tellings, 2004, p.456). In combination with 
kerabal, 15 it is used to refer to a group of people with close affinity, family 
ties, and kinship. The kaw6rn-based classification not only referred to their 
(ethnic) background but also kinship ties, which allowed people in mixed 
marriages to be classified in one of the four kaw6m (Zainuddin, 1961 ; 
Hurgronje, 1906). The four different kaw6rn were: the Three Hundred 
Community (Ac.: kaw6m Lhee Reutoih); the Four [mam (Ac.: kaw6m lrneum 
Peuet) , also called the Four Hundred (Ac.: kaw6rn Peuet Reutoih); the 
'Forefather-stone' or 'Enough-stone' (Ac.: kaw6m Tok Batee); and the 
'Sandcmg-Forefather' (Ac.: kaw6m Dja Sandang). 
Traditional Acehnese live in garnpong, a territorial community that is 
tied to a village mosque (Ac.: rneunasah), which is also used as a meeting 
house, and, in previous times, as a rest-house for visitors and sometimes as 
sleeping-place for men (Zainuddin, 1961 ; Hurgronj e, 1906). The garnpong is 
led by head of gampong (Ac. keusyik), 16 accompanied by an advisory body 
consisting of four senior (Ac.: tuha) community members or community 
infomial leaders (Ac.: ureueung tuha garnpong). The advisory board is called 
the 'four-elderly' (Ac.: tuha peuet), to denote the number and types of 
seniority of each members. The seniority depends not on the age, but on the 
following four qualities (Somadisastra, 1977, p.84): a sound understanding of 
religi()n and traditions (Ac.: tuha-tuho, which literarily means ' those who 
14 Kawom is derived from the Arabic kawm, people (Bakker, 1993, p. 16). It also refers to an 
' Islamic official who advises on religious matters and looks after the mosque' (Steven and 
Schmidgall-Tellings, 2004, p.456). In Indonesian language, 'Kaum ' (Ac.: Kaw6m) is used by 
lndones ian Chinese to refer to the pribumi (the indigenous) (Steven and Schmidgall-Tell ings 
2004, p.456), particularly in Java. The term 'wong kauman ' (the kaum people) not only refers 
to the indigenous (I.: pribumi) Javanese but also depicts the lower social status of the Javanese 
who, under the Dutch government, was grouped as the lowest rank in society after the 
Chinese, Arabs, and Indians, at the second rank, and the Dutch and other Europeans, at the 
first rank 
15Kerahat in Steven and Schmidgall-Tellings (2004, p.484) is translated as (a) ' close 
relationship, affinity ' and (b) 'member of the family, relative, (nearest) relatives; kinship, 
consanguinity'. 
16There are several ways of writing this word. Alternative spellings are keucik or geu:iyik. In 
this thes is I use keusy ik for consistency. 
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lmow the directions'); psychological maturity (Ac.: tuha turidroe); a capacity 
as peace makers (Ac.: tuha peproe), and the love of one's religion and country 
(Ac. : tuha gaseh keu agama ngon keu nanggroe) (Somadisastra, 1977, p.84). 
]t is, therefore, possible to find a young member such as the one that I met in 
Banda Aceh. He was only around 20 years old when he was appointed as a 
member of the advisory body of his gampong in 2002. According to him, it 
was his university background that resulted in him being appointed. 
Several gampong composed a mukim (parish), originally an Arabic 
word moqim for 'resident of a Friday prayer area' (Bakker, 1993, p.16), which 
was led by the head of mukim (Ac. imeum mukim). Several mukim formed a 
mukim federation, led by a chieftain (Ac.: uleebalang). 17 Under Sulthan Nurul 
Alam Nakiattudin Sjah (1675-1677), three mukim federations were formed in 
Great Aceh (I.: Aceh Besar; Ac.: Aceh Rayeuek) and named sagoe, which 
literally means corner. These federations were later known as the three sagoe ( 
Ac.: thee sagoe), which were led by uleebalang, the administrative chief, and 
panglima sagoe, the Sultan's 'watch-dog' on the uleebalang' s performance 
(Zainuddin, 1961 , p.316; Hurgronje, 1906, p.3 ). According to the Sarakata 
(the sultan 's formal letter), in war time, pang Ji ma sagoe would assume both 
civil and military commands of their region on behalf of the sultan 
(Zainuddin, 1961, p.316). Mukim in areas outside of Great Aceh had the same 
arrangement - led by uleebalang under the direct authority of the sultan - and 
were named ' nanggrue bibeueh' (Zainuddin, 1961 , p.316). Apart from the 
sagoe and mukim arrangements, there was also a traditional body for 
agricultural matters (Ac.: seunobok), led by a chief (Ac.: peutua). It is not 
clear when this societal arrangement began, especially the gampong and 
mukim. However, letters issued by several different sultans (Ac.: sarakata) 
clearly indicate that the arrangement was formally adopted and maintained in 
17 There were at least three different ways of writing this word : u/eeba/ang or oeleeba/ang 
(using Ejaan lama or the O ld Spelling of Bahasa Indonesia), ulee balang, and ulebalang. In 
this thesis, I have used uleeba/ang, following Hugronje. The word was derived from 
hulubalang(an Army commander) and was adopted s ince before the Sultanate era 
(Hurgronje, 1906, v . l). 
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the sultanate era. 18 It is also worth noting the authenticity of this arrangement. 
Hurgronje (1906, v. l ., p.3) stated " ... these institutions in Acheh are in a large 
measure genuinely indigeno11s and of very great antiquity". 
During the sultanate em, the arrangement was revised at least three 
times (Zainuddin, 1961, pp. 314-317): in 1641- 1675 under sultan TadjuJ Alam 
Sjafiatuddin Sjah; in 1675-1 677 tmder sultan Nurul Alam Nakiatuddin Sjal1; 
and in 1841 - 1904. 19 The c11anges exemplified further the power dynamics 
between the sultan and the c()nquered uleebalang, as the changes always 
involved limiting the author]ty of the uleebalang. In the Dutch period, this 
dynamic was fostered and utilised to defeat the sultanate of Aceh. Under the 
New Order (1965/1966 - 19C)7 / 1998), however, this territorial community 
arrangement was abolished and 1·eplaced by the standardized government 
structure of hamlet (I.: dusu11), rural village (I.: desa) and urban village (I.: 
kelurahan) , sub-district (1.: Kecamatan), district (I.: kabupaten), province (I.: 
propinsi), and central government (I. : pemerintahan pusat).20 The advisory 
board (Ac. tuha peuet) was replaced by the village council for development 
matters (Lembaga Ketahanarz Masyarakal Desa -LKMD). 
Nevertheless, gamporzg remained an important notion for Acehnese 
identity. As exemplified in section 4, gampong were always an important 
point of reference among the Acehnese to signify their identity as Acehnese 
(Ac.: Ureueng Aceh; I. :Orang Aceh). In 2001, responding to the recent 
political dispute between the government and GAM, the traditional 
arrangement was reinstated with the adoption of Law no 18 of 2001 on 
Special Autonomy for the N AD province (Annex 1). 
18 Hurgronje ( 1906, p.2) stated that the Acehnese, at the time of his assignment in Aceh, I iked 
to compare the Acehnese area with the form of a w innowing basket (Ac.:jeu 'ee). The mouth 
of the basket illustrates the debouchment of the Aceh river (kreung Aceh) and the downstream 
points to the three confederations ofmukims (Ac.: thee sagoe) with the three sagoe 
commanders (Ac. panglima sagoe) who stood as the head of the three sagoe. Most likely this 
was what was referred to as 'the men <>fthe 3 sagi' in Drewes and Voorhoeve ( 1958, p.8) 
19 The last change was made during the era of sultan A laidd in Ibrahim Mansjur Sjah ( 1841-
1870) and was maintained unti l the end of the sultanate era in 1904, with the capture of sultan 
Alaidin Muhammad Daud Sjah by1he Dutch (Zainuddin, 1961, pp.4 17-422). 
20 This was a nation-wide feature. For security purposes, Suharto adopted a standardised local 
government, especially at village J~vel, in the late 1970s. This consequently abolished the 
trad itional arrangements, including the Javanese notion of'desa ', which were actually quite 
democratic. 
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2.2 Sources of the Basic Principles and Their Dynamics: 
From Islamic to Market Values 
The culture and tradition (I.: adat istiadat) of the contemporary 
Acelmese is the result of acculturatio11 between several cultures, in which 
Islam has had a strong influence. Alo11g with Islam and 1radition, the basic 
principles of the society have also been heavily influenced by the longstanding 
history of violent political conflict.21 Societal principles were dete1mined by 
the power relations of elite politicians,. those involved in the political decision 
makings and negotiations, at both the central and local, &1d perhaps also 
international, levels. 
2.2.1 Islam, Traditions, and Hil<ayat 
Islam entered the region in th( 11th century22 thr()ugh the Arab traders 
and became a fundamental part of po Ii ti cal organization with the 
establishment of several port kingdoms23 (Reid, 1969, p .1 ). Having been in the 
region ever since, Islam has provided an important source of basic principles 
for Acehnese society. Since childhood, the Acehnese learn about Islam and 
tradition. I often heard neighbours asl their children to behave by politely 
reminding them what they had learnt from Islamic scholars, also considered as 
leaders, (Ac.: teungku).24 This usually manifested itself jn their simple 
question of "what did the teungku say?" (Ac.: "peue peugah teungku?").25 
Children would usually behave as a result of this reminder. 
2 1 See Chapter 5 for details of the history of"violent political conflict in Aceh. 
22 Some Acehnese historians, based on their analysis on the Sarak«la (sultan's official letter), 
the news of epoch (hikayat), and other historical evidence in the region such as the graves of 
some ulama and the oldest Islamic boarding school , Oayah Cot Ka1a in Aceh, argue that Islam 
entered the region in the 7th century (see Hasjmy, 1983, p.45; Zainuddin, 1961). In this thesis, 
I follow Reid ( 1969, 2005, and 2006) because this is what is currently accepted among 
international scho lars. 
23 The greatest one was Samudra-Pasai, developed in the fourteenth century in Lhokseumawe 
(Reid, 1969, p. I). 
24 Teungku (Ac.) is the Acehnese t itle for an Islamic scholar or leader. 
25 In the city, however, some parents asked '"'what do teachers say?"' ("peu peugah guru?"). 
110 
The importance oflslam began to be significant during the time of 
Sultan Iskandar Muda ( 1607-1636). 26 The presumed basic principles in this 
era were illustrated in the following old Acehnese saying espoused by Sultan 
Iskandar Muda, which is often pro11dly cited by the contemporary Acehnese~ 
even among the youth: 
Adat bak Po Teumeureuhom; 
Hukom bak Sjiah Kuala; 
Meudjeulih kanun bak Putroe Plzang; 
Resam bak Bentaran 
Custom and Tradition from the sultan 
Judicial law from Sjiah Kuala 
Civil Rules and politeness in marriage (Muslim Administrative Law) from 
the Queen 
Customary habit and practice [at local level] from the Commander 
(/aksamana, or panglima or benlara ) of each kaum or region (negeri) 
(Zainuddin, 1961 , p.313) 
The saying depicts the role of prominent figures in that era. The 
custom and traditions (Ac., I.: adat) were composed of tlrree themes: the law 
of Allah (Ac.: Adatullah); the law()fthe Sultan (Ac. : Ada/ Mahkamah) and 
the local traditions applied in each kawom (Ac.: Adat Tunah) , which should be 
in line with the law of the Sultan (Ac.: Adat Mahkamah) 27 (Zainuddin, 1961~ 
pp.313-399). The custom and traditions (adat) were noted as coming from 
Sultan lskandar Muda (1607-1636). This is in line with the tradition of the 
sultanates of Aceh, where the Sultan possessed the distinct position of the 
supreme guardian of the customary law, which was put into practice in 
conjunction with Islamic law sourced from Ulama, who were also the sulta:n 's 
26 The Islam ic Kingdom was initiated by Sultan A li Moeghajat Sjah ( 1514-1528) who led ihe 
fight against the Portugese, with the help <lfthe Ottoman empire (Reid, 1969, pp.1-3). 
However, it was Sultan lskandar Muda who successfully established a strong Islamic 
Kingdom. The next sultan was Sultan lskandar Muda's son in law, Sultan lskandar Tsani 
(1636- 1641) (Hurgronje, 1906; Zainuddin, 1961). The boundaries of the Acehnese kingdom 
were Teumieng (Tamiang) at the East Coast and the boundaries between Acehnese kingd()!l1 
and M inangkabau at the Western Coast (Hurgronje, 1906, vo. I , p. I). 
27 The laws of the Sultan included the law regulating the status, rights and obligations of 
panglima sagoe, uleebalang (adat meuk21ta a/am); the marriage law (adal perkawinan); rice 
farmi ng law (adat blang); marine and fishery law (adat laot); forest law (adat glee); law for 
managing the forest, especially those witli pepper plantations, opening new forest for farm ing 
and/or for establishing new mukim (adat s euneubok); market law (adat peukan); law 
concerning the mouth ofrivers (adat kuwala); and animal husbandry law (adat geumeubeu). 
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advisors (Zainuddin, 1961 ). Civil rules originated from Putro Ph<111g,28 a 
Malay princess who married Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) ()f Aceh. 
Customary habits and practices (reusam )29 at local level were in the hands of 
the commander of each kaw6m. 
During the sultanate era, Islam's role as the basic principle was also 
well illustrated in the hikayat,30 also called news of the epoch (Ac.: haba 
jameuen), from which the (Islamic) moral values of the society and even 
changes (development) in those values were documented and passed from one 
generation to another (Hurgronje, 1906, p.68). 31 As news of the epoch, hikayat 
can be considered as documented histories written in lyrical pros.e, with events 
added as they occurred, including wars (Siegel, 1979, p.231).32 The !1ikaya1, 
therefore, portrayed the overall changes in the society, that may l:Je traced as 
far back as the Hindu and Buddhist times to the later influence of Islam in the 
society (Hamidy, 1977, p.22). They were chanted anywhere possible: at home, 
meunasah (village meeting house), even at forts among soldiers. The hikayat 
recorded the power relations and the political discourses in the society, as well 
as the overall moral values, religion, tradition, ways of thinking, social 
relations, including relations between men and women, art and history. 
The hikayat not only represented the existing traditions of the society 
but were also an important means of social control through whicJi moral 
sanctions and rewards were learnt. From the hikayat, the notions of heroism, 
nationalism and, unfortunately, fanaticism, were also learnt.33 TJie latter 
characteristic was exemplified by the following Hikayat Prang Sabi! (Holy 
28Putroe Phang or Putro Phang was a well-known among the Acehnese, even the current 
(2004) younger generations, as a cultural heroine. A youth group established lly a local NGO 
to promote reproductive health named the group after the Princess. 
29 From the Arabic word 'rasam' which means habits, ways, and traditions (Polern , 1977, 
p. 105) 
3
° Following the Indonesian Old Spelling(!.: Ejaan lama), some literature writes this as 
'hikajat.' Following the Indonesian New and Comprehensive Spelling (1.: Ejaan Baru dan 
Yang Disempurnakan), I use' hikayat' instead of 'hikajat. ' 
31 The composers of some hikayat, such as hiakayat Ma/em Dagang, remain anonymous, 
while the authors of other hikayat are clear, such as hikayat prang Gompeni by Abdul Karim 
ofGlumpang Dua (Hugronje, 1906, p. I 00). 
32 Hurgronje (1906, p.66) argued that the hikayat were oral compositions. This, h<lwever, 
refen-ed more to the nature of story telling. Most stories derived from hikayat but s.ome can be 
~ure l y anonymously composed and spread from mouth to mouth like dongens in Java. 
3 http://atlas.spaceports.com/- asn I f/sastraatjeh/pran gsabi .htm. 
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War) written by ulama, which was usually chanted before the Acehnese went 
to wage war against the Dutch infidels (Kaphe) (Zentgraaff, transl.version, 
1983, p.399; Daud and Durie, 1999, p.138; Siegel, 1979, pp.236-262) . 
... Njang meubahgia seudjahtera sjahid dalam prang Allahlpulang 
deundajang beudiadari/Ho ka siwa sirawalsjahid dalam prang dan 
senang/Geu peurab ridjang peutamong sjuruga tinggi ... 
. . . Happy are those who become martyrs in the holy war/ back [to God] 
accompanied by angels/to be armed with dagger/ Be a martyr in the [war] 
and be happy/Be graced a place in the high of heaven 
The hikayat, however, are now declining as more new-fashioned 
media, such as television, newspapers, magazines, and movies influence 
society. Nevertheless, some Acehnese artists try to revitalise the hikayat 
through contemporary Acehnese popular songs. An example of this is Rafly, 
the famous Acehnese pop singer, in his song entitled 'Aina[u]l Mardhiah', on 
his second solo album of' Syiar dan Syair'34 that was released in 2000. The 
song illustrates the re-enactment of the spirit of holy war in contemporary 
Aceh. Heaven is perceived as embodied within 'Aina[u]l Mardhiah', the 
beautiful bride of the martyr as described in hikayat Prang Sabi! (see Siegel, 
1979, pp.237-250), composed by Teungku Pante Koeloe, a follower of the 
ulama of Tiro (Damste, ed., 1928 in Siegel, 1979, p.19). Unlike the original 
hikayat, the spirit of holy war is not directly stated in the pop song. However, 
it is well represented by 'Aina[ u ]l Mardhiah ', the beautiful princess of heaven, 
in conjunction with the illustration of the delightful feeling of those who 
witness heaven (see Table 4-3). 
34 I cannot find the word 'syiar' and 'syair' in the Acehnese-lndonesian-English Thesaurus of 
Daud and Durie (I 999). However, both words possibly relate to the word 'siar' and 'syair' in 
Indonesian language. 'Siar' has several meanings: to disseminate, broadcast, announce, made 
known, spread, propagate, publish, radiate, and send forth (Seven and Schm idgall-Tellings; 
2004, p.933). 'Syair' means a quatrain consisting of four rhyming lines, a poem (Seven and 
Schmidgall-Tellings; 2004, p.979). 
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Table 4-3. Ainul Mardiah : The modern vs traditional versions of Hikayat 
Prang Sabi/ 
Aina[u]I Mardhiah 
Lyrics: Dike Aceh & Selawat Nabi Tgk. 
Bustami Mahmud; Song: Pak Rep 
Ainu! Mardhiah, the beautiful slim/A inu! 
Mardiah, nyang cidah-cidah lintek 
the incomparable in the world /Hana ngoen 
bandeng di dalam donya 
Fair complexion, s lightly rouge/Kuletjih 
puteh, meujampu-jampu kuneng 
flower of silimeng, red is its colour 
/Bungong silimeng, mirah wareuna 
Refrain: 
In heaven, so unbelievably beautiful/Dalam 
syuruga indah bukoen le 
In the air, its adornment I Meganlung kande 
ban-ban seunlingka 
Hanging adornment, with no rope/ Kande 
megantung bukoen ngeon taloe 
In the air, God ' s blessing/Meugantung 
keudroe Tuhan karonya 
They glisten /Ji bedeoh-bedeoh cahya 
moving around/Meu puseng-puseng 
starring at it endlessly, my heart is 
exceptionally delighted/ Taka loen plang-
pleng hate that suka 
eyes like diamond, body is so slim/Mata 
sang intan badanjih rampeng 
the flower is proposed by those in 
heaven/Si bungong bungong sunteng asoe 
syuruga 
Note: Silimeng is a kind of star fruit usually 
used as one of the main ingredients of an 
Acehnese traditional dish. 
Ainoel Mardijah [Ainul Mardiah], 
excerpted from the Hikayat Prang Sabi! 
(source: Siegel, 1979, pp.242-248) 
" ... 'Salamu 'alaikumja chariulnisa [the 
chosen lady}', is my spouse here?" . . . 
'"'Alaikum salaamja walijullah [the love 
of God]. Come here. Come here to Ainoel 
Mardijah [Ainul Mardiah], to the reward of 
God for the holy war. You are indeed 
fo11unate, oh, prince, to come to paradise 
and see the price of the ho ly war. Oh, 
fortunate teungkoe [teungku] come a bit 
closer. Step before us into our palace. We 
are all ladies of the court, servant of your 
fiancee ... " 
" ... the court ladies were lovely; their 
bodies, slender and lither, were draped 
with diamond necklaces and sparkling toe 
rings ... " 
" I went on, approaching a row of lamps. I 
looked at everything a long the way. The 
riches of God are more than can be 
described . . . There were more palaces, 
g lowing with rays like those of the 
sun ... and staged with glittering 
diamonds ... " 
" I went toward the couch decorated with 
diamond dust. Coming to the in laid door, I 
was amazed ... Ainoel Mardijah [Ainu! 
Mardiah], the lovely princess, awaited me. 
Seeing me, the fai ry star said, 
'Alhamdu!illah [Praise the Lord], our wish 
has been granted ... come here, sit with me 
on the couch. ' 
" ... Ainoel Mardijah [Ainul Mardiah], the 
lovely one, has no equal. .. She looked at 
me and laughed and smiled with her red 
lips like the Southern Cross. The power of 
the creator of the world is beyond my 
comprehension. 
"Teungkoe [teungku], my lord, the Lord 
has granted me my desire. Later we will 
sleep together, as I greatly desire my 
husband ... " 
"So the fair and de licate one spoke, her 
voice sweeter than any flute ... I was 
rushing to embrace her when the lovely 
one said, 'Oh, teungkoe [teungku], 
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Aina[u]I Mardhiah Ainoel Mardijah [Ainu! Mardiah], 
Lyrics: Dike Aceh & Selawat Nabi Tgk. excerpted from the Hikayat Prang Sabi/ 
Bustami Mahmud; Song: Pak Rep (source: Siegel, 1979, pp.242-248) 
blossom, wait just a minute more for the 
proper time. Return first to the holy war. 
Oh, teungkoe [teungku], if you are killed 
tonight the promise will be fulfilled. Let 
me wait a moment longer. The life in 
[your] body is not yet pure. The condition 
if firm belief, elevating the rel igion of the 
Lord ... " 
The revitalisation of this hikayat with its Islamic values illustrates the 
continuity of Acehnese moral values. It further exemplifies the fact that 
Islamic law and tradition have long been part of the society, especially since 
the period of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636), and that both Islamic law 
and tradition are indivisible as described in the following section. 
2.2.2 The Inseparability of Islam and Traditions 
The inseparability of Islam and Acehnese traditions is well articulated 
in the old Acehnese saying 'tradition and law are like substance and its innate 
qualities' (Ac.: adat ngdn huk6m lagee zat ngdn sifeut). This saying describes 
the link between (Islamic) law and adat kebiasaan (I), which is as close as a 
substance, and its innate characters. The illustration strongly suggests the 
indispensable and, at the same time, inseparable characters of the (Islamic) 
law and adat kebiasaan. Both Islamic law and tradition are like two sides of 
the same coin. 
Scholars such as Siegel (1969) and Hurgronje (1906) have debated the 
roles and interlinked characters of adat and Islam. Both maintained that the 
role of Islam in society should not be taken at face value as there were diverse 
concepts and understanding of Islamic tradition. Acehnese society cannot be 
simply viewed as Islamic society. Different groups perceived 'Acehnese' and 
' Islam' differently. Siegel and Hurgronje may be correct, but they tend to 
understate the general values of Islam shared by the entire society that are 
deeply embedded within their traditions. 
Until today, Acehnese tend to tum to tradition and customary law 
(adat kebiasaan) in which Islam is well-established, and traditional leaders 
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(such as ulama) for guidance on their personal or even development problems. 
This is due to their perception of the powerlessness of the local government. 
as clearly illustrated in the following Acehnese saying: 
Calling for help from the head of vi llage is like a round pumpkin I Tajak bak 
keusyik, /agee bah pik hana sagoe 
Calling for help from the head of sub-district is like a small bell with no rope 
I Tajak bak camat, /agee munumal hana taloe 
Calling for help from the head of district is like a rice pestle with no pounder 
I Tajak bak bupali, lageejingki hana bajoe 
There are two different types of pumpkin based on their shapes-the 
round and the angled one. The round pumpkin, due to its shape, has no firm 
stand, and shifts easily. It symbolises the unstable situation one will face in 
calling for help from a keusyik (head of village). It also symbolises an 
unreliable keusyik whose words cannot be trusted; especially when s/he tends 
to please her/his superior rather than her/his own society. Similarly, the small 
bell with no rope represents uselessness since it does not produce any sound. 
It also represents an w1trustworthy camat whose authority is given by the 
central government and who does not have a strong attachment to the society. 
The worst is calling for help from bupati, which is pictured as a pestle with no 
pounder. With rice as staple food for the Acehnese, a pestle is therefore 
important. However, without a pounder (that may also represent the 
connection of bupati with the people), a pestle becomes a completely useless 
tool. 
The saying clearly denotes the longing of the Acehnese for a clean and 
reliable government. The Acehnese distrust of unreliable governments 
parallels their distrust of the national legal system, resulting in the Acehenese 
preference to rely on their tradition and customary law rather than on national 
law in resolving their legal disputes. This preference however, may also be 
explained by the inseparability of Islamic law and adat in Acehnese society, 
as described above. 
Nevertheless, it is important to take into account the discrepancy and 
power relations between the Islam imposed by the government, using Shari 'a 
law, and Islam as practiced by the people in their day-to-day life. Unlike the 
government, which is interested more in the physical appearance of Islam, the 
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people have a different understanding of Islam, placing more importance on 
relations with God (Hablun min-Allah) and with others (Hablun min-Annas) 
than on physical expressions of their faith. Tolerance and respect, at the time 
of research, could be easily observed from not only the existence of religious 
buildings of other faiths such as churches, but also from the fact that during 
the most recent conflict between GAM and the government of Indonesia, none 
of these buildings were disturbed. 35 This, however, may also be explained by 
the fact that Moslems are the majority in the region. Based on the Population 
Census in 2000, Moslems comprised 97.3% of the total population of Aceh 
(Figure 4-3). 
Figure 4-3 Proportion of the Population of Aceh by Religious 
Background, in 2000 
Ell Catholic; 6,314; 
0.36% 
o Other; 263; 
0.02% 
o Moslem; 
1,687 ,835; 
97.3% 
Data source: Population ofNanggroe Aceh Darussalam , Results of the 2000 Population Census , BPS, 
Statistics lndones ia, Jakarta, Indonesia 
Note: Pie Chart is made by Author 
35 This is different from the provinces ofMaluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi, which 
suffered from religious-based conflicts between the Moslems and Christians. These three 
provinces have almost an equal number ofMoslems and Christians who hold relatively equal 
power in local politics and the economy. 
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2.2.3 Shari'a Law: Between Norms and Reality 
The implementation of Shari 'a law, through the adoption of Law no 
18 on the special autonomy of Aceh signed by President Megawati on 9 
August 2001 (Annex 1 ), was a product of a long history of political disputes 
between Jakarta and Aceh (Ishak, 2002). This has led to the enforcement of 
superficial issues of Shari 'a, such as 'sweeping hijab ',36 rather than the more 
fundamental issue of having a just and prosperous Islamic society. At the 
time of my research, many Acehnese viewed the adoption of Shari 'a law as 
merely political since it was conducted as part of the government efforts to 
calm down the strong demand of the people for independence (see also Munir, 
2003; Amir, 2002). 
Shari 'a basically means the law of Allah, as specified in the Qur'an 
and Sunnah (the life examples of Prophet Muhammad), and covers all aspects 
of human life, in both the relation with God and others (Hooker and Hooker, 
2006, p.13 7). With its basic premise that ' the fundamental duties of human 
beings is to obey God in all things', it is the ' heart of Islam' and ' theology in 
legal form' (Hooker and Hooker, 2006, p.137). Al-Ghazali (cited in Hooker 
and Hooker, 2006, p.137) listed the five purposes of Shari 'a as ' protection of 
religion, protection oflife, protection of intellect, protection of generations, 
and protection of property. ' There are three 'defined penalties ([Ar.] hudud)' 
in classical Shari 'a law: physical; compensation (Ar.: ' qisas'); and other 
penalties from ajudge (Ar.: ta'zir) (Hooker and Hooker, 2006, p .137-138). 
Shari 'a comprises two main principles: the art of worship (Ar.: al-
ibadat) and human interactions (Ar.: al-mu 'amalat ). The art of worship 
covers the five pillars of Islam, also known as 'arkaan addiin' or 'arkaanud-
diini' (Ar.), which are set out in the Qur'an (Hooker, 2006, p.93-94): ' the 
declaration of faith (Ar.: shahaadah), the five daily prayers (Ar: §.alawaat) , 
the obligation to pay a wealth tax (Ar.: zakaah), fasting dming the month of 
Ramadan (Ar.: §_awmun) and undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca (Ar.: 
36 See Chapter 2, Section 3.1. 
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!J..ajjun).37 The human interactions cover: financial and social transactions; 
endowments; laws of inheritance; marriage, divorce, and childcare; food and 
drink (ritual slaughtering and hunting); penal punishments; warfare and peace; 
and judicial matters (such as rules governing the ability to give witness 
testimony and other forms of evidence). 
However, in the case of Aceh, at least when initially implemented in 
200 l , Shari 'a law seemed to be understood more from the ait of worship (I.: 
al-ibadat) dimension with less attention paid to human interactions (I.: a/-
mu 'amalat). It was understood as the following: forcing women to adopt the 
Moslem dress code, enforcing the obligatory Friday prayer (especially for 
men), and harsh punishment for criminals. It was also understood as imposing 
more tangible Islamic (Arab) symbols in the region through, for instance: 
adding Arabic letters on the names of streets, shops, and government offices; 
displaying posters of women in proper Islamic dress and displaying verses of 
Al Qur'an along the main streets. Such enforcements were perceived as 
imposing Arab-Islamic culture (Munir, 2003, p.131). 
It was therefore apparent that more importance was placed on the 
physical rituals of the art of worship (I: al-ibadat) than the more favourable 
results/outcomes offered to society through the human interactions (I: al-
mu 'amalat), such as the more human-faced Shari 'a economy at micro and 
household levels. An example of a Shari 'a inspired initiative was baitul 
qiradh, which were sporadically introduced by some local NGOs. Baitul 
qiradh is typically an Islamic self-help group in which, ideally, the rich donate 
resources to be initial running capital for the productive activities of the 
poorer members of the self-help group. In Aceh, however, some baitul qiradh 
were rather different, more resembling local savings and loan cooperatives 
(EMT - Bait Maal Wat Tamwil) with the additional role of collecting the 
Moslems' wealth tax (1.: zakat; Ar.: zakaah) and charitable gifts (I: sadakah 
or sedekah; Ac.: seudeukah), such as endowments or property donated for a 
37 Moslems refer to examples from the Prophet Muhammad ' s life for further guidance on the 
conduct of these five pillars of Islam (Hooker, 2006, p.14) 
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religious purpose (Ac.: wakeueh; I.: wakaf or waqf; Ar.: waqfun),38. The 
Shari 'a economy itself covers banking, interest, debt arrangements, tax, and 
welfare. Underlying these is the Shari 'a economy's concept of, among other 
things, money as a tool for exchange not as a commodity; and lawful and 
legitimate actions according to Islam (Ac.: haleue;39 I.: halal; Ar. !lalaalun).40 
The Shari 'a economy was seen as essential to counter the violent 
political conflict that infiltrated the day to day life of Aceh, as well as the 
market economy that came along with its inherent inequality between the 
haves (the rich) and the have nots (the poor). During the 201h century, the 
market economy penetrated the local economy in Aceh and opened up 
channels with the outer world. Under Indonesia's New Order government, the 
oil economy in the 1970s boosted the market economy even more. As its 
benefits went to the central government more than to locals, impoverishment 
unavoidably occurred. This impoverishment was then worsened by the violent 
political conflict through its cascade effect on local economy deprivation (I.: 
penghancuran ekonomi loka[). 
2.2.4 The 'Madonna Factor': The Penetration of Western Market 
Values 
Following the neo-Marxist critique of capitalism as Western 
civilisation (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1979), I argue that the market economy 
has inevitably exposed Acehnese society to western values, which is locally 
termed the ' Madonna factor' (I: 'faktor Madonna '). I firstly heard about this 
term when I was in Banda Aceh (from my local NGO friends), and I heard it 
again when I travelled to Lhokseumawe during my field work. The ' Madonna 
38 Fealy and Hooker (2006, p.I) listed different meanings ofwakaf: ' confinement', 
' prohibition'; 'perpetual charitable trust for religious purposes; endowment or property 
donated for a religious purpose' . In Islam ic law, wakafis a charitable endowment dedicated 
for A 1 lah through donating it for some pub! ic benefit, specified by the donor. Wakaf and 
cannot be ' given away, sold, mortgaged, inherited or otherwise disposed of' (Nasution, 2002, 
p.299). If the specified purposes ofwakef cannot be achieved, the endowment should be 
a llocated for the relief of the poor, the ultimate purpose of every wakaf(Natution , 2002, 
p.299). 
39 The Acehnese also used the word kheueh to refer to a ' halal attitude', a genuine and non-
corrupt attitude. 
40 
' released' (from prohibition) ' ; ' denoting what is permitted or lawful in Islam ' (Fealy and 
Hooker, 2006, pp. xxxvii i). 
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factor' exemplifies the perceived symbols of western culture embodied within 
Madonna, an American singer of popular songs, who was quite controversial 
with regards to her performances, the lyrics of her songs, her dress, and 
personal life story. Madonna contentiously explores the political, sexual, and 
religious imagery, not only in her art works but also in her personal life. This 
local simple idea of Madonna is sexy clothes, make up, and semi-
pornographic performances. The term signifies the negative influence of 
western values on the society. Although I did not hear the tern1 from the 
women from villages that I met in different parts of the province, these 
women also held the same idea of 'unusual' western culture in comparison to 
Acehnese Moslem culture. The 'Madonna factor' also illustrates urban (the 
locals use the term 'modem') life styles, boosted by the oil economy of the 
region. 
The infiltration of Western values occurred not only through the 
market economy, but also in different periods. In the Dutch period it appeared 
through the close link with the uleebalang, the families who controlled the 
market. Under Indonesia, the oil economy has advanced the more urban style 
oflife of the society.41 Examples ofthis urban life style were the 
establishment of Kentucky Fried Chicken and California Fried Chicken in 
Banda Aceh in the 1990s. Following the most recent violent pol itical conflict 
between GAM and the government, the international presence during the 
Cessation on Hostility Agreement (CoHA) period in late 2002 to early 2003 
inadvertently caused a penetration of western values. The international 
presence also created a new market. Hamburger stalls and cafes with western 
menus, for example, suddenly mushroomed, especially in big cities such as 
Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe. The cinema in Banda Aceh, that had not been 
seen in the region for sometime because the building was set on fire in the 
conflict in the l 990s,42 was re-established in a different part of the city with a 
more urban style of a ' resto-cinema', a mixture of restaurant and cinema. The 
41 This was one of the grievances raised by GAM. See Chapter 5 section 2.3 for details. 
42 At the time of research there were two cinemas in Banda Aceh : cinema ' Gajah ' in Kutha 
Alam sub-district and 'Merpati' in Peunayong sub-district, both in Banda Aceh municipality. 
Neither were operating. 
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new international/Western inspired 'resto-cinema' was a novelty in Aceh, and 
became one of the favourite places to hang out, especially for wealthy locals 
and the international community. The non-indigenous sport of surfing has also 
become one of the favourite sports of young Acehnese. 
The 'Madonna factor', therefore, needs not be merely perceived as the 
western values of sexy clothes, porn and semi-porn songs and movies, but also 
the ugly aspects of the capitalistic approach in a society without the political 
stability assumed necessary for a market economy. Under conditions of 
violent political conflict, it was apparent that a just and fair market could not 
operate. Furthermore, the 'violent political conflict economy' 43 often resulted 
in economic inflation. 
What I mean by the 'violent political conflict economy' is a market 
economy created and boosted by violent activities. Its components range from 
the security services to provision of support facilities for those coming to the 
region for conflict related reasons, such as humanitarian workers, peace 
negotiators, peace keepers, and even combatants. The 'violent political 
conflict economy' is also influenced by strategies employed by both 
conflicting parties to win the battle through violent actions, such as cutting off 
supplies, destroying infrastructure, adopting illegal taxation, and limiting 
people's mobility. This, in turn, affects the local economy and triggers 
economic inflation (often hyperinflation). 
Figure 4-4 shows that in the years 2000 - 2004, the inflation rate of 
Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe tend to be higher than the national rate. 44 
Both Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe reached their highest inflation in 200 l. 
The most likely explanation is the escalation of conflict in 1999/2000, which 
not only occurred in Aceh, but also in many other provinces in Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, the inflation rate of Lhokseumawe was lower than the national 
rate in 2000 and 2001, which may relate to the low population and limited 
activities of the LNG plant due to the conflict. 
43 This is a modified term for the 'war economy' as discussed in many scholarly works on 
conflict studies. 
44 The year 2003 is an exception with the inflation rates of both Banda Aceh and 
Lhokseumawe being slightly lower than the national rate. This possibly happened because of 
the implementation of mattial law in 2003 to 2004, which has weakened the local econom ies. 
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Figure 4-4 Inflation Rate at Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe And 
National Level By Year in 2000 - 2004 
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Both Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe reached their highest inflation in 
2001. The most likely explanation is the escalation of conflict in 1999/2000, 
which not only occurred in Aceh, but also in many other provinces in 
Indonesia. Nevertheless, the inflation rate ofLhokseumawe was lower than 
the national rate in 2000 and 2001, which may relate to the low population and 
limited activities of the LNG plant due to the conflict. 
The influx of outsiders and their violent political conflict related 
activities that ranged from purely humanitarian work to warfare has inevitably 
increased the price of houses and cars due to the high demand from the 
international community. After the Tsunami in December 2004, the region 
suffered from hyperinflation due to the imbalance of supply and demand. The 
scarcity of economic resources resulting from the Tsunami has been worsened 
by the influx of international agencies. The cost of renting a house went up to 
approximately 20 million rupiah (around US$2,222 with 1$=Rp9,000) per 
month, which was more than ten times higher than the average/typical pre-
tsunami price. 
The above discussion further illustrates the state of ambiguity in 
contemporary Acehnese society resulting from divergent influences. Apart 
from Islam and tradition, which both went hand in hand and are the 
fundamental sources of life principles and an essential element of Acehnese 
identity, the violent political conflict and resulting economic effect together 
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with the 'Madonna factor,' have affected local life. On the one hand, under the 
Islamic (Arab) tradition in Acehnese society, women were obliged to be 
responsible for the domestic rather than the public sphere, which was 
considered the men's domain. On the other hand, the history of Sultanate and 
Acehnese heroines were strongly imposed by society in general, creating the 
image of the receptive traditions for female presence in public spheres. 
To the Acehnese, household activities can be grouped into two: 
seeking rice (Ac.: mita breueh) and seeking money (Ac.: mita peng), with 
responsibilities allocated to wife and husband respectively (Jayawardena, 
1977, p.29). Seeking rice represents the domestic domain, with traditional 
Acehnese women usually working in their family's paddy field for their 
household subsistence. Seeking money represents the public domain with 
Acehnese men perceived as the income earner who is required to bring money 
home. This is illustrated in the Acehnese saying 'no money no woman' (Ac.: 
'hana peng hana inong '). 
This domestic versus public dichotomy may explain the phenomenon 
of male dominance in market places, where male traders were more evident 
than female traders at the time of my research. The small stalls, especially 
coffee shops (Ac.: warung kopi) and burger stalls, were also more occupied by 
men than women. Peddlers were generally men, and it would be very rare for 
a woman to be a peddler (Ac.: mugee). If women did participate in the market 
economy, it would be more as additional rather than main income earners. 
This was the case of women in coastal areas where a living was made by 
searching for oysters along the rivers. Whilst men went to the sea to fish and 
were exposed to more danger, women stayed upstream on the river, not far 
from their domestic domain, to earn some 'extra money ' for their households. 
The dichotomy has further strengthened the male ' s dominance in the 
public sphere, with men entitled to top positions and vital roles as leaders, and 
even negotiators in peace deals. As opposed to their female counterparts, men 
occupied the special position of leaders, from household to community levels, 
and consequently benefited from the overall privileges afforded to leaders. At 
the household level, male members should be prioritised in anything as a 
gesture of respect. I remember an occasion in my adopted family when the 
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grandfather (Ac.: abu chiek) came from gamp6ng to visit and stayed several 
days in Banda Aceh. Mother (Ac.: mamak), made bubur kanji (a traditional 
Acehnese porridge of rice, chicken, coconut milk and some traditional herbs). 
All of us, the women family members, were busy in the kitchen preparing the 
bubur. Once it was ready, we did not eat it until abu chiek and abang (who 
was the only son in the family) finished their porridge and left the dining 
table. This apparently was a common feature of Acehnese households, 
regardless of their social status, as I observed similar actions of women from 
village U who put aside the meals for their husbands before they allowed their 
children to have their breakfast. 
In contrast to this female-domestic versus male-public dichotomy, the 
society in general strongly emphasized the history of the Acehnese Sultanate 
and heroines. The accentuation of the history of Acehnese female leaders has 
created an image of a tradition receptive to female presence in public spheres. 
Interestingly, this public domain is not just a public domain, but in the 
political sphere and war zones, as demonstrated by the famous Acehnese 
heroines Admiral Malahayati, Cut Nya Dien, Cut Meutia, and Pocut Baren.45 
Amir described this as an ' over-representation' of women (2002, p.46), 
suggesting that women entered public affairs in extreme circumstances, 
including the forefront of conflict zones. At the time of my fieldwork, this 
pattern re-appeared in the case of widows (Ac.: inong balee)46 who had 
survived the military operation during the second phase of the GAM 
emergence. Women assumed men's responsibilities during their absence, 
either permanently or casually. This suggests that the public roles were only 
45 Historically, Acehnese women also had the advantage of playing a role in political spheres 
as women heads of state or members of the Sultanate parliament in the era of Ratu 
Syafiatuddin (164 1 - 1676). There were several women Sultans: Ratu Tadjul Alam 
Syafiahtuddin Syah or Seri Ratu Tajul Al am Syafiahtuddin Johan Berdaulat ( 164 1 - 1676), 
Ratu N ihrasiyah Rawa Khadiyu, Seri Ratu Nurul Alam Nakiathuddin Syah ( 1676-1 678), Seri 
Ratu Zafiathuddin lnayat Syah ( 1678-1688), and Seri Ratu Kama lat Diathuddin Syah ( 1688-
1699) (Zainuddin, 1961 , pp.392-429; Hasjmy, 1983, pp.141-142). At the t ime of Ratu 
Syafiatuddin , women composed aro und 25 % of the members of the Sultanate parliament 
(Balai Maje/is Mahkamah Rakyat) with 18 out of73 members of being women (Hasjmy, 
1983 , p. 141). 
46 The term is also used for GAM's women soldiers, mainly composed of women survivors of 
the Indonesian military operation in the 1980s to late 1990s. 
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available for women as an extension of their domestic domain, and when no 
other options were available. 
Unlike men, to obtain leading roles in the public sphere, women are 
required to meet certain criteria as illustrated in the following citation: 
. .. Acehnese women must fulfi I several requirements in order to attain 
leadership roles. First, they must have an elite, socio-economic, and re lig ious 
background. Second, they must follow the lead ofa male figure (be it 
husband or father) . . . For women the rule remains ... that kinship and marriage 
are important in establishing authority for a woman as well as to gain 
political alliances. Being related or married to a male leader is always 
important for a woman is staking a claim for leadership. (Am ir, 2002, p.58). 
2.3 The Kinship System: The Mix of Patrilineality and 
Matrilineality 
Scholarly works suggest that the kinship system of the Acehnese 
embraces both matrilineal and patrilineaJ elements (see Siapno, 2002; 
Jayawardena, 1977; Hugronje, 1906; Siegel, 1969).47 Some other scholars, 
such as Bowen (1993) and Azra (1992), identified the elements of both 
matrifocal and patrifocal systems. Interestingly, the Acehnese have no family 
name, which in many other cultures in Indonesia indicates a patrilineal 
system, such as the Batak and Manadonese whose surnames followed their 
father's surname. These facts suggest that the Acehnese kinship system 
contains different formal categories (see Jayawardena, 1977, p.223). 
The matrilineal emphasis is illustrated in the uxorilocality and the 
ownership ofresources by women, who are locally termed 'owner of the 
house' (Ac.: peu rumoh or po rumoh),48 with the consequence that men work 
in rice fields owned by their wives (Reid, 2006; Amir, 2002; Jayawardena, 
1977; Siegel, 1969). This situation usually exists in Aceh Besar and Pi die, 
where a father is obliged to provide a house (Ac.: rumoh peunulang) and other 
47 Siegel (1969) stated that women's position in the Acehnese society owed a lot to Islamic 
law. 
48 There are different ways of writing th is word. Jayawardena ( 1977) writes it as ' njang peu 
rumoh '. Daud and Durie (1999, p. 12 & p. 159) writes it 'peurumoh '. 
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necessary economic resources (paddy field, gold, and coconut trees)49 to a 
daughter upon her marriage tlu·ough a 'separation ceremony' (Ac.: 
pumeukleh);o w itnessed by the head of gamp6ng (Ac.: keusyik), the head of 
the village mosque (Ac.: imeum meunasah), senior members of the society, 
and relatives. 
Acellnese uxorilocality, however, is a 'fexible uxorilocality' in order to 
accommodate 1be practical situations of the society, which is apparently also 
commonly practiced in many other societies (Schultz and Lavenda, 1995, 
p.578). What I mean by 'loose uxorilocality' is that unlike with the basic 
anthropological concept of uxorilocality in which 'husband takes up residence 
in the parental home of his wife' (Jayawardena, 1977, p.31 ), the Acehnese 
allow the wife to move to the husband' s home with approval from the wife ' s 
family and authorities of the wife's gamp6ng. Such cases may happen for 
political or prac.tical reasons. An example of a political reason is the need for a 
keusyik to remain in hi s gamp6ng to secure his position, which means he has 
to require his wife to follow him (Hurgronje, 1906, p.65-66). An example of a 
practical reaso11 is the case of a father's inherited house being located in a 
different village. In such a case, the father is allowed to provide a house 
outside the wife's village of origin. 
At the 1ime of my research, the practice of uxorilocality was becoming 
even looser than before, with fathers allowed to buy a piece of land or house 
in other villages at the behest of their daughters. This may happen due to the 
livelihood changes resulting from the armed conflicts that often took place in 
rural areas. People tend to move to safer places, in either cities or their 
peripheries, and consequently become engaged in the informal employment 
sector. The fle:tible practice of Acehnese uxorilocality is also due to daughters 
who, understanding the poverty level of their parents, do not demand a house 
upon their marriage. This was the case of Yan' s family in Aceh Besar, whose 
father's inheriied house was in West Aceh and was passed on to the first 
daughter ofthis family. The first daughter and her husband, moved to West 
49 The poor families usually only provide a room and several coconut trees, if anything . 
50 This can be do11e not immediately after man-iage but usually when the new couple has the ir 
first baby, the parents wil I do the ir best to conduct the 'separation ceremony.' 
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Aceh after their marriage. They run a small shop (Ac.: warong; I.: warung) in 
their new house. The second daughter stated that she would not demand a 
house upon her marriage since she understood that her parents could not 
afford to provide her with one. 
Patrilineality can be identified from the kawom clan system 
(Hurgronje, 1906). In addition to kawom, the Acehnese also use wareh and 
syedara to refer to relatives in a broad sense (Daud and Durie, 1999, p.12). 
The three terms, especially syedara, possibly relate to the Islamic concept of 
ummah (Ar. 'ummah) , 'the Islamic community in the broadest sense of 'all 
Muslims" (Fealy and Hooker, 2006, p.l). The existence of patrilineality can 
be recognized also from the Islamic regulations of descent and inheritance. 
According to Jayawardena, descent is considered to be bilateral and 
generational. Houses are provided by fathers and not mothers to daughters. 
Another indication of the patrilineality is the Acehnese proverb ' like coconut 
like its oil, like father like child' (Ac.: pakriban u meunan minyeuk, pakriban 
du meunan aneuk). This proverb illustrates the inherited characters of male 
children from their father. However, when I discussed this in relation to a 
mixed marriage of an Acehnese and non-Acehnese with two of my key 
informants from Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar, they understood it as indicating 
that children from a mixed marriage of an Acehnese father and a non-
Acehnese mother acquired Acehnese identity. 
The above discussion suggests that the Acehnese might have adopted 
matrilineality before the arrival of Islam. When Islam arrived with its 
patrilineality, some cultural negotiations and adjustments possibly took place, 
resulting in different facets of kinship embraced by the Acehnese at the same 
time. What remains interesting is how these cultural negotiations have enabled 
different systems to exist together. In my opinion, this strongly suggests that 
the Acehnese have found an accommodation of patrilineal and matrilineal 
systems. 
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Amir (2002, pp.76-77) maintained that social mobility and inter-
marriage (either inter-regional or inter-cultural)51 may have brought about the 
heterogeneity in the kinship system, including gender relations. However, the 
long history of contact with the outer world through trading as well as 
interactions among the kaw6m in Aceh, whose origins were diverse (Malay, 
Chinese, Indian, and even Turks), might have also contributed to this 
heterogeneity. Consequently, gender relationships also vary, existing 
differently in different parts of the region. For example, there are two terms 
for the female owner of a house/ a wife: the Acehnese term po rumoh and 
'binoe ' (I: bini). This may be explained by the fact that uxorilocality was 
mainly adopted in the areas of Aceh Besar and Pidi, but not in North Aceh, 
where men brought the house to the marriage, and post-marital residence was 
virilocal. Hence, in the latte case, the wife is more likely to be called 'binoe' 
(I: bini). 
Negotiations about who would bring the house to the ma1Tiage usually 
took place in mixed marriages between two persons from different regions 
that adopted different kinship practices in Aceh. An example is the case of a 
woman from Aceh Besar who married to a man from North Aceh. In many 
cases, however, both husband and wife would contribute to bringing the house 
to the marriage. Families from Aceh Besar who had good economic status 
usually insisted on providing the house for their daughters. The main reason 
given was 'supayajangan disia-siakan' (I) (to protect the daughter from being 
ignored or exploited by her husband). 
However, in terms of cultural identity, children from a mixed marriage 
of an Acehnese father to a wife from another ethnic group (I: suku) would 
automatically be considered as Acehnese. Nevertheless, those with a non-
Acehnese father are not automatically classified as a non-Acehnese. A self 
defined identity is permissible, especially when the person speaks the 
Acehnese local dialect and resides in an Acehnese gamp6ng. In such a case, 
both the local dialect proficiency and gamp6ng of origin would be the point of 
51 Amir (2002, p.75) noted the increasing incidence of successful Achehnese men opting to 
marry non-Acehnese women. He takes, as an example, Abdul lah Puteh, the former governor 
of Aceh, who married a Javanese woman. 
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reference for regarding them as an Acehnese. These arrangements may 
suggest the practice of bilateral descent (Schultz and Lavenda, 1995, p.560), 
which accepts an equally mixed-practice of patrilineality and matrilineality of 
the kinship system that treats both male and female lines at the same level of 
importance. Nevertheless, since the ' keacehan ' (Acehneseness) refers more to 
the language proficiency and gampong of origin rather than the blood shared 
from their parents, this suggests the practice of the ' beyond blood-ties' 
kinship. 
The 'beyond blood-ties' kinship was also well illustrated in local kin 
terms. The local term for close kin or family is 'wali kar6ng' (from mother' s 
side) and 'wali adat' (from father's side). The word 'wali ' is an Arabic word 
meaning protector, supporter, guardian, supporter, helper or friend (The Noble 
Qur' an, p.889). Stevens and Sclunidgall-Tellings (2004, p.1089) translated it 
as " the one near (-by), to be near/close to God, (a trusted) friend, benefactor, 
nearest relative." 
Apart from 'wali /wrong ', Acehnese also use lww6m, wareh, and 
'syedara ', which all refer to a broader sense of relatives. Kaw6m, as further 
elaborated in section 3.1 is, locally understood as the widest kinship system 
that is based on similar ancestors (Ac.: endatu) (Mahmud et al. , 1983, p.37). 
Wareh refers to affinity based on similarities in socio-economic status, 
domicile, interests, and fate (such as the most recent violent political conflict 
situation), that create close social ties (Mahmud et al., 1983, p.37). Although 
wareh is not based on blood-ties, due to the social-intimacy, it is considered to 
be at the same level of importance in Acehnese society and will always be 
referred to for generations. Syedara is used to refer to kin and non-kin ties 
(Durie and Daud, 1999, p.169). It is clear therefore that the three kin terms -
lww6m, wareh, and 'syedara' - are used to refer to those considered as having 
close affinity whether or not they have blood ties. The usage of the kin terms 
'kak ' (sister), ' cut/wk' (big sister, also meaning beloved sister), ' bang' 
(brother), 'cutbang ' (big brother, which can also mean beloved brother), ' si 
nyak ' (child) also go beyond the kindred, as they can be used to also refer to 
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those with no kin-ties but who are nevertheless felt to be as close as one's own 
blood-kin.52 
Anthropologists consider a classification that goes beyond literal 
kinship ties to be ' metaphoric kinship' or 'fictive kinship' (Schultz and 
Lavenda, 1995, p.584). To the Acehnese, 'metaphoric kinship' also embraces 
the notion of 'shared sufferings,' solidarity, and the Islamic basic concept of 
brotherhood. These emotional bonds bring a deep meaning to the social ties 
and cannot be fully accommodated within the proposed concept of fictive 
kinship, but do go beyond ego-centred kindred. In times of difficulties, for 
example, the Acehnese may tum to their entrusted close circle, which is not 
necessarily their blood-kin but can be close friends or both. An example of 
this is the case of the Tausug53 in the Philippines, as discussed by Kiefer 
(l 972, p.28).54 Such a situation, however, requires a deep mutual trust 
between the persons involved. 
2.4 The Gender Relations Dynamics 
With regards to male-female roles and positions in the public sphere, 
gender-based segregation was evident at the time of my research. I observed 
that in public ceremonies such as weddings, for example, women and children 
would tend to sit together and discuss family (domestic) and women-related 
matters (such as beauty, fashion, especially techniques in wearing fashionable 
hijab or cake baking). Discussions about politics, however, sometimes 
emerged, especially when those gathered knew each other pretty well and felt 
safe showing their political colours. 
52 
'Cut ' means younger and used after kin terms such as 'yahcut ' (younger uncle from either 
father or mother sides) and 'nekcut' (younger great uncle or aunt). But when it is used before 
the kin term such as 'cutbang ' and 'cutkak' as mentioned above, it means older (see Daud and 
Durie 1999, pp.12-1 3) 
53 The Tausug, like the Acehnese, suffered from violent political conflict between rebel 
fighters and the central government of the Philippines. 
54 A close friend who lost her house during the tsunami in 2004 once told me about her uneasy 
feelings due to the subtle ' rejection' of her kin whom she and her sister depended on for some 
months. She mentioned that good fr iends can often be more reliable than close relatives. 
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Plate 4-1 An Acehnese Nikii.h in a local Mosque, 2003 -
Whilst men sit and discuss the wedding in the foreground, 
women, including the bride (arrow sign) quietly sit at the 
Plate 4-1 illustrates the gender segregation in an Acehnese Nikah that 
took place in a local mosque in 2003. Nikah is a 'marriage (wedlock) 
according to Islamic law' (The Noble Qur'an, p.878). Women and men, 
including the bride and groom, sit separately. Men sit at the foreground and 
women sit at the back. Not until the akad nikah (the marriage ceremony in 
which both the bride and groom were announced to be husband and wife after 
stating their vows) was about to be conducted was the bride asked to approach 
the foreground where all the men, including the kadi55 and the groom were 
sitting. During the nikah ceremony, the bride remained sitting at the back with 
her female friends and family members. 
As suggested by Siapno (2002, p.173), it is important to consider the 
differences arising from urban and rural backgrounds as well as variations in 
socio-economic status in analysing the situation of Acehnese women. In line 
with Siapno's findings, it was apparent from my fieldwork that rural women 
tend to have stronger agency compared to urban women, who tend to be more 
submissive to their husbands. However, the violent political conflict situation 
possibly also contributed to the strong agency of rural women, which was 
55 Kadi (I.) is a civil judge dealing with a Moslems affair (Steven and Schmidgall-Tellings, 
2004, p.435). A kadi is usually a Moslem scholar from, or authorised by, the Office for 
Religious Affairs (I.: Kantor Pengadilan Agama). 
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apparent even in pre-conflict Acehnese society (Zentgraaff, transl.version, 
1983; Jayawardena, 1977; Siegel, 1969; Hurgronje, 1906). 
Facing violence on a day to day basis, many rural Acehnese women 
managed to develop a coping strategy in which agency played an important 
role. It certainly required particular skills for them to survive in their position 
sandwiched between the two conflicting parties. A woman from Aceh Besar 
who worked at a local factory and who was responsible for managing it after 
the owner went to live in North Sumatra for security reasons, told me about 
her experience of facing an intricate situation. She was caught between the 
threat of a wounded GAM soldier who had hidden himself in the factory, and 
army soldiers who were searching for him. In such a situation, good 
communication skills, self-reliance, and psychological strength were crucial. 
Once she managed to send the army soldiers away, she demanded that the 
GAM soldier leave her alone in return for her 'protection' . 
The well-established families in urban areas present a different picture 
of gendered power-relation dynamics resulting in weaker women' s agency. As 
shown in the case of Abu Chik' s family in section 2.2 above. Compared to 
rural women, the urban women appeared to be more reliant on, and 
submissive to, men. However, they seemed to be ambivalent about this 
subordinate position as, once I became involved in conversations on Acehnese 
women ' s roles and great intimacy developed, the golden history of Acehnese 
heroines would often be cited. Women seemed to long for a stronger agency 
but had to face the Islanlic (Arab) tradition of women's submission to men. 
3 Social Groups: From the Traditional to Contemporary 
The social groupings of the Acehnese have differed from time to time, 
and the classifications do not represent rigidly defined groups, but are fluid 
and represent a heterogeneous society. As elaborated in the following 
sections, the kaw6m 56 based classification was adopted in the pre-Sultanate 
era and fostered during the Sultanate era. Although the kaw6m-based social 
56 See footnote nol4 for a detailed explanation of the word kaw6m. 
133 
classification was maintained, other types of social group based on political 
roles in the society emerged, especially after the arrival of Islam. An example 
of this is the Moslem scholars' group (Ac. & I.: ulama). In addition, economic 
activities and geographical location (domicile) are also important bases for 
social groupings. Following McLean (1999), a broader context of ' self-
identified' and ' culturally' identified social group, as further elaborated in 
section 4 below, is worth considering as well. At the time of research, I found 
that contemporary Acehnese society can also be classified in accordance with 
people's cultural-linguistic groups, the notion of identity, and political 
affiliation. 
3.1 The Kawom 
In the era of Sultan Alaiddin Rajat Sjah Alqahar (153 7-1568), the 
Acehnese community was classified into four groups of kawom or sukee, from 
which it was normally declared that every Acehnese must be descended 
(Zainuddin, 1961, p.20; Hurgronje, 1906, p.47). Each kawom was headed by 
kawom chief or commander (Ac.: panglima kawom). The kawom (or kawom)57 
is an ancient and patriarchal system. As Hurgronje (1906, p.45) described 
" ... a kawom include all whose pedigrees fo llowed up in the male line coincide 
in a single ancestor. Even when the line cannot be clearly traced .. . they still 
hail one another as fellow-tribesmen ... " Considering its long history, kawom 
was most likely used as the basis for the territorial arrangements of gampong, 
mukim, and sagoe in the Sultanate era as explained in section 2.1 of this 
chapter. 
As noted previously, the four kaw6m are the Three Hundred-
community (Ac.: kawom Lhee Reutoih; I.: kaum Tiga Ratus); the Four Imams 
(Ac.: kawom Imeum Peuet); the 'Forefather-stone' or ' Enough-stone ' (Ac.: 
57 There are several ways of writing it: kaw6m (Daud and Durie, 1999), kawom (Hurgronje, 
1906), or kaum (Zainuddin, 1961 ). I use kaw6m, except in direct citations, for consistency 
purposes. As with other Acehnese words in my thesis, I take this spelling from the Acehnese-
lndonesian-English Thesaurus of Daud and Durie ( 1999). 
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kaw6m Tok Batee); 58 and the 'Sandang-Forefather' 59 (Ac.: kaw6m Oja 
Sandang).60 The Three Hundred-community (Ac.: kaw6m Lhee Reutoih) 
basically refened to the Mante, who are said to be the possible origin of the 
Acehnese (Zainuddin, 1961), and the Batak Karee/Karo. The Four Imams 
(Ac.: kaw6m Imeum Peuet), also called the Four Hundred (Ac.: kaw6m Peuet 
Reutoih), refen-ed to those who belonged to the Hindu (Indian) Kling (Ac.: 
Kleng)61 or the Hindu (Indian) Traders (Ac. ureueng dagang).62 The 
'Forefather-stone' (Ac. : kaw6m Tok Batee) was the compilation of Arab, 
Persian, Turk, and other foreigners, including the Bugis, from Sulawesi. The 
'Sandang-Forefather' (Ac. : kaw6m Oja Sandang) were those who came from 
mixed maniages between the Batak Karee and the first anivals of the Hindu 
(Indians). In an Acehnese poem, these four groups were described as follows: 
The Lhee Reutoih is like a drang63 seed I Kawn lhee Reutoih ban aneuk drcmg 
The Dja Sandang is like turmeric seed I Ka111n Oja Sandang djeura hafeba 
The Tok Batee is only a few in numbers I KaumTok Batee na baij'ul-ba!jut 
The lmeum Peuet is the one who shakes the world I Kaum lmeum Peuel njang 
gok-gok donja 
(Source: Zainuddin, I 96 I, p.20) 
58 Hurgronje (I 906, p.5 1) argued that Tok has a similar meaning to Dja or Ja: forefathers. He 
then trans lated 'Tok Batee' as the Forefather or Grandfather Stone. Batee (also written as 
batee) means stone (Daud and Durie, 1999, p.120). Zainuddin (196 I, p.21) translated ' Tok 
Batee' as Enough Stone. This is based on the argument that the term 'Tok Batee' was given to 
this kawom's because of its vigorous participation, that resulted in them being acknowledged 
as the hardest workers among the four kawom, in collecting stones for the development of the 
Sultan's palace (Zainuddin, I 96 I, p.21 ). In Daud and Durie (1999, p. I 73) there are words 
with simi lar pronunciation: Lok (arrive) and tbk (Adam's apple), which may relate to ancestor 
(Forefather). I use both translations since both have strong arguments that are not conflicting. 
59 Dja or Ja is an Acehnese term for ancestor (Daud and Durie, I 999, p.137) or forefather 
(Hurgronje, I 906, p.49). As for sandang, I cannot find this word in Daud and Durie ( I 999). 
Hurgronje, however, translates it " to carry something under the arm suspended to a rope or 
strap passing over the shoulder" (Hurgronje, 1906, p.49). This is similar to the Indonesian 
translation for sandang, which in Acehnese is sawat. In order not to pre-judge the diverse 
understandings, I use the term as it is. 
60 Apart from these four kawom, there is also the slaves group, composed of the N iasese, 
Batak, and Abeusi (Africans). Mixed marriages of Acehnese and the slaves occurred, whose 
chi ldren were well respected addressing them as 'children of gold ' (Ac.: aneuk meueh), and 
after two or three generations they would be considered as Acehnese (Hurgronje, I 906, pp.22-
23). 
61 Hurgronje (I 906, p. I 7) noted that apart from the Hindu Kling, there were also people from 
Madras and Malabat, and the Chetties (the money lending caste of Southern India). 
62 
'Urezmg dagang' was usually used to indicate the Kling and strangers (H urgronje, 1906, 
pp. I 8- I 9). It was later used for on Iy the Kling, some of whom engaged in agriculture and 
were considered as part of the Acehnese (Hurgronje, 1906, p.19). 
63 Wild grasses that usually grow in paddy fields after harvesting time. 
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The Three Hundred-community (Ac.: kawom Lhee Reutoih) was 
viewed as wild grass seeds (Ac.: drang) to illustrate the large number of thi s 
kawom, which was noted as the second strongest group after the Four Imams 
(Ac.: kawom Imeum Peut) or the Four Hundred (Ac.: kawom Peuet Reutoih; 
I.: kaum Empat Ratus). These names, the Three Hundred and the Four 
Hundred, were based on the story of a dispute over an adultery case between 
300 people from the Lhee Reutoih and 400 people from the Imeum Peuet. 
This dispute almost led them to armed clashes but was able to be resolved 
peacefully (Zainuddin, 1961, p.21 ). The two groups were afterward often 
referred to as the Three Hundred and the Four Hundred. 
Apart from its large population, however, drang also denotes the 
uselessness of the Lhee Reutoih, since the wild grasses (Ac.: drang) usually 
grow rapidly after harvesting time and cannot be used for anything, but cause 
trouble. This is in contrast to the Dja Sandang, which was symbol ised as 
turmeric seeds. Since turmeric is one of the main ingredients in the Acehnese 
traditional cuisine, the term represents a more positive image of the people. 
The Tok Batee were called batjut-batjut (Ac.), which literally means a few in 
number, due to their small population. Although they were batjut-batjut, the 
Tok Batee played an important role in the society, exemplified by the fact that 
the Sultan was from kawom Tok Batee (Zainuddin, 1961 , p.20). The Imeum 
Peuet was referred to as gok-gok donja (Ac.), which means the one who 
shakes the world. This expression was given not only because this kawom was 
the largest group, but also due to their strong influence on the government and 
trading activities. Their favourable economic position as traders may explain 
their significant influence in political decision-making. 
Each kawom was strongly unified by their own customs, which 
differed from each other. Rivalry between each kawom often occurred, as 
illustrated in the first verse of the Acehnese poem on kawom: 
The Lhee Reut6ih are uleebalang I Sukee Lhee Reutoih uleebalang 
The Oja Sandang may become rajas64 I Sukee Oja Sandang j euel keuraja 
(Source: Hurgronje, 1906, p.58) 
64 The word raja is identical to uleebalang, who are said to be the r~j as of Acch (Hurgronjc, 1906, 
p.58) 
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This verse demonstrates how the power of lmeum Peuet, the strongest 
kaw6m, with other kaw6m could be balanced through the united efforts of the 
rest of the kaw6m, especially the Lhee Reutoih and Dja Sandang (Zainuddin, 
1961 , p.21; Hurgronje, 1906, p.58), even though custom differences between 
the other three (Dja Sandang, Lhee Reutoih, and Tok Batee) kaw6m often 
created disputes between them. Although Islam was adopted as the foundation 
of the Sultanate of Aceh at the time of Sultan All Moeghajat Sjah (1514-
1528), Islamic law could not be implemented at kaum level due to the 
diversity of the culture and tradition of each kaum. 
In the period of Sul than Alaaddin Riajat Sjah Al Qahhar (1537-1568), 
a non-unified custom (Ac.: 'adat plakpleueng' ) was adopted to accommodate 
this diversity. After Sulthan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636), however, Islam was 
strongly imposed as the main source of custom and traditions. Iskandar Muda 
employed the four state regulations of: custom and tradition (Ac.: adat) from 
the sultan; judicial law (Ac.: huk6m) from Moslem scholars (Ac.: ulama); civil 
rules and politeness (Ac.:kanun/qanun) from the queen; and customary habit 
and practices (Ac.:reusam) from kaw6m commanders. This is illustrated in the 
old Acehnese saying cited at the beginning of this chapter. In this era the 
strong link between the Sultan and ulama was clearly exemplified in the 
Sultan's regulation (Ac.: Qanun Meukuta Alam, often referred to as Adat 
Meukuta Alam),65 in which it was stated that ulama and sultan should not be 
separated as otherwise the kingdom would come to an end (Hasjmi, 1983, 
p.190). 
The four kaw6m wielded quiet influential power in the Sultanate 
palace, as shown from their success in cancelling the proposed marriage of the 
Sultan of Johor to Sultane Tadjul Alam Syafiathuddin Sjah66 of Aceh, the 
daughter of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) who succeeded in 1641-1676 
65 The Qanun was initiated by Sultan Alaiddin Riayat Syah Al Khahhar (I 539-1579), 
completed by Sultan lskandar Muda ( 1607-1636), modified, especially for women 's position 
in the legislation, by Sulthanah Seri Ratu Tajul Alam Safiatuddin Johan Berdaulat (1641-
1676), and revised further, adding the geneology of other Islamic kings in Aceh, by Sultan 
Alaiddin Ibrahim Mansur Syah (1857-1870) (Hasjmi, 1983, p.345). 
66 The first women sultan in Aceh (Zainuddin, 1961 , p.38) 
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after the sudden death of her husband Sultan Iskandar Sani67 ( 1636-1641 ). 
These four ka.wom considered the marriage to be a trick by the Dutch to gain 
power over the Sultanate of Aceh, given the close link of the Sultan of Johor 
and the Dutch. It was apparent that under a common threat, which a Dutch or 
Portuguese invasion would pose, all ka.wom put aside their internal clashes 
and united to fight against the colonial powers. This clearly demonstrates the 
balance of power in which each kawom had their voice in the sultanate ' s 
policy decision making through their representatives in the sultanate 
parliament (Hasjmi, 1983). The voice of the people (ka.wom) remained vital in 
the policy decision making process. This was true until the beginning of last 
century, when Hurgronje (1906, p.45) wrote that the kawom " ... have by no 
means lost all significance" even after the territorial distribution had been 
adopted for centuries during the Sultanate era. 
The above example of the social unity and disunity of the four kawom 
illustrates the ability of the Acehnese society to be receptive to outsiders and 
resistant to outside domination at the same time. A welcome gesture to 
outsiders could quickly change to a strong condemnation of them when 
common interests were perceived to be at risk. Taking into account the 
tradition of a balanced power, receptive nature, and confrontational nature of 
the Acehnese society, it is therefore understandable that the region 
experienced a long period of violent political conflict and has had no peace for 
over nine years, as described in chapter 5. 
It is not clear until which period the ka.wom based classification of the 
Acehnese society retained its importance. Siegel ( 1969) argued that it may 
have vanished and the groups successfully amalgamated. Nevertheless, from 
my field work it was apparent that the kawom based classification had not 
totally disappeared, but may have been greatly weakened. It was sometimes 
mentioned by individuals merely as additional information rather than an 
immediate point ofreference for their identity. The gampong or place of 
origin would usually be mentioned before any other characteristics. This was 
67 Sultan lskandar Sani Ala Addin Mughayat Syah ( 1636-1641) is the son of Raja 
Ahmadsyah, the king of Pahang. He married Sultan lskandar Muda's daughter, Puteri Seri 
Alam, who later became Ratu Tajul Alam Syafiathuddin Syah. (Zainuddin, 1961) 
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the case with my foster family in Banda Aceh, whose abu chik (grandfather 
from the mother's side) was from Sigli but had mixed Hindu Kling and Arab 
origins. When they described his identity, he listed his gampong of origin in 
Sigli before his kaw6m based descent of the Hindu Kling and Arab. Similarly, 
when I asked the place of origin of a friend from a local NGO, he mentioned 
his kaw6m based descent from the Hindu Kling in addition to his gampong of 
origin in North Aceh. 
The historical kaw6m based society of the Acehnese might explain the 
argument of Siegel (1969) and Suyatno (1977) that the Acehnese society in 
the 19111 century was not a hierarchical-vertically integrated society but a unit 
composed of four groups living side by side that did not integrate but 
cooperated across boundaries for their own needs. Suyatno (1977) further 
argued that in this period, the social system of the Acehnese depended on the 
family and territorial ties that operated in the common interests of social 
relations, economy, and religion. His argument suggests a horizontal 
integration of the society through marriage, which may be one of the factors 
explaining the weakened kaw6m based society suggested by Siegel (1969). 
Siegel (1969) classified the society based on ethnic backgrounds, places of 
origin, livelihood activities, and socio-political roles and status (which also 
indicated religious role). 
The adoption oflslam as the main principal of the State, especially in 
the time of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607 - 1636), has led to a vertical 
integration of the society that later has made the region become known as the 
'veranda of Mecca' (I: Serambi Mekkah; Ac. : Seuramo Mekkah),68 denoting 
its strong Islamic nature. As a result, Acehnese society can be seen to have 
been integrated both horizontally and vertically. This has occurred at two 
different levels: the political and the practical. At the political level, the 
society experiences a vertical integration, with Islam providing the key 
element for a single identity for the society. This began from the 14111 century 
under Sultan All Moeghajat Sjah (1514 - 1530), who was noted as the first 
68 The term can be traced as far back as 164 1 in ' Bustan al-Salatin' written by Nur al-Din al-
Raniri (Riddel, 2006, p.38) 
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Sultan to establish an Islamic Kingdom in Aceh, and reached its peak in the 
16th century under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636), who was able to unite 
a number of Acehnese small kingdoms into one Islamic Kingdom. Social 
integration deriving from Islam was further strengthened in the 19th century 
during the war against the Dutch and at the current time has re-emerged with 
the implementation of Shari 'a law. While undergoing this vertical integration, 
the society has been horizontally integrated at the practical level, where 
economic activities plays and geographic location have played an important 
role, as discussed below. 
3.2 Economic Activities and Geographic Location 
(domicile) 
At the time of research, the three traditional occupational 
classifications were still used: farmer (Ac.: ureueng meutani), trader (Ac.: 
ureueng meukat), and artisan (Ac.: ureueng ut6h). The ureueng meutani were 
composed of several groups: the paddy field farn1er (Ac.: ureueng meugoe ), 
the highland farmer (Ac.: ureueng meulampoh), and landless farmer (Ac.: 
ureueng ceumatok). Farmers who had both paddy fields and upland fields 
were considered to be the rich (Ac.: ureueng kaya); those who were either the 
paddy field farmers (Ac.: ureueng meugoe) or highland farmers (Ac.: ureueng 
meulampoh) were considered the middle class (Ac.: ureueng sep pajoh); and 
the landless farmers (Ac.: ureueng ceumatok) were considered the lowest class 
or the poor (Ac.: ureueng gasien). 
The traders (Ac.: ureueng meukat) were classified into three large 
groups of large, middle, and small traders. The large traders usually 
dominated big business in the cities, such as the owner of Pantee Perak (the 
only supermarket in the province at the time of my fieldwork) or the owner of 
Kuala Tri pa Hotel (the fanciest hotel in the province at the time of my 
fieldwork) in Banda Aceh. The Kuala Tripa was the hotel where the 
international staff usually stayed during the Cessation on Hos6lity Agreement 
period, when the region experienced an influx of international workers. The 
middle traders were those who possessed small businesses such as toko (small 
shops), household companies, small hotels, and internet cafos. The small 
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traders were those who usually engaged in petty trading such as mugee (the 
peddlers) who travelled around by motorcycle carrying two big baskets at the 
back filled with merchandise, usually agricultural products. 
The artisans (Ac.: ureueng utoh) were composed of three main groups: 
the gold artisans (Ac.: utoh meuh), iron artisans (Ac.: utoh beusoe) and metal 
artisans (Ac.: utoh chik), with specialities in different kinds of metals. 
Combinations of the three groups were possible, and were usually considered 
to have a higher status due to their possessing different expertise or, 
sometimes, for possessing magical powers like the utoh chik beusoe. The 
artisans (Ac.: ureueng utoh), unlike the farmers (Ac.: ureueng meutani) and 
traders (Ac.: ureueng meukal), have disappeared over time. This has 
particularly happened to the iron artisan (Ac.: utoh beusoe) and metal artisan 
(Ac.: utoh chik), due to the decreased demand for their products as a 
consequence of the availability of new mass produced metal goods. The 
agricultural tools, for example, that used to be produced by the iron and metal 
artisans have been gradually replaced by products from factories. Carriages, 
which once were produced and maintained by these two utoh, have been 
replaced by cars manufactured by multi national corporations with 
maintenance provided by auto repair shops. At the time of research, while I 
rarely encountered shops of these artisans, I still could find gold artisans. It is 
worth noting also that these artisans were predominantly men. Women were 
not represented among artisans as these occupations were considered to be 
men 's skills, requiring physical strength, and also men' s income earning 
occupations (Ac.: 'mita breueh'). 
Based on geographical location, there were two groups: the uphill 
people or villagers (Ac.: ureueng tunong) and downhill or coastal people, 
including the people from town or city (Ac.: ureueng baroh). This 
classification was often highlighted by the villagers. These largely horizontal 
classifications therefore encompass not only places of origin but also 
economic activities such as farming and trading. 
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3.3 Political Roles 
The final type of grouping was that based on political roles in the 
society. Apait form the Sultane/Sultanate, there were special classes of ulama 
and uleebalang, who were predominantly men. 69 The traditional title for 
ulama is Teungku and for uleebalang is Teuku. The ulama started to obtain an 
important position in the society after the coming oflslam in the region and 
gained more power after the establishment of the Islamic Sultanate. Whilst the 
Sultan was the main figure in the government, the ulama and uleebalang were 
the major players in politics, and the political and economic status of the latter 
was exploited by the Dutch to conquer the Sultanate and ulama. Unlike the 
ulama and uleebalang, being in a relatively distant position from the people 
and Jacking access to the people, the Sultan became merely a symbol of power 
that faded away under a new system of government, especially after the 
Independence of Indonesia in which the ulama, claiming to represent the 
people, vowed to join Indonesia. 
The ulama were stratified into highest, middle and lowest ulama, 
identified through their titles of teungku chik, teungku di bale, and teungku 
(Somadisastra, 1977). The ulama led dayah, traditional Islamic boarding 
schools, through which they obtained political power and legitimacy from 
society. As well as being a respected class- probably the most respected - the 
ulama often became important leaders in many aspects of life in Aceh. People 
often came to the ulama to seek refuge, ask for advice to settle disputes, or 
even to complain about the local government's development policies. With 
their unique mixture of political and religious powers, the ulama have always 
been a strong informal authority, with their power rooted in civi l society and 
acting as a countervailing force (Fachry, 2003, p.54; Suyatno, 1977) against 
the government. During the Dutch colonial era, the ulama became a 
' peripheral-aristocracy' . What I mean by this is that the ulama obtained a 
noble status not from their bloodline but from a society that highly valued 
69 These two social classes were later involved in the dispute between the pro and anti 
Republic of Indonesia led by u/ama and uleebalang respectively during the initial stage of the 
independence of Indonesia. See chapter 5 for details. 
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their religious teachings. The people found psychological comfort from this, 
and the ulama became central to the resistance against the Dutch. 
The uleebalang gained and maintained their status through hereditary 
office and modes of exercising power. They used their economic networks 
obtained through their position as tax collectors for the Sultan to maintain 
their power and position in the society (Siegel, l 969). However, as stated by 
Suyatno (1977), the strong economic power of the uleebalang depended on 
the economic position of the region, especially in regard to trading activity. 
Uleebalang in coastal areas, where trade played an important role in economic 
activities, had more economic power than in the upland areas. 70 This suggests 
the economic ties between the uleebalang and ureueng meukat (traders) In 
recent times, uleebalang families have maintained their favourable economic 
status from their property and other valuable possessions, such as land and 
gold, inherited from their ancestors. Although they are much weaker now than 
in the Sultanate and Dutch colonial era, the uleebalang families still occupy a 
distinct social-economic status in the society, especially those who were able 
to sustain the land inherited from their ancestors. 
The limited observations that I made suggest that those who live in 
coastal areas continued to have a higher economic status than those in the 
uphill areas. 71 An uleebalang descendant family that I met in village A of 
Aceh Besar, which was located in the coastal areas along the Malacca strait, 
for example inherited more than 2 hectares of land on which they established 
their very prosperous prawn farming business. Their big house, which was 
made of solid bricks and built in the centre of their land with fences around it, 
was quite distinct among neighbouring houses owned by poor fisherman, 
which were approximately twenty four (four times six) m2 and made of wood, 
and in some cases, did not have tiles but roofs thatched with palm leaves. The 
wife of the uleebalang family was an important contact used by local NGOs 
70 An example is Teuku Muda Nyak Malim, uleebalang ofSimpang Ulim, who was 
well known as a pepper-king due to his successful trading direct to Penang, overriding the 
Chinese middlemen (Reid, 1969, p.80). 
71 It is possible, however, that the December 2004 Tsunami has changed this feature. With 
coastal areas harshly affected by this catastrophic Tsunami , the economic gap between 
uleebalang descendants in coastal and uphill areas may have become smaller. 
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to gain access to other women villagers. Her noble status, and probably also 
her favourable economic position, enabled her to gain respect and become a 
leader whose words were listened to and whose orders were fo llowed by other 
women. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to observe the relationship between the 
descendants of uleebalang and ulama. However, according to historical 
accounts, after the Cumbok War (1945-1946), the war between ulama and 
uleebalang ended with glory on the side of the ulama, and the power of the 
uleebalang was weakened and became almost invisible. Nevertheless, some 
families of uleebalang descent were still able to maintain their economic 
power through their positions as head of gampong (geusyiek). I noted that 
some of the current (2004) geusyiek had uleebalang background, either from 
their father or grandfather. 
The ulama have also experienced a decline in their role and position 
in society. This particularly occurred after Suharto coopted the ulama into 
allowing his ruling party, the Functional Groups Party (Golongan Karya), to 
win in Aceh. In the recent violent political conflict between GAM and the 
government, the ulama did not appear to play any vital role in addressing the 
needs of the people. The people I interviewed signalled their disappointment 
towards current ulama, who were perceived as being ignorant of the human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian Armed Forces during their 
military operations.72 
3.4 Contemporary Acehnese Society 
Along with the aforementioned groupings, contemporary Acehnese 
society may also be classified in accordance with its cultural-linguistic, self-
defined identity and political affiliation. The cultural-linguistic identity refers 
to the dialect and culture adopted by Acehnese. The self-defined identity 
relates to the use of domicile in Aceh to denote one's identity. In the context 
of the recent violent political conflict between the GAM and the government, 
political affiliation has also become a basis of social differences. 
72 See Chapter 4 Section 1.3. for details of the Military Operation. 
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The 'self-identified' society especially occurred among those who fled 
from their gamp6ng of origin to reside in particular areas in Aceh for security 
reasons. An example is village U of Banda Aceh. This community has only 
existed since the 1970s when most of the inhabitants fled there from troubled 
areas during the previous violent political conflict in the 1970s (DI/TIJ - see 
Chapter 5). The village, which was swept away by the Tsunami that hit the 
region in December 2004,73 was mainly composed of modest wooden houses 
that were built above the high sea water level along the coast facing the 
Malacca strait. At the time of my fieldwork (up to August 2004), people were 
still fleeing to this area to escape from the armed conflict of GAM. 
Most of the people who lived in this area tended to immediately 
identify themselves in reference to the name of this area and considered 
themselves to be the Acehnese from U. Thus, U was considered their ' cunent' 
gampong of origins. Their 'self-defined' identity drew on their current place 
ofresidence, their language, and religion. However, once the conversation 
developed further on their origins, the common response would be "Asli saya 
memang dari 'X' tapi saya orang U sekarang. Orang Aceh U, karena saya di 
sini [U] " (I)/"lt is true that I originated from 'X' but I am currently in U. I am 
a U Acehnese, because I am here". It is apparent from that although they also 
remembered their gampong of ori'gins, this was not an immediate point of 
reference. It only appeared at a later stage of a conversation. 
Other forms of identification emanate from the long period of violent 
political conflict between GAM and the government oflndonesia. As a result, 
Acehnese society can also be divided into three conflict related groups: GAM 
fighters and partisans (Ac.: urueung GAM), TNI spies and allies (Ac.: Cuak), 
and civilians (Ac.: rakyat). Due to the high degree of tense military activity of 
both conflicting parties, these divisions have infiltrated social relations in 
Aceh, and to a certain extent ruptured the fine fabric of social ties, even 
kinship ties. A girl from East Aceh admitted to having her extended families 
divided into pro- and anti-GAM groups. Her father was a keusyik or village 
73 The Tsunam i completely destroyed the vi llage, and the people are currently living e ither in 
camps or re lative's and friends ' houses. 
145 
head, but her uncle on her father' s side was a GAM soldier who came to their 
house from time to time to ask for material support, such as rice, money, and 
other necessities. The regular visits of her uncle certainly endangered the 
family, and generated a family-political dispute, which would not have 
happened during the non-violent political conflict times. She said that 
whenever her uncle paid them a visit, there were always quarrels between her 
father, who asked her uncle to leave them alone, and her uncle, who 
threatened to report them to a GAM commander. Another example was the 
case of a woman from North Aceh whose husband was a GAM soldier killed 
by the Army. She confessed to having trouble 'distributing' her children. 
None of her extended families were willing to adopt her children and take on 
the wali responsibilities since they were too afraid to be seen as being 
affiliated with GAM. 
4 On Identity: From 'Aceh Bit' to 'Aceh Swasta' 
At the time of my research, there were three aspects usually used by 
Acehnese as points of reference for defining their identity. These are 
geographical origin (gampong of origin), mother tongue, and Islam. The 
presence of these three factors is fundamental in delineating the trueness of 
one's identity as an Acehnese. This has led to a dichotomy of the true 
Acehnese as opposed to the ' not so true' Acehnese. During my field work, 
three individuals, two from different areas of Banda Aceh and one from North 
Aceh, whom I met on different occasions, propped me up with their term 
'Aceh swasta' to illustrate the 'not so true Acehenese' identity. This section 
describes these two types of identity of the contemporary Acehnese. 
4.1 The 'Aceh Bit': Between 'Gampong' of Origin, Local 
Dialect and Islam. 
At the time of my research, it was obvious to me that gampdng was 
always used in daily conversations, not only to refer to the place of origin but 
also to express identity as an Acehnese. The polite question of 'Which 
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gampong are you originally from?' (Ac.: Pat gampong gatha?) or the simple 
and less formal question of 'Where are you from' (Ac: Pat gampong?) always 
appeared at the initial stage of conversations between strangers to dete1mine 
whether the person was orang Aceh Asli (I) or not. The geographic location of 
the gampong determines the degree of ' keasUan' . Those who come from Aceh 
Besar, Pidie, Bireun and North Aceh, would be considered as authentic Aceh 
(Ac.: Aceh bit or I.: Aceh asli). 
Another aspect that signifies Acehnese identity is the local language, 
bahasa aceh (I) (Acehnese language), which is a member of the Malayo-
Polynesian family (Schmidt in Zainuddin, 1961 , p.30; Siegel, 1979, p.8; Reid, 
2006, p.7). Its lexical and grammatical distinctiveness, however, is closer to 
the Cham (currently central Vietnam) language than the Sumatran sub-set of 
Austronesian (Reid, 2006, p. 7). Zainuddin notes that bahasa aceh was used 
officially until the era of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) who, after the 
expansion of his kingdom to current day Malaysia (the kingdoms of Kedah, 
Pahang on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, Perak, Malaka, Djohor, 
Batak and Nias),74 announced that Malay language (which in their old 
manuscripts was referred to as bahasa Djawoe or bahasa Djawi) would be 
used as the official language. In this era, all Sarakata (the Sultan's formal 
letters) were written in Malay (bahasa Djawoe) with introductions in Arabic 
(Zainuddin, 1961). The Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) also asked 
someone named Sjech Abdul Rauf Al Fansuri (1593 -1695), well-known as 
Sjiah Kuala, with the assistance of two Malays, to compose two books of 
reference for the Sultan's officers: Maratul Thalab and Tafsir Baidhawi. The 
Malay language was also used in schools, where students were taught to 
master the language before learning other subjects,75 in literature, as well as in 
court (Zainuddin, 1961 , p.39; Siegel, 1979, p.12). 
Before the conflict between GAM and the Indonesian military, the 
Acehnese tended to avoid using their local dialect to avoid being considered 
as people from a hamlet (I.: orang kampung) or villagers (I.: orang desa). 
74 Apart from these regions Zainuddin ( 1961 , p.38) also mentioned Java and Celebes (Bug is) 
but it was not clear whether or not these two reg ions were under Sultan 's empire. 
75 Other subjects that were learnt are Masa Ila!, Bigajah, and Sirat (Zainuddin , 1961 , p.39) 
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This was because association with 'kampungan ' (I) denoted the ' kampung' 
characteristics of uneducated, unsophisticated, poor and backward. The term 
evokes the contrast between urban people (1.: orang kota), or the well 
educated and well mannered, and people from a hamlet (1.: orang kampung) , 
or villagers (1.: orang desa), the hicks, or country bumpkins who are non-
educated and ill mannered. Consequently, people, especially in cities, 
preferred to speak in Bahasa Indonesia, which is the national language of 
Indonesia that symbolizes closeness to Jakarta, the capital city and is a symbol 
of pride. 76 The general opinion was that only those who came from villages 
and the uneducated spoke in dialects. Villagers who moved to cities for study 
or work also tended to avoid using the local dialect and relied on Bahasa 
Indonesia. 
During the period of the GAM-TNI conflict, however, the local dialect 
started to be widely used. Unlike in previous times, people tended to show that 
they could speak the language, or at least understand the conversation as 
passive speakers, particularly those for whom bahasa Aceh was not their 
mother tongue. There was also a shift in mentality among the younger 
generation from feeling shameful and ' kampungan ' to being proud of 
speaking their bahasa Aceh and showing their Acehnese identity. I remember 
a conversation with three friends from an NGO in Banda Aceh in March 2003, 
in which they raised their concerns about whether it was shameful that some 
Acehnese spoke in their bahasa Aceh, and asked whether or not bahasa Aceh 
sounded as 'kampungan' to me as it was generally perceived by local society. 
The conversation revealed the aforementioned shift in mentality towards 
bahasa Aceh. 
This trend might be related to the enforcement of the use of bahasa 
Aceh by GAM around the year 2000 as one important way-apart from place of 
origin-of demonstrating Acehnese identity. General information from key 
informants whom I talked to indicates that as Acehnese sympathy towards 
GAM increased, the use of bahasa Aceh became more widespread and the 
76 It is important to note, however, that this did not solely happen in Aceh but was a common 
picture in many other areas in Indonesia, especially areas where local dialects are different 
fro m Bahasa Melayu - the root of Bahasa Indonesia. 
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general view of bahasa Aceh as kampungan declined. The use of bahasa Aceh 
was not shameful anymore, but rather a source of pride. 
Another possible explanation of this change is security. At GAM 
security checks, proficiency in the local dialect was often used as an important 
way to distinguish Acehnese from non Acehnese. The security check usually 
started with the Islamic greeting of 'May peace be with you together with 
God's Mercy and Blessings in this life and the life to come' 
(Assalamu 'alaikum warahmatullahi wa barakatuh)77 or its short version of 
' May peace be with you' (assalamualaikum) . The greeting would then be 
followed by some simple questions in Acehnese dialect, such as How are you 
(Ac.: Peu haba)?; Where are you heading to (Ac.: Jak wo)?; Which gampong 
are you originally from (Ac.: Pat gampong droen or more polite, Pat 
gampong gala)?, which as previously mentioned, is also used to denote the 
Acehnese identity. 
Responding to these questions in a language other than Acehnese 
would lead to suspicion. This was experienced by a friend of mine who 
originated from Tamiang, one of the districts in Aceh, and was a passive 
speaker of Acehnese language, i.e. s/he could not speak it but understood the 
conversation.78 S/he admitted that knowing thats/he was an Acehnese who 
could not respond in the Acehnese dialect, the GAM soldier became annoyed 
and raised his voice asking whether s/he was not an Acehnese or an Acehnese 
who was too proud and felt too ashamed to speak in their own local dialect. 
On the other hand, answering questions in Acehnese language during 
the Indonesian military sweeps could also lead to suspicions of being a 
partisan of GAM. Having limited, or sometimes no knowledge of the local 
dialect, Indonesian soldiers were usually annoyed at not understanding what 
the conversation was about and often became suspicious that it might be about 
GAM related issues. In addition, not using bahasa Indonesia (the national 
language) was perceived as announcing one's political standpoint as being 
77 The reply to this greeting would be' Wa alaikum assalam wa rahmatu Allah wa barakatuh.' 
(And to you too be peace together with God ' s Mercy and Blessings in this life and the life to 
come) 
78 Aceh Tamiang have a different local dialect, Bahasa Tamiang. 
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against Indonesia. Consequently, during Indonesian military security checks, 
the use of local dialect was prohibited by the Indonesian military. 
These examples clearly show the importance of local dialect as an 
expression of identity, as well as the significant influence of the Acehnese 
upon other cultural-linguistic groups in Aceh, such as Tamiang, Gayo, Aneuk 
Jamee and Alas. Moreover, in the context of violent political conflict, Bahasa 
Aceh was used as part of the battle on an ideological level about the notion of 
' national identity' between the ethno-national identity (national identity based 
on the ethnic affiliation) of GAM versus the state-national identity (identity 
imposed by the state) of the Indonesian government. 
As well as gampong of origin and local dialect (Bahasa Aceh) 
proficiency, another important facet of Acehnese identity is Islam. Aceh and 
Islam are intertwined and inseparable, as exemplified by the following 
conversation that I had with an eight year old girl who has Acehnese and 
Minang parents but was born and grew up in Banda Aceh: 
Me: ·•Ninda, If you were asked who you are [in terms of ethnic background], 
what would be your answer?"l"Ninda, Ka/au dilanya Ninda orang mana, Ninda 
jawabapa?" 
N inda: " Acehnese"l''Orang Aceh ., 
Me: "Why would you say Acehnese?"/ "Pakeun Ninda bilang orang Aceh?" 
Ninda: "Because I am a Moslem"/"Kareuna Ninda Islam " 
Me: "So a Moslem would be an Acehnese?"/ ".Jadi kn/au orang Islam orang 
Aceh?" 
Ninda: "No, An Acehnese would be a Moslem"/"Bukan, kalau orang Aceh 
itu Islam" 
Islam, as part of Acehnese tradition, can be observed on both material 
and ideological levels. At the material level, the presence of Islam is evident 
from the presence of many mosques that can be found everywhere in Aceh. At 
gampong level, the mosques are usually small and called meunasah, from the 
Arabic word madrasah (school). The meunasah, led by an imuem meunasah, 
does not only function as a mosque, but also a madrasah where children learn 
to recite Al Qur' an (the Moslems ' holy book) and as a meeting house for 
villagers' social activities. The meunasah was originally also used for guests 
of families with no male family members who needed to stay over night. At 
higher level , from mukim to nanggroe level, mosques are usually bigger and 
are called masjid, led by imeum masjid. Since the implementation of Shari 'a 
law, the physical presence of Islam is also evident in the use of the Islamic 
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dress code, which is normatively applied to both men and women, but in 
practice is enforced more often in relation to women. For men, it was their 
presence in the mosque or meunasah during Friday prayers that was enforced. 
Every Friday, between 11.30 am and 2 pm the streets were usually empty, 
with shops closed and public transportation ceasing operation. In the cities, the 
Shari 'a police usually moved around to ensure that no men were seen on the 
street or in public places during these times. 
At the non-material level, the presence of Islam as part of Acehnese 
identity could be observed from the use of Islamic rules and regulations in the 
conduct of day to day life and events, such as weddings, funerals, and in 
settling disputes, both in domestic and public spheres. The presence of Islam 
is also reflected in people's proficiency in reciting the Al Qur'an. Every 
Acehnese ought to know how to recite the Al Qur'an. Lacking this skill 
means being an incomplete Acehnese. 
During times of violent political conflict, the conduct oflslam in daily 
life could become problematic, especially with regards to Islamic funeral 
rituals. According to Islam, it is obligatory for all Moslems in the area to 
perform an Islamic funeral for neighbouring Moslems who have passed away, 
and not conducting it would be considered sinful. There are at least three basic 
actions required here, i.e. the eyes should be closed; the corpse should be 
cleaned and well wrapped (Ac.: pumanoe manyet); and a special prayer for the 
person who passed away (I.: sholatjenazah; Ac.: seumayang manyet) should 
be conducted. Only through this proper Islamic funeral can the spirit of the 
dead person be guaranteed forgiveness from God. This needs to be followed 
by several ritual feasts (Ac .:khanduri, I.: kenduri)79 to commemorate the 
deceased, during which people recite surah Yd-Sin, 80 one of the verses in Al 
Qur'an. At least four khanduri need to be conducted: the funeral feast (Ac.: 
khanduri buka uruek), on the funeral day; the seventh day feast (Ac.: khanduri 
79 The khanduri is also conducted for other activ ities, such as farming and fishing or on the 
birth ofa baby. Apart from khanduri, the Acehnese also perform peusijeuk, a special 
ceremony to signify the special occasions of a peace deal after serious disputes, a return of 
family members from war, and the recovery of family members from a serious disease. 
80 This is the thirty sixth chapter of the Q ur'an. It is be lieved that on ly Allah knows the 
meaning of 'Ya-Sin' and it is considered as one of the miracles of the Qur'an. 
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tuj6h also named seuneujdh), on the seventh day after the death; the fortieth 
day feast (Ac.: khanduri peuet pl6h),81 on the fortieth day after the death; and 
the hundredth day feast (Ac.: khanduri sireut6h), on the a hundredth day after 
the death. 
Unfortunately, under the circumstances of violent political conflict, 
one or more of these religious ceremonies often could not be performed due to 
security reasons. The corpse often could not be found and khanduri could not 
be conducted, or when khanduri took place neighbours might not attend due to 
either security concerns or the fear of being seen as affiliated to GAM. 82 An 
example of this is the case of an old woman from Aceh Besar, described in 
Chapter 5 section 2, whose son, a GAM soldier, was killed during an armed 
clash between the Indonesian Army and GAM. The woman was informed of 
the death of her son. Hence, she was obliged to conduct the proper funeral and 
khanduri for her deceased son. However, due to security reasons, she failed to 
find the whereabouts of the corpse and consequently, she could not conduct 
khanduri until the proper funeral was performed, once the corpse was 
discovered. This exemplifies the effect of conflict on the spiritual life, apart 
from other aspects of life, of the Acehnese. 
4.2 The 'Aceh Swasta': The Un-authentic Aceh 
The above discussions clearly show the importance of Bahasa Aceh 
proficiency, gampong of origin, and Islam as fundamental points of reference 
for Acehnese identity. However, this situation is intricate considering the fact 
that the people who lived in ' tanah Aceh' (the land of the Acehnese) are not 
only the Acehnese but also other cultural-linguistic groups such as Gayo, 
Alas, Tamiang, and Aneuk Jamee. These groups have resided there for a 
similar length of time as the Acehnese. In addition, mixed marriages often 
81 Some societies, such as those in some vi llages in North Aceh, have it on the forty-forth day 
after the death (Ac.: kandhuri peuet ploh peuet) and continue to do it every year. The biggest 
feast is the seventh day khanduri. 
82 This was a common phenomenon especially in the late 1990s, but was often undermined. 
Emi, et a l. ( 1999) extensively describes such cases in 'Nyala Panyot Tak Terpadamkan' (The 
un-exting uishable lamp), a compilation of short stories that are based on real life stories of 
Acehnese women, wri tten by the fie ld staff (mostly volunteers) of Flower Aceh, a well-known 
Banda Aceh based NGO. 
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occur, such as in the case ofNinda's mother who had a mixed background of 
Acehnese (father) and Minang (mother). In such cases, people often tend to 
have 'self-defined' identity. In Ninda's family, for example, unlike Ninda who 
firmly identified herself as an Acehnese, Ninda's mother considered herself to 
be ' Aceh swasta.' This term signifies the unauthenticity of her ' keacehan ' 
(Acehneseness) because she is not entirely but partly an Acehnese. However, 
the word 'swasta ', which literally means private or non governmental (Steven 
and Schmidgall-Tellings, 2004, p.987), also indicates self governance and 
independence. Implied in the meaning of this word, therefore, is the notion of 
one' s freedom and liberty to dete1mine one's own identity. 
Contrasting this notion of one's freedom to self-identify with the 
notion of Acehnese ethno-national identity imposed by GAM, suggests two 
important things. Firstly, the ' undesirable supremacy' of one particular 
culture-linguistic group over ones' identity, was actually one of the main 
rationales for the GAM's movement against the government oflndonesia, 
which was perceived as representing Javanese ethnic identity and forcing their 
ethno-national identity on the Acehnese. Nevertheless, the very same tactic 
that was criticised by GAM was used by the latter to impose their own idea of 
Acehnese ethno-national identity. 
Secondly, the 'self-identified' or ' self defined' identity of, for 
example, the people at the former U village of Banda Aceh, was 'orang Aceh 
from U'. They felt they needed, to specify ' from U' to avoid mentioning their 
real place of origin for security reasons. This was especially true for those 
coming from what the TNI considered to be 'black zones' or the predominant 
GAM areas, some people from these areas were automatically considered to 
be GAM members or partisans. The stigmatisation was quite widespread, and 
as a result, those coming from such regions tended to keep it secret. 
These 'displaced-migrants' 83 and those from mixed marriages who 
tended to have a 'self-defined' identity are therefore vital to understanding the 
83 I deliberately use this term to refer to the mixed features of migration and displacement. 
The word 'displaced' refers to those who fled from their places of origins due to natural 
and/or man-made disasters. 'Migration ' is commonly used to refer to movement of 
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heterogeneity of the contemporary Acehnese society. They underline the fact 
that, in order to understand the contemporary Acehnese society one must not 
ignore its diversity, complexity, and the effects of the violent polit ical conflict 
in the area. 
5 The Socio-Economy of Aceh 
The traditional socio-economic structure of Aceh was mainly anchored 
in agriculture and trading, which under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607 - 1636) 
made the region become a 'powerful trading empire' (Boediono and Hasan, 
1974, p.35). Although agriculture and trading remain important in the 
contemporary economy of Aceh, the discovery of oil and liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) in the 1970s has brought some significant changes. However, the new 
industrial activities failed to fully utilise local human resources, leading to 
some grievances that a later stage developed to a violent political conflict. 
This has in tum deterred development of the region and led to poverty. This 
section aims to describe the socio-economy of the region, with particular 
attention on the impact of the violent political conflict on poverty in Aceh, at 
macro-regional and household level. 
5.1 The regional economic profile 
At the time of research, the economy of Aceh was primarily based on 
agriculture (rice cultivation, livestock farming, and other agricultural 
products) which was predominant in Aceh Besar and Pidie. Trade was also 
one of the major economic activities of the people.84 Historically, both areas 
of Aceh Besar and Pidie, were well known as the major producers of pepper, 
cloves, nutmeg, patchouli and rubber (Siegel, 1979, p.8). Reid (1969, p. 79) 
stated: 
individuals from one place to another, mostly for economic purposes. Both features were 
embedded in the society of vi llage U, Banda Aceh. 
84 Aceh has a long hi story of trading activities that can be traced back as early as I 007 to 722 
BC, which intensified after the I I 1h century (Zainuddin, 1961 , p.27-28). 
154 
" 
... the region between Diamond Head and Tamiang profited from its virgin 
soil and proximity to Penang to surpass the west coast in pepper production 
in the l 860's. This became the new Atjehnese 'boom district' where fortunes 
were qu ick ly made ... (Reid, 1969, p. 79). 
Aceh was also known as one of the major producers of coconut (some 
of which were further processed to brown sugar), tobacco and especially 
coffee, all of which were grown mostly by smallholders for exp01i 
consumption (Boediono and Hasan, 1974, p.40). From the late 1960s to early 
1970s, Aceh was one of the main sources of rice in Indonesia, with its per 
capita production being higher than any other province (Hasan, 1976, p.77). In 
this period, the region contributed over 100,000 tons annually to the paddy 
surplus oflndonesia, most of which went to the paddy deficit areas of North 
Sumatra (Boediono and Hasan, 1974, p.39). These agricultural products were 
the sources of trading activities, again mainly conducted by smallholders in 
informal arrangements between traders in and from Aceh and their customers 
from Penang and Singapore (Boediono and Hasan, 1974, p.43). 
Since their discovery in the late 1970s, oi l and liquefied natmal gas 
(LNG) resources in North Aceh have become an important somce of regional 
income (The World Bank, 2006) and have boosted the economy through the 
development of industrial complexes. At the time of discovery, the resource 
held an estimated amount of 20-21 trillion cubic feet of gas that would be able 
to generate two to three billion US dollars a year for over a twenty to thirty 
year period (Ross, 2003). The resources were first found in North Aceh in 
1971, and started to be extracted in 1977 by Mobil Oil Co together with 
Pertamina (The Indonesia State Oil Company) and Jilco (a Japanese 
conglomerate). The oil boom has also benefited the region through the new 
roads, schools, medical facilities, and approximately 4,000 to 5,000 new 
houses built by the Mobil Company,85 as well as some new downstream 
industries, such as ASEAN fertilizer and P.T. Kertas Kraft (paper company), 
which have been established in the region. 
85 A factory was planned to be built in North Sumatra, but a strong protest !Tom the people 
successfully led the government to construct an industrial complex in Aceh (Sjamsuddin 1984 
in Ross 2003, p.1 2). Some grievances later emerged with regards to the resources exploration. 
See Chapter 5 Section 1.3 on The Aceh Independence Movement (GAM-the Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka) for detai ls. 
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The oil economy, however, has caused economic inequality and 
poverty in the region. In the 1990s, Aceh had a high poverty rate, as measured 
by the number of villages receiving IDT - Inpres Desa Tertinggal (The 
Presidential Instruction on Underdeveloped Villages) (Siapno, 2002, p.45) and 
poverty level of the region. The World Bank report (2006, p. 27) argues that 
the revenue extracted from the oil and LNG was far from optimal. The 'trickle 
down' 86 effect apparently occurred in big cities only, and did not affect 
villages. The World Bank Poverty Survey of Aceh (2002, pp. 7-8) reported 
that although the oil and gas sector comprised 48 percent of the total regional 
income in 2000, agriculture, including plantation crops, estate crops, and 
forestry, was the most important sector for livelihood, especially for the poor, 
(see Table 4-4 below). 
Table 4-4. The Economic Structure of Aceh 
Percentage of non poor and Percentage of 
poor involved in each sector Contribution of Each 
Sector Sector in Aceh 
Non Poor Poor RGDP (Non Oil and 
Gas), 2000 
Agricu I tu re 60.28 75 .59 57.1 
Mining 0.12 0.25 1.1 
Industry 5.08 5.92 10.9 
Electricity 0.09 0.09 0.3 
Bui lding 2.89 2.00 4.3 
Trade 15.20 8.1 2 1 1.1 
Transportation 2.99 2.52 8.8 
Finance and Other Services 0.35 0.13 1.2 
Community Service 12.99 5.38 5. 1 
Total 100.00 100.00 100 
Source: The World Bank (2002, p.8) with a modified and additional descnpllon on the lllle o f the 
table made by the author. 
The government's National Social Economy Survey (I.: Survei Sosial 
Ekonomi Nasional - Susenas)87 in 1999 indicates that compared to other 
86 Th is is a concept in a market economy in which vital economic activities are bel ieved to 
accelerate other economic activities. In th is conception, the development of LNG factories 
provides indirect benefit to the people through its indirect impact on the local economy. 
87 Susenas is the annual household socio-economic survey conducted by BPS (The Central 
Statistical Bureuau of Indonesia). The Poverty line is measured by consumption of 26 
varieties of food and non food commodities for rural areas, and of 27 varieties of food and 
non food commodities for urban areas. In a poverty alleviation program, BPS used 14 
indicators to determine levels of poverty of households. These are: ( I) The per capita size of 
the house is 8 m2 per person; (2) Floors made of soil , bamboo, or cheap wood; (3) Walls 
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provinces, Aceh had the fourth highest rural poverty rate and the fifth highest 
urban poverty rate. Despite a slight improvement in the years 2002 to 2004, 
the poverty rate of Aceh can be said to have remained relatively high. Figure 
4-5 indicates that Aceh had the eighth highest percentage of urban and rural 
poor of all the provinces in Indonesia in 2002 to 2004 after East Java (I.: Jawa 
Timur), Central Java (I.: Jawa Tengah), West Java (1.: Jawa Barnt), North 
Sumatra (I.: Sumatra Utara), Lampung, South Sumatera (1.: Sumatera 
Selatan), and Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi). It is wo11h noting that the 
December 2004 tsunami has fm1her worsened the poverty situation of Aceh 
(The World Bank, 2006, p.32). 
made of bamboo, sago palm, low qua lity of wood, unpaved bricks; (4) No private toilets (has 
to use public toilet); (5) No electricity; (6) Clean water sourced from well, unprotected spring 
water, river, and rains; (7) Fuel sourced from wood, charcoal, and kerosene; (8) Once a week 
consumption of meat, mi lk, chicken, at maximum; (9) Once a year of buying new clothes, at 
maximum ; ( I 0) Meals only twice a day, at maximum ; ( 11) Cannot afford health expenses in 
public health services at district and vi llage levels; (12) The main sources of income of head 
of households are farming with less than 0.5 ha, farm labour, fisherman, labourer in public 
buildings, or labourer in forestry; (13) The highest educational attainment of head of 
household: no education, uncompleted elementary school , or completed elementary school; 
(14) No savings or goods valued at Rp 500,000 or around US$ 55.56 (with I US$=Rp 9 ,000). 
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In line with this, The World Bank's Poverty Survey (2002, p.7) 
discovered that poverty was widespread, in Aceh, especially in areas affected 
by conflict and particularly in female-headed households. As indicated in 
Table 4-5, the proportion of female-headed households in poverty was much 
higher than the national rate in both Susenas 1999 and the World Bank 
Poverty Survey 2002. The World Bank's Poverty Survey (2002, p.5) 
furthermore stated that 64 out of 75 female-headed households in their 
samples fell within the category of the poor. 
Table 4-5. The Poverty Situation of Aceh in Comparison to Indonesia 
(%) 
Key Poverty Indicators Indonesian Aceh Poor 
Poor Susenas The World Bank (Susenas (1999) Poverty Survey 1999) (2002) 
Years of education (aged 18-65 in 5.1 6.2 7.2 
1999, 68< - in 2002) 
Fraction of Female-Headed 8.3 12.3 12 
Households 
House has earth, wood, or bamboo 54 52 56 
floor 
Access to safe (pipe, pump, bottled, 65 50 52 
covered well) drinking water 
Access to electricity 69 53 50 
Access to health services (the 8.4 7.2 16.7 
percent i II and [who] sought care in 
the past month 
Source: The World Bank 2002 (Summarised Table I and 2 of the World Bank Report, 2002. pp.4-5) 
Note: The different figures presented by the Susenas and World Bank Poverty Survey may be due to 
different poverty line concept. As argued by Booth ( 1993, p.53) different studies on poverty in 
Indonesia use different concept of poverty line. and therefore derive different results of analysis. 
The poverty situation might also be due to the number of internally 
displaced persons. The armed clashes often forced rural people to flee to 
secure places for some period of time, ranging from 2 weeks to more than a 
year. This situation worsened and became a widespread phenomenon in the 
province during the initial implementation of martial law in 2003 (Map 3). 
Aceh poverty correlated with the conflict situation, with the hot spots 
suffering more than the non hot spots. The limited access to health services, 
for example, was not only due to lack of services (both health infrastructure 
and providers) but also due to the security situation, which hindered health 
personnel freely, providing their services. Education was similarly affected. 
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The high rate of educational attainment of the poor of Aceh compared to the 
national rate cannot be taken at face value, but needs to be viewed in 
conjunction with poor attendance rates. It was a common phenomenon that 
students and teachers had to skip classes due to armed clashes. 
The Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) - the sub district 
development project of the World Bank in Indonesia- conducted a survey of 
13 primary schools in Aceh, and found that the attendance rate was well 
below national level (The World Bank, 2002, pp. 6-7). The attendance rates of 
primary, junior secondary and senior secondary school levels were 85 percent, 
82 percent, and 86 percent respectively. These were certainly below the 
national rate of 95 to 96 percent at all levels. The survey also revealed that the 
attendance rate of permanent teachers was also lower, with the Aceh rate of 78 
percent being lower than the national rate of 89 percent (The World Bank, 
2002, p. 7). These were not surprising findings, given the conflict (VPC) in 
the region for years and the resultant disruption of both the qual ity and 
coverage of public services. 
The need for a peaceful and secure environment to conduct their 
livelihood became the main concern of the Acehnese people. Farming could 
not be done normally, forcing people to plant and harvest at inappropriate 
times, which resulted in low prices or market delivery failures of agricultural 
products. Poor security on the main road between Medan and Banda Aceh 
also added to inflation by driving up the prices of goods that could not be 
transported easily or on a regular basis. Adding to the high cost economy was 
the practice of 'security money' extorted by both conflicting parties. Trucking 
firms, for example, reported spending approximately 60 percent of their cargo 
revenues at formal and informal check points along the Medan-Banda Aceh 
main road, which involved around Rp 50,000 to Rp 2 million, depending on 
the value of the transported goods (The World Bank, 2002, p.8). 
Transportation is indeed vital to the Acehnese economy, especially after the 
closing down of the Port of Sabang and the appointment of Medan, with its 
Belawan Port, as the centre of trade at the northern tip of Sumatra in the early 
1980s. 
Furthermore, due to repeated armed clashes, ambushes, and attacks, 
working capital (money or other goods that are used for keeping businesses 
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running) became a critical issue. Citing the Provincial and District Chambers 
of Commerce, the World Bank (2002, p.8) reported that the business 
environment of Aceh was 'an environment of stuck credit'. Small 
businessmen whose business properties were attacked (set on fire) faced 
difficulties in returning their outstanding loans to the bank and in accruing 
fresh credit from the bank (World Bank 2002, p.8) . 
. .. New or revolving credit lines are reportedly impossible to obtain except 
for the very best, most secure businesses, and as a result many borrowers are 
not repaying even when they are able since this will represent a loss of 
working capital. (The World Bank 2002, p.8) 
Adding to the difficult situation were the difficulties and limits of 
development assistance from either the government or the Donor community. 
An ADB loan ofUS$122 million to the Sumatra Urban Development Project, 
for example, was suspended for over a year due to difficulties in performing 
on-site technical supervision and monitoring (The World Bank, 2002, p.15). 
Approximately US$8 - 10 million of the total US$122 million was designed 
to cover seven districts in Aceh. Nevertheless, some development assistance 
such as the World Bank funded Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), in 
which assistance for economic activities was given to poor households in 
particular poor sub districts, was able to be delivered to eight out of 20 
districts in Aceh and reached 2700 villages through the respective 
mechanisms of main grants and local government matching grants. NGOs and 
the government admitted, however, that coverage was quite limited and 
mainly restricted to areas that were accessible, meaning that areas, which were 
not in conflict zones and therefore not severely affected by the conflict were 
the only ones covered. 
The deterioration of the regional economy of Aceh may also be partly 
due to the general decline of economic growth in the region during 1997 to 
2002, as illustrated in the following Figure 4-6. Although the national 
economic crisis may well have impacted on Aceh, the sharp decline in 1998 
and 1999 clearly illustrates the unfavourable economic atmosphere in Aceh, 
which might have been due to the intensification of armed clashes between the 
Indonesian military and GAM soldiers. A possibly similar situation might 
have occurred during the implementation of martial law. 
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Figure 4-6 Economic growth of Aceh in comparison to Indonesia in 1996 
to 2002 
10 ~-
-+-N anm oe Ac eh Darussalam -+-- lrrlonesia 
Source: Regional Development Planning Board, Pro\· ince ofNan,ggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2003. Unpublished publ.ication. 
5.2 The Day to Day Economy 
As noted above agriculture is historically dominant in Aceh. In the 
villages of Aceh Besar and Pidie, especially, parents with favourable 
economic status usually provide their daughters with not only a house but also 
paddy fields upon their daughters' marriages. Those with unfavourable 
economic status would provide their daughters with at least a room in the 
parents' house and several coconut trees from which the new family can start 
making money. Some families give gold to their daughters as a form of 
'savings' to be used in case of emergency, such as a long drought or sickness 
of family members. 
Apart from agriculture, animal husbandry (cattle) may also be 
considered as an important source of income. Raising cattle was part of the 
Islamic tradition of the Acehnese. During the feast days before the fasting 
month (Ac.: meugang or makmeugang), Acehnese households usually 
slaughtered cows to celebrate the coming fasting month (Ramadhan). 
Ramadhan is the obligatory month for the Moslems to cleanse themselves 
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from sins over the year. It is therefore considered to be the most important 
month during the year for the Acehnese. 
In the old times, the Acehnese tended to spend time praying and 
contemplating during Ramadhan, and consequently did not pay much 
attention to their livelihood. They used their savings to cover their expenses 
during the fasting month. This is well illustrated in the old Acehnesse saying 
'one year saving for one month spending' (Ac.: 'si th6n mita, sibuleuen 
paj6h', which literally means 'one year of working, one month for eating'). 
Currently, however, the saying is interpreted to mean spending as much as 
one can to celebrate Ramadhan, which can be perceived as the biggest fiesta 
in Aceh during which people spend their one-year saving. One of the big 
celebrations is the aforementioned meugang or makmeugang, in which 
thousands of cows are slaughtered in the entire region, as married men are 
obliged to bring the 'rneugang' meat to their parents-in-laws. Another picture 
of the contemporary fasting month is petty traders selling traditional food 
along the main road of the city, especially near the time for breaking the fast 
at the end of the day (I.: buka puasa). A wide variety of traditional food and 
cookies can be found at these small stalls, such as chicken rice porridge (Ac.: 
bubur kanji), hot/spicy rice porridge (Ac.: bubur pedaih), hot/spicy vegetables 
sauce (Ac.: sambai on peugaga), and the traditional sweets made ofrice 
powder, sugar, and coconut milk (Ac.: thimpan asoe kaya). The fasting month 
(Ramadhan) is therefore a special month in which money circulates fast in 
trading activities. 
Trading was another important source of income for the Acehnese. 
Traders performed their activities in market places, peddling around from one 
place to another with a motorbike, opening temporary small stalls along the 
main road, opening small shops in their houses, or simply putting their 
products on somebody else's stalls in the neighbourhood area. It is worth 
noting, however, that during my research I observed that market places and 
impermanent small stalls on the main road were usually dominated by male 
traders. The few female traders in market and other public places, usually sold 
vegetables, herbs, and traditional meals. The peddlers (Ac. : muge) were also 
mostly men. Women peddlers were the exception. Women, however, could be 
easily found in small shops attached to houses. 
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Markets, as trading places, can be grouped into two: the daily market 
and the weekly market (Ac.: uroe gantoe). The former, which opened on a 
daily basis, was usually located in cities. The weekly markets, opened on a 
certain day every week, were usually located in villages. The weekly markets 
can be grouped into two types as well; the main weekly markets (Ac.: uroe 
gantoe rayeuk), usually in sub-districts, and the small weekly market (Ac.: 
uroe gantoe cut) in villages. Whilst the main weekly markets were usually 
situated in permanent constructions (permanent stalls), the small weekly 
markets took place in an open area where traders used plastic tents and small 
tables, or simply displayed their merchandises on mats and in baskets. 
The weekly market was not only a place for trading, but also a social 
place for meeting others, exchanging information, and leisure (Hasybullah, 
1977). It is interesting to observe that during the violent political conflict, the 
weekly market could also be an office place for a head of village (Ac.: 
keusyik). On one of my trips to Aceh Besar, for example, the weekly market 
was used as the meeting point of a keusyik from village S, one of the hot spots 
in Aceh Besar, and people of his village. The keusyik could not stay in his 
village (Ac.: gampong) due to security concerns. He designated the market 
place as his alternative office, where he performed his administrative tasks, 
including preparing paper work for villagers who need to travel. The weekly 
market was also used for people to exchange information on the armed clashes 
and casualties. It became one of the important sources of information about 
the fate of disappeared family members. People could pass on information to 
each other relatively easily in such a busy market. Following this local pattern, 
I also used the weekly market as one of my meeting points with my research 
subjects from the hot spots. The weekly market was usually an easy excuse to 
leave the village. The army and police would easily give their permission for 
people to go to the market. 
6 Conclusion 
Aceh is rich not only in terms of land and natural resources, but also 
culture and traditions. Its long history as an independent polity, the mixture of 
ethnic groups, and the fierce resistance against Dutch colonial rule clearly 
164 
signify the richness, heterogeneity, strength and uniqueness of Aceh and the 
Acehnese. This has consequently made Aceh a diverse society in many 
different ways. 
As the point of entry of Islam into the archipelago that can be traced 
back as early as the 11th century, Islam and local traditions amalgamated over 
the centuries. This is well exemplified in the old saying 'the law and tradition, 
is like a substance and its innate qualities' (Ac.: 'Adat ngon hukom, lagee zat 
ngon sifeut' ). The mixture oflslam and tradition has penetrated the Acehnese 
society to the extent that it has become part of the identity. Apart from Islam, 
however, there are two other vital components of the Acehnese identity; 
gampong or origin, and mother tongue. Among these three, gampong seemed 
to be the immediate point of reference for identity. However, the strong belief 
in independence and Islam, which has intermingled and resulted in the strong 
resistance against invasion by outsiders, is also evident. The notion of ' Aceh 
as Islam and Islam as Aceh' is clearly illustrated in the aforementioned old 
say mg. 
The contemporary identity of Aceh, however, has been significantly 
influenced by the dynamics of the local ' oil-economy' and recent violent 
political conflict with their consequences on the day to day life of the people. 
The establishment of the Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) plant and several other 
industries in East Aceh has penetrated the society with what is locally termed 
'Madonna factor' (I: 'faktor Madonna '). This factor symbolises the negative 
influence on the society of western values, and the urban, or locally defined as 
'modern' , life styles that have resulted from the oil economy of the region and 
the influx of international humanitarian workers. Adding to this 'Madonna 
factor' is the 'violent political conflict economy',88 a market economy created 
and boosted by violent political conflict related activities that have often 
resulted in high economic-inflation (often a hyperinflation) as shown in Graph 
4. 
88 This is a modified term for the 'war economy', which is discussed in many scholarly works 
on conflict studies. 
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Over and above this, the contemporary challenges of Acehnese 
identity have been the policies and operations of GAM, which have 
strengthened the idea of Acehnese identity as opposed to the national 
Indonesian identity. With local dialect proficiency, gampbng (Ac.) of origin 
and Islam as fundamental points in defining identity, discussion about 
Acehnese identity becomes intricate. This is especially true considering the 
fact that the people who live in the land of the Acehnese (I: tanah Aceh) are 
not only the Acehnese but also other cultural-linguistic groups, such as Gayo 
and Alas, who have resided in the region for about the same length of time as 
the Acehnese. Adding to this is the mixed marriage phenomena, such as the 
case ofNinda's mother who had a mixed background of Acehnese (father) 
and Minang (mother). 
In line with identity transformation, the social classification has 
apparently also been transformed from kaw6m based to occupational and 
domicile based. The kawom of origin, however, was still sometimes 
mentioned in discussions on identity as an item of additional information. 
The dynamics of conflict have also brought some changes to the 
impoverishment of the economy of Aceh, evidence of which can be seen from 
the relatively high level of poverty among female-headed households that 
especially can be found in conflict zones, compared to other provinces in 
Indonesia. Adding to this is the limitations on delivery of development 
assistance from either the government or other parties concerned with 
development issues. The World Bank funded KDP project, which was obliged 
to limit assistance to the neediest areas, and the ADB funded Sumatra Urban 
Development project that was suspended for over a year, were examples of 
how the conflict hindered the delivery of development assistance. 
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Chapter 5 The Long-Lasting 'Battle' of Aceh (A 
Violent Political Conflict Context) 
Jika kau berikan aku keag11nga11 puisi 
Biarkan ia menje/ma man/era danjampi 
Mengubah kebencian men.Jodi cinta kasilz 
Tak menyalak lagi senjata dan dendam pergi 
Tapi satujiwa mere11gg111 jiwa yang lainnya 
Tangan siapakah yang 111enggerakka1111ya? 
Tapi d11ka te/ah letih merangkaki arasymu yang 11111/ia 
Tongan siapakah yang akan me11ghentikannya? 
Katakan/ah saatnya telah tiba 
Dan kau akan bicara: kebe11aran telah datang 1 
Ir you give me the greatness of poetry 
Let it be a spell and enchantment 
To transform hatred to love and care 
Guns shout no more and revenge disappears 
But souls have destroyed one another 
Whose hand is directing it'l 
But sorrow has heen too tired crawling down on your Divine Altar 
Whose hand wi ll bring it to an end? 
Tell me that it is about the lime 
And you'll say: truth has arrived! 
(Source: Wiratmadinata. 'Dataran Qalb ·• 24 November 2004, Scrambi 
Online. 9 December 2004. 
http://www.serambinews.com/ indcx.php?aksi= indckpuisi) 
Violent political conflict in Aceh is a longstanding phenomenon that 
has given the region a reputation for rebelliousness and Islamic militancy1 
which has become a ' legend'2 for young generations to learn. The reputation 
has been well documented from the Dutch colonial period with the Aceh War 
(Perang Aceh) (I 873 to 1903), Holland's longest and costliest war in Aceh,3 
to the most recent conflict between the Government and the Free Aceh 
Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka- GAM). Aceh has been one of the most 
conflict-prone provinces in Indonesia, with a typical violent political conflict, 
1 See for examples the work of Siapno (2002), Robinson (200 I), and Siegel ( 1979). 
2 See Siapno (2002), Yusuf (2002), Lee ( 1995), lbrahimy (1993), Siegel ( 1979). 
3 The Aceh War ( 1873-1903) opposed the Dutch ' pacification' policy in the East Indies 
costed I 0,000 Dutch lives and about one-eight of the Acehnese population died or were 
displaced (Robinson, 200 I; Siegel, 1979) 
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a conflict between the state and civil society in the form of freedom fighters 
employing guerrilla tactics. 
The Aceh conflict, however, was not only related to the conflict 
between the state and civil society (or those who claimed to represent civil 
society), or the centre and periphery. It was also about a complex phenomenon 
involving different layers of people' s daily lives, the consequences of which 
encompassed most segments of life, covering all levels from personal to 
social, and has been carried out over generations. Islam is well-established 
within the society and has always been part of the conflict, either as a spiritual 
validation or a source of resentment. 4 
This chapter explores the political context of the conflict in Aceh, its 
nature, causes, and consequences, using historical accounts with a particular 
attention on to people's livelihoods. This follows Blok's argument on violence 
as a historical cultural construction,5 and Glazebrook's proposition on the 
need to elaborate the political historical context in her work on the Papuan 
refugees on the border of Indonesia and New Guinea (Glazebrook, 2001, p.2). 
An historical account encompasses economics, politics, and anthropology and 
thus provides a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the conflict. 
Together with chapter three on the ethnographic and Islamic contexts of 
Acehnese society,6 this chapter sets out the fundamental milieu in which the 
coping strategies of women and their households' livelihoods, described in the 
next chapter, are situated. 
Arguing that Aceh's violent political conflict mainly related to the 
di saffiliation of the region with Indonesia, our analysis stmis from the 
independence struggle of Indonesia in order to gain a more holistic picture of 
the evolution of the conflict. However, considering that this research was 
conducted in the period of GAM conflict, more attention is given to the recent 
conflict of GAM and its economic, political, and cultural effects at both macro 
and micro levels. I adopt and slightly modify the periodisation of the GAM 
4 This well explains the region's legendary rebelliousness and Is lamic militancy. 
5 Blok (2000, p.24)'s defines violence as " ... a changing form of interaction and 
communication ... a historically developed cultural form of meaningful action." 
6 See Chapter I for the definition of society and Chapter 4 for details of the Acehnese society, 
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movement proposed by Ross7 (2003):: 1976 to 1979; 1989 to 1991 ; and 19998 
to 2003.9 1 modified the latter to 1999 to 2004, the period of my research. 
Such periodization is essential for understanding the historical process. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Aceh violent political conflict is 
analysed in tem1s of 'severe stressor' (Hobfoll, et al 1996, p.323; Lepore and 
Evans, 1996, p.353; Mikulincer and Florian, 1996, p.556) and 'cataclysm' 
(Hobfoll, et al 1996, p.323). It is argued here that the conflict has moved from 
being a 'severe stressor' and ' cataclysm', to being a 'focal stressor' and has 
brought about a cascade effect triggering other stressors, such as ' major life 
event stressors' - e.g. the ' social losses' due to major life transitions, such as 
divorce and separation, death, job loss, victimisation, and relocation - either 
forced or voluntarily. In this connection, the violent political conflict has 
sternly challenged women' s coping strategies. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first elaborates the 
history of violent political conflict in Aceh, since the independence era of 
Indonesia. Particular attention is paid to the conflict between the government 
and GAM that lasted for over 20 years and cost thousands of lives (Schulze, 
2004, p.5, Robinson, 2001, p.214). The second outlines the general 
consequences of violent political conflict on society at both the macro and 
micro levels, encompassing both tangible and intangible consequences, and its 
cascade effect on the day-to-day lives of the people. 
In this chapter, I have three main arguments. First, the history of 
violent conflicts in Aceh has always related to a political power struggle and 
therefore falls under the category of violent political conflict. Second, the 
longstanding history of such conflicts in Aceh has provided, to use Juris' s 
7 Sukma (2004), Schulze (2004), and Robinson (200 I) suggested this periodisation. However, 
it was Ross (2003) who made a clear periodisation, which is quite useful in analysing the 
GAM dynamics. 
8 Sukma (2004, p.vii) argued that November 1998 was the beginning of the third GAM re-
emergence, with a series of actions and attacks against Indonesia and her military and police 
personnel. Examples of these are the burning of Indones ia's flag and torture of two 
Indonesian soldiers on November 2 in North Aceh, the burning of Indonesia Radio Station on 
November 15, and the abduction and execution of seven Indonesian military personnel 
(Sukma, 2004, pp.12-13). 
9 The years between these periods: 1979 to 1989; 199 1 to 1999; and 2004 to date; were the 
time when GA M was inactive or declined due to either the successful act ions of the 
Indonesian Military, GAM's change of strategies, or a peace deal between GAM and the 
government. 
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term (2005, p.415), a 'cultural template' of violence for spanning generations 
that, together with the existing trauma, may have fostered and regenerated the 
conflict. Third, the consequences of prolonged violent political conflict was 
quite devastating for the civilians, especially the grassroots women and 
children. I propose three important consequences of the prolonged violent 
conflict that have, unfortunately, been overlooked by scholarly works on 
Aceh, namely 'extended-regenerated collective trauma' , the awkward 
'sandwiched position' of Acehnese civilians, and the deprivation of the local 
economy (I: penghancuran ekonomi lokal). 
It is worth remembering that in addition to the importance of 
understanding the socio-cultural and socio-political background of the 
conflict, the geography of the region itself has been noted as being conducive 
to a high risk of conflict. The strategic position of the region enables a 
relatively easy channel of mobility to and from Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand. Due to this, the region had a long history of gun smuggling during 
Indonesia's independence struggle. It has been a 'well-trodden path' for 
smuggling and the transfer of people, goods (including marijuana and arms), 
and money back and forth from Aceh-Batarn-Singapore and Aceh-Medan-
Riau-Malaysia (ICG, 2002b, p.5). Comparatively easy and affordable 
transportation along the strait has helped the activists and partisans in several 
violent political conflicts of Aceh, such as the Darul lslam/Tentara Islam 
Indonesia/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII/Nll) and Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM), to abscond to foreign countries. The nearby 
Batam islands located next to Singapore has also been used by the Acehnese 
as a place for selling marijuana in exchange for, among other things, arms 
(ICG, 2002b, p.6). 
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1 Tracing History: The Nature and Causes of Violent 
Political Conflict in Aceh 
From historical accounts, it appears that the fluidi ty of Acehnese 
history juxtaposed with the romanticism of the golden history of the Islamic 
independent Sultanate in the Dutch colonial era, contrasts with the imbalance 
in political-economic power between the central government (1.: pusat) and 
the regional government (I.: daerah). This has certainly led to tremendous 
dissatisfaction among the Acehnese, which has materialised in the conflict. 
This section aims at providing a historical account of the major violent 
political conflicts of the region since the independence of Indonesia. These 
major violent political conflicts are the Cumbok War (1945-1946), the Darul 
Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/Tll/NII) 
(1948/1949 - 1961/1962), and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka - GAM) conflict (1976-2004). I focus on the period of 1976 - 2004, 
since this is the period of my research. 
1.1 The Cumbok War (1945-1946), Aceh's Stance in 
Indonesia's Independence Struggle. 
In the period of Indonesia's independence struggle, there were four 
elite groups in Aceh, each with different interests and stances regarding the 
new state of Indonesia (Alfian, 1982). These four elites were the uleebalang 
(Ac.), ulama (I., Ac.), 10 youth (divided into those with Japanese military 
background and those with modem religious educational background), and, 
the smallest and least important, the minority (intellectuals and non-Acehnese 
leaders). The Cumbok War (I.: Perang Cumbok) (1945-1946) was the 
culmination of armed clashes between the uleebalang and ulama. The 
uleebalang group was led by Teuku Muhammad Daud Cumbok 
10 See chapter 3 for details. 
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( 1910-1945), a son of the uleebalang from Cumbok village, 11 the name of 
which was adopted to describe the war. This group named the area under their 
control the 'uleebawng's site' (I.: Markas Uleebalang) and established their 
armed personnel, who they called the Security Guard Line (I.: Barisan 
Penjaga Keamanan). The ulama group was initiated by the Moslem youth 
(especially the modern religious group). They named their area of control, the 
General Aceh Regional Site (I.: Markas Umum Daerah Aceh), and their 
arn1ed personnel, the Indonesia Struggle Body (1.: Badan Perjuangan 
Indonesia). The conflict soon became a war (1.: perang) between the pro 
Indonesia lobby, which was led by a group of Moslems scholars (Ac. , I.: 
ularna) known as the All Acehnese Ulama Unity (Persatuan Ulama Selurnh 
Aceh - PUSA), 12 and the anti-Indonesia uleebalang (Ac.) group. The war was 
therefore an internal dispute within Acehnese society on the issue of 
affiliation versus disaffiliation with Indonesia during the independence 
movement against the Dutch colonial power. 
The confl ict struted in December 1945 with attacks on villages 
dominated by the youth group by the security guard line of the uleebalang, 
and concluded in 1946 with the victory of the ularna led group (Alfian, 1982). 
This was partly due to the fact that the ulama-led group was backed by Aceh 
civi lians and the Indonesian Armed Forces (I.: Angkatan Perang Indonesia -
API). The defeat of the uleebalang, did not immediately end the anger of the 
populace, which escalated into a mass riot, and included setting fire to the 
houses ru1d other property of uleebalang as well as an attempt to massacre 
their families, including women and children. The approximate number of 
casualties during Cumbok War was 1500 people (Tempo, 2003, p.30; Alfian, 
1982). 
The Cumbok War (1945-1946) actually signified the culmination of an 
internal conflict in Acehnese society between the ularna and uleebalang, 
which had existed since the Sultanate era and been fostered by the Dutch and, 
11 It is important to note that not all uleebalang in Aceh share the ideas of Teuku Daud 
Cumbok, for example Teuku Muhammad Daud Syah, Teuku Panglima Polem Muhammad 
Ali, and Teuku Nyak Arief (Alfian, 1982, p. 73), who were pro-Indonesian independence. 
12 PUSA was established as the result of an Ulama Congress in Peusangan on 5 May 1939 and 
first led by Teungku Daud Beureueh (Saleh, 1992, p. 17). 
172 
Japanese. As described in Chapter 3, the pre-colonial social structure of Aceh 
was characterised by three fairly balanced power centres: the sultan, the 
uleebalang, and the ulama, who always sought balance and harmony to 
maintain social stability (Siegel 1979, 1969; Hurgronje, 1906). This picture, 
however, simplifies the political tension among these three centres, which was 
indicated by, an1ong other things, the exclusion of uleebalang from the 
development and exercise of laws, traditions, and customary practices during 
the reign of Sultan lskandar Muda (1607-1 636) described in Chapter 3, 
section 2.3 . This may reflect the political rivalry between uleebalang and the 
sultan, with the ulama at the sultan' s side, or at least the political concern of 
the sultan towards the possible dissident uleebalang. 
The uleebalang possessed the oldest form of power in Acehnese 
society, predating that of the sultan and ulama. Siegel (1979, p.1 0) argued that 
uleebalang were important political figures in the lives of most people, and 
obtained authority based on their capacity to mobilise kinsmen. As described 
in Chapter 3, they were originally kaw6m chiefs or commanders (Ac. : 
panglima kaw6m), some of whom (presumably the strongest ones) were 
designated as uleebalang, the heads of mukimfederation13 adopted under 
sultan Nurul Alam Nakiattudin Sjah (1675-1677) (Zainuddin, 1961 , p.316). 
As leaders with legitimate authority given by the society of several mukims, 
uleebalang were also considered kings (I., Ac.: raj a), 14 war/military 
commanders (I.: panglima perang) , and, on occasion, judges (I., Ac.: hakim) 
(Hugronje, 1906, v.1 , p.92). I refer to them here as 'societal-based' 
uleebalang because they established their power within, and lived among, 
their society. 
[n the Sultanate era, the position and autonomy of the 'societal-based' 
uleebalang was at first acknowledged and maintained. They were also allowed 
to establish a new body for agriculhrral matters (Ac.: seunobok). This 
autonomy, however, was gradually limited, as they became in effect tax 
collectors for the Sultan. This especially happened after the period of Sultane 
Tadjul Alam Sjafiatuddin Sjah, the first female Sultan (1641-1675), with the 
13 See Chapter 4 section 2. 1 for details on mukim 
14 Some uleebalang descendants may have retained this idea. One of my key informants called 
his first son raja signifying his position as the heir of the family. 
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appointment of a civil judge for Muslim's affairs (Ac.: Kadhi Malikul Adil), 
who took over some of the uleebalang 's authority. In addition, their ' societal-
based ' powers were contested by the appointment of some ulama and ' palace-
based ' uleebalang as the Sultanate's advisors, as well as commanders of the 
three sagde, the three mukim federations specifically established in Great 
Aceh (I. Aceh Besar; Ac. Aceh Rayeuk) under Sjafiatuddin Sjah (1641-1675) 
and continued by her predecessors. The three sagde commanders (Ac.: 
panglima lhee sagde) had special autonomy from the sultan and, in times of 
emergency, would assume the position as war commanders for their own 
regions (see Chapter 3 for details). 
These new policies unavoidably created tensions and jealousy among 
the 'societal-based' uleebalang. It is possible that the appointment of these 
new positions had been deliberately undertaken to undermine and perhaps also 
control the 'society-based' uleebalang through creating rival positions both in 
the Palace and in their mukim federation. Based on this, I argue that the 
absence of uleebalang in traditional Acehnese sources about adat and 
traditions adopted by Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) as described in 
Chapter 3, was actually part of the power struggle between the sultan (and 
ulama) and the 'society-based ' uleebalang. 
These tensions were maintained and exploited by the Dutch with their 
divide and conquer politics, or the 'divide et impera ' (I.: politik belah bambu 
or politics of splitting bamboo) to counter the strong resistance of the 
Acehnese. The uleebalang, who possessed both economic and political power, 
were provided with more privileges by the Dutch to undermine the Sultan's 
authority. These privileges, in turn, resulted in strong local capitalists and new 
local bourgeoisie that adopted the Dutch life style and possessed great 
supremacy over their region. With less concern for society's welfare than their 
own business interests, the socio-economic gap between uleebalang and their 
communities became wider. This situation was so well manipulated by the 
Dutch that in some cases, the uleebalang became the Sultan's rivals and 
developed their own political legitimacy over regions under their authority for 
their own political-economic benefits (Siegel, 1969). 
This was in contrast with the ulama, who concentrated more on 
spiritual richness. These ulama grew together with, and lived among, the 
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grass-roots community, who felt exhausted from the uleebalang 's economic 
exploitation.With their dayah (Ac.), the traditional Islamic boarding school , 
the ulama obtained their power and legitimacy from the oppressed society that 
longed for spiritual consolation for their hard life. The ulama became the 
strong informal authority in the colonial periphery, rooting their pre-eminence 
in civil society and becoming countervailing forces 15 to the colonial 
aristocracy of both the Dutch and uleebalang. 
The Cumbok War also exemplified Aceh 's stand on its affiliation to 
Indonesia. With a long history and fierce resistance to the Dutch colonial 
presence, the region was instrumental in supporting Indonesia' s independence 
struggle against the Dutch. Compared to other areas in Indonesia, Aceh was 
indeed one of the strongest sources of support, since it was able to secure 
foreign trade conducted by Acehnese, which the new Republic of Indonesia 
considered an important asset. In a mass meeting in Aceh on June 17, 1948, 
Sukarno called Aceh the 'resources region' (I.: daerah modal), referring to the 
commitment of the Acehnese to provide two aircraft, gold, and an amount of 
money for the new republic (Al-Chaidar, 1999, p.115; Saleh, 1992, p.116). 16 
On 15 October 1945, two months after the proclamation of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the ulama of Aceh reaffirmed the holy war against the Dutch. As 
described in chapter 3, the Acehnese had always considered the war against 
the Dutch a holy war. The hikajat Prang Sabi! (the hikajaL on holy war) 17 was 
always chanted before sending guerilla fighters to fight against the Dutch. The 
revitalization of the holy war was clearly stated in the All Acehnese Ula ma 
Declaration (I.: Maklumat Ulama Seluruh Aceh), which called upon the 
Acehnese to be behind Sukarno, whom they named the mega leader (I.: 
pemimpin besar) (Al-Chaidar, 1999; Saleh, 1992). 
15 See Ali, Fachry (2003, p.54). 
16 Little information is available on the amount of money donated to Indones ia as how the 
Acehnese were able to provide it in a short period. One possible source is rampasan perang 
(goods and properties collected from the defeated enemy) of the defeated uleeba/ang who at 
the time possessed a favourab le economic status. My interview with one of my key 
informants in Aceh Besar indicates this as one of the reasons behind the GAM strugg le. 
According to him/her, a team has been established in Jakarta to conduct research on this. The 
desire for the return of the donation by some GAM members might be true once we compare 
these pieces of information with the current peace-deal between GAM and the Indonesian 
government. This furth er supports my argument for the economically driven movement of 
GAM as elaborated in section 1.3. 
17 See Chapter 3 for details on the hikajat. 
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The Cumbok war, however, also signified the internal conflict of 
interests and power struggles among uleebalang themselves, who were 
divided into pro and anti-Indonesia parties. The pro-Indonesia uleebalang, led 
by Teuku Nyak Arif (later appointed as the head of East Sumatra), pledged 
their support to Indonesia on 24 August 1945 (Al-Chaidar, 1999). 
The Cumbok war remains a dark period of history that has left deep 
sonow in Acehnese hearts. It was apparent during my fieldwork, for example, 
that most of the people that I met preferred to talk about the golden history of 
the Acehnese Sultanate rather than the painful history of the Cumbok war. 
The Cumbok war was clearly something the Acehnese were not proud of. 
1.2 The Darul lslam/Tentara Islam Indonesia/Negara Islam 
Indonesia (1948/1949 -1961/1962): An Islamic Religious-
Driven Violent Political Conflict? 
After its strong support for the independence of Indonesia, in the 
period 1953-1961/62, Aceh joined the Darul Islam/ Indonesia Moslem Army/ 
Indonesia Islamic Republic (I.: Darul Islam/fentara Islam Indonesia/Negara 
Islam Indonesia-DI/TII/NII) movement in West Java that sought to establish 
an Indonesian Islamic State in 1948/49 - 1961/62.18 Darul Islam literally 
means the 'house' or 'home' of Islam, refening to the 'world or territory of 
Islam', an Islamic nation in which the Islamic faith and the implementation of 
Islamic law and regulations are compulsory (van Dijk, 1981 , p.10). It is 
usually used in placed of Darul Harb, the land of war and the world of the 
infidels, which is contrasted with Darul Salam, the world of peace (van Dijk, 
1981, p. l 0). The two, however, can become a single entity as Darul Harb is 
gradually incorporated in Darul Islam. 
18 The date of the establishment of DI/TII/Nll remains contested, but the general opinion 
maintains 7 August 1949 (Fealy, 2005. p. 16). The movement was initially named the Tgk. 
Daud Beureuh Struggle (Pemberontakan Tgk Daud Beureueh), then changed to Dl/T ll a fter 
Aceh chose to be part ofthe N II (Saleh, 1992, p.233). 
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The DI/TII/NII 19 movement consisted of regional rebellions in West 
Java, Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and Aceh (van Dijk, 
1981, p.269).20 It was the most severe Islamic movement in Indonesia, 
causing the massive destruction of infrastructure and assets, an enormous loss 
of lives, and innumerable injuries (Fealy, 2005). The casualties numbered 
between 15 ,000 and 20,000 deaths; tens of thousands more injured; an 
estimated one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 400,000 
premises destroyed (Fealy, 2005, p.18). 
Aceh was the last region to join the movement (van Dijk, 1981 ,p.269), 
proclaiming an official branch of DI/TII/NII, led by Teungku Daud Beureueh 
(I 898-1987), on 7 August 1953, and announcing their support for NII on 21 
September 1953 (Tempo, 2003, p.42). Teungku Beuerueh was one of the most 
notable Ulama in Cumbok, the founding father of PUSA, and a supporter of 
Indonesia. His strong support for Indonesia was due to his unwavering 
commitment to Islamic values, which he understood would be accommodated 
in the monotheism spirit embedded in the first principle of the national 
ideology (Pancasila)21 (Al-Chaidar, 1999, p.121; Saleh, 1992, p.1 48). Teungku 
Beuereueh has also recently been noted as central to both GAM and JI 
(.Jemaah Islamiyah)22 since both organisations perceived him as an important 
19Some recent western scholars use Darul Islam to refer to the movement. I deliberate ly use 
Dl/TllfNII to make it consistent with its history and to avoid misunderstanding and confus ion 
with the Darul Islam organisation that has been established since Dutch colonial times and 
together w ith other organisations sought the independence of Indonesia. The organisation was 
later split in two groups, especially after the unsuccessful attempt to include the Jakarta 
charter into the constitution, those who opted for a militant approach, and those who preferred 
a peaceful way. 
20 West Java Province was the most important region for DI/TII!Nll for three main reasons: it 
was the base of Kartosoewirjo; the origin of the Negara Islam Indonesia- Indonesian Islamic 
State; and ' the most severe security challenge to the central government and its military 
forces ' (Fealy, 2005, p.17). See Annex 8, for details about the province, leadership and key 
events of the Dl/TllfN 11 movement. 
2 1 Firstly mentioned on I June 1945 by Soekamo, the first pres ident of Indones ia. See Chapter 
2, footnote 8 for the Five Principles. 
22 JI , established by Abdullah Sungkar on I January 1993, has a long history as the covert 
organisation ofDl/T llfN ll in Indonesia. This is based on the fo llowing reason s: First, the 
DI/T I IfNll's leader, SM Kartosoewirjo, was the important inspirer for JI ' s leader. Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir and his associates (Jones, 2005, p.5); second, the two prominent JI leaders, Abdu llah 
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, were important DI/Tll members (Fealy, 2005, p.25); thi rd, 
the marriage ties among leaders of Dl/T ll!Nll, JI and GAM (Jones, 2002; Fealy, 2005). The 
possible link between Dl/TII!Nll-J l-GAM , however, needs further investigation, which 
unfortunately is not the focus of this thesis. 
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pioneer figure for the independence movement and the establishment of an 
Islamic state (ICG, 2002, p.7). 
The DI/TII/NII movement drew upon multifaceted causes, and 
encompassed a mixture of regionalist and religious sentiments as well as 
internal political power struggles (Aspinal, 2006, p.152). The causes related to 
five incidents that occutTed in Aceh in the early 1950s, which mostly related 
to considerations of Acehnese pride and historical identity as an independent 
entity that had long enjoyed sovereignty over their own region under their 
sultans. These five events were: the abolition of the Indonesian military 
Division X (I.: Divisi X) of Aceh, widely known as the White Elephant 
Division (I. : Divisi Gadjah Putih); the abolition of Aceh provincial status on 
23 January 1951 and its merger under North Sumatra on 25 January 1951 ; the 
unfulfilled promise of the first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, on special 
autonomy for the region, the provision of which would have allowed Aceh to 
have its own governmental system based on Islamic principles; rumours about 
a black list (I.: 'daftar hitam ' or 'les hitam ') 23 containing names of 300 
leaders of Aceh who Jakarta planned to assassinate by means of a secret 
operation (Tempo, 2003; Saleh, 1992, p.149; van Dijk, 1981 ); and the 
centrali sed government system that neglected local needs and wishes 
(Robinson, 2001 , p.216). 
The first two factors reflect Acehnese disappointment towards the 
central government. Division X or the White Elephant division, originated 
from Acehnese guerri lla fighters during the Dutch occupation and had become 
one of the greatest sources of Acehnese pride. Its name was derived from the 
elephant forces (I.: pasukan gajah) of Sultan Iskandar Muda, and therefore 
denotes a historical sentiment and the identity of the Acehnese. The abolition 
23 Some scholars, such as Comelis van Dijk ( 198 1 ), believe the list was indeed real. Others, 
such as B.J. Boland, argue that it was merely a political rumour created by the left wing 
politicians in Jakarta to scare the Islami c leaders in Aceh (Tempo, 2003 ). Then-Prime 
Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo, in a final meeting with the House of Representative on 2 
November 1953, however, stated that his Cabinet had never issued the list (Tempo, 2003). 
Nur el-Ibrah imy (as cited in Tempo, 2003, p.28), Beureueh's son in law, argued: ·'The Black 
List is a proof that raised our suspicions that the impetus for the bloody incidents was the 
games of political rivals ofTeungku Daud Beureueh to destroy him and his fellows" (l:" l es 
hitam adalah bukti yang menimbulkan kecurigaan kit a bahwa pencetus peristiwa berdarah 
itu adalah permainan lawan-lawan politik Teungku Daud Beureueh untuk menghancurkan 
beliau dan kawan-kawan") (Tempo, 2003, p.28). 
178 
was seen as a ' forced-circumcision' of Acehnese identity, which hurt and 
disappointed general Acehnese society. Exacerbating the existing discontent 
was the abolition of provincial status and incorporation under N01ih Sumatra, 
locally perceived as representing the 'Batak', an ethnic group that the 
Acehnese traditionally considered as a seed of wild grass (Ac.: drang seed) ,24 
to signify their uselessness. The never-fulfilled promise of special autonomy 
to develop their own Islamic governmental system, and the killings of u!ama 
on the presumed black list, further accentuated Acehnese disappointment. 
This disappointment was accompanied by the anger of the ulama 
toward the uleebalang descendants of Cumbok War survivors, their old rivals 
whom the ulama believed had manoeuvred their arrest (Saleh, 1992, pp.13 7-
142). The ulama's anger was openly demonstrated in their yells 'move 
forward, finish the uleebalang; one two, cut the throat of the aristocrats; left 
right, kill them all' (I and Ac.: 'Majujalan, kapeuhabeh uleebalang," satu 
dua, ka koh takue kaum raja," kiri kanan, kapoh mandum si ureung nyan' ) 
(Saleh, 1992, p.151 ). 
The above-mentioned grievances coincidentally arose during the time 
of the DI/TU/NII movement of Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo (1905-
1962)25 from West Java, the main aim of which was to establish an Islamic 
State under wholly Shari 'a Law. The movement saw its action as a holy war 
in the way of God (Ar.: 'jihad fl sabilillah ')(Fealy, 2005, p.21 ). 
Kartosoewirjo described TII personnel as holy war fighters (Ar.: Mujahid) and 
the Republic oflndonesia's armed forces as infidels (I.: kafir) ,26 ' apostates' , 
and 'communists'.27 Consequently, Indonesian Moslems were forced to make 
a stand. Anyone not joining the movement would be automatical ly considered 
the enemy of Allah, could be justifiably attacked and killed for residing in the 
'abode of war' (Ar.: darul harbi) (Fealy, 2005, p.21). This may help explain 
24 See chapter 3 section 3.1 
25 The movement itself was put founded in place by Kyai JusufTauziri , who withdrew his 
suppo1t soon after DI fought against the Republic, and formed the Darul Salam (the world of 
peace) movement a imed at establishing an Islamic state through peaceful way (van Dijk 1981. 
rfl·l
3
-l
4): I h ... ·1 GAM' d . . f h I d . ·1· ' . ., 
- nterestmg y, t 1s 1s s1m1 ar to s escn pt1on o t e n onesian m1 1tary as s1 pa1 -
Pasukan Anti Islam (The Anti Islam Forces). 
27 The rhetoric used by the Dl/Tll/NII is analogous to that used by George W. Bush in 
drawing support for the War on Terror: 'either you are with us or you are our enemy.' 
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the action ofDaud Beureuh's DI/TII/NII led movement in Aceh.28 The 
movement's struggle cost more than 4,00029 lives and lasted for nine years. 
The vi llagers experienced terror from the DI/TII/NII actions, especially with 
the frequently fierce assaults and the occasional massacres of villagers 
conducted by Dl/TII/NII personnel (Horisoki, 1975 cited in Fealy, 2005, 
p.20).30 
Responding to the situation, the Government commenced a military 
operation against the region. Not until 1956 did the Government begin to use 
a more conciliatory, persuasive approach, as exemplified in the Principals of 
Wise Concepts (I: Konsepsi Prinsipil Bijaksana),31 which later resulted in the 
Lamteh Vow (I: Ikrar Lamteh) on 7 April 1957. In this context, some 
negotiations for a peaceful conflict resolution were made. Leaders of 
DI/TII/NII in Aceh split into those against (led by Daud Beureueh) and those 
in favour (led by Hasan Saleh)32 of a peaceful resolution. Following the arrest 
and execution of Kartosoewi1jo, the national DI/TII/NII leader in 1962, 
Daud Beureuh rejoined the Republic ofindonesia on 22 December 1962 
through the Blangpadang Vow (1.: Ik.rar Blangpadang),33 a peace agreement34 
with the central government, on the condition that a Shari 'a law would be 
28 At a later stage, Beureueh was credited with developing the thirteen basic principles of N I 1 
and TII, the NII Military. 
29 See Yusuf (2002, p.50) 
30 Scholars have long debated whether Darul Islam can be rightfully characterised as a 
terrorist organisation. Referring to the atrocities, Horisoki ( 1975 in Fealy, 2005, p.20) 
class ified the actions as terrorist. This is in line with the term ' diteror ' (I) used by villagers. 
Referring to the attacks on public facilities and Government officials, including the 1957 
Cikini incident (I: Peristiwa Cikini), an attempt to assassinate Soekamo in Cikini (Central 
Jakarta), Fealy (2005, p.21) argued that DI/Tl I was obviously attempting to terrorise the 
Government and the people. 
31 The Concept was drafted by Kolone l Sjamaun Gaharu, the Mil itary Regional Commander 
of Aceh. 
32 Hasan Saleh was the Aceh region Dl/TII commander. In 1959, he met Prime Minister 
Djuanda and signed a cease fire agreement without prior consultation with Daud Beureueh . 
Following this, Hasan Saleh made a secret deal wi th General A.H. Nasution, the Head of 
Army Staff, to control Daud Beureueh. For this purpose, on 26 May 1959, Hasan Saleh and 
Teungku Husin al-N ujahid manoeuvred the organisation by formi ng the Aceh Federal State 
Revolutionary Council-Indonesia Islamic State ( I: Dewan Revolusi Negara Bagian Aceh-
Negara Islam Indonesia). 
33 Blangpadang is the name of a place on the border of Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh. 
34 The peaceful situation did not last long. In the period from 1965 to 1966, in the context of a 
war against communism, approx imately 3,000 people, of the approximate total number of I 
mi llion people in Indonesia, were massacred because of the presumed Comm unist coup 
(Ross, 2003 , p.6). In 1968, fo llowing this massacre, Aceh's special autonomy was w ithdrawn 
by the Suharto regime (Ross, 2003). Shari 'a Law was re-instated in the year 200 I after 
Su harto stepped down. 
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granted for the Special Province of Aceh. The peace deal illustrates that the 
DI/TII leaders never sought a separate country from Indonesia (Robinson, 
200 I, p.216; Saleh, 1992). The non-violent approach of Colonel Yasin (the 
regional military commander at the time), however, was much more 
influential than any other political arguments in favour of the peace deal 
(Saad, 1999, p.166). 
Understanding the Acehnese culture and the character of the notable 
Acehnese ulama and his important role in Acehnese society, Colonel Yasin 
persistently approached Daud Beureueh by sending letters addressing him as 
father (I. , Ac.: ayahanda) (Tempo, 2003, p. 36). This special Achenese 
respectful form of address for an elder man carries the notion of full respect 
and care, as if the person was his own father, as well as the cultural gesture of 
positioning oneself as a humble younger person who fully respected the great 
ulama. More importantly, the form of address also signified that Daud 
Beureueh was not considered as rebel and traitor to the nation but, on the 
contrary, as someone who was deeply concerned on the nation and the people, 
but possessed a different approach that needed to be discussed instead of 
disputed. This approach might ' have instilled pleasure' (I.: berkenan di hati) 
in Daud Beureueh's heart as he replied to the letters using a similarly polite 
tone, addressing Yasin as son (I.: anakanda), a respectful term of address for a 
younger man which conveys a notion of care and acceptance, as ifthe person 
is considered as close as one's own son. This opened up a channel of 
communication between the two leaders about the underlying reasons for the 
movement. The cultural approach was continued by having a welcoming 
reception fo r Daud Beureueh35 and his fighters when they came down from 
the mountain to end the fighting on 9 May 1962, which further signified the 
cultural gesture ofrespect to Daud Beureueh as a well respected ulama. 
The reasons why Teungku Beuerueh 'surrendered' are not clear. From 
a cultural point of view, however, there are two possible factors. The first was 
that it was a genuine gesture by the Acehnese. It represents their openness to 
negotiate as long as their feelings are respected. This character is well 
35 In his last days in the mountains, Beureueh was accompanied by e ight loyal fo llowers 
namely Teungku Ilyas Leube, Hasballah, Amin Negara, Amin Basyah, and Baihaqi (Tempo, 
2003, p.34). 
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depicted in the following old Acehnese saying that clearly challenged the 
Dutch picture of them as stubborn and difficult to communicate with. It also 
illustrates that the Acehnese can offer loyal (fanatical) support to their 
leaders.36 
If hearts are not being insulted I Meunyo hana teupeh ate 
Even the next season seeds of rice wi ll be g iven I Pade bijeh pih teubi 
But once hearts are offended I Meunyo ka teupeh ate 
Not even the bad leftover of steamed rice would be offered37 I Bu Leubeh pih 
han ta peutaba 
The second view is that it was a political trick to allow time to rebuild 
the organisation which had been nationally weakened after the leader, 
Kartosuwirjo, was captured by the government. Supporting this is the fact 
that in 1962, the same year as Beureueh's surrender, before his execution, 
Kartosuwirjo reportedly designated Daud Beureuh to be the next leader and 
ultimately appointed him the second Imam of NII (ICG, 2002). Not long after, 
Daud Beureueh nan1ed Abu Has bi Geudong, 38 a fellow Acehnese, as his 
successor (ICG, 2002). This can be viewed as a political tactic to avoid 
DI/Til/NII being defeated by the Indonesian Military. The appointment of NII 
Imam further suggests that the organisation and its goal of establishing an 
Islamic Republic have never entirely faded away. Citing ICG, Fealy (2005, 
p.24) stated" .. . DI remains active to the present and still has probably several 
thousand members, though it has no central leader or unified executive." 
The cultural perspective suggests two contradictory facets of 
concordance and resistance as part of the 'muslihat' (I, Ac.) and 'bermain 
cantik' (I) of these political actors. Siapno (2002, pp. I 0-19) elaborates the 
concept of 'muslihat' in relation to the concept of 'political performativity'. 
Muslihat is an old Acehnese conception (derived from Malayan culture) of 
attaining triumph through indirect means such as hiding, disguising, using 
36 The history of the struggles (and how they stopped once the leaders surrendered) of 
Acehnese heroes and leaders, such as Teuku Umar, Cut Nya Dien, Teungku Cik d i Tiro 
( 1867-1942), and Daud Beuereueh ( 1898-1 987) wel I document the loyalties of the Acehnese 
to their leaders. 
37 Husin, 2003, p.24 
38 The son ofGeudong, Teungku Fauzi Hasbi and his family were formerly involved with 
GAM. He was later considered a GAM traitor after surrendering to The Indonesian Army 
Special Forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus- Kopassus) in 1979. 
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indirect movement and languages. Siapno (2002) views this as part of 
indigenous resistance against the ruling Dutch, and later, the Indonesian 
government. Muslihat is closely linked into the old Acehnese saying of ' lheuk 
Jago meuluel' (Ac.), which has no precise English translation but can be 
described by using five qualifications proposed by Siapno (2002, p.17). 
Firstly, the ability to be 'invisible, self effacing, not fully defined, not easily 
categorizable.' Secondly, the capability to perform well and convincingly in 
'contradictory roles' in accordance to circumstantial demands. Thirdly, the 
proficiency to 'merayu' (I), which Siapno translates it as ' to coax, seduce, 
flatter, soften the heart of one's adversaries in order to get what one wants. ' 
Fourthly, the intelligence to have a perspective on events, and to sensibly 
judge their degree of importance. Fifthly, the patience to wait, accompanied 
by the intelligence to judge the right time for the right move. 
1.3 The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (1976 - 2004): The 
Economically-Driven Violent Political Conflict? 
This section describes the nature and causes of the Free Aceh 
Movement (I : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM). It is divided into four 
sections: the primary rationale for the movement and its validity challenges, 
the :first period of GAM, and the second period of GAM, and the third period 
of GAM. It attempts to provide an objective picture of the movement, viewing 
it from different relevant angles, including the macro economic and political 
situation of Indonesia. 
1.3.1 The Primary Rationale & Its Validity Challenges 
There is debate about the history of the establishment of GAM. Most 
western scholars (such as Schulze, 2004; Ross, 2003; and Robinson, 2001), 
believed that GAM was established by Hasan Muhammad di Tiro.39 Some 
39There are some controversies about the history of Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, who often 
presents himself as the heir of T iro's family as the only grandson ofTeungku Chik di Tiro. 
Some (Yusuf, 2002; Saleh, 1992; Al-Chaidar, 1999; Robinson,2001) support this. Some others 
(for example Jihad, 200 I, pp. 11-1 7) argue that he has no link with Tiro 's family. He was the 
second chi ld of Leubee Muhammad and Fatimah binti Mahyidin binti Tgk. Syekh Samalanga, 
from Tan jong Bungon village, Kuta Bakti Subdistrict, district of Pidie. This is in line with 
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Acehnese scholars (such as Jihad, 2001 ; Al-Chaidar, 1999; Saleh, 1992), 
however, clearly contest this argument and link the initial idea of GAM with 
the previous DI/TII movement for an Islamic Republic of Aceh (l: Republik 
Islam Aceh - RIA). They argued that Hasan di Tiro's involvement was more 
as an international link for GAM to obtain guns and international suppo1i, as 
promised by di Tiro himself. These never materialised, resulting in some of 
his Acehnese colleagues (such as Abu Hasbi Geudong and Abu Jihad) calling 
him a I iar (Jihad, 2001 ; Al-Chaidar, 1999). 
Hasan di Tiro apparently further developed the initial concept of GAM 
into a different direction that did not please most of his colleagues. However, 
trusting him as possessing better knowledge of the international world, his 
colleagues finally allowed Hasan di Tiro to make the proclamation of the 
establishment of GAM on 20 May 1977, internationally understood as 4 
December 1976 (Schulze, 2004, p.4; Robinson, 2001 , p.216).40 There were 
several :fundamental disagreements about the date of proclamation, text, area 
of sovereignty, type of state, flag, national language, and the historical 
foundation of the state (Al-Chaidar, 1999, pp.141-149). The absence of 
Islamic greetings before and after the text of the proclamation was one of the 
disagreements between Hasan di Tiro and the rest of the leaders. This possibly 
led to the existence of two types of GAM in the region, which I name the 
original and the derivative GAM. The original GAM carries the aspirations of 
the Dl/TII movement for an Indonesian Islamic State (I: Negara Islam 
Indonesia - NII), composed of two main elements: those who aimed at 
establishing NII, an Islamic state at national level, such as Abu Hasbi 
Geudong,41 and those who supported RIA, an Islamic state in Aceh. This 
Zentgraff( J983, translated edition, p.71-76) who wrote about the end of di Tiro' s family 
th rough the kil ling of the only grandson of di Tiro, Teungku Chik Ma' at di Tiro, by the Dutch 
in 1911. Hasan di Tiro previously lived in New York and worked at the Indonesian Mission 
to the United Nations in early 1950s, and lived abroad until 1976 (Robinson, 200 I, p.216; 
Ross, 2003). He quit the United Nations in 1953 to support Daud Beureueh and became an 
important contact for mobilising foreign funds and purchasing guns (Ross, 2003, pp.9-11 ). 
40 This is according to Teungku Fauzi Hasbi Geudong, a previous member ofGAM, who 
stated that Hasan di Tiro was not in Aceh in 1976 (Al-Chaidar, 1999, p. 149). 
41 See ICG , 2002, p.7 
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GAM therefore is a 'metamorphosis' of the Dl/TII/NII movement. The 
derivative GAM of Di Tiro aspired to an Acehnese Sultanate.42 
Regardless of these disagreements, di Tiro managed to establ ish his 
version of GAM and build an international image and acceptance that his 
Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) and the ' Declaration of 
Independence of Acheh-Sumatra' 43 on 4 December 1976 represented the true 
wishes and needs of the Acehnese. Several statements made in the Declaration 
(Annex 5) served to denounce Indonesia and provide the rationale for Di 
Tiro ' s movement. The statements includes the romanticism of the golden era 
of Aceh history as an Independent sultanate; the condemnation of the 
illegitimate transfer of supremacy from the Dutch to the Javanese colonialists; 
the exploitation by the Javanese of Aceh's natural resources; and the 
impoverishment of Aceh due to the extraction of the natural gas revenue for 
Javanese benefit. 
On careful enquiry, however, these statements in the ASNLF are 
contradicted by the following facts. Historical records indicate that Aceh was 
not part of the Anglo-Dutch treaty44 dealing with the transfer of the Dutch 
East Indies, later known as Indonesia. The integration of Aceh with Indonesia 
was due to an Acehnese decision, illustrated by the oath of the ulama and 
some uleebalang who were pro-Indonesia,45 and the Cumbok war (1: Perang 
Cumbok), in which the pro-Indonesia ulama led group successfully defeated 
the anti-Indonesia uleebalang led group. The statement also contradicts the 
1928 Youth Vow (Sumpah Pemuda 1928) made by youth organisations in the 
42 T he derivative GAM is the focus of th is chapter as this is the one that is internationally 
understood as the only GAM, which has made a peace agreement with the government of 
Indonesia. 
43 GAM used Acheh instead of Aceh (Ac.: Aceh). Some believed that this was intentionally 
used to articulate their standpoint against the government of Indonesia that is used ' Aceh ' . 
Taking the history of the ejaan lama (the old style of spelling) and ejaan baru (the new style 
of spell ing) of the Indonesia language, however, a simple technical reason might need to be 
considered as explaining the use of Acheh vs Aceh. The declaration of Independence of 
Acheh-Sumatra was developed in 1970s w hen Bahasa Indonesia used the ejaan lama. To be 
consistent, and in line with the current spelling of Bahasa Indonesia, I use ' Aceh'. 
441n both Anglo-Dutch Treaty ( 1824) and the treaty in between the Sultan of Aceh and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (18 19), Aceh was treated as an independent 
Su ltanate (Schulze, 2004, p.6; Reid, 1969, pp.60-78). 
45 Such as Teuku Nyak Arief, Teuku Daudsyah, T Panglima Polem Muhammad Ali, Hamid 
Azwar, and Teuku Ahmad Jeunib, Teuku Bentara Pineung (Alfian, 1982, p.68; Tempo, 2003, 
p.30) 
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East Indies, including the youth organisation from Aceh, on 28 October 1928, 
which declared the wish to be united as one country, one nation, and one 
language, and named the state Indonesia as opposed to the Dutch's East 
Indies. 
Di Tiro's claims were further weakened by a lack of evidence for his 
claims of decreased wellbeing in Aceh and the loss of revenue from Aceh' s 
natural gas (Ross, 2003). Di Tiro alleged that the life expectancy of the 
Acehnese was 34 years and decreasing, which conflicted with empirical data 
indicating an increased life expectancy from 48.5 years in 1969 to 55.5 in 
1977 (Hill and Wideman 1989, p.40). The infant mortality rate for males and 
females respectively appeared to have dropped from 141 and 120 per 1000 in 
1969, to 99 and 82 per 1000 in 1977, which was better than the national male 
and female infant mortality rates, which dropped from 152 and 129 per 1000 
in 1969 to 117 and 98 per 1000 in 1977 (Hill and Weidemann, 1989, p.40). 
The regional economic indicators also demonstrated relatively good economic 
performance and suggested little risk of conflict. Aceh's GDP (gross domestic 
product)46 per capita, including oil and gas, sharply increased from Rp 28,000 
in 1971 to Rp 1,220,7000 in 1983, making it the third highest in the country 
(Robinson, 2001 , p.221; Hill and Weidemann, 1989, p.8). The real annual 
average growth rate of Aceh increased from 5.2 percent in 1971 -1975 to 18.9 
percent in 1976-1982, making it the highest in Indonesia (Hill and 
Weidemann, 1989, p. l 0). 
The claim that US$ 15 billion has been extracted from the revenue 
earned from natural gas for the benefit of the Javanese was also not supported 
by empirical data. Aceh had not yet produced this an1ount of revenue, which 
was an extrapolation of Aceh's mineral wealth calculated by GAM (Ross, 
2003, p.10). Colombijn (2003, p.342) stated that in 1983, approximately 84 
per cent oflndonesia's oil exports were actually predominantly sourced from 
Dumai in Riau Province.47 It is, however, true that most of the economic 
46 GDP is one of several measures for the size of economy of a country or reg ion (within a 
country). It calculated the overall goods and services produced within a country or a region 
(in a country) in a particular period, including the export and import activities. 'Gross' 
indicates that depreciation of investment is not weighed in the calculation. 
47 The importance of Riau in Indonesia's economy was boosted further with the establi shment 
of the Three Growth Triangle ofSingapore-Johor-Riau in 1989. 
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resources benefited the central government. This can be illustrated by 
contrasting the GDP with the development expenditure and subsidies 
(including presidential instruction grants), which mainly flowed to Java and 
some provinces in North Sumatra, but not Aceh (see Hill and Weidemann, 
1989, pp.30-32). This may have led the region to fall into the ' high growth -
low income' category, especially in 1975 - 1983 (Hill and Weidemann, 1989, 
p.12) 
It is also interesting to note that the strong notion of Islam in the 
region was largely hidden in the ASNLF declaration (Ross, 2003, Schulze, 
2004). Opposition to the authoritarian rule of Suharto and the greater 
autonomy of Aceh, which di Tiro (as cited by Ross, 2003, p.11) claimed to 
advocate, were also left unarticulated in the Declaration. Some have argued 
that di Tiro deliberately avoided addressing such issues because they were not 
useful for gaining international support (Ross, 2003; Jihad, 2001 ). Although 
Islam was always at the core of Aceh's political movement, mentioning it in 
the declaration would only militate against international support. A movement 
for a greater autonomy within the Indonesian federation would not be 
favourable either, as it would be considered a domestic affair and therefore 
support would not be attained.48 
Di Tiro's proposal for the movement, however, was in line with the 
general feeling of disappointment across Aceh, which may have resulted from 
the centrally planned development model in Indonesia. This development 
model left the region with little benefit from the exploitation of regional 
economic resources and caused the extemalities49 or the ' undesirable side-
effects'50 of industrial growth: the unequal employment of the Acehnese vs 
48 Later, the movement used the issue of human rights to mo bi I ise international support. 
Foreign States, starting with the US, and later fo llowed by the Japanese Government, UK, and 
Austra lia, openly supported the Unity of Indonesia. The human rights issue, however, still 
gained wide support from the International Communities. During the Martial Law, for 
example, several Human Rights Activists were funded by d ifferent countries to visit and brief 
the leaders of these countries on human rights issues in Aceh. Some of these activists were 
interested on the independence movement, others were mainly concerned with human rights 
abuses (observations and interviews with several activists on several occasions in 2004). 
Although the Martial Law Authority tried to seize these activists and limit their mobility, they 
were able to continue their activities in a low key. 
49 Externality is an economic concept used to refer to the social and environmental cost, such 
as prostitution and pollution, resulting from economic (profit oriented) activities. 
50 Robinson, 200 I, p.222 
187 
non Achenese (especially Javanese); inadequate compensation to local 
farmers for seizure of their land; and the environmental and moral 
degradation, for example the night life and sex workers, particularly in 
Lhokseumawe in North Aceh, especially where the plants were located 
(Basuki , 2003, p.15; Ross, 2003, p.17; Robinson, 2001). 
The disappointment was clearly demonstrated in the failure of the 
Functional Group Party (Golongan Karya - Golkar), the ruling party under the 
Suharto regime, in the general elections of 1971 and 1977. In these election, 
Golkar won only 49.7 percent and 41 percent of the vote, respectively, in 
comparison to the 48.9 and 57.5 percent gained by the Islamic party, the 
United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan - PPP) (Ross, 
2003, p.9; Abdullah, 2003). These figures clearly suggest that the United 
Development Party was the major rival for the Functional Group Party in 
Aceh. Considering the fact that it was the only Moslem-oriented party in 
Indonesia at the time, it is possible to argue that the political grievances went 
hand in hand with the religious based discontent of the predominantly Moslem 
area and were exacerbated by the romanticism of the Islamic independent 
Sultanate of Aceh. 51 
This may explain the success of di Tiro, who was the DI/TII/NII 
representative abroad in 1956-1962 (Jihad, 2001 , p.13), in gaining support 
from some of the Acehnese, despite the lack of evidence, absence of 
prominent facts, and the under rated economic achievements of Aceh in di 
Tiro' s proposal. GAM reportedly gaining sympathy of many ex DI/TII/NII 
fighters and their families, including Teungku llyah Leube52 and Teungku 
Fauzi Hasbi, the son of Abu Hasbi Geudong, the third Imam of NII. 
Nevertheless, Daud Beureuh, the second Imam of NII, who was a former ally 
of di Tiro, declined to support him, due largely to the absence ofreference of 
Islam, the basis of Beureuh's movement, in the declaration. For Beureuh, the 
51 In the 1970s, the central government sent a special mission to Aceh to find out why Aceh 
was against Golkar, but this resulted a weak analysis that overlooked the root causes of 
Aceh's grievances (Tempo, 2003). In addition, the mass arrests of villagers in Pidie, re lig ious 
leaders, ex 01/Tll fighters, and student activists fuell ed to discontent (Siapno, 2002, p.44) 
52 He is one ofBeureueh 's seven loyal followers who accompanied him until the last day of 
his movement. 
188 
stronghold of Islam motivated him to desire nothing but a state that 
accommodated the monotheism of an Islamic State. 
In line with the claims in the declaration, the movement focused on the 
new status of Aceh as a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)53 exporter and made the 
grievances not only to Indonesia but also to the US, which was perceived as 
not only supporting the Indonesian Government but also exploiting their 
resources.
54 Since its establishment, GAM's pre-eminence has ebbed and 
flowed as is described in the following sections. 
1.3.2 The First Period (1976 to 1979) 
In this first period, GAM was a small organisation that was poorly 
equipped and easily defeated by the Indonesian military. GAM reportedly had 
no more than two hundred fighters, some of whom had involuntarily joined 
the movement, and a few old weapons, some of which were residues of World 
War II. They were engaged more with 'social buy in' , producing and 
distributing pamphlets and raising an Acehnese flag to gain sympathy from 
the people, than with military attacks. Financial support was quite limited, and 
mostly obtained from the town folk (Schulze, 2004; Ross, 2003). Around 
1977, however, GAM stole the LNG facility's payroll, shot two Americans 
workers, and killed one of them (Ross, 2003).55 This was the first instance of 
GAM's efforts to extort money from the plant (Ross, 2003, p.13). 
53 The resource was first found in North Aceh in 1971 and started to be extracted in 1977 by 
Mobil Oil Co together w ith Pcrtamina (The Indonesia State Oil Company) and Jilco (a 
Japanese conglomerate). The exploration reached its peak of production in 1988 (Schulze, 
2004, p.9, Dawood and Sjafrizal, 1989 in Ross, 2003 , pp.11-12; Ross, 2003, pp. I I & 41 ). An 
unfair neglect of local firms, however, was quite prominent. This situation was experienced 
by di Tiro himself, whose own company was once defeated by the U.S.-owned Bechtel for a 
pipeline building project of Mobil Oil (Ross, 2003, p.12). The oil boom also benefited the 
reg ion in the new roads, schools, medical facilities, and approximately 4,000 to 5,000 new 
houses built by the Company, as well as some new downstream industries, such as ASEAN 
ferti lizer, established in the region. The factory compound was initially planned to be built in 
North Sumatra but moved to Aceh due to the strong protest from the people (Sjamsuddin, 
1984 in Ross, 2003, p.12). 
54 This was documented in Di T iro's diary in May 1978, in which he critised the US for not 
only supporting Indonesia but also exploiting Aceh's resources through Mobil Oil (Schulze, 
2004, p.9). 
55 Di Tiro argued that the shooting happened when GAM tried to arrange a secret meeting 
with an Acehnese manager to discuss the ' ways and means' to protect the plant from possible 
damage due to guerri lla fighting (Ross, 2003, p.13). Teungku Fauzi Hasbi Geudong confessed 
that the shooting was on Di Tiro's instruction to attract international attention (Al-Chaidar, 
1999, p. 152). 
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The government responded to the initial period of GAM activities with 
both coercive and persuasive approaches. The coercive approach resulted in 
forced disappearances and the torture of not only GAM fighters but also their 
family members. Women and children were often taken as hostages by the 
government in the event that their husbands managed to evade arrest. From 
August 1977 to August 1980 approximately thirty men were shot dead in 
public with no proper trial (Ross, 2003, p.14 ). Coercion continued until 1982, 
and trials of suspected GAM partisans lasted until 1984 (Ross, 2003, p.14). 
By the early 1980s, these government efforts had successfully weakened 
GAM.56 
The persuasion approach consisted of building new public facilities 
such as roads and television relay stations in remote areas to dissuade civil 
leaders from supporting GAM. Added to this was the development of new 
public facilities and downstream industries, which certainly provided more 
employment opportunities. With the LNG power plant, the region enjoyed 
outstanding economic figures: a 7.6 percent average annual rate of GDP and 
13.7 percent average annual growth rate in the manufacturing sector from the 
period 1975 to 1984, and a rapid increase of the oil and gas contribution to 
GDP from less than 17 percent in 1976 to 69.5 percent in 1989 (Ross, 2003, 
p.14). 
The fine economic performance of Aceh, unfortunately, was not 
widely enjoyed by the region, as most of the benefits from the LNG 
56 Some GAM members, including Teungku Fauzi Hasbi, surrendered and became informants 
for the Indonesian Army. Interestingly, Teungku Hasbi was connected to Jemaah lslamiyah 
and the Army Special Forces Command (l: Komando Pasukan Khusus - Kopassus) at the 
same time and reportedly regularly traveled to Medan and Jakarta from Kuala Lumpur (ICG, 
2002b, p.7). Both Jemaah lslam iyah and the Kopassus possessed common interests of 
fighting GAM . The link between Hasbi 's family and Jemaah lslamiyah leaders can be traced 
to 1976, when his family hosted Haji Ismail Pranoto, the East Javanese Darul Islam leader, 
who came to seek Beureuh 's permission to revive 01/Tll/Nll and to join Abu Bakar Ba' asyir 
and Abdullah Sungkar in the organisation (ICG, 2002, p.7). Fauzi Hasbi's father, Abu Hasbi 
Geudong, was imprisoned from late 1979 to around 1982. Upon his release, he started 
contacting the former 01/TII/N ll members to d iscuss strategies to fight against Suharto' s 
repression of Islam (!CG, 2002, p.7). In Singapore, he shared a house with Malik Mahmud, 
and was invited to be an advisor for GAM in Sweden . Abu Hasbi Geudong, who supported 
the original idea of Darul Islam for N 11 and rather than a separate state of RI A, decided to 
move out in 1984 (JCG, 2002b, p.7). 
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exploration went to the central government.57 In addition, the new economy 
caused social disruptions that were overlooked by the government and led to 
the re-emergence of GAM in 1989 to 1991. With a sharp increase in 
population from 490,000 in 1974 to 755,000 in 1987, North Aceh suffered 
from overstretched social facilities and infrastructure, not to mention other 
social costs, such as pollution; social problems of corruption, gambling, and 
prostitution; as well as problems of non-Acehnese migration with its overal I 
consequences of 'land seizures' and stiff job competition (Ross, 2003, pp. 15-
17; Basuki, 2003, p.15; Robinson, 2001; Kell, 1995). Amnesty International 
(1993 in Ross, 2003, p.17) reported the following protests conducted by locals 
over this issue: (a) May 1988, the setting on fire of the local police station by 
villagers from ldi Cut, East Aceh; (b) August 1988, the bombing of a hotel in 
Lhokseumawe, North Aceh, that was used as a prostitution centre; (c) March 
1989, a riot of an estimated 8,000 people who destroyed a building owned by 
the military to protest a circus show which, according to the local Moslem 
leaders, was not compatible with Islamic teachings. These riots signalled the 
re-emergence of GAM in the second period from 1989 to 1991. 
1.3.3 The Second Period (1989 to 1991) 
In the second period, GAM emerged as a bigger, better equipped, and 
better-trained organisation compared to the first period. Although it lacked 
teITitorial control, GAM reportedly possessed the necessary command 
structure to perform 'hit and run' guerrilla operations to attack military 
installations and personnel. This resulted from the training provided by Libya 
in the 1980s, which was largely due to the hard work of Hasan di Tiro and his 
'Acelmese government-in exile.' 58 Another factor that may also explain this 
57 This was a common situation in provinces in Indonesia that only obtained a greater 
authority after the issuance of Law 22/ 1999 and 25/ 1999 on regional autonomy and the 
central and regional government financia l balances. 
58 In 1986, di Tiro 's government established contact with Libya and received non-financial 
support. In the 1980s, around 250 to 2000 Acehnese, mainly from Malaysia, were trained in 
Lybia (Schulze, 2004; Ross, 2003 ; Robinson, 2001 , p.2 17), of which approximately 150 to 
800 slipped into Aceh via Malaysia and Singapore (Vatikiotis, 1991 in Ross, 2003, p 16). 
Other sources records different numbers of GAM fighters trained in Libya in 1986-1989. 
According to Schultze (2004), Di T iro (Wali Nanggroe, Defence Minister, and Supreme 
Commander), claimed there were 5,000; Malik Mahmud (GAM's Minister of State), 1,500; 
ICG, 700 -800; and Indonesia Army intelligence, 583. Di Trio and Malik Mahmud disagreed 
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was the estimated 47 ex-Indonesian military and police officers who joined 
GAM in 1989. In this phase, GAM was concentrated in the north-eastern 
coastal areas of Pidie, North Aceh, and East Aceh. As for financial support, 
GAM admitted to obtaining it from, among others, Acehnese settlers in 
Malaysia. However, the organisation also extorted some funds from their 
claim to revenues from the Mobil Oil company (Schulze, 2004; Ross, 2003; 
Robinson, 2001). Undoubtedly, this claim related to their dissatisfaction over 
the limited benefit received by the locals, as indicated by the small number of 
Acehnese hired by the company in comparison to outsiders, especially the 
Javanese - a practice the company attributed to the locals' comparative lack of 
skills. 
GAM became more confident to pursue more aggressive courses of 
action (Sukma, 2004; Schulze, 2004; Ross, 2003). It staited to attack police 
and military units;59 public facilities; civil authorities; commercial buildings; 
suspected 'cuak' (Ac.), the local term for the Indonesian military's informers 
and spies, mostly recruited as operational support resources for the Indonesian 
military (I.: Tenaga Pembantu Operasi - TPO); and non Acehnese settlers, 
mainly the Javanese, in the region. The attacks that began on a small scale and 
in limited areas in 1989 quickly became more extensive and serious in the 
1990s (Sukma, 2004, p.6). 
The question of whether to respond with an intense military counter-
action was still being debated by the central government, especially armed 
forces officials. Their public statements, however, did not necessarily match 
their actions. On the one hand, the Military Headquarters issued a press 
release and made public statements that identified GAM as weak and easily 
overcome by the Indonesian military, and that it was purely criminal and not a 
about the opportunities for training in Libya. ICG (2002, p.7) reported' ... Husaini made 
contact with Libya and learned that military training was being offered there for would-be 
Muslim separatists. There was a choice of six-month, eight-month, or twelve-month training, 
and each trainee received a cash payment of U.S.$5,000 on completion of the course. Husaini 
and the people around him wanted to send more educated people, but Hasan di Tiro was 
worried that if educated people were sent, they might think for themselves and challenge di 
Tiro's rule.' 
59 Examples of these attacks are: May 1989, GAM attacked and killed army officers in di 
T iro subdistrict and took their arms; Simil ar attacks appeared in September 1989 and early 
1990 in different districts of North Aceh, Pidie, and East Aceh (Sukma, 2004, p.6). These 
attacks were due to GAM 's shortage of arms (Sukma, 2004, p.6). 
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in this was a serious concern towards the situation in general. This argument 
is actually in line with Suk.ma's suggestion of a 'hidden military agenda' 
(Sukma, 2004, p.8), which he did not clearly describe but rather implied in his 
proposed four reasons for the government's counter insurgency against GAM 
- namely, the rapid growth of GAM supporters from civil society;63 fear of 
the possibility of Acehnese intellectuals' supporting GAM; the imposed tlueat 
towards the security of vital industrial projects in the region, and fear of the 
possible external (international?) support obtained by GAM, especially the 
former DJ/Til/NII Acehnese fighters exiled in Malaysia. 
The movement's potential impact on national stability, particularly 
economic stability, may have alarmed the government. In the 1970s and 
1990s, Indonesia was enjoying her best economic performance, benefiting 
from, among other things, the oil boom of the 1970s (see Manning, 1998). 
Such a favourable economic situation could not afford any political 
disturbances, especially with the national economic master plan aiming to 
achieve the 'take off' (I: lepas landas)64 stage in 2000. The Indonesian 
military's denial of the seriousness of the problem was essential to assure 
public, especially market, opinion. The military portrayed the disturbance as 
small and apolitical, and that everything was stable and under control in order 
to ensure both national and regional economic stability. Such statements were 
necessary to maintain the market, protect the Foreign Direct Investment (FDJ), 
and prevent the weak currency from becoming weaker (as experienced by 
Indonesia on previous several occasions). However, statements of ' denial', 
'criminalisation', and 'de-politicisation' from the Indonesian military were 
insufficient by themselves, and needed to be followed by serious action to 
prove what had been stated. The sending of ' non organic troops' was, 
therefore, indispensable to reassure the public that the domestic situation was 
secure and stable. 
63 Citing Kell, Sukma (2004, p.6) stated that " ... in a relatively shott period GAM had 
succeeded in drawing the support of village officials, serving members of the armed forces, 
veterans of the Darul Islam movement of the 1950s, civil servants, small traders, and 
schoolteachers." 
64 This is one of the Rostow's five-stage developments (the growth-led development) which 
The National Development Plan of Indonesia aimed to achieve. 
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The serious politicisation of the situation became more evident with a 
issuance of the Military Operation (M0)65 order, which was supported by the 
elite Acehnese (Ishak, 1999, p.32). The operation was popularly known as 
DOM, an abbreviation for the Indonesian term 'Daerah Operasi Mi liter' , the 
Military Operation Areas, in 1989-1998 covering the three districts of North 
Aceh, Pidie, and East Aceh.66 Under the code name the 'Red Net Operation' 
(I: Operasi Jaring Merah), the military aimed to squeeze GAM in six months 
(Sukma, 2004, p.9). This operation is remembered by the people as the most 
frightening, with so much violence, including torture, executions, arbitrary 
arrests, rape, and forced disappearances. It was pretty obvious during my field 
trip that almost everyone in Aceh knew what the red net (l:jaring merah) 
was, and always mentioned it with the look of fear and horror in their eyes. 
The MO had two main characteristics: the 'institutionalisation of 
terror' and the 'systematic and forced mobilisation of civilians' , especially 
with its 'shock therapy' (Robinson, 2001 , p.226; Sukma, 2004, p.10; Schulze, 
2004; and the Human Rights Watch, 2001). Regardless of its breaches of 
international law prohibiting direct involvement of civilians in a war situation, 
the ' red net' operation was accompanied by the ' Fence of Legs' strategy (I: 
Pagar Betis)67 in which civilians were used for sweeping, finding, and 
protecting the area from, GAM fighters. Under this operation civilians were 
65 The MO for Aceh was under the North Sumatra Kodam Bukit Barisan, with a Field 
Operation Command (Komando Pelaksana Operasi -Kolakops) established under the 
Liliwangsa Sub Regional Military Command (1: Komando Resort Mi liter - Korem), North 
Aceh District (Sukma, 2004, p.8). At district level , the operation comprised Special Task 
Forces (Satuan Tugas Khusus -Satgasus), Tactical Task Forces (I: Satuan Taktis - Sattis), and 
the Operational Support Resources (I: Tenaga Pembantu Operasi -TPO), consisting of 
civilians and GAM detainees who had, both voluntarily or involuntarily, joined the military 
operation and served as military spies and informers (Ac.: cuak). 
66There have been debates on the existence of DOM. Some scholars (such as Sukma, 2004), 
pointing to the nature of the operations and number of 'non organic troops ' deployed to the 
region, argued that DOM was applied. Some others (such as Widjayanto and Kammen, 1999), 
maintained that DOM never legally existed in any troubled provinces of Indonesia and posit 
that a distinction ought to be made between DOM and areas with m ilitary action characterised 
by a combat command (Kolakops), such as the Kolakops Timor Timur for the former East 
T imor province and Jaring Merah for Aceh. To accommodate both arguments, I use the term 
Military Operation (MO). 
67 The Fence of Legs strategy has been applied in other troubled provinces: the former East 
Timor province (see Kammen, 200 I) and West Papua province (see Davis, 2001 ). In the case 
of Aceh, the Fence of Legs strategy was inevitable due to the Military's lack of knowledge of 
the region's geographic characteristics and difficulties in identifying GAM fighters. 
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forced to become involved in military formed militias68 and vigi lante units 
that consequently put their life even more at risk. The Indonesian military 
argued that the 'Fence of Legs ' strategy was in line with Hankarnrata, known 
in Indonesia as 'Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Merata', one of the prominent 
government policies for the involvement of civil society in national security 
defence. 
'Red Net' was not a stand alone operation but accompanied by a 
territorial operation (I: operasi territorial) which aimed at gaining the hearts 
and minds of the Acehnese, especially in areas with a strong GAM presence 
(Sukma, 2004, p.11), through rural development and infrastructure programs. 
The overall operation package, however, developed into one of the blackest 
sagas in the history of the Indonesian Military's counter insurgency actions 
due to its viciousness, particularly its ' shock therapy' strategy, i.e. a terror 
campaign designed to create fear and deter people from supporting GAM 
(Schulze, 2004; Sukma, 200, p.1 O; the Human Right Watch, 2001 ). As Sukma 
notes (2004, p. l 0): " ... what was initially claimed to be a normal 
counterinsurgency operation turned to be a brutal violation of human rights by 
Indonesia' s miliary apparatus." The operation were noted as " ... the heaviest 
counterinsurgency campaigns seen since the 1960s. "69 
Given the size and length of the operation, it was hardly surprising that 
it effectively weakened GAM, with many commanders being captured or 
killed. In its first three years of implementation, more than one thousand 
civilians were also killed (The Human Rights Watch, 2001). From 1990 to 
1992 alone, the estimated death toll ranged from 2,000 to 10,000, mainly 
caused by the Indonesian military, particularly the Military (Amnesty 
International, 1993; ICG, 2001). In 1991 to 1998, many believed that GAM 
no longer existed and normalcy seemed to be ' restored'. The MO lasted until 
68 Galas i (from the names of the three districts of Gayo, Alas and Singkil, in Aceh) was the 
first Military formed militia. Many believed that members ofGalasi were mostly criminals 
and gangsters (I: preman) from Medan in North Sumatra. The usage of militia, however, is 
not restricted to the military. Some political parties and religious organisations in Indonesia 
were noted as using militia or some sort of organisation close to militia, to protect their 
political interests, such as the Nation Guard (I: Garda Bangsa) of PKB, Versatile Guard 
(Banser) of NU, and Sympathetic Line (Barisan Simpatik) of the National Message Paity 
(Darwin, 2003, p.112) 
69 The Human Right Watch, 2001 . For the 1960s incidents see Cribb ( 1990) 
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August 7, 1998 (Sukma, 2004, p.12). Unfortunately, the fundamental 
grievances of the people remained unaddressed. 
1.3.4 The Third Period (1999 to 2004) 
In the third phase, 1999 70 to 2004, GAM resumed its activities as a 
much larger and better-funded organisation which was able to mobilise more 
international attention on Aceh, particularly during 1999 to 2003. Their 
activities were then curtailed by the Indonesian military with the adoption of 
martial law in the region in 2003 to 2004. The contexts of a national transition 
to democracy and civil society provided GAM with favourable conditions to 
gain its objectives. Five interrelated factors are generally cited as the major 
reasons for the rise of GAM in this period: the Indonesian MOs (especially the 
1989-91 killings), the economic crisis, political transfom1ation, the success of 
the East Timor referendum, and weakened government credibility (Ross, 
2003, p.18; Sukma, 2004; Schulze, 2004). 
The counter insurgency military operations (especially the 1989-91 
killings), against the second phase of the emergence of GAM fostered deep 
trauma among civilians against the Indonesian military. GAM effectively 
utilised this situation and propagated a vision of the importance of Aceh 
having self-government to ensure the wellbeing of the people. These two 
factors resulted in wide-spread civilian suppo1t for GAM in early 2000. 
Illustrating this argument, a local argued that a complete clamping down on 
GAM would not be possible, for it was 'under everybody's tongues', meaning 
that GAM had been integrated into Acehnese society not only physically but 
70 Some, such as Sukma (2004), the Human Rights Watch (2001 ), and Robinson (2001) 
maintained that 1998 was the starting point ofGAM's re-emergence when over a hundred 
Libyan-trained GAM fighters returned to Aceh. This is based on a series of violent attacks in 
late 1998, such as the Lhok Nibong incident in which a crowd stopped a mi litary bus full of 
soldiers about to go back to their place of orig ins (mainly Java) for annual leave and beat to 
death seven sold iers (Saad, 1999, p.27). However, given that the violence reached its peak in 
early 1999 with the commencement of The Authority Operation (I: Operasi Wibawa) that 
" ... ostensibly aimed at capturing those responsible for the ki llings, and restoring government 
authority, resulted in scores of arrests and the killing of at least eleven people in the vicini ty 
of Lhokseumawe ... " (Robinson, 200 I, p.2 16). I have chosen 1999 as the starting date. 
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also philosophically. The killing of GAM members would therefore mean the 
killing of the civilians. 71 
The economic crisis in Indonesia, which was an after-effect of the 
1997 financial crisis in Southeast Asian countries, also helped GAM to gain 
public support. Indonesia's economy suffered severely, especially from mid-
1998 onwards. This can be seen from a number of indicators, including the 
followings. As of December 1998, Indonesia's total foreign debt amounted to 
150 billion US$, placing Indonesia number five after China, Mexico, Russia, 
and Brazil. 72 The weakened currency saw Indonesia' s exchange rate sharply 
decline from US$1 to Rp2,000 in 1997 to Rp 16,000 in June 1998. In 
addition, an increased proportion oflndonesians were living below poverty 
line, from 11 percent in 1996 to 24.2 percent in December 1998, which 
equates to an estimated 50 million people (Baswir, 2003, pp.61-82; Ananta, 
2003, p.1 O; Basri, 2003, p.54). The negative effects of this crisis were nation-
wide. In Aceh this translated into a deterioration in food security, education, 
and health, which were all relatively unfavourable compared to other 
provinces in Indonesia. 73 
For food security, education, and health, Aceh was ranked the 1 i\ 
l 8t\ and 15111 rank respectively among 25 provinces studied (not including 
West Papua and East Timar) (Ananta, 2003, p.249).74 The relatively 
unfavourable ranking of Aceh, however, illustrates not only the consequence 
of the crisis but also the impact of the conflict on Acehnese households. 
The national economic crisis was accompanied by widespread social 
unrest and political turmoil in 1998. 75 The social unrest encompassed three 
71 Interv iew on Apri l 2003 
72 China, Mexico, Russia, and Brazi l had total debts amounting to 254, 159, 183, and 232 
bi ll ion US$ respectively. The crisis was in its worst stage in 1998 (Ananta, 2003 , p.17). 
73 The situation was actually worsened with the implementation of JM F's package for 
economic recovery in which a neo liberal economy was the core theoretical framework, 
characterised by the three important concepts of free trade, free market (which is mainly about 
cutting subsidies), and privatisation of state owned companies. Evidence from many 
developing countries show that the first two concepts, especially the free market, led to 
impoverishment. 
74 Ananta (2003) studied the impact of the economic crisis on regional food security, using the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of Indonesia from 1998-2000. The CPI measures the price 
changes of goods and services for household consumption in order to build a picture of 
households' consumer behaviour. The prices examined do not include dwelling, life 
insurance, social security contribution, and direct taxes. 
75 Darwin (2003 , p. l 06) argued that the late 1990s were years of violence for Indonesia. 
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types of conflict: inter-religious conflict (Central Sulawesi, North Maluku and 
Maluku), inter-ethnic conflict (Central and West Kalimantan), and state-civil 
society conflict (Papua, East Timor, and Aceh). The crisis was at its worst in 
1998 (Ananta, 2003, p.17). The political turmoil of 1998 resulted in a country-
wide people's power demonstration for democratic elections and an end to the 
New Order76 under Suharto. The crisis signalled the end of an authoritarian 
government, military domination, and prevalent corruption (ICG, 1999, pp.1-
2). Indonesia was further politically transformed into a more democratic state 
on 7 June 1999, when the first democratic general election after almost 44 
years of democratic silence took place. The political transformation, however, 
was a two-sided coin, with two contradictory effects. On the one hand, it led 
to a new freedom of expression being enjoyed by civil society, including Aceh 
and the former East Timor province. On the other hand, it resulted in ' political 
euphoria', which left the country anxious and indecisive about its future, frail, 
fragmented, and chaotic.77 
In this context, some rapid political decisions regarding the two 
troubled areas of Aceh and East Timor were issued. Both provinces were 
experiencing vertical conflicts between Indonesia's Armed Forces and 
Freedom Fighters. Two important decisions on both provinces were made by 
President Habibie, Suharto's successor. On 8 August 1998, Habibie officially 
acknowledged that the MO had never been lifted from Aceh and vowed to 
withdraw the military forces. This promise was fulfilled with the withdrawal 
of 'the non-organic' troops (I: pasukan non organis) from the region (The 
76 Indonesia's political situation can be grouped into three orders or era: (I) the O ld Order (I: 
Orde lama- Orla) under the first president of Sukarno ( 1945- 1965); (2) the New Order (I: 
Or de Baru-Orba) under the second president of Suharto, who was repeatedly re-elected for 
the next 25 years ( 1966-1999); and the Reformation Order (I: Orde Ref or111as1) (2000 -
present), the post-Suharto era, mainly characterised by a major shift from an authoritarian to 
a more democratic government. 
77 Another factor, but not the most important one, was a change in the dual socio-political role 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces (l:Dwi Fungsi ABR() under which the Indonesian Armed 
Forces enjoyed a bloc of seats in the Parliament and key administrative posts such as 
Governor and Head of Districts. Due to the strong demand of the civil society for the military 
to go back to barracks (l:kembali ke barak), this dual role came to an end. This, however, has 
left a blank spot on what unites the country. The military, given its origin from the Indonesia 
guerrilla freedom fighters in the Dutch coJonial era, possesses a historical legitimation as the 
guardians for the uniting of Indonesia. In its absence, the big question of what is ' Indonesia' 
that led to a further deeper question 'Quo Vadis Indonesia,?' unavoidably emerged. In my 
opinion, this has also, to a certain extent, contributed to the frail , fragmented , chaotic, and 
indecisive situation in Indonesia. 
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Human Rights Watch 2001). This followed a public apology and declaration 
of guilt by the Armed Forces' Commander, General Wiranto, on 7 August 
1998 for the implementation of the military policy in Aceh (Sukma, 2004, 
p.12). Closely following these actions, on January 27, J 999, Habibie officially 
promulgated East Tim or's right to self-determination. The Acehnese student 
activists instantly took up the issue with an all-Aceh student congress in early 
February 1999. The congress called for a referendum for the peaceful 
resolution to the conflict in Aceh and established an information centre for the 
Aceh referendum (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh -SIRA). 78 
Meanwhile, by January 1999 79 the security situation in Aceh had 
deteriorated with intensified armed clashes. The Indonesian military argued 
the necessity of a harsh military approach, pointing to the increased violence 
conducted by GAM. In their efforts to accrue funds, for example, GAM was 
taking a harsh stance toward civilians. As noted by Ross (2003, p.25), in its 
third period of emergence, GAM mobilised funds from several sources such 
as" .. . voluntary donations, taxes, extortion, kidnapping, and sale of timber 
and cannabis". Involuntary donations were acquired through violence and 
threats to individuals and businesses or companies. From J 999 to March 2001 , 
Exxon Mobil experienced increased attacks. There were fifty hijackings of 
Mobil Oil vans and pickups, two incidents of ground-fire at Company 
airplanes, repeated attacks on Company facilities with both gunfire and 
grenades, an ambush of Company buses used to take employers to work, four 
officers killed while off duty, and some threats to employers. Most of these 
attacks aimed to extort funds from Exxon Mobil. These actions led Mobil Oil 
78 As SIRA was more about a referendum than the independence of Aceh, it arguably had no 
link with GAM and practically opposed GAM's philosophy of offering no options but the 
independence of Aceh (The Human Rights Watch, 2001 , p. 19). Most of SIRA ' s members, 
however, were noted as pro-independence. The civil society based campaign of SI RA was in 
GAM 's interests, and without GAM's support the mass ive attendance at SIRA 's rallies would 
not have been possible (The Human Rights Watch, 200 I, p.19). Examples of these ra ll ies are 
the rally call ing for a referendum and for UN intervention on 16 August 2000, symbolised by 
the raising of the UN fl ag on the follow ing day, which happened to be the independence of 
day of Indonesia. 
79 This actually started in late 1998, only a few months after the withdrawal of the ' non-
organic' troops. A mass-riot attacked a local police office in Bayu, North Aceh, on 20 
December 1998 after hearing rumours on sexual harassment of a local woman by a police 
sergeant (Robinson, 2001 , p.2 17). Following this, was a riot in Lhok N ibong resu lted in the 
death of seven soldiers dragged from a pass ing bus (See also footnote 70) 
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to pay a 'double tax' to both the Government and GAM.80 The latter was able 
to collect 1.1 billion rupiah, or US 130,000 tluough the GAM' s taxation (Ac.: 
pajak nanggroe) 81 (Ross, 2003, p.25). 
Responding to this deterioration, Habibie's successor, Abdurahman 
Wahid,82 a key Islamic leader, issued Presidential Instruction (I: Instruksi 
Presiden - Inpres) no 4/2001 aimed at a comprehensive resolution, combining 
security and negotiation. Following this presidential instruction, the Operation 
for Security Restoration and Law Enforcement (I: Operasi Pemulihan 
Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum - OPKPH) commenced. Although it said to 
be part of the comprehensive solution, the operation exemplified a military 
approach rather than a negotiated approach for two reasons. Firstly, members 
of the operation comprised four coercive elements, namely the police 
(consisting of the regular and paramilitary police); the Indonesian military 
te1Titorial forces based in Aceh under Korem Teuku Umar of Banda Aceh, and 
Korem Lilawangsa ofLhok Seurnawe, North Aceh; the Navy; and the Air 
Force. Second, the Inpres that was aimed at, providing a legal basis for the 
police to take over the responsibility of the security in Aceh, failed to do so. 
Legally, operational conunand was given under the national mobile police 
brigade (I: Brigade Mobil- Brimob). In practice, however, the power Jay with 
the Indonesian military, particularly the Army, e.g. Korem Liliwangsa simply 
because the police were not ready; they lacked capacity, ski lls, and 
equipment. 83 
80 Moreover, the Company also had to accommodate GAM's demand for the employment of 
their personnel, which became an economic inefficiency for the Company due to the lack of 
skills and education of these employees. 
81 GAM local taxation applied to all personal income, business income, schools in the 
r:rovince. 
2 According to the National General E lection, the PDl-P party of Megawati Sukarnoputri was 
the w inner. However, Am ien Rais with his 'Central Axis ' ( I: Poros Tengah) was able to stop 
her from becoming president. With so many manoeuvres in the Parl iaments, Abdurrahman 
Wahid (commonly known as Gus Dur) was finally elected as the Fourth President of 
Indones ia. 
83 Sukma (2004, p. I 7) maintained that whi le the Mi litary - that is the Rajawali Force - was 
able to identify combatants and non combatants and took special care in this, Brimob 
persistently marred this hard work with its lack of professionalism: " ... the excessive use of 
force, summary executions, regular intimidation and torture of civilians accused of having 
lin ks with GAM, extortion, and the burning of schools and houses". 
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The heavy dependence of the Police on the Indonesian military was 
further accentuated by the next president, Megawati Sukarnoputri,84 who 
approved the establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda in Aceh province in 
February 2002. Many argued that the establishment of a Kodam in Aceh 
would not really help the government address the basic issues, but would only 
sustain the presence of the Indonesian military. The government maintained 
that such a presence was needed since GAM had intensified its operations. 
The establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda, however, may also have added 
to the grievances of some of the Acehnese on the merging of their Kodam 
with the North Sumatra Kodam and the abolition of the white elephant 
division (I: Divisi Gajah Putih), which was a great source of Achehnese pride, 
under Suharto. These two contributed to the feeling of being treated unfairly, 
like a step child (I: dianaktirikan), and being betrayed by Jaka1ia. 
Responding to the people's demands, not only from Aceh province 
but also other provinces that were concerned about the situation of Aceh, post-
Suharto governments have taken several steps. These are: sending a 
parliamentary fact-finding team to assess human rights violations in 1999~ 
apologising in 1998 for the human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian 
military; withdrawing combat forces and ending the MO in 1998;85 pledging 
special aid to the regional economy and widows and orphans in areas of MO 
in 1999; adopting Law no 22 on regional autonomy and Law no 25 on central-
regional fiscal balance in 1999, which provided a legal framework for more 
84 Megawati was the daughter of the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, and the leader of 
PDI-P (I: Partai Demokrasi lndonesia-Perjuangan) - The Struggle Democratic Political Party, 
which had a nationwide support society. At the time, many people referred to this party as the 
people's party ( I: partainya rakyat). Many argued that Megawati profited from her father ' s 
popularity as one of the national heroes who ensured the foundation of the unity of Indonesia. 
Following his lead, Megawati was a strong nationalist and would contemplate an idea but the 
unity of Indonesia. When she stepped into power, many argue that she would a lly more with 
the Indonesian military, which was well proven with the establishment of Kodam Iskandar 
Muda in Aceh. This created more grievances among the Acehnese given one of her political 
promises was to let no more blood be spilled in Aceh. 
85 The withdrawal, however, was marked by violence in Lhokseumawe resulting in the setting 
on tire of shops, a cottage, and the regional parliament building (Sukma, 2004, p.12). This 
was followed by massive killings of Indonesian military spies and informers (Ac.: cuak). No 
parties claimed responsible to this incident. Both Indonesian military and GAM blamed each 
other. Such accusations and denials rrom and were common in the conflicts of Aceh. Both 
parties actually made use of individuals in civil ian clothes to run amok and carry out atrocities 
in order to avoid responsibility and put the blame on the other side (The Human Rights 
Watch, 200 I, p.5). 
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autonomy at district level and a more equitable extraction of income from 
natural resources between the central and district governments; and enacting 
Law no 18/2001 on special autonomy for Aceh province to govern and have 
control over its own cultural, religious, and educational affairs, in 2001. 86 
Unfortunately, little can be said about the success of these efforts. 
Apart from the consequences of 'partial democratic rule', a factor that may 
shed light on these poor results was the government's lack of credibility87 that 
resulted in Acehnese lack of trust of the government and widespread support 
for GAM that prolonged the conflict (Sukma, 2004; Robinson, 2001 ). 
Compounding the situation was the government's lack of a comprehensive 
political solution for Aceh, whlch necessitated the use of military force as 
exemplified in Wahld's Presidential Instruction (I: Instruksi Presiden - Inpres) 
no 4/2001 that was further strengthened with the establishn1ent of Kodam 
lskandar Muda by Megawati Sukarnoputri, Wahid's successor. 
It is important to note that the third period of GAM was also 
characterised by the heightening of disputes among GAM leaders in Sweden, 
especially the leadership rivalry between Hasan di Tiro and Dr. Husaini 
Hasan. The establishment of the Government Council of GAM (I: Maj el is 
Pemerintahan, well-known by its abbreviation: MP-GAM) by Husaini Hasan 
clearly illustrates these internal frictions. Attacking Husaini Hasan's faction, 
Di Tiro's introduced the notion of the 'real' as opposed to the 'non real ' 
GAM. Thls dichotomy was used by the Indonesian government to undermine 
the 'real' GAM (ICG, 2002, p.8) by dealing with MP-GAM rather than Hasan 
di Tiro in negotiations. In this way, the government was able to maintain, and 
even sharpen, the internal conflict withln GAM. 
The nature of the violent political conflict in the thlrd period of 
GAM's resurrection differs significantly from previous periods. Firstly, there 
86 This law was issued by Megawati's government on 9 August 2001, but was drafted under 
Abdurahman Wahid. 
87Citing Crouch, Ross (2003, p.22) noted that the central government's credibil ity was close 
to zero given the history of broken promises since the 1950s. Adding to this was the extensive 
counter insurgency carried out by the Mi litary during the 1990s, in which violence and hum an 
r ights abuses were quite prominent. Including the killings of some '40 peacefu l 
demonstrators ' near Lhokseumawe in North Aceh, and the military attack on an Islamic 
Boarding School in Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh, that caused 57 to 70 casualties (Ross, 2003, 
p.22; ICG, 1999, p.5). 
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was a decreased involvement of civilians in the Indonesian military's security 
operations. With a better understanding of human rights and the international 
laws of war, and lessons drawn from previous military operations, the 
Indonesian military was relatively more careful about the extensive use of 
civilians. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there was a total absence of 
this practice, as noted below by Suk.ma (2004, p.17): 
... This, however, does not mean that such practices were entirely absent. 
During Operation Cinta Meunasah, for example, military sources 
acknowledged that militias had been formed in Central Aceh to fight GAM 
forces in the area ... These militias were reportedly made up of Javanese 
migrants in the area who had become frequent targets of attack by 
unidentified groups .. . (Sukma, 2004, p.17) 
Second was the increased willingness of both the Indonesian military 
and GAM to put more effort into a diplomatic, dialogic, and non-violent 
approach. Facilitated by the Swiss-based NGO, Henry Dunant Centre, both 
parties had several meetings for peace building and conflict resolution. They 
finally agreed to sign the Cessation on Hostility Agreement (CoHA) on 6 
December 2002, which created so much hope for the Acehnese. 
Unfortunately, the situation deteriorated in early 2003, and the CoHA 
was finally ended with the implementation of martial law on 19 May 2003, 
which lasted for around 1 year. During this period, GAM was practically 
neutralised by the Indonesian military, with most of their peace negotiators 
and some of their fighters imprisoned or being killed. On 15 August 2004, a 
peace agreement between the government of Indonesia and GAM was signed, 
following the Tsunami that occurred on 26 December 2004. 
2 On Bitter Ground: The Acehnese in the Midst of Conflict 
In this section, I attempt to describe the effects of the violent political 
conflict between GAM and the government on the people of Aceh at both 
macro and micro levels. I elaborate the consequences of the most recent 
conflicts of GAM and the government by considering the history of violent 
political conflict in Aceh in the previous era. 
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2.1 The Neglect of Human Rights: From Threat to Economic 
Resources Extortions. 
In early 2000, both the military and the GAM forces were accused of 
human rights abuses, including arrests, 'disappearances', tortures, murders, 
and rapes (Human Rights Watch, 2001), with the military accused of more 
sins than GAM forces. As a consequence, it is understandable that the people 
were gradually becoming less sympathetic to both government oflndonesia's 
armed forces and GAM fighters. 88 
There were five types of violations conducted by Indonesian Armed 
Forces: extrajudicial executions; torture; disappearances; collective 
punishment; and restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association (Human Rights Watch, 2001, pp.14-19). The extrajudicial 
executions mostly took place during the MO in which Indonesian military 
conducted their 'sweeping' (I: penyisiran), which essentially involved the 
search for GAM fighters and partisans. The excuse often used by the 
Indonesian military for the incidents was armed clashes (I: kontak senjata), 
and unavoidable shootings due to GAM fighters and partisans attempting to 
escape. Civilians were often inadvertently caught in the cross fire. Torture was 
frequently reported during interrogations. One civilian's house in Glumpang 
Minyiek vi llage in Pidie District was used for such interrogations. The house 
was well-known as the brick house (Ac.: rumoh geud6ng), and became a 
'monument of terror' for the people. People told me that anyone taken to the 
brick house would either die or become insane. Stories of t01ture techniques 
such as pulling out finger nails were passed from mouth to mouth and became 
a nightmare for the people from the entire province. Disappearances were 
considered part of ' normal daily life' for the people of Aceh in the 1990s. 
Collective punishment was not uncommon, especially for villagers from the 
88 As explained in Chapter 2, I use the term GAM fighter purposively, following the argument 
of my key informant on the importance of differentiating the 'on the ground' ( I: orang 
bawah) and the 'on top ' (I: orang atas) GAM supporters since there were often some missing 
links of command between the two. What was conducted on the ground did not always 
represent what had been decided from the top. 
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' black areas' where GAM was identified as having a strong presence.89 The 
burning of Gampong Jawa in Idies Rayeuk Sub-District in 200 l , and the 
burning of more than 11 5 shops, kiosks and homes in Samalanga were 
examples of this collective punishment90 (The Human Rights Watch, 2001 , 
p.18). Such punishment had a dramatic negative impact on the people' s lives 
and their livelihoods.91 
The Indonesian military not only targeted suspected GAM members, 
but also medical, personal, journalists, and local NGOs delivering services 
and assistance for human rights protection and other support, such as socio-
economic supports, to survivors of human rights abuses (Sukma, 2004, p.14; 
Human Rights Watch, 2001).92 Explainjng the situation, a local NGO activist 
referred to the early 2000s as the period of lying prone (I: masa-masa tiarap). 
The word liarap93 refers to the action oflying flat on one 's stomach with face 
down to avoid being noticed or to avoid danger. 'Masa-masa tiarap ' therefore 
implied on a period during which activities were conducted in a very low key 
manner or not at all in order to avoid danger, i.e. to avoid being noticed by the 
Indonesian military. 
It was apparent, however, that the ' lying prone' period also applied to 
local civilians, especially villagers in the hot spots classified as black areas (I: 
daerah hilam). These people often suffered from military blockades, armed 
clashes, and tight security checks that limited their daily activities. The 
89 Reports on the human rights violation by the Indonesia Military during the military 
operation period can be found in several lCG and the Human Rights Watch reports. 
90 Responding to this, GAM usually set on tire government buildings such as offices and 
schools. This not on ly symbolised their reaction to the Military's mass punishment but also 
their political stand against the government of Indonesia. 
91See section 2.2.2. and Chapter 5 for details 
92 Restrictions on rreedom of expression, assembly, and association were also evident and 
mainly aimed at political activists based in Aceh and Jakarta. The accusation of ' spreading 
hatred ' , which during the Suharto era was a favourite used by the Police and Mi litary to 
capture activists for political activities. Referring to these incidents, some argued that the MO 
has never really been lifted. 
93 Tiarap (I) in Stevens and Schmidgall-Tellings (2004, p. I 028) is translated as a ( I) ly ing 
prone, (2) to lie low, try to avoid being noticed. The word has a similar meaning to telungkup 
( I) which in Stevens and Schmidgall-Telling (2004, p. I 012) is translated as ' lying facedown' 
or tengkurap which is translated as ' lying prostrate, on one' s stomach'; to fa ll flat on the 
ground. The three words describe an action oflying prone on one's stomach with facedown. 
However, embedded in tiarap is the notion of avoid ing notice or avoiding danger and, 
therefore, it is conducted purposely. In contrast, 'lelungkup and tengkurap ', the action can be 
done either purposely or accidentally, for example 'jatuh tertelungkup ' or '.iatuh tengkurap ' 
which can be translated as ' to fall flat on one's stomach on the ground with facedown' . 
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people 's mobility was often restricted by the Indonesian military to whom 
people had to report anytime they left the village, even if just to practice their 
livelihood. They could not carry out their farming activities, especially if their 
fields were located close to the mountains where armed clashes usually took 
place. They also could not go to the forest to collect wood and rattan, one of 
their main sources of cash income. They often had to survive using whatever 
was left, because the mobile traders (Ac. : mugee),94 from whom villagers 
bought basic necessities (vegetable oil, salt, and sugar), often did not come to 
their vi llages because of the conflict. Thus the villagers experienced both a 
decrease of income and difficulties in meeting their households' daily needs. 
The GAM forces faced accusations of three types of human rights 
violations: the execution of alleged informers and relatives of Indonesian 
police and military personnel, expulsion of Javanese, and restrictions of 
freedom of expression. Two more was revealed in my fieldwork, which 
showed that, just like Indonesian military, GAM also engaged in unlawful 
detention. In addition, GAM was also accused of imposing war taxation to the 
people, who paid either voluntarily or by force. 
The executions were mainly aimed at 'si pai ' (Ac.), the local 
pejorative term for Indonesia armed soldiers, and 'cuak ' (Ac.), the Indonesian 
military's spies and informers. Locals called this execution as 'koh tako' or 
'kena tak ' (slaughter) which is a traditional Acehnese way of cutting 
somebody's throat. The forced displacement of the Javanese settlers,95 some 
of whom were, in fact, not Javanese, was part of GAM's 'anti Javanese 
94 The mobi le traders usually arrived on motorcycles with two big baskets behind, and came 
to the village to the agricultural product and/or sell goods needed by vi llagers. 
95 The Javanese settlers can be traced back as far as Dutch colonial time when many were 
transferred to Sumatra Island to work in the plantations. During the Suharto era, more 
Javanese were transmigrated to Aceh (and many other provinces in Indonesia), and can be 
classified as either spontaneous (voluntary) or non-spontaneous (involuntary) transmigrants. 
The involuntary transmigrants were those from the target areas of the transmigration program. 
The camps for the Javanese IDPs located in the neighbouring provinces, such as North 
Sumatra. Some of these !DPs settled in the national park after paying around 300,000 Rp 
(US$ 33, with I US$= Rp9000) per family to an anonymous party that helped them to escape. 
Responding to my question on whether they would like to go back to Aceh province, most of 
them said ' no'. A few, however, indicated they might return if the government provided a 
security guarantee. As happened to their Acehnese fellows, these Javanese were also 
traumatised by the conflict. This is well illustrated by their reluctance to talk about their 
escape. A woman even politely asked me not to ask such a question as it was too bitter to talk 
about and better to simply forget it. 
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colonisers' campaign and the effort to establish a separate ethno-national 
identity for Aceh.96 The forced displacement, however, also applied to 
Acehnese villagers in order to attract international attention (Peace Brigades 
International, 2001).97 
Restrictions of freedom of expression were mainly aimed at 
prohibiting local people from engaging in the Indonesian Government's 
programmes through persuasion and abduction. This happened particularly 
around the year 2000, when GAM fighters violently forced the people not to 
support any of these programmes and policies, including family planning and 
immunisation. A midwife from North Aceh complained of facing threats for 
performing immunisation and family planning services. A local health officer 
testified to the kidnapping of midwives, using the term of 'taken to the 
mountain' (I: dibawa ke gunung), usually for about one week, as punishment 
for delivering such services, and their families had to pay money to release 
them. No physical abuse was reported, as long as instructions from the 
kidnappers were followed. 
Interestingly, women, especially in the predominantly GAM rural 
areas, persistently sought fami ly planning injections and immunization for 
their babies. This was done secretly without their husbands' consent. Whilst 
men tended to prevent women from using contraceptives, women simply 
ignored their wishes. According to these women, getting pregnant in conflict 
situation was something to be avoided, unless they did not yet have any 
children. 
GAM also gradually took over government functions at the district and 
subdistrict levels, such as reorganising the village administrative apparatus 
and replacing it with a traditional administrative system, by either persuasion 
or abduction. Based on this alternative administrative system, GAM claimed 
to be a legal government entity in the region and therefore entitled to collect 
taxes from civilians. Based on this, GAM imposed their State Tax (I: Pajak 
Nanggroe) on the people, which basically was a 'war tax' (Human Rights 
Watch, 2001, p.10). The tax was not only a means of collecting money but 
96 See Chapter 3 for detai Is on the issue of identity. 
97 http://www.peacebrigades.org/eto/etobakhist. html#aceh, accessed on 5 July 200 I. 
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also an important symbol of GAM's authority. The tax was compulsory and 
used to denote one's political affiliation. Refusing to pay it would be 
perceived as a political stand against GAM, which would lead to serious 
repercussion, for example threats, kidnapping, paying more tax, or even death. 
A local woman from a conflict zone whose husband ran a shop complained of 
the pajak nanggroe as not only an extra economic burden but also a 
psychological one due to the threats that they received whenever they could 
not pay the mandatory amount for their household. 
Unlawful detention was often carried out through kidnappings, as 
involved those who did not follow GAM's policies (such as declining to pay 
the pajak nanggroe or participating in government programmes), those who 
were considered cuak (Ac.), Indonesian military's spies and informers, and si 
pai (Ac.), Indonesian soldiers, or simply against those whose families could 
afford to pay money for their release. 
Kidnappings, however, could happen randomly to anyone at anytime 
for any reason, sometimes even for no particular reason. A local informant 
used the term 'nasib-nasiban' (I) or one's faith or luck, to indicate the random 
nature of kidnapping. This was especially true when the kidnapping was not 
merely to obtain funds but also for media or propaganda. Several people who 
were kidnapped for different reasons admitted to me that they have been 
subject to briefings (I: diberi pengarahan)98 during their kidnappings, which 
varied from several hours to a week or so. In the briefings they were lectured 
on the importance of having independence, called on to support GAM, and 
advised to perceive tax or donations as noble acts for supporting a righteous 
vision. 
GAM also conducted some security checks and 'sweeping' , by 
stopping cars along the main roads that connected Aceh and North Sumatra 
province and asking passengers to show their identity documentation. Their 
main targets were government officials and the Javanese. Ethnic background 
98 This is a prominent term used during the Suharto era to refer to special speeches given by 
the Authorities, usually during special ceremonies, that aimed at raising commun ity's 
awareness. These briefings were basically used as part of government propaganda. The term 
also denotes a negative aspect of community's improper behaviour that needs to be 
straightened up through a special counsel. 
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was usually determined through names, regardless of the fact that many 
Acehnese had taken Javanese names in the belief that this would help advance 
their careers in government. However, GAM usually did not injure passengers 
that were found to be Acehnese Government officers, but they would be fined 
approximately Rp 50,000 - Rp. 100,000. I know little, however, of the fate of 
the Javanese captured in GAM security checks. 
Apart from the two conflicting parties of GAM and government of 
Indonesia, there was also a 'shadow' group that took advantage of the conflict 
for their own benefit. Robinson (2001, p.221 & p.224) referred this as the 
' semi-official mafia' or ' military-linked mafia' that possessed close ties with 
the military, particularly the Indonesia Army Special Forces (Kopassus). 
Some members of this special unit enriched themselves through " ... serving as 
enforcers, debt-collectors, security guards, and ext01iionists . . . " (Robinson, 
2001 , p.221). There were also some indications that these ' mafia' were 
involved in illegal logging in the province. The illegal logging was often done 
by locals who were in debt and had to pay their debt trough working for this 
'mafia' . A woman that I met in Aceh Besar told me she worked as a labourer 
for a businessperson from Medan who ran an illegal logging business with the 
backing up of someone in the local military unit. According to her, it was 
common for villagers to engage in illegal logging in order to repay their debts. 
2.2 The out of sight: What has been overlooked in the 
Existing Conflict Analysis and Interventions 
There has been ample analyses of the violent political conflict between 
GAM and the government oflndonesia. However, most of this analysis 
focuses on the political nature of the conflict and the human rights violations 
perpetrated by both conflicting parties. Consequently, these analyses tend to 
disregard the socio-psychological and socio-economic impacts of the conflicts 
upon society. In this section, I attempt to incorporate these two latter aspects 
into the analysis of the conflict provided in this chapter. 
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2.2.1 The 'extended-regenerated collective trauma' 
The violence, especially the Indonesian military's shock therapy of the 
1990s, affected not only GAM members and partisans but also the general 
society. This was especially true for women, who often had to face the 
Indonesian military on their 'sweeping' operations in villages, as husbands 
and other male family members ran and hid. Women, especially those whose 
husbands and/or sons were suspected of being GAM members, 'had to face 
Indonesian military' s punishment, ranging from an obligation to repori 
regularly to the local military authority (I: wajib lapor) to more severe 
punishment. The casualties of the military operation (MO) policy therefore 
included not only GAM members but also civilians, especially women and 
children. The Care Human Rights Forum, for example, reported that there 
were approximately 16,375 orphans, some of whom had witnesses of torture 
and killing of their parents. Consequently, this caused deep trauma within 
society, which did not stop with the end of the MO and the collapse of GAM, 
but was in fact regenerated. 
The regenerated trauma was manifested by through telling stories, 
cultivating certain attitudes and behaviour, as well as labelling and 
stigmatising Indonesian soldiers and their allies. Stories of the horrible 
military operations were passed on so that children who had not witnessed the 
violence internalised the traurna.99 Certain attitudes, behaviours, and 
stigmatization, as further explained later in this section, were also cultivated 
through day-to-day direct and indirect social learning. This is in line with 
findings of the study by Dickson-Gomes (2002) on the 'transgenerational 
transmission' 100 of the trauma in Salvadorian fami lies in the post war period 101 
in which stories of infirmity as well as responses to and explanations of, day 
99 See the work of Siapno (2002) who documented these stories and analysed their paradox of 
power, co-optation, and resistance. See also Em i et al. (2000) that documented the true stories 
of women victims of the MO in 1998 in a short stories version. 
100 This is also in line with the arguments ofSiapno (2002, p.25) on the capability of the 
independence movement in Aceh to regenerate itself. Embedded here is the presumption that 
violence can regenerate through the social-learning process of the generations in Aceh due to 
their longstanding history of violence. 
10 1 The El Salvador's civil war erupted in the period of 1980 to 1992 (Dickson-Gomes, 2002, 
p.415). 
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to day events transmit trauma to their children who did not have any direct 
experience of the trauma (Dickson-Gomes, 2002, pp.415-416). 
The regenerated trauma has consequently led to a ' collective trauma' , 
i.e. trauma experienced by a society due to repeated shocks and te1Tors 
occurring over a relatively long period of time. Hence, the collectiveness 
implies not only on the repetitiveness of shocks and terrors but also those who 
suffered from them. This supports the arguments of Suarez-Orozco and 
Robben (2000, p.l) and Dickson-Gomes (2002, p.415) that collective trauma 
encompasses not only the physiology and psychology of individuals but also 
the socio-cultural order since the target of collective violence is more than the 
body and psyche of the people. It also targets the 'social bonds and cultural 
practices' (Suarez-Orozco and Robben, 2000, p.11) and is orchestrated in the 
rhythms of daily life (Margold, 1999, p.64). In Aceh province, for example, 
fears and suspicions were cultivated due to the longstanding harsh violent 
political conflict, and resulted in shattered social bonds of the society where 
trust cannot be easily found. This has resulted in the fear of people, even when 
simply engaged in their daily livelihood, as will be further described in 
chapter 6. 
The collective trauma not only regenerated but also ' extended' from 
the Indonesian military and its allies to ethnic Javanese. This was due to at 
least two main reasons. Firstly, the nature of the MO with its ' fence oflegs' 
operation (I : Operasi Pagar Betis), support resources operation (I: Tenaga 
Pembantu Operasi - TPO), and heavy use of civilians, especially from the 
Javanese settlers, in militias. Secondly, the central government was locally 
perceived as embodied within the Javanese ethnic group. 102 
I use the term 'extended-regenerated collective trauma' , to mean a 
collective trauma that is not only regenerated but also extended from one 
particular organisation or party (the Indonesian military) to a particular ethnic 
102 There was a general perception that the 'bureaucrats were Javanese and vice versa'. There 
was also a general belief that having Javanese sounding names would make easier to get a 
better education in Java and boost their career as government bureaucrats. I observed that the 
use of Javanese names were a common phenomena not only among the Acehnese but also 
other ethnic groups in Indonesia, such as Sumbanese. I have friends from both areas who 
argued that their parents gave a 'Javanese sounding name' such as Sri, Dewi, and Dharma, to 
make it easier them to get a better education in Java and have a career with the Government. 
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group (the Javanese). This process could be seen in the use oflanguage. 
Children, for example, learned consciously to refuse to use the national 
language (Bahasa Indonesia) and chose to use the local dialect instead 
(Bahasa Aceh), manifesting their identity and political attitude towards the 
government. One Saturday afternoon in 2004 at a coastal area in Great Aceh 
(I: Aceh Besar, Ac.: Aceh Rayeuek) I met some children who shouted and 
threw small stones at me to drive me away when I was talking and 
videotaping some women who were collecting oysters from a river near the 
sea. While throwing stones at me, they repeatedly said "Go away! Go away! 
Why are you taking our pictures?" (Ac.: "Jak wo! Jak wo! Pakeun cok-cok 
gambar kamo!?!"), with hatred. This happened after they learned that I was 
not an Acehnese but a Javanese, the most hated ethnic group in the region. 
The adoption of the 'extended-regenerated collective trauma' could be 
observed also from the labelling of both Indonesian military and their spies 
with the labels 'si pai 'and 'cuak'. I remember meeting a family with a son 
who was approximately 2-3 years old one Sunday morning in 2004 in a 
coastal area of Banda Aceh. It happened that at the time, there was a joint 
army and navy training exercise in the area, and many soldiers were hanging 
around with their military equipment, such as guns, compasses, and trucks. 
One of the soldiers greeted this family's son with a kind and friendly 
salutation of"Hi kid .. . hi kid ... " (I: "halo dik ... hallo dik.. "). 103 The mother 
asked her son to reply to the greeting in a similar way and to address the 
soldier as ' uncle soldier' (I: Oom104 tentara). However, the little boy, having 
never learned the word 'tentara' (I), used the local pejorative term of address 
'pai' (Ac.), and responded with 'Oom Pai ... Oom Pai" with his fun loving cute 
innocent baby face. The soldier, not understanding local terms and slang, 
returned this little boy's greeting in an even more friendly and enthusiastic 
manner. 
103 Dik is a polite informal and kind way to address younger siblings or younger people (either 
a man or woman) and is often used to address little chi ldren. If it was spoken in a kind way, it 
would sounds nice to people. 
104 This derives from a Dutch word, meaning uncle. As with ' dik', the term was used as a 
polite informal address term, especially from a little kid to a male adult. 
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The grammar of violence, terror and fear could also be observed from 
general comments about the security situation. It was pretty common to hear 
' There is no such word as peace in Aceh' (I: 'mana ada aman di Aceh? ')or 
' Aceh has never been at peace' (I:'Aceh itu tidakpernah aman'). Another 
example is the term 'OTK', an abbreviation of the Indonesian phrase 'orang 
or organisasi tak dikenal', unidentified persons or organisation. This illustrates 
the grammar of violence, fear and terror. ' OTK' was widely used to identify 
the person or organisation responsible for certain violent actions occmTed in 
the region. To explain who was possibly responsible for setting certain 
buildings on fire or destroying bridges, for example, the people, even children, 
would immediately say ' OTK'. This was also the immediate answer I received 
when I asked about the party who could have been responsible for the body 
found in the gampong where I lived in Aceh Besar, in April 2004. It was 
around 8.30 am, when I heard that a body had been found at the T junction of 
the road of the house where I was staying. I was about to go to the city as 
planned with my Acehnese sister, but our mother (Ac.: mamak) asked us to 
stay until lunch time or if possible even cancel our plan. We discussed the 
body for a while, especially the type of wound that had caused his death and 
his possible gampong of origin. When I asked about the possible killers, the 
answer was 'OTK' and that was the end of our discussion as mamak asked us 
not to talk about it any longer. ' OTK' not only illustrates an evasion but also a 
fear of the consequences (punishment) of pointing at a particular party. 
Although it was common knowledge that GAM was often responsible for 
setting fire to public buildings while the Indonesian military for frequently 
burned houses and villages, this was a 'public secret' and people simply 
avoided talking about it. 
These pieces of evidence contain three important features. Firstly, the 
power of language and role of 'the chain of telling' 105 in forming an 
alternative history of violence and trauma that transcends time and space. This 
is in line with Fieldman's argument, on the significant role oflanguage in the 
105 This is adopted from Siegel (1979, p.263) who, in Shadow and Sound: The Historical 
Thought of A Sumatran People, thoroughly analysed the literature of the holy war and argued 
for the crucial role of ' the chain of telling' as" ... an exaggeration, a dream of the effective 
power of the Koranic injunction across time and cultures." 
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verbal reiteration of the incidents of violence by deforming the fragmented, 
tortured, and confined body into 'a new body' (Siapno, 2002, pp.8-9). 
Secondly, the ' extended-regenerated collective trauma' that might very 
well lead to other grievances in the future, as described above. As argued by 
some scholars, such as Ross (2003), cultivated trauma was a major factor in 
the widespread support of civil society which contributed to the second re-
emergence of GAM. The Jakarta Post reported that in 2000 most GAM 
fighters were child survivors from the MO areas (in Ross, 2003, p.24). 
Thirdly, the extensive view of conflict and its actors resulted from the 
extended-regenerated trauma processes, which are more just the 
'infectiousness of psychological symptoms' but also a socialisation of the 
general view of, and responses to, violence such as hatred, fear, and 
pessimism (Dickson-Gomes, 2002, p.416). Those who indirectly experienced 
the trauma, such as the above little boy, consciously and unconsciously 
formed this view in accordance with the world-view learnt from parents, other 
family members, as well as the society on what, who, why, and how to 
respond to the violence and its perpetrators. 
The phenomenon of ' extended-regenerated collective trauma', 
however, has been overlooked in both scholarly works and interventions for 
peace building and conflict resolution. The 'sustained' feature of the conflict 
seems to have been taken for granted and attributed primarily to political and 
economic grievances. Consequently, only two superficial facets of the conflict 
are usually identified, while its deeper roots remain unaddressed. This has, in 
turn, leads to a symptomatic and 'superficial ' analysis that glosses over the 
core issues of the psycho-social state of the people who have suffered violent 
political crises for generations. It is, therefore, critical to give more serious 
attention to this issue in conflict analysis, especially with regard to its root 
causes, impacts, and possible resolutions. 
With no attempt to discount the role of the MO of the 1990' s, with its 
massive shocks and terror, it is important to note that the ' extended-
regenerated trauma' may have been present in society even before the 
operation itself was implemented. The strong oral traditions of story telling in 
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Aceh, 106 provides a vehicle on the regeneration of trauma and the 'cultural 
template' 107 (Juris, 2005, p.415) of violence may have been available for 
generations. For example, the post-colonial period saw a series of violent 
political conflicts (see Annex 7). The Cumbok War (1945-1 946) discussed in 
section 1.1 ought to be taken as the staiting point of analysis for the post-
colonial cultivation of the 'cultural template', following by the DI/TII/Nll 
(1953 - 1961/1962) movement led by Daud Beureuh, the well-known 
Acehnese ulama. Acehnese children who witnessed or were involved in the 
Cumbok War in 1945 and/or other violent political conflicts after 1945, would 
ce1tainly carry the trauma with them and could regenerate it. A fifteen-year 
old child in 1945 for example, would be in her/his thirties in the 1960s when 
the 01/Tll/NII clashes erupted, and would be in her/his fo1ties when the MO 
was launched, at which time she/he might already have grandchildren. 
The 'cultural template' is also indicated by Siapno (2002) and Siegel 
( I 979) on their thorough analysis of the use of stories, songs, and recitations 
to express a ' traditional' and 'religious' calling for joining a war. The 
following Acehnese traditional lullaby (Ac.: dododaidi) further exemplifies 
the existence of the 'cultural template' of violence. Through such dododaidi, 
children are called to join the war to defend the nation and religion since their 
infancy. 
Dododaidi ( Lullaby) 
Singing a lullaby whi le praising God I Allah hai dododaidi 
The big ' Gadong' fruit is from the forest I Boh 'gadong' be boh kayee 
uteuen 
getting bigger my child I Rayek si nyak 
there is nothing that mother can give I hana peue ma bri 
It is a shameful punishment, people know why I 'azeuep ngon keuji, ureueng 
d6nya ko 
Singing a lullaby while praising God !Allah hai dododaidang 
Kite had its string cut-off I geulayang blang ka put6h /aloe 
Getting big soon, big enough I Meu rijang rayek, muda seudang 
you go help the war, you defend the country /Tajak bantu prong, ta be/a 
nanggroe 
106 See for examples, the works Siapno (200 I) and Siegel ( 1979). 
107 It is worth noted, however, that this 'cultural template ' is not sole ly true of Aceh but 
almost the entire nation. The history of Indonesia is fu ll of violence, with mass riots ( I: amok 
masa) and the use of ' vigi lante civilians gangs' (Cribb, 1990, p.3) by the military common in 
troubled regions such as Aceh, as can be seen from the G3 0S/PKI inc idents in 1965/1966, the 
most recent social unrest in several provinces in the early 2000s, and the recent violent 
political conflicts in the troubled provinces of Aceh, West Papua, and former East Timor. 
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Sit down no more child I Wahe aneuek bek La duek lee 
Rising up together we defend the nation I bedoh saree La be/a bangsa 
Don't be afraid to shed blood I Bek ta Lakot keu darah ilee 
your mother allows you to die I adak pih ma/ee poma ka re/a 
Walk in small steps, walk in small steps I Jak loen (Ion) Leteh, mejak /oen 
1eteh 
Get up child, go to Aceh I Beudoh hai aneuk takjak u Aceh 
The fragrant [banana] leaf, the fragrant Timphan I Meu bei bak on ka meu 
bei thimpan 
The fragrant body of an Acehnese child I Meu bei badan bak sinyak Aceh 
Dear Godj Allah hai po ilia hon ha 
How far is my vi llage until I return home I gamp6ngjarak hantrok loen woe 
If only I had wings I would fly I Adak na bulei uloen teureubang 
So that I could soon reach my country I mangat rijang trok u nanggroe 
Allah, I swing my ' rice' (referring to the baby) I Allah haijak loen timang 
breueh 
Beloved waves splashing on the beach I Sayang riyeuk di sipreuk pantee 
They [the waves] are so white, when they are big I Oh rayeuk sinyak yang 
puteh meu preuk 
Child, just like you my fruit of heart I Teh sina/uek gata bah haLee 
(Source: Nyawong hit, 2002) 
The song clearly illustrates how war and death are perceived in a 
positive manner, as something not to be feared but to be proud of, and not 
only anticipated, but to be wellcomed due to their holiness. Through the song, 
Acehnese children learn about the long period of war that has prevented their 
mother from offering a good life to them. However, they al so learn that their 
lives can be made useful if they join the holy war to defend their land, as 
shown in the second and third verses. The parallel of the fragrance of the 
banana leaf, the fragrance of the traditional sweet cake (Ac.: thimpan) and the 
fragrance of the body of an Acehnese child, symbolises how Acehnese 
mothers perceive the deaths of their sons in the (holy) war, as ' pleasant' as the 
mixed fragrance of thimpan and the banana leaves which wrap it. 108 
This song was said to be widely sung during the Aceh war, which was 
considered a holy war, in the Dutch colonial period. During the recent violent 
political conflict between GAM and the Indonesian military, the song was 
revitali sed by Nyawong, an Acehnese popular band group, in early 2000. The 
album was popular amongst the Acehnese and quickly sold out in the 
108 Thimpan is an Acehnese traditional sweet cake wrapped in banana leaf. In an emergency, 
banana leaves may also be used for wrapping a dead body before it is buried. 
217 
market. 109 The reiteration of dododaidi during the conflict between GAM and 
government oflndonesia demonstrate the reinvigoration of the 'cultural 
template'. 
This ' cultural template', however, was indeed reinforced by the 
brutality of the recent violent political conflict of GAM versus the government 
oflndonesia, especially by the harsh military counter insurgency approach of 
the government in the second phase the GAM emergence. As maintained by 
Siapno (2002, p. xviii): 
... In the ongoing government of Indonesian violence in Aceh, it is not 
' Islamic Fundamentalism' nor extremism which is held responsible by 
ordinary people for armed conflict and increasingly patriarchal practices, but 
the ultimately violent and criminal nature of the Indonesian state in its 
behaviour towards poor Acehnese. For many ordinary Achenese [Acehnese], 
the Indonesian police and military has become a main source of" insecurity" 
in their lives. (Siapno 2002:xviii) 
During the period of martial law in 2003 to 2004, the development of 
the 'cultural template' continued through the display of corpses and heavy 
military presence in the region. 
2.2.2 Just Like 'Pli'u': the 'Sandwiched Position' 
The ' sandwiched position' refers to the difficult situation of Acelmese 
civilians who are being trapped between the two conflicting parties, which has 
limited most aspects of their day-to-day lives. An Acehnese woman from 
Aceh Besar District excellently illustrated this, using the metaphor of 'pli 'u' 
(Ac.), a traditional Acehnese ingredient made of sun dried old (rotten) 
coconut used as a main ingredient of the traditional Acehnese vegetable curry 
(Ac.: sayur pli '). Together with other ingredients, this is usually ground 
between two grindstones until soft and mixed to add to the pli ' curry. 
Referring to the nature and the process of making it, she said "We are just like 
pl i 'u in between the grindstones" (Ac.: "Kamo ni, !age pli ' u bak batee 
seuneupeih "). The pli 'u metaphor clearly illustrates the difficult violent 
political conflict circumstances that have positioned these civilians in between 
two powers, like pli' u between grindstones, which do nothing good, but rather 
109 An interview with two traders in Aceh market (I: Pasar Aceh) in March 2003. 
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crush, smash, and run over them. The pli 'u was forced to survive and cope 
with these two grindstones. The moist form of pli 'u represents the fact that 
although it was difficult and painful, they managed to cope. The fluid analogy 
is apt in that their Acehnese substance remained, but was transformed to 
adjust to the violent political conflict situation. This was especially true for 
women from 'widow-villages' (I: desa Janda), 110 who had lost their husbands 
from forced disappearances, abduction, killings, or migration to other areas 
for security purposes. The 'sandwiched position' was not only about being 
between two conflicting parties. It was also about negotiating between the 
' stigma' of being the widows of freedom fighters and the need of the women 
and other family members to get on with their own life. 
The situation burdened the people not only psychologically but also 
economically. The risk of being seen as affiliated to certain parties required 
women to be extra cautious in performing their livelihood activities. This did 
not onJy apply to those considered to be Acehnese but also non Acehnese. A 
Batak woman, a traditional masseur married to an Acehnese man, stated that 
she often had to refuse some customers who lived in the Indonesian military 
or police compound to avoid being seen as too close to the government of 
Indonesia. At the same time, she had to also be selective in receiving other 
customers to avoid being seen as a partisan. 
The 'sandwiched' position was also experienced by workers of Mobil 
Oil. As part of their claim to share in the revenue earned by the oil company, 
GAM demanded that their people be hired in the company. 11 1 The presence of 
GAM personnel put the 'non partisan' workers, especially the locals, in an 
awkward 'sandwiched position' between GAM and Indonesian military 
personnel. 112 The LNG complex was considered a vital industry, and so its 
security was paramount for the government. For this purpose, some 
Indonesian military personnel were assigned to guard the complex, especially 
after some attacks from GAM fighters (see also Siapno, 2002, p.44). The 
'non-partisan' workers were therefore squeezed in between the two 
conflicting parties. A vigilant situation that required an extra consciousness 
11 0 This is a term designating to vil lages in which widows were the predominant feature. 
111 See footnote 80 
112 Personal interview with a former Mobil oil staff member in August 2003 . 
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from these Jay people, for a wrong statement or action might put them at risk 
from either side. 
Acehnese tradition, however, possesses vital coping strategies that 
have been in the society for generations. These old coping strategies are 
exemplified in the Acehnese terms 'muslihat' and 'lheukjago meuleul ', with 
both exemplify the ability to play beautifully (I: bermain cantik). 11 3 This 
strategy of conducting oneself in a way that does not give the impression of 
opposing another' s conduct enables one to survive and continue to live a 
' normal' life. As described in section 1.2, these traditional coping strategies 
were used by Dl/Til/NII leaders as a political tactic to avoid being defeated by 
the Indonesian Military. During the recent conflict between GAM and the 
government of Indonesia, this traditional strategy of coping was quite pivotal 
for the Acehnese women. This was especially true in dealing with their 
'sandwiched position' between two conflicting parties. Women have to use 
carefully chosen words and phrases to avoid danger, such as telling the 
military posted in their village that they need to go to the market in the city for 
shopping or buying groceries whilst in fact they also use the time to meet with 
local NGO staff. Therefore, both concepts of 'muslihat' and 'lheukjago 
meuleut ' were applied in the political struggle, as portrayed by Siapno (2002), 
and also the day to day struggle of women in managing their household 
livelihood in the violent political conflict situation of Aceh. The latter will be 
described in the next Chapter. 
2.2.3 The Deprivation of the Local Economy (Penghancuran 
Ekonomi Lokal) 
In general, however, it is true that the long standing violent political 
conflict situation - with its social, cultural , economical, and psychological 
consequences - has made people, especially women, suffer directly and 
indirectly. One of the most tangible consequences identified quickly by my 
research subjects was the impact on their livelihoods. 114 In conflict affected 
areas, am1ed clashes resulted in the disruption of people' s daily and livelihood 
113 See also Chapter 2, Section 3.3. 
114 See chapter 6 for details. 
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activities. The fighting was described as leading to the deprivation of the local 
economy (I: penghancuran ekonomi lokal). 
The collective punishment of setting fire to shops, kiosks, houses, and 
boats resulted in not only forced displacement but also to the disruption of 
livelihoods of the people, who lost of sources of income and capital at the 
same time. The implementation of 'pajak nanggroe' (GAM tax) is another 
example of the effect of the violent political conflict that had serious 
consequences to the household economies. During my field work, it was 
pretty common to hear bitter statements about how difficult it was to pay taxes 
to both 'authorities' . Not paying to either side would certainly bring more 
problems and the risk of being seen as traitors by both sides. As further 
exemplified in the next chapter, some small businesses had to close down 
because they were unable to cope with the double taxation. 
All this occurred on top of the hard life for the internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). There were allegation that some camps were used by GAM to 
attract international attention and these camps were not accessible for 
humanitarian assistance. This was the case at the camp at L in North Aceh 
(see Figure 5-1). The camp was identified as controlled by GAM and 
therefore the government limited humanitarian assistance. These IDPs were in 
a true 'sandwiched position', caught between the government, who asked 
them to go back to their village of origin but could not guarantee their 
security, and GAM who required them to stay. 
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Figure 5-1. IDPs Camp at L, North Aceh 
Source: Private documentation - early 2000 
Moreover, when the armed clashes targeted basic services such as electricity, 
water, health, and education, livelihood became a true problem for people, 
inside and outside these camps. 
Adding to this was the forced involvement of civilians in military 
operations. Recruited by the military as trackers to find the whereabouts of 
GAM fighters, husbands or/and other male family members could not work 
for days, sometimes weeks. This caused a cascade effect on the household 
economy as they had to rely on one source of income, that of the women. 
Further economic depletion occurred since women also had to spend time 
taking meals to their husbands in the forests. In some cases, they also had to 
feed the military soldiers as well. Villagers reported that the military gave no 
economic compensation to either the men or the women. 
Another difficulty faced by villagers was the isolation of villages by 
the military, especially villages located in the hot spot areas, to limit the 
movement of GAM fighters. However, this also resulted in an uneasy life for 
villagers and the obstruction of their livelihood. In Y village in Pidie District, 
for example, there was a time when no public or private transport was allowed 
by the military in order to limit the movement of GAM fighters. Every single 
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vehicle had to be kept (I: dititipkan) 115 in the military's custody. In return, the 
military provided a vehicle for the villagers. Nevertheless, most of the people 
preferred to walk rather than take this regardless of the fact that the distance to 
the nearest city was as far as 5 km. One of the reasons was the fear of being 
perceived as supporting the Indonesian military. As happened to IDPs 
situation, taking assistance from the government or following the 
government's request might put them at risk of being perceived as 'cuak' and 
worse than this, of not being Acehnese. 
Such circumstances led to impoverishment. The case ofNur's family 
described in the next chapter clearly exemplifies the grass roots level impact 
of the violent political conflict. To cope with such complexities, the people 
had to develop their own strategies. Given the longstanding phenomena of 
violent political conflict, some of these coping strategies may have become 
internalised and an integral part of day-to-day life in Aceh. 
The ability to 'muslihat ', 'lheukjago meuleut ', and 'bermain cantik ', 
noted above, became an essential part of their coping strategies. Economic-
rnigration (I: rantau) discussed in the next chapter, was another one of their 
coping strategies. Although rantau was part of the old tradition of the 
Acehnese for economic advancement, it was taking a new form as an 
important way of coping with the violent political conflict circumstances. 
Some people opted to migrate (I: merantau) for security purposes, escaping 
from the armed clashes. 
3 Conclusion 
The GAM-violent political conflict was both a multi faceted 
phenomenon, which needs a multi sectoral analysis, and a sequential event, 
that requires a historical account. It is indeed true that different violent 
political conflicts in Aceh emerged in different socio-political contexts as 
argued by Ishak (2003, p.46; 2000). Based on this argument, some scholars 
115 The root word 'titip' means:( I) to ask someone to do a favour, run an errand, etc. ;(2) to 
entrust something to someone for safekeeping;(3) to give something to someone for 
safekeeping (Stevens and Schmidgall-Tellings, 2004, p.1035) 
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(such as Suk.ma, 2004 and Schulze, 2004), tend to discount the link between 
the recent GAM- violent political conflict and previous conflicts. Sukma 
(2004, p.3), for example, stated that: 
The outbreak of GAM rebell ion in 1998 was the result of a complex set of 
root causes that had accumulated in Aceh province since the end of the first 
rebellion in the mid-1970s ... (Sukma, 2004, p.3). 
The statement clearly suggests that the accumulation of causes started from 
the first phase of GAM activities and disregards the pre 1970s conflicts such 
as the one under Daud Beureuh. Such analysis suffers from a narrow reading 
of the causes of the Acehnese violent political conflict. 
Recent studies suggest several vital connections among the violent 
pol itical conflicts; especially DI/TII/NII and GAM (see Robinson, 200 l; ICG 
Reports, 1999, 2002, 2003; Fealy, 2005), although the two movements 
involved different morals and dynamics.116 The current GAM conflict 
correlates to the previous DI/TII/NTI- violent political conflict from the 
involvement of the personnel and connections maintained by GAM leaders 
and ex-DI/TII/NII fighters. For example, Hasan di Tiro, the prominent GAM 
leaders, was engaged in Daud Beureuh's movement and therefore connected 
to the ex-DI/TII/NII fighters. The previous history of violent political confl ict 
in Aceh; its casualties, impact, and possible links to the current confl ict, thus 
warrants ample analysis. The main issues put forward by the conflict actors 
may differ, but the material conditions might be the same. The post 1970 
conflict took place in the very same region of Aceh and the very same society 
of the Acehnese as the series of previous conflicts. 
This chapter has argued that this legacy was and is enduring. Focusing 
on the existence and enactment of 'extended-regenerated collective trauma' 
we have further suggested the existence of, not only, a cultivated 'culture of 
11 6 Under d ifferent leaderships and driven by different motives, DI/Tll/NII and GAM 
possessed d ifferent dynamics. The periodic analysis ofGAM clearly demonstrates that, from 
its initial time, GAM was always a political movement that favoured violent political conflict 
more than a diplomatic approach, with independence as the main spirit and driving force. The 
Aceh DI/Tl I/NII, in comparison, harboured a federalist spirit in which an independent state 
was out of the q uestion and possessed more room for a diplomatic approach and peaceful 
negotiation. 
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fear' but also 'grammar of terror' and 'culture of violence' 117 perpetrated by 
conflicting parties. These have provided the 'cultural template' (Juris, 2005, 
p.415) of violence that made the regeneration of the violent political conflict 
possible. Robinson (2001) suggests this in the fo llowing citation: 
So legendary is Aceh's reputation for rebelliousness and Islamic militancy, 
that it is tempting to view the recent Aceh Merdeka uprisings as new 
manifestation of an Acehnese tradition or, as some would have it, an 
expression of a primordial Acehnese urge to independence. There is an 
element of truth in these views, as the patterns of historical continuity among 
the different rebellions attest. (Robinson, 200 I, p.218) 
Robinson (2001, p.218) argues further that 'historical continuity', 
'shared memory', and personal connections between the actors in the 
conflict, 118 all play a part in the wider context of political and economic 
changes in Indonesia in explaining the emergence of GAM. We have also 
seen how stories, songs, and recitations have a role in transmitting 
' traditional' and 'religious' reasons for joining a war. Even lullabies can teach 
children to fight and die to defend the nation. 
The ' cultural template' of violence alone, however, is not enough to 
explain the violent political conflict of Aceh, especially the after-1 990s 
conflict. The harsh approach of the Indonesian military played a pivotal role 
in escalating and prolonging the violence (Siapno, 2002; Robinson, 2001). 
The conflict involved a ' reciprocal violence' in which the intensity of 
violence of the military was closely related to the intensity of violence of 
GAM, to the degree that it became an integral part of three important facets: 
the development of violence on both sides; the material conditions that 
encourages violence to reoccur; and the volatility which reproduced it. Both 
parties learnt from each other's strengths and weaknesses and used this in 
11 7 For the culture of fear, terror, and violence, see the works of Siapno (2002) on women 's 
agency in the competing and contradictory characters of Islamic identity, nationalism and 
gender relations in Aceh, Ballard (2002) on the Amungme, the traditional landowners of the 
highland mining area of West Papua, Dickson-Gomes (2002) on El Savadorian families in 
the post war situation, Robinson (200 1) on the relation between the toughness of Central State 
to the emergence ofGAM, Suarez-Orozco and Robben (2000) on the second-generation of 
Holocaust survivors from Sloven ia, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Turkey, the United States, Ind ia, 
and Argentina, and Margo Id (1999) on the ethnographic works on culture and fear in rural 
areas in the Phillipines. 
118 Robinson (200 I , p.218) illustrated the personal link of actors in the Aceh confl ict by 
noting the kin relationship between Hasan Di Tiro, the current GAM leader, and Teungku Cik 
Di Tiro, The Indonesian National Hero from Aceh, and from the close associat ion between 
Hasan Di Tiro and Daud Beureueh. 
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their strategy to win the war. Increased awareness of the rights of civilians 
was an example of this. It was apparent that when GAM started to neglect 
civilian rights and exhibited a lack of empathy for civilian vulnerabilities from 
the late 1990s, the Indonesian military started to pay more attention to the 
rights of civilians and carefully minimised civilian casualties in early 2000. 
The GAM violent political conflict was not only political, but also 
cultural and economic. As exemplified in this chapter, and as has been argued 
by some other scholars (such as Suk.ma, 2004; Ross, 2003; Siapno, 2002; and 
Robinson, 2001, p.214), the conflict was multi-dimensional. Neither a security 
nor a political approach alone was enough to address the situation. A 
comprehensive peace package has been lacking in previous attempt to end the 
violence, including the Cessation on Hostility Agreement. This was partly due 
to the focus of conflict actors, while the peripheral and indirect participants of 
civil society remained untouched. 
The lack of a comprehensive solution for ending the violent political 
conflict in the late 1990s to early 2000 may have occurred due to the national 
political context of Indonesia. This context was characterised by: a focus on 
national stability (I: stabilitas nasional); unclear policies that were remnants 
of the reformation era; a back and forth shifting of command for domestic 
security between the Indonesian military to the Police; and, most importantly, 
a lack of understanding of the multi dimensional nature and causes of the 
Aceh conflict. 
Siegel ( 1979) argues that historically the Acehnese situation provides 
the best picture of 19th century politics in Indonesian society, in which an 
autocratic government had to face strong civilian resistance. The grievances, 
however, like grievances in other places in Indonesia, tended to be economic 
ones, spanning the unfair use of local resources for the benefit of central 
government, development polarisation and its unequal distribution of 
advantages, and unfair job market competition. Adding to this were the human 
rights issues that were neglected by, the Indonesian government, especially 
under Suharto. As Human Rights Watch (2001, p.7) stated: 
When GAM was formed in 1976, its architects stressed the plundering of 
Aceh' s wealth and resources by "Javanese-Indonesian" colonialists in the 
name of development and the need to recapture Aceh ' s past glory. Econom ic 
g rievances were and continue to be important, but the more immediate spur 
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to the independence movement has been the failure of the post-Soeharto 
governments to address human rights abuses of the past, particularly those 
committed between 1990 and 1998. 
This is not to say that the Indonesian government did not try a non-
violent approach. The government attempted diplomatic approaches during 
both the Dl/TII/Nll and GAM conflicts. Unfortunately, these approaches were 
not divorced from the militaristic approach, and suffered from the lack of 
supporting factors such as economic empowerment for the affected 
communities. 
The nature and impact of the recent GAM violent political conflict on 
the civilian population became not only a ' severe stressor' and 'cataclysm' but 
also a 'focal stressor' which brought about a cascade effect that triggered 
other stressors. The stern military operations of both conflicting parties 
resulted in social and economic consequences, such as divorce and separation, 
death, job loss, victimisation, and relocation - either forced or voluntarily. The 
'extended-regenerated collective trauma' and the local economy deprivation(: 
penghancuran ekonomi lokal) are results of such losses. As discussed in the 
next chapter, these losses were especially suffered by women through the 
absence of their husbands due to forced disappearances, forced displacement, 
or the husbands' decision to join the freedom fighters. In this regard, the 
current GAM- violent political conflict may be perceived as a major challenge 
to women and their household livelihood coping strategies. 
In addition, this chapter has highlighted the difficult 'sandwiched 
position ' between the two conflicting parties experienced by civilians and the 
ways the have coped with the resultant problems. This will be discussed in 
detail, particularly in relation to women, in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Beneath The Battle: Women and 
Household Livelihood's Sustenance 
As in many other conflict areas, the important issue of women's cop ing 
strategies in sustaining their household livelihood has been overlooked in Aceh 
and has not been addressed adeq uate ly by scholars working in the area. Based on 
data co llected from field work conducted from June 2002 to August 2003, th is 
chapter attempts to examine this issue. The data used here were col lected through 
in-depth interviews, Focus Group Di scussions (FGD), limited participant 
observations, and a survey of the households of my research subjects, covering 32 
households from Great Aceh, North Aceh, Bireun, Pidie, and Banda Aceh. 
Households in the first four areas mostly came from rural areas, which were 
characteri sed by agriculture activities and limited access to public fac il ities. Some 
of these areas were isolated by the Indonesian military as part of their effort to 
se ize GAM fighters so I had to meet the women in a nearby town or city or in 
market places, as described in Chapter 2. This was especially true for hot spots, 
where public faci lities were often targeted and road blocks hindered access into 
and out of their villages. Households from Banda Aceh were from urban areas, 
and were predominantly engaged in informa l sector activities. 
Women and their households were chosen based on snowball sampling, 
fo r wh ich I relied primarily on the information and suggestions from local 
contacts and research subjects. I found this type of sampling especial ly suitable in 
the vio lent political conflict context of Aceh as it enabled me not on ly to be 
accepted by these women, but also to gain their trust, as I was seen an 
acq uaintance through someone they knew. In this context, no other research 
approach was possible due to the fear and susp icions as exemplified in Chapter 2. 
Most of these women were target beneficiaries of my local NGO contacts, and for 
security reasons I use pseudonyms for al l of those I interviewed. 
I met these research subjects and key informants at times and places 
suitable for them. Women in the ' hot spots' preferred to meet me in the city, both 
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for my security and their own safety. According to them, my presence in their 
vi llages might be seen as suspicious by the two conflicting patties, and might get 
the women into trouble. Nevertheless, after meetings, they usually began to 
accept me even more, and invited me to come to their vi llages. Their invitation, 
however, seemed to be part of their courtesy only, since when I indicated serious 
interest in visiting, they usuall y showed signs of anxiety and discussed among 
themselves how I cou ld get there and how the arrangements could be made to 
ensure my safety, which, as noted above, I believe was just as much about their 
safety as well. I usually simply observed their discussions and ' helped ' them out 
by saying that I was happy enough to meet them in the city and perhaps some 
other t ime I could visit them at their v ill ages and stay overnight. A woman from 
village A, however, was very insistent about me go ing to her village, and I did 
pay her a v isit - the security for wh ich took a lmost two weeks to arrange. 
It was apparent to me that women have become the backbone of their 
fami lies in times of crisis. Women had to deal and cope with not on ly household 
li velihoods but a lso the consequences of the violent po litical conflict in the area 
that created a situation that required women to 'p lay beautifully' (I: bermain 
cantik), meaning maintaining good relations with both conflicting parties, fo r 
their household sustenance. This has, in a way, put women at ri sk considering that 
they were in a difficult position, sandwiched between the two conflicting parties. 
The 'sandwiched position ' 1 strongly suggests that women experienced not only 
stress and suppression from being primarily responsible for household li velihood 
under different conditions but a lso stress from the negative effect of the violent 
political conflict on the most mundane of their da il y activ it ies. Hence, the 
women's coping strateg ies went beyond direct liveli hood issues and affected all 
aspects of their li ves. 
This chapter has six sections. The first section presents the general data 
co llected from my household surveys focusing on the description of househo ld 
demographi c characteristics. The second section outl ines the consequences of the 
violent po li tical conflict on household li vel ihood as well as the cop ing strategies 
1 See Chapter 5 section 2.2.2. 
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women and their households employed to deal with these. The third section links 
the impact of coping strategies to household impoverishment. The fourth section 
examines the availability of social assets or capital and the choices made by 
women in using or abandoning these assets to cope with their household situation. 
The fifth amplifies the study findings by discussing the case study ofNur and her 
family, who escaped from the violent political conflict situation and its negative 
effect on livelihood in their village of origins, to the capital city of Banda Aceh, 
where they were trapped within another form of poverty in the slum area of the 
city. Finally, the last section provides some conclusion drawn from the overall 
analysis of the research results. 
1 Households Demographic Characteristics 
Thirty-two women and their households were covered in the survey. They 
came from the following regions - 9 from Aceh Besar, 6 from Aceh Utara, 4 
from Biruen, 7 from Pidie, and 6 from Banda Aceh (Figure 6-1). 
Figure 6-1. Number and Distribution of Households Surveyed (Source: 
Survey Data, 2004) 
DAceh Bel" •B • nd 1 Aceh 
OBireun 
C Nor1h Ac.h 
• Pldi 
The first four regions were considered to be hots spots, areas within which armed 
clashes often took place. The last one was a relatively secure area, for it is the 
capital city. Even here, however, the effects of the violent political conflict could 
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not be ignored. The area may look quiet and people may seem to perform their 
daily activities in a manner similar to many other areas in the rest of Indonesia, 
but the tension of the violent conflict was still prevalent. 
Of the total 32 households, 14 were reported to be female- headed and 18 
were male-headed households (Figure 6-2) The female-headed households were 
originated from Aceh Besar, North Aceh, and Pidie, areas where armed clashes 
between GAM and the Indonesian army usually occurred. Whilst female-headed 
households were from the three areas with extensive violent clashes, the male-
headed households were from the overall areas covered in the study. 
Aceh Besar 
Figure 6-2. Types of Household by District 
(Source: Survey Data, 2004) 
Banda Aceh Bireun 
Dlstrlct 
North Aceh 
Type ofHH 
• Male Headed Household 
a Female Headed Household 
Pi di 
Among these households surveyed, the largest number of reported female-
headed households was from Great Aceh (Aceh Besar), followed by North Aceh 
(Aceh Utara) (Figure 6-3), and the largest number of male -headed households 
was found in Banda Aceh (Figure 6-4 ). 
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Figure 6-3 
(Source: Survey Data, 2004) 
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Figure 6-4 
(Source: Survey Data, 2004) 
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This distribution reflect the fact that both Aceh Besar and Aceh Utara were 
regions with relatively intensive armed clashes and women interviewed were 
survivors of the military operation (MO) who had lost their spouses during the 
subsequent violence. Banda Aceh, in contrast, was a relatively safe area and 
became one of the areas of destination for those fleeing the 'hot spots'. However, 
it is not possible to generalise beyond the sample due to its small size and the 
nature of the sampling procedure discussed above. 
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Table 6-1 The Demographic Characteristics of the Household Heads 
:.... "' 
;:c Type of Average Age Cl) ..... .Q c 
'- "' 
Educational 
E .a 0 ..... :c Households (H) (AVG) Cl) c Attainment 
= c bJi Cll Cll F M z ~ < i::s 0 c N E ~ Headed Headed Husb c.;i Cl) c.;i Cl) >Q > fr s s District H H Wife and < 'o <Q 
Aceh Besar 9 7 2 44 30 4 16 I 6 
Aceh Utara 6 5 I 43 24 4 22 0 4 
Bireun 4 0 4 - 44 4 12 0 4 
Pi di 7 2 5 34 34 3 12 1 5 
Banda Aceh 6 0 6 - 54 5 19 0 2 
2 
Total 32 14 18 40 35 4 17 2 1 
Source: primary data; Note: NS=No School, ES=Elementary School, PS= Primary School, 
HS= High School 
p H 
s s 
I I 
I I 
0 0 
0 1 
2 2 
4 5 
As shown in Table 6-1 average ages of the adu lts in these households 
were 40 and 35 for wives and husbands respectively. With an age range from 34 
to 44 for wives and 24 to 54 for husbands, they were all of an economically 
productive age. T hese households had approximately 4 dependants, with an 
average age of 1 7, with a range of 12 to 22. These dependants were not on ly 
children but also sisters and brothers. One family even had a close friend from 
their village of origin as their dependant for he no longer had any close relatives. 
The highest educational level of househo ld heads was hi gh school 
graduates (5 out of 32) and the lowest was primary school graduates, which made 
up the majority of household heads (21 out of32). This is in line with the gross 
enrolment rates of primary school s in Aceh in 2000-2004, which was higher 
than secondary and tertiary schools (The World Bank, 2006, p. 91 ). Only 2 out of 
the 32 heads of households fell under the category of NS (No School), meaning 
they never attended school , reflecting the incidence of ii I iteracy in the reg ion. No 
head of household possessed a university education background. Poverty, 
insecurity, and a perception about the unimportance of secu lar education might 
explain th is. Some people explained that it was common among the o lder 
generation of Acehnese, especially from rural areas, to consider secular education 
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to be less important than religious education. Being able to recite the holy Qur'an 
was paramount, so the older generation tended to send their children to the 
traditional Islamic boarding school (I: pondok pesantren) rather than ordinary 
state schools. 
There were three types of houses i.e. permanent (solid brick), semi 
permanent (combination of so lid brick and wooden), and non permanent 
(wooden) houses. Plate 6-2 and Plate 6-2 illustrate the contrast between two 
extreme types. The wooden houses exemplify the situation of poverty, and the 
residents of such houses could usually be classified as poor. The permanent 
houses demonstrate the wealth of the residents. 
Plate 6-2. The non 
permanent (wooden) house 
Plate 6-2. The permanent 
(solid brick) house 
(Source: Local NGO's Private with permission, 2003) 
Table 6-2 shows that 16 out of the 32 households had non-permanent 
houses. This was especially true for those residing in Banda Aceh, whose houses 
were made of wood and built above the sea shore, which was vulnerable to 
natural disasters. These houses were completely swept away by the Tsunami 2004 
and nothing was left (Plate 6-3). The people built their houses in this area because 
of their poverty. They had insufficient money to buy land or rent a more 
substantial house in a safer area. 
234 
Plate 6-3 Post Tsunami Situation, Banda Aceh 
(Source: Ari Priawardhana, with permission, 2005) 
These people in Banda Aceh were not only vulnerable to natural disasters 
but also to government policy. At the time of my research, there was a p lan by the 
provincial government to clear the area and develop it as one of the tourist spots 
in the province. Some households had been moved already, while the rest were 
waiting for their turn. The people who lived in th is area were mostly from outside 
of Banda Aceh and fl ed to the city from the confli ct. They began to settle in the 
area in the late 1970s, when GAM had just formed and clashes were not as 
intense as in the 1990s. 
Table 6-2 The Basic Situation of Housing 
Types of houses 
Total Semi Br ick Wooden 
Dist rict RH Br ick House House House No House 
Aceh Besar 9 3 2 4 0 
Aceh Utara 6 I I I 3 
Bireun 4 0 1 3 0 
Pi di 7 I 0 5 I 
Banda Aceh 6 0 3 3 0 
Total 32 5 7 16 4 
Source: Survey data, 2004 
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Four out of the thirty two households admitted to no longer having a 
house after their houses were set on fire during the conflict in 1999. These 
households were from North Aceh (Aceh Utara) and Pidie, the two regions which 
were considered 'hot spots' . At the time of research, at the time of research these 
families were living with their relatives or parents. 
Both female and male-headed households were predominantly poor, with 
the majority owning wooden houses (Figure 6-5). From the number of households 
with brick houses and semi brick houses, it is apparent that female-headed 
households were worse off than male-headed households. There were one and 
three female-headed households with brick and semi brick houses respectively 
compared to four and five for male-headed households. 
Figure 6-5 Types of Female and Male-headed Households 
mber of households 
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7 
6 
Types of household 
Source: Survey Data, 2004 
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Household 
Types of house 
D Blicked Hoose 
II Semi Bricked House 
D W ooden House 
A similar pattern seen in the types of furniture owned by households 
(Figure 6-6). Five female-headed households had no basic furniture compared to 
none of male-headed households. This further signified the female-headed 
household' s economic vulnerability. 
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Figure 6-6 Types of Furniture Owned by Female and Male-headed 
Households 
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It is apparent from these data that female-headed households were in a less 
favourable state than male-headed households. The most probable reason to 
explain this is the fact that female-headed households also usually represented a 
single source of income for the household. 
2 On Household Livelihood: The Consequences of the Violent 
Political Conflict. 
The violent political conflict in Aceh had brought devastating effects on 
the daily lives of the people, especially villagers. The effects on the livelihood 
situation, however, hit men first then women. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
traditionally Acehenese men are required to bring money home or 'seeking 
money' (Ac.: 'mita peng' ), whilst women stay at home and take care of the basic 
necessities of their households or ' seeking rice' (Ac.: 'mita breueh'). However, 
due to the violent conflict, men could not perform their 'mita peng' (Ac.) role any 
longer due to their permanent absence (death), temporary absence due to 
migration or flight to a safer area, or limited mobility. Consequently, women had 
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to extend their 'mi/a breueh' (Ac.) role in their households.2 This section aims to 
examine how the conflict affected livelihood and other areas of household life. 
2.1 The General Effect on Household Livelihoods 
The violent political conflict in Aceh had both direct and indirect effects 
on households. The direct effects were suffered immediately by households 
because of the permanent and temporary absence of husbands or other males 
family members. The male were often asked, or some used the word 'forced' (1: 
paksa), to flee from their villages of origin for their own safety. Wives or other 
female family members testified that they had deliberatel y 'forced' their husbands 
and sons to flee. The men thus left either voluntarily or involuntarily. The indirect 
effects of the conflict were experienced through the counter insurgency strategy 
of the army in response to the guerri Ila tactics of GA M, as described in chapters 4 
and 5. The actions of both sides consequently limited civilians' mobili ty and 
hindered them from their livelihood activities, such as farming and trading, as 
well as other normal daily activities, such as going to the market for daily 
necessities. This was especially true for those who resided or farmed in or nearby 
mountain areas where the clashes usually took place. They also could not go to 
forest to collect wood and rattan, which was one of their main sources of cash 
income. They had to survive using whatever resources they had left. 
Some villagers from other areas were still able to work in small local 
mining industries which, during the martial law period, were run by the 
Indones ian military or Indonesian military personnel (my informants were not 
clear about this). Some banana traders complained of not being allowed to carry 
the sharp knives needed for their occupation. Some mobile traders (Ac.: mugee) 
complained of a significant decrease in their incomes because they were not able 
to trade freely or collect goods to sell due to secu rity reasons. Women and their 
male counterparts also complained about the difficulties of finding j obs due to the 
implementation of martial law. 
2 See Chapter 4 for 'mita peng ' and 'mita breueh ' roles of Acehnese men and women. 
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These claims are supported by revealing increased in less stable 
employment among heads of household in the period after 1999/2000. This 
reinforces the information on personal cases interviews. This was especially true 
during the initial stage of martial law, with its tight security checks, part of the 
Ma1tial Authority's effort to identify and isolate GAM members and partisans. 
The security check often led to restricted mobility for people, which , in tum, 
resulted in limitations in performing their livelihoods. 
Villagers, especially from the ' hot spots' were obliged to report to and 
seek the consent of both conflicting parties, especially the local military post, 
anytime they needed to leave their village. In such situations, villagers were 
required to present reasonable reasons for their travel or otherwise they would not 
be permitted to leave their village. Unessential travel was often avoided as this 
might lead to suspicion and consent might then never have been granted in any 
circumstances. My research subjects from these villages said that, people in their 
vil lages tried to limit their travel and 'save' their times of travel (I: berjaga-jaga) 
just in case they needed to travel out of the village for serious family matters. 
There were several acceptable excuses for leaving the village: buying 
groceries at the weekly market (usually at subdistrict level); attending weddings, 
funerals and circumcision ceremonies; visiting family; and shopping in the city. 
The first reason was the easiest to use. As described in chapter 3, to the Acehnese, 
going to the weekly market is more than an economic necessity. T he weekly 
market traditionally has been an important occasion for pleasure (I: hiburan) and 
meeting others from different neighbouring villages, sometimes even from a far 
distant village. This was especial ly true when weekly markets at certa in places 
specialised in particular products. Villagers from faraway villages often came to 
find this product or simply to observe the price. During the period of marti al law, 
the weekly market became an important point for villagers to obtain and 
exchange pertinent information, especially about the fate of family' s members 
who had to flew from their villages of origin because of threats from both sides, 
or who had decided to join GAM. 
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Whilst the weekly market could be the safest excuse, the last two (visiting 
families and shopping down town) could not be used too often or it would appear 
suspicious, and permission might be declined by the doubtful and distrustful 
Indonesian military. Three of my research subjects who came from one of the 
' hot spots' of Aceh Besar told me of being asked suspiciously by the Indonesian 
military at the guard post when they sought consent to leave the village to attend 
the FGD that I organised in Banda Aceh. That was simply because it was the 
second time for them to leave the village within a week. In this situation they had 
to smartly answer in a relaxed way, with smiles and simple jokes to avoid raising 
suspicions. Their gender also helped. It was common knowledge that women and 
children were less likely to be suspected than men. Consequently they were more 
mobile than men. 
Figure 6-7 Problems Faced by Households at the Time of Research 
(During the Martial Law Period) 
Source: Survey Data, 2004 
Figure 6-7 illustrates this situation. Male households' heads reported 
transportation hindrance as the main problem they faced at the time of research, 
which was the martial law period. Female households' heads, on the contrary, 
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having less impediments to mobility, were more concerned with difficulties in 
establishing new businesses. These difficulties, however, were also related to the 
general situations, such as lack of household capital because of Joss of household 
resources due to the conflict and double illegal taxation. 
2.2 From 'Mita Breueh' to 'Mita Peng': A Change in Gender 
Relations in the Households. 
The different impact according to gender extended to household 
livelihoods. The impact of the conflict on livelihood was more likely to occur for 
men first then women. This is illustrated in Figure 6-8, which shows an increase 
in the number of unemployed husband and a decrease in the numbers of men in 
each type of occupation after 1999/2000. 
Figure 6-8 Husband's Main Occupation Before and After 1999/2000 
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It also appears that the varieties of main occupations of husbands 
expanded after 1999/2000. This, however, does not necessarily equate to wider 
job opportunities, but more to an expansion from predominantly landowner 
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farmer and wage labour occupations to include more trading and illegal mining. 
One man who had never been involved in illegal mining, had take thi s up to repay 
his household ' s debt to the person who ran the business. Another husband 
become a fisherman, which may have been related to the security situation. 
Joining a fishing boat or a sh ip that has a 'wel l qualified ' captain who possesses 
the skill for a smooth talk with the sea patrol wou ld make the ship a 'safe-haven' 
for those escaping from the conflict. This is especially true for partisans, who 
cou ld easily hide among the ship crews, especially a big boat that can 
accommodate more than 20 crewmembers. Interviews with two households in 
2004 revealed that between the change in husbands' occupations, there had been 
a period of unemployment when they cou ld not assume their role as income 
earner, locally termed ' mita peng' (Ac.) or seeking money as revealed in my 
interviews with two households (2004). It is also worth noting that regular 
income cou ld not always be expected (I: tidak bisa diharapkan) , especial ly if the 
men were engaged in fishing, wh ich was very much dependent on the season. As 
we wi ll see later in Nur' s family (Section 5), there were times (around three 
months in each year) when husbands could not get any money due to the west 
wind season (I: musim angin barat). 
In these period of unemployment, households usually depended on 
women. This may explain the sharp decrease in the number of housewives after 
1999/2000, accompanied by the decreased number of unemployed wives (Figure 
6-9). With limited skill s, women tended to use their domestic skills of cooking. 
T his exp lains the sharp increase in the number of women involved in trading, 
mostly in cookies and other types of traditional foods. Another factor that might 
explain this is the decreased number of landowner farmers. Like the ir male 
counterparts, the number of the landowner farmers declined due to the armed 
c lashes that made them abandon their land in combat zones, usually the mountain 
areas. 
The data not only indicate a change in women ' s jobs, but al so the 
extension of their role in household production, termed ' seeking rice ' (Ac: mi ta 
breueh), which is contrasted w ith men ' s role in the extra-household economy, 
242 
described as ' seeking money' (Ac.: mita peng), replacing their husbands' roles 
that could not be performed for various reasons. Household production (Ac.: mita 
breueh) which traditionally ensured that a household' s basic needs were met had 
to be extended to seeking money (Ac.: mitapeng) outside the domestic economy. 
The transformation, however, did not substitute but rather extended the household 
production (Ac.: mita breueh) of women, as they were still required, and felt 
obliged, to perform maintain household subsistence. Consequently, women had to 
perform both ' seeking rice' (Ac: mita breueh) and ' seeking money' (Ac.: mita 
peng) roles at the same time. This indicates the double burden of women. If one 
then add their agency in dealing with the two conflicting parties this becomes a 
triple burden. 
~ 
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Figure 6-9 Wives' Main Occupation Before and After 1999/2000 
Source: Survey Data, 2004 
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The transformation might explain the reasons for changing jobs. Figure 6-10 
shows the reason women gave for changing their jobs. Most of these were 
income-related. The women said that jobs offered more income or were perceived 
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as more advantageous because they promised more income. The options of only 
being a housewife was no longer feasible, further exemplifying women's 
increasing public role (Ac.: mita peng). 
Figure 6-10 Reasons for Wives to Change Their Types of Work 
Source: Survey Data, 2004 
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The change in role coincided with the absence of the women's husbands 
or other household members, because they were away or deceased 
Figure 6-11 Number and Types of Absented Households' Members 
by Types of Households 
Source: Survey Data, 2004 
I!? 
.8 
E 
.. 
:i; 8 -i---------------
.. 
'O 
0 
.c 
.. 
.. 
:I 
0 
:c 6 -t-----
" J!! 
c g: 
;:i! 
~ 4 +--~-Nooe_. 4_ 
.8 
E 
:I 
z 
2 
O +--~--
Others, 1 
Female 1-tea:lOO HaJsd1dd 
Nale , 11 
Types d Household 
Male 1-tea:lOO -
IJNcne 
•rusband 
CJ Children 
Cl Others 
Note to table: This includes households with husbands are present but confined to the house and 
hence economically inactive. 
Information gathered in my survey indicated that female-headed 
households had more absent household members, especially husbands, than male-
headed households (see Figure 6-11 ). This signifies the greater burden for women 
in these female-headed households, s ince they had to work harder to bring more 
money home. A further elaboration on the need for rice (Ac.: breueh) to feed 
family in comparison to the need for money (Ac.: peng) provides more evidence 
of this transformation of women's role. 
Figure 6-12 shows that female-headed households perceived both as being 
of equal need, whilst the male-headed household still followed the traditional 
pattern. This was the case of Khadijah, whose husband had fled for his own 
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safety, which meant she had to assume both the 'mita peng' (Ac.) and 'mita 
breueh' (Ac.) roles at the same time. 
Figure 6-12 The Needs for Rice (Ac. Breueh) in Comparison to the Need for 
Money (Ac. Peng) 
Source: Survey Data, 2004 
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Without attempting to make generalisations based on the limited number 
of households surveyed in my research, it is worth noting that the results are 
indicative of a possible transformation of the Acehnese society with regard to 
gender relations due to the long history of violent political conflict in the region. 
As in many other societies, armed conflict and war often bring significant 
changes to gender relations. The shift of 'mita peng' (Ac.) and 'mita breueh' 
(Ac.) has not only occurred in Aceh but in many other societies in the world 
suffering from such conflicts. 
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2.3 Household impoverishment 
The majority of women complained about the worsening economic 
situation of their households in after 1999/2000, when the conflict reached its 
peak. Their income fluctuated due to the unpredictable nature of their livelihood 
activities because the insecure s ituation. Nurbayani, a woman from village L, said 
that she had to forget her dreams of selling clothes instead of cookies due to 
increased costs and hence the greater start-up capital required. Wardah , another 
woman from the same village, reported that she ran out of capital due to the 
insecure and uncertain conditions that affected the market. For the same reasons, 
her husband had to change from cattle trading before 1999/2000 to coconut 
trading, wh ich brought in a much lower income. Similar circumstances happened 
to Wahidah who used to have a tricycle taxi (I: becak) but had to sel l it to cover 
the fam ily's daily expenses. 
Murni moved from farm ing to sell ing coconut steamed rice (1: nasi gurih), 
usually sold with some meat and vegetable curry, due to the danger that prevented 
her from farming. She and other villagers often were obliged to harvest before the 
crops were ready, resulting in low prices for their agricu ltural products. Often 
they could not harvest at all. Similarly, women from villages P and A complained 
of not being able to harvest their crops, or even before the crops were ready due 
to the security situation. This especially happened when villagers were informed 
in advance of a planned attack near to their farms. Both GAM and the Indonesian 
military usually warned villagers of planned attacks, especially ifthere were near 
harvest time. In such situations, farmers usually moved their plans forward before 
the attacks took place, which in turn led to low prices in the market, and therefore 
decreased income. 
In addition, there were periods when the Indonesian military did not allow 
vi llagers to go to the forest fields, especially in mountain areas, because 
Indonesian military suspected that they might provide logistical support to GAM 
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fighters. The following are examples of statement made by the women I 
interviewed in Aceh. 
"The condition is terribly unsafe, I also have to sell flowers at home 
otherwise there wont be enough money to pay the day-to-day li ving cost 
and the children 's school fee"/"Kondisi keamanan susah that, loen 
payah keurija siet puebloe bungong di rumoh, meuhan han sep peng keu 
be/anja ngon siku/a aneuk" (Wardah) 
'·Livelihood activities cannot be performed safely. Before going to the 
paddy field or other fields one should observe the situation first, [is it] 
safe or not, so [we] have to wait until I 0 am, if the situation is safe, there 
are no armed clashes or patrols; then [we] can go. There are also some 
restrictions to go to the paddy field, fields, or gardens near the forest 
because [armed] clashes often happened ... Livelihood activities can be 
performed only during day time in between I 0 am to 4 pm"l"Mencari 
najkah tidak bisa dilakukan dengan aman. Pergi ke sawah atau ke 
lading harl/S melihat situasi dulu, aman atau tidak,jadi harus menunggu 
jam JO siang, ka/au aman tidak ada kontaksenjata a/au patroli, maka 
boleh pergi. Adajuga /arangan pergi ke sawah, ladang, atau kebun 
yang dekat hutan karena sering kontak ... Mencari najkah hanya bisa 
dilakukan siang hari antarajam 10.00 - 16.00" (Murni) 
"Everything is difficult, cannot say anything anymore, how to find 
money for buying rice, fish, salt, and so on, do not know what to do 
anymore, the situation never changes, always li ke this"f'Duem pue 
susoh. Hana meutupu pe11gah pieh. Kiban mita peng ke11 bloe breueh, 
engkot, sira ngoen laen-laen. Padahai mita peng paleng suleut. Han 
meutaoeh penget sapue pieh thee. Keadaan hana meu ubah2 lagee nyoe 
sabe-sabe " (Wina) 
T he women did not specify the intensity and the degree of difficulties 
created by the armed clashes, but the ir words clearly illustrate their frustration 
with their situation. These statements clearly demonstrate their feelings that the 
situation was so difficult that it affected their entire life, to the point that they 
could no t seen any solution, especiall y when the situation has rema ined the same 
for a long period oftime. 
The unsafe circumstances did not on ly affect farming activities, but also 
handicrafts, which was al so one of the main sources of income fo r villagers. 
Some women who made woven floor mats as their main source of income, 
complained of not being able to collect pandanus leaves, the main material for 
pandanus mats ( I: Likar pandan). Wild pandanus leaves (I: daun pandan) were 
usuall y co llected from the forest, where GAM and Indonesian military clashes 
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often took place. Rania, a woman from B, for example, reported a sharp income 
decrease from 80,000 JDR per month before 99/00 to 20,000IDR per month after 
99/00 because of the difficulties in finding the raw material for the mats. 
The regu lar armed clashes and security operations, therefore further 
impoveri shed women and their households. Facing limitations in their day-to-day 
activities, they suffered decreased income. The pro longed conflict might wel l 
have incarcerated these households in what Gunnar Myrdal ( 1968) termed a 
'vicious circle of poverty', that led to nothing more than degenerated poverty. 
The fo llowing statement of Trisna illustrates thi s: 
"No money for daily living cost, no permanent j ob, do not always have 
job every day ... no house"/ "Peng belanja hana, buet hana meupat, hana 
buet tiep uroe ... rumoh gohlom na ... "(Trisna) 
In her limited words, the woman tried to explain that the prolonged armed 
confl ict was leading her into a poverty trap. Her current situation (2004) of ' no 
money' further deteriorated with no job opportunities, which might lead to her 
ending up with no house to replace the one that was set on fire. This would lead 
to further consequences of not being able to provide good education for her 
children, wh ich consequently prevented them from getting a good job, and, in 
turn , promised noth ing but poverty. The ' poverty trap' situation can also be seen 
in the case of Marlinda, a former employee of Exxon Mobil. In 2003, together 
with man y other workers, she was fired due to the company's down-sizing 
operation, which Mobil claimed resu lted from its difficulties in covering the high 
costs of security. Consequently, she had to struggle with her household dail y 
economy and could not send her son to school any longer. 
In contrast, Nurmala admitted to not having any problem: 
"At that time [1999/2000 and after] our family was okay, no problem, 
... "/" Watee nyan keadaan keluarga kamoe get-get mantoeng. Hana 
masalah, ... "(Nurmala) 
However, this was not a common picture, and can be understood given 
that she resided in Banda Aceh, the capital city of the province, which was 
relativel y peaceful compared to other regions. In add ition, she had a good 
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business that enabled her to have a relatively better economic status than others. 
She started her business in the 1980s, selling household necessities and clothes. 
Slowly expanding the business to household furniture, she obtained more profit, 
wh ich she smartly invested in building wooden houses in U of Banda Aceh, 
which she rented out for Rp 300,000 (for one bedroom) to Rp 650,000 (for three 
bed rooms) rupiah per year. As U was a settlement for those who fled from the 
conflicts in their villages, she was in fact able to profit from the confl ict. She 
admitted to having one three-bedroom house that she rented out, but her close 
friend, who was also her tenant, told me that she had 3 or 4 houses and named her 
the' local conglomerate'. T his title may not be exaggerated considering that she 
a lso owned a fishing boat which she rented out if her husband cou ld not go 
fishing because he felt sick or simply too tired to go to sea. 
2.4 Double Illegal Taxation 
It was not only armed clashes and security operations that caused these 
women and their households to suffer dep letion of resources. The illegal taxes 
extorted by both conflicting parties was often mentioned as sign ifi cant burdens 
for their household economies. Both the Indonesian army and GAM personnel 
often asked for supports fro m locals. While, the ' taxation' of the army was totall y 
illegal since it was not an institutiona l policy, the GAM's tax (Ac.: pajak 
nanggroe) was part of the GA M' s official policy decided by their central office in 
Sweden. Thi s was based on the argument that as a formal entity, the GAM 
apparatus was entitled to obtain taxes from the people. However, neither party 
secured the prior consent of these taxes, which is surely the ultimate source of 
legitimacy. 
Initially, the women I interviewed ad mitted to being happy to pay the 
GAM tax, viewing it as their support for a ' noble goal'. After 1999/2000, 
however, as GAM started to employ s imilar fierce methods of co ll ection to those 
use by the Indonesian military, GAM's good reputation decl ined. Th is was 
especially true for people who failed to pay the tax on the due date, in wh ich case 
GAM's personnel would snatch the household 's valuable property to force them 
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to pay on a new due date, together with penalties should the new due date 
payment not be met. These women generally said that villagers started to view 
GAM ' s tax, pajak nanggroe (Ac.), as a burden, and felt it was too often and too 
much. 
The pajak nanggroe became one of the main sources of household 
resource depletion. As explained by Mala from L, who used to run her own kiosk 
selling cloth in the market, Pajak Nanggroe was blamed for the demise of her 
business. In responding to the question why she closed down her business, she 
said: 
" Because I was often asked for PajakNanggroe"f 'Karena sering 
dimintai pajak nanggroe " 
A similar situation was experienced by Alawiyah, who also had to close 
down her business due to the double illegal taxation. 
Alawiyah: " It is difficult for people like us to run a business. Just 
imagine, in a week those people could come to ask for money two or 
three times"/"Sulit bagi orang macam kita ni untuk bikin bisnis. 
Bayangkan sqja dalam satu minggu bisa dua tiga kali orang-orang tu 
datang minta uang" 
Me: " Who are they?"/"Orang-orang mana maksud kakak? " 
Alawiyah: "Well , those people ... "/ " Ya orang-orang tu .. " 
Me: "The army?"l"TNI? " 
Alawiyah: "Well , both ... it's not only that, they a lso ask not in small 
amounts ... it can be two hundred [thousand], three hundred [thousand], ... 
how can we have such amounts of money ... ce ll phones cannot be sold 
quickly .. It looks good from the outside but we really struggle inside ... 
but they wi ll not understand it... everything seems so wrong for us, either 
giving them money or not, it is just not right ... in the end, we went 
bankrupt..."/ "Ya dua-duanya Lah. . baru gitu khan, mereka minta /uh 
tidak tanggung-tanggung..yang dua ratus, yang tiga rat us .. mana ada 
kita uang segitu .. bisnis hp itu kan tidak cepat laku .. kelihatannya saja 
bagus dari luar tapi kita di dalam tuh mati-matian.. tapi mana mau 
orang tuh tahu ... serba salah kita, mau kita kasih salah tidak kita kasih 
juga salah ... ya sudah, bangkrutlah kita .. " I 
Another person who ran a similar shop admitted a similar experi ence with 
a Police officer who offered hi s ' security protection ' . 
"Sometime ago that person came. He said that he wanted to help take care of 
the shop. I said, this is not my shop, my brother's shop, then I simply 
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mentioned somebody's name, a policeman that I know ... that person went 
away without saying anything anymore ... " /"Ada kemarin orang t11h datang, 
kak. Orang tuh bi/ang mau bant11jaga-jaga toko. Sinyak [acehnese call ing for 
a kid] bi/ang khan, ini bukan toko Sinyak, toko abang, terns SiNyak sebut saja 
nama polisi kenalan Sinyak. ... pergi orang tuh tidak bilang-bilang /agi .. " 
Implied in the 'security protection' was the illegal extortion of money 
from this local businessperson by the police officer. Apart from this, the shop 
owner had to face GAM fighters who came to collect his pajak nanggroe, 
although he admitted he did not have to pay as often as those who had shops in 
GAM areas. 
Several people I talked to said they used to eagerly pay the pajak 
nanggroe. However, from being initially voluntary supportive, the pajak 
nanggroe gradually became an additional economic burden due to the extraction 
of household resources for the rebel fighters. Shafira commented: 
" ... The most difficult one is when GAM personnel come to the house, 
early in the morning asking for money, threatens to beat [us] to 
death ... "/" .. Nyang pa/eng sos ah meunyo awak CAM t6k keu rum oh, 
beungeh-beungeh /akee peng, kacak meutumb6k ngon meu poh 
matee ... "(a single mother from Pi die - whose husband fled to another 
province for security reasons) 
As a consequence of these situations, households had difficulties in 
meeting their daily needs, adding to their already vulnerable situations. 
2.5 Beyond Livelihood: Spiritual and Psychological Sufferings 
It was apparent that people suffered not on ly from economic deprivation, 
but also in other spheres of life. The effects of the violent political conflict 
between GAM and the Indonesian military also affected the very core of their 
personhood, their spirituality and psychological wel l being. As explicated 
extensively in Chapter 4, the combatants in the conflict often employed 
'psychological warfare' , which created an atmosphere of constant fear and terror. 
This practice ranged from displaying corpses in public places to propagating 
policies for rewards and punishments for those who supported and acted against 
either conflicting parties, including stigmatising each other and the followers of 
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the other patty. Through these actions, ' fear and terror' were culti vated among the 
people, regardless of their age and gender. 
The obligation to report one's movements to both conflicting patties 
might also have added to the fear and terror among the people. Often, however, 
villagers tended to avoid speaking about this to me, which further exemplified the 
existence of apprehensive feelings. I often encountered statements made by my 
research subjects that cannot be understood at face value, but need fu11her 
elaboration. Rina, for example, said that there was no intimidation from the army 
so ldiers at her village. This may indicate relative security and easy mobility. 
However in a further e laboration, she contradicted her statement by noting that 
men in her village only went out if they had to, otherwise they stayed in the 
vi llage. Considering that she was from a ' hot spot,' the conflicting statements 
signify her ' fear' of telling the truth and hindered her from talking about it. 
Nevertheless, not everyone was subjugated by the ' fear.' In some cases, 
women could be outspoken, and directly confronted the fear and those who 
perpetrated it. I remember meeting an old woman at one of the sub-district 
offices in Aceh Besar who came to the office to ask her head of gampong (Ac. 
keusyik) to assist her to find out from the military the location of the body of her 
son, who had joined the fighters some years before and had been recently killed 
in an incident. According to Islam, dead bodies have to be buried properly. If they 
are not, it is considered a sin by the kin deceased or other Moslems who knew 
about it. Through her crying, this old woman kept on saying that she had to find 
and bury her son or otherwise her prayer (I: sholat) would not be accepted by 
God. "Just tell me where the location is and I will collect it myself. It 's been 15 
days!" she said impatiently when the keuchik answered that it was not possible 
for them (men from the village) to collect it due to the conflict. The keuchik said 
no more as he knew that this old woman would certainly go and put her life at 
risk to collect the body if he did give a clue as to where the body might be. 
Women from his village knew the forests very well, even better than their male 
counterparts, since they were the ones collecting wood and rattan. 
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This story exemplifies the deeper impact of vio lent political conflict on 
the spirituality of people dealing with the after life as well as their mundane 
existence. It also illustrates the women's central caring roles in household coping 
strategies as well as their own lives. This strengthens my argument that women 
were not on ly passive victims but 'active survivors' at both personal and 
household levels. 
3 Coping with the Effects of the Violent Political Conflict on 
Livelihoods 
From several interviews and the household survey, it was apparent that a 
variety of strategies were used by different households to cope with the livelihood 
consequences of the v io lent po litical conflict in Aceh. I found at least three 
cop ing strategies, which each brought different consequences to the households. 
Thi s is in line with the study of Jaspars and Shoham (2002) on household coping 
strategies in vio lent political conflict situations described in Chapter 3, where 
petty trade was predominant among the li velihood strategies employed. 
Nevertheless, out of fo ur strateg ies identified by Jaspar and Shoham 
(2002), I was only able to find three. The ' returning back to subsistence 
economy' was unlikely to occur in Aceh in the short term considering that the 
armed clashes often took place in farming areas. The fo llowing section describes 
the three main coping strategies I identified and their effect on the households' 
impoveri shment. 
3.1 The Three Coping Strategies 
The way of coping depends on three major factors, namely the escalation 
of the conflict, the extent of the impact of the conflict on the household's 
livelihood, and the level of threat experienced by household members. Based on 
thi s, I identify three coping strategies. The first is to escape by evacuating the 
who le household out of the v illage to safer areas, usually big cities such as Banda 
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Aceh, to continue their life and livelihood. The second strategy is for on ly part of 
the household to migrate to big cities or even a foreign country such as Malaysia. 
The third way of coping is to stay in the village as the family has nowhere to run, 
and struggle to survive in different circumstances. 
In the first strategy, households usually did not move together in one-step 
but in stages to avoid suspicion from both conflicting parties. Husbands or other 
adult male household members would go first, followed by the rest of the 
household once these male members had been able to settle down. Th is strategy 
was especially employed by households from ' black areas' or ' hot spots' . During 
the period of martial law or even the military operation preceding this, people 
from these villages needed to seek consent from the military and civil authority 
anytime they wanted to leave the vii lage. Non-formal consent was also needed 
from GAM. In this case, the usual excuse was visiting relatives. This was 
considered to be the safest and most appropriate reason for an extended absence 
that was well accepted by both the Indonesian military and GAM fighters. If the 
villagers failed to return, people would usually start to ask about their 
whereabouts, in which case the reply would be migrating (economic migration) 
(I: merantau) or seeking life in the city (I.: mencari rejeki di kola). 
This is similar to the second way people coped, but in this case only part 
of the household migrated to big cities or even to a foreign country. This second 
approach only involved those members directly affected by the conflict. These 
people typically faced some difficulties because they were perceived to be closely 
affiliated to either GAM or the Indonesian military and the Police. Commonly, 
this included husbands or sons who had received death threats, or women who 
had lost their husbands due to forced disappearances or killings. The husbands 
and sons in these cases were perceived as, supporting GAM, not supporting 
GAM, or strongly affiliated to the Indonesian military and the Police, and, in late 
2000, lo the Javanese. An example is Nina, a research subject from B village 
whose husband, a Minangkabau, left her and their children to flee to Padang in 
the neighbouring province of North Sumatra around 2002 after he had received a 
life threat from GAM fighters: 
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"That was the GAM soldier, they said that ifthere was no money amounting to 1 
million, my husband had to go .. . but, even though there was I million provided, 
my husband had to go out of the village still , or otherwise 'Koh tako"' /" Ye keu 
awak GAM, goet nyan peugah menyeo hana peng I juta !aka Lon I poh ... tapee, 
/age nyan na I ju/a, /aka Ion teutap weh kareuna kalo han weh, 'koh tako '. .. " 
(A Women from B) 
'Koh tako' (Ac.) is a term used for cutting someone's throat to kill them. 
It is part of the old traditional practice of the Acehnese to protect one 's pride3. 
However, during the conflict, it was used to punish those who were considered as 
endangering, betraying, or disrespecting the Aceh independence movement. 
Nevertheless, it was not usually done li ghtly. Depending on the seriousness of the 
villager's mistake, some warn ings were usually given beforehand. In most cases, 
the villagers were asked to leave the vi llage and never to return. Later, however, 
in around 1999/2000, the practice of ' koh tako' was copied by the Indonesia 
military and it became difficult to differentiate the two parties. Apart from this, 
some people used 'koh tako ' for their own private revenge or dendam pribadi (I). 
This may explain why people tended to not discuss ' koh tako ' if such a case 
happened. They simply said it was conducted by OTK (I: Orang/Organisas; Tak 
Dikenal), an unidentified person or party. Their fear oftalking about ' koh tako ' 
incidents was evident. Three reasons might exp lain this fear. First, the 
indistinguishable nature of the 'koh tako, ' since it might have been conducted by 
either confl icting party or simply by civilians for private reasons. Second, the 
risk of being seen to be in opposition to one or other of the conflicting parties. 
Third, discussing and specu lating about the 'koh tako' did not help to make their 
situation better. 
Interestingly, the story of how GAM fighters, including the Jnong Ba lee 
(Ac., literally widows), the female fighters of GAM, were highly skilled at 'koh 
tako ' and could make a quiet, clear cut and disappear before others realised what 
had happened, moved around from one region to another. Sometimes I had the 
3 Traditional killing to protect one' s pride is not restricted to the Acehnese society in Indonesia. 
An example of a traditional honour fight is the carok (I) among the Madurese. Many other 
societies in different parts of the world, however, have such practices, in especial ly former times. 
In the 16th century in Western society, for example, a ' duel ' was a gun or sword fight between two 
persons to defend their honour. 
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impression that people were quite proud of this skill, their eyes were sparkling 
when they told me about the story. 
The women who used this second strategy were typically widows of 
GA M fighters. These women, usually left their children, if any, with their mother 
or another close relative who was willing to take care of them. Finding someone 
who would take the responsibility for children from such families, however, was 
not easy. Not everyone, even close relatives, would take the risk of having trouble 
with the Indonesian military or the Police for helping GAM-identified children or 
families. In such cases, local NGOs usually played a crucial role in finding foster 
families for these children, and assisted the poor mother to get a job. Ayu, a 
woman that I met in North Aceh, for example, had just lost her husband, a GAM 
solider, who was shot to death by the Indonesian military. With four chi ldren 
aged from around I to 13 years o ld, it was difficult for her to make a living, not to 
mention the stigma she had to carry of being the wife of a GAM soldier. 
Neighbours and close relatives turned down her pleas for assistance, until she was 
met by a local NGO that helped to find foster families for these children. At the 
time I met her, she was still with two remain ing children, aged I and 8 years o ld , 
and the NGO was still trying to find foster families for them. 
Communication could be problematic for husbands or sons who escaped 
from home because of threats to their lives. Nina, the above mentioned woman 
from village B whose husband had fled due to the threat from GAM, for example, 
had not communicated with her husband since the day he fled from their village. 
Nevertheless, Vanda, another research subject, was luckier since her husband 
visited her once in a whi le and brought some money for the family, although he 
never slept at home and always left the same day as his arri val. 
Communication was thus sometimes possib le, especially for those who 
fled to far away places, patiicularly to foreign countries such as Malaysia, since 
they were able to communicate with their family by phone. In this case, a mobile 
phone became an essential tool of communication. This does not mean that 
villagers had to have a mobile, which is very much a luxury for villagers, but they 
usually borrowed one from their trusted neighbours or friends. They usually did 
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not have to pay for this, but simply did some small things for balas budi (I) or 
returning their kindness or help. This is usually done through offering their labour 
to these people whenever it is needed. 
In contrast to communication, remittances were often problematic. 
Migrants could often not sent money home. One of the reasons was that the 
money was usually used to settle their debts to the labour recruiting agency or 
their work place to cover their initial expenses to migrate and reside in the cities. 
This was especially true for those who immigrated to another country. As 
admitted by Kumala, a mother of a son who left for Malaysia to escape from the 
conflict: 
" ... [!]haven 't sent any, because it still needs to be used to pay the debt 
for covering the cost of passport, transport, and the permit to stay in 
Malaysia .. . "f' ... gohlomji kirem, kareuna man/oengji bayeu penggoh 
yang dipinjam keu biaya passport, ongkos kapa/ dan urus (iin tinggal di 
Malaysia ... " (Kurnala) 
Migration for economic reason, meranlau ( I), however, was not only a 
phenomenon of people from the hot spots and areas close to the hots spots, but 
a lso people from big cities like Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe. This especially 
happened due to the lack of job opportunities in the region. Some factories that 
used to be the main source of employment, such as Exxon Mobil and ASEAN 
fertiliser, as we ll as NGOs (both national and international) had to scale down 
their operations because of the heightened state of the confl ict. Some small 
businesses went bankrupt for the same reason, such Alawi yah' s family discussed 
above, who ran a mobile phone shop but could not cope with the double ill ega l 
taxation in the region. 
The destinations of meranlau (I) varied. They included cities in the same 
district, cities in another district but still in same province, cities out of province 
but still in the country, and lastly foreign countries. In most cases, the main 
country of destination was Malaysia, which was closer for three main reasons, 
namely the success the previous Acehnese migrants (I: Aceh peranlauan) in 
Malaysia; the ease of making a I iving there, and the absence of a language barrier. 
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My data indicated four major reasons why members of households 
migrated from their villages of origin. First, to escape (especiall y male family 
members) from being recruited as track-finders (I:pencarijejak) and militia, or 
for being suspected of being partisans by the Indonesian military. This especially 
happened in areas that were considered as ' hot spots', like the mountain areas 
where Indonesian soldiers were not familiar with the local situation and, 
therefore, needed local assistants to find the whereabouts of GAM. An example 
of this was the case of Kumala, who asked her son to leave the country since he 
was suspected of being a GAM partisan, which according to her was abso lutely 
not true. With some financial support from her family, she sent her son to join the 
Indonesian labour migration to Malaysia. 
Second, households' resources were depleted. The prolonged conflict 
resulted in difficulties in earning their living and depletion of their resources. In 
such situations, households usually decided to flee from their villages of origin. 
Third, threats from GAM fighters due to accusations of being an Indonesian 
military spy and informer (Ac. cuak). Those who were alleged to be 'cuak ' 
would certainly have to leave their villages or otherwise they would be killed. 
Fourth, weariness of the conflict with its frequent sweeps and armed clashes and 
the overall consequences of these on day-to-day life. These four reasons were 
interrelated and clearly indicate that people were basically not interested in the 
conflict. In fact, these lay people were tired of being ' sandwiched' in between the 
two conflicting parties and being innocent victims of the conflict. 
The third way of coping was to stay in the village and adapt to the 
situation in some way. This was option was chosen, or forced on, by those who 
usually had nowhere to go, nowhere to run, and no choice, except to face things 
and somehow, cope! One reason to opt to stay in the village was the strong 
connection with their land. Leaving the village would mean abandoning their 
land , which was culturally undesirable, especially when the land has been 
inherited from their parents. Although there were some limitations on farm 
activities, they could continue. 
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Those who were in a more favourable position of having contacts in other 
regions or having a better economic situation, could send their sons out of the 
village once they were grown up. This was out of fear that they would be 
persuaded by GA M' s propaganda (I: termakan) and join the freedom movement, 
or be suspected of being partisans by the Indonesian military. When they sought 
consent for these sons to leave the village the parents usuall y told both the army 
and GAM, that they wanted them to go to cities for a better education. No one 
would oppose thi s. The Indonesian military or GAM usuall y simply asked 'where 
do they go for school? ' (I: ' sekolah dimana?' ) and never asked more detailed 
questions. The strategy of staying but sending their male family members out of 
villages can be considered as a strategy for minimizing threat in wh ich distancing 
or detachment is made to avoid threat. The strategy of staying but send ing male 
family members out of villages can be considered as a threat minimization 
strategy, in which di stancing or detachment is made to avoid or diminish a threat. 
Considering that violent political conflict has been in the region for over 
twenty years, the women I interviewed tend to perceive the conflict situation as 
part of their normality. My question on how they sustain themselves in such 
situations usually received the very definite answer of "th is is our lives, this is 
what we have been facing for years, and thi s is our normal life". On the face of it, 
this conflicts with their statements about the difficulties of living under violent 
political conflict circumstances. However, the perceived 'normality' needs to be 
viewed from the coping strategy perspective. The violent political conflict milieu 
was 'daily life ' in the region, and after some time it was felt to be ' normal life'. I 
personall y experienced this attitudes during the conduct of the research. I was 
someone from a 'relatively' non violent political conflict situation who had to live 
the conflict situation in Aceh and put up with it. After some time, I also regarded 
it as part of the routine dai ly life. This led me to unconsciously perceive the 
situation as ' normal ' which I did not realise as abnormal until I returned to 
Canberra. 
The strategies that these women applied in their households always 
involved the first three dimensions of a coping strategy: identification of problem 
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focus, support seeking, and positive apprai sal (Zeidner and Norman, 1996). In 
identifying problem focus, women tended to admit the difficulties of sustaining 
their household day-to-day living under the violent political conflict 
circumstances. However, they did not simply passively sit and wait for their 
livelihood situations to change. Instead, they were actively seeking information 
and mobilising support. They were also actively seeking the meaning of their 
s ituation and using it as a source of internal strength and courage to move on. 
These efforts can be seen as support seeking and positive appraisal. It is apparent 
that the very tangible and practical problems of their day-to-day living and the 
way they coped with these problems represented their personal strength. Thus, 
these women and their households did not apply a sing le coping strategy, but 
rather a combination of different strategies. 
It was common for a strong faith in God to become the main source of the 
women's inner strength. As further e laborated in section 4, the FGD results 
clearly indicated that re ligious-based institutions, such as Takziah (!), Pengajian 
(I) and Wh-id (I) were always mentioned as one source of help in difficult 
situations. This was especially true for those in rural vi llages, where religion 
tended to play a central role. 
Takziah, literall y means condolence, mourning, and consolation (Stevens 
and Schimdgall-Tellings, 2004, p.988), and is a Moslem prayer gathering for not 
only mourning and consolation for bereaved families but also for asking 
forgiveness from God for the spirit of the deceased. This is a common 
phenomenon among Muslims in Indonesia. In some places, such as in Aceh, 
takziah (I) has become institutionalised and refers to a group (of Moslems) 
establi shed to mainl y assist bereaved families. The group can be as small as 
around 20 people and as large as I 00 people or more. It usually collects and 
accumulates funds during the takziah prayers, which is then used as 'uang dukci' 
(1), money donated to the bereaved families to cover the expenses for the funera l, 
the amount usuall y being decided collectively in a meeting. During the takziah (I) 
prayer session, the bereaved families provide coffee, tea, biscui ts, trad itional 
cookies and sweets, and sometimes also meals. Members of the group usually 
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bring bohjaroe (Ac.), a g ift of sugar, bi scuits, tea, coffee, and similar things for 
the bereaved families. 
Combining these meetings with the trad it ions for commemorating the 
deceased on certain days, the Takziah prayers were usually conducted at least five 
times: on the day of bereavement, three days after, seven days after, forty-four 
days (some villages are forty days) after, and a hundred days after the 
bereavement. The traditional commemoration ceremony itself used to be held up 
to a thousand days after the bereavement and afterwards every year. Th is, 
however, was usually conducted by those with favourable economic status. As 
the conflict has deprived households of their income, fewer and fewer households 
conduct the takziah for the thousand day commemoration ceremony. There is a 
general tendency for households to commemorate the bereavement up to forty-
four days on ly. 
Pengajian (I) is an activity in which a group of Moslems learn to recite 
the Qur 'an, usually led by an ustadz , a Moslem scholar, usuall y a man. At vil lage 
level, the pengajian is usually conducted at the meunasah (Ac.), the vi ll age 
meeting house, within which people sit in accordance to their gender. In most 
cases, separate pengajian are conducted for men and women. Sim ilar to the 
takziah, the pengajian group has become an impo1tant social asset, especially in 
times of difficulties. In this respect, members of the group attend pengajian not 
on ly for religious purposes, but al so social purposes of maintaining social ties. 
Wirid ( I) basically has two meanings, i.e. division of the Qur 'an (to be 
read, studied , etc.) and extra, persona l prayers said after the ritual prayers. Wirid 
entails reciting a certain division of the Qur 'an either by a group or an ind ividual. 
Wirid in Aceh refers to a Qur 'an Reading Group which usually recites the 
Qur 'an on a regular basis such as weekly, bi-weekl y, monthly or bi-monthly. 
Unlike pengajian, in which people learn how to recite the Qur' an and sometimes 
li sten to a lecture by the ustadz to understand the meaning, in wirid, people are 
assumed to know how to read the particular di vision of Qur 'an to be read and 
there is no lecture or discussion of the meaning. 
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The role of these three types of religious groups in the lives of women in 
Aceh wi ll be discussed below. 
3.2 From Farming to Engaging In the Informal Sector 
The households that opted to flee from their vi llages of origin to safer 
areas usually ended up in the cities such as Banda Aceh and Lhokseumawe, 
which seemed to provide work opportunities through their engagement in the 
informal sector. However, their movement from farming to the urban informal 
sector often resulted in a move from one type of poverty to another. In some 
cases, thi s even increased the househo lds' impoverishment for, as one woman 
described it, in their villages of orig in at least they had a piece of land and a house 
to live in , compared to their vu lnerable situations in urban areas. Having to stay in 
a rented poor house in urban slum areas with no farm land or a proper job that 
could bring a regular income to the household was another form of ' insecurity' 
that they had to face in the cities. 
Households often had to flee with insufficient money or possessions. They 
were usually helped by their friends or relatives who had gone to the cities before 
them. But soon thi s help would come to an end and they had to cope on the ir 
own. Having insufficient skills to enter the formal job market, engaging in the 
informal sector was unavoidable for these households, and became the most 
common way of coping with the new situation of urban li fe. 
Men became cheap labour, such as fi shing hands (I: buruh kapal pencari 
ikan), rickshaw dri vers (I: penarik becak), or public motorcycle driver (Ac., I: 
penarik erbete; I: penarik ojek).4 Those who were lucky enough to have sav ings 
after some time in the city would buy a motorcycle or make a small boat for 
fi shing. Fishing income, however, de pended very much on the season. There 
were times, especia ll y during the west wind season ( I: musim angin barat) when 
4 Ojek (I) locally known as erbete (Ac.), is motorcycle (sometimes a bicycle) used to carry 
passengers who sit behind the dri ver for some fee. It is a common means of public transportation 
in Indonesia, especially in remote areas which lack publ ic transport. 
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they did not have any income for around two to three months since they could not 
go out to sea. 
In such situations, women, w ho usually immediately set up as petty 
traders, became the backbone of the family. Petty trading (l:jualan kecil-kecilan) 
was the most prevalent economic activity for women that I interviewed in urban 
areas. Their activities varied from making cookies, selling steamed rice with 
coconut milk (I: nasi gurih), to small-scale catering for university students in the 
neighbouring gamp6ng. Two women became domestic helpers, which was quite 
new for the Acehnese. According to them, these various activities significantly 
helped (I: sangat membantu) household cash flows. 
Their insecurity thus underwent a transformation, from armed clashes to 
in formal sector insecurity. In addition , they Jacked social capita l, compared to 
when they were still in their villages of origin (see next section). Thei r situation 
can also be seen as a transformation of one type of 'sandwiched position' to 
another. In their villages of origin, they were trapped in between two conflicting 
pa1ties. In cities, they were trapped between gaining a relatively secure location 
and the urban poverty they found there. Whilst living in the city was vul nerable, 
returning to village of origins was not feasib le. 
4 Social Assets 
One of the important sources of resilience for women, and their 
households, from a confl ict affected situation is the ir social assets, which include 
general social support, coalition building, social joining (and parting), and social 
protection, as we ll as the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and tru st 
entrenched in social relations (Moser, 200 I, p.43). Social assets encompass both 
micro institutions, such as commun it ies and households, and macro institutions, 
such as the rules and regulations of formal institutions, especially in economic 
structures and arrangements. 
Part of my research concern was to in vestigate the availability of social 
assets, see how women perceived them, and how these assets were deployed in 
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women ' s coping strategies. The following section aims at elaborating these 
issues. 
4.1 The Focus Group Discussions on Social Assets 
The results from the two Focus Group Discussions presented here 
illustrate the role of social assets in women household coping strategies. The two 
FGD were conducted with women from two extremes: the rural and urban 
settings in the region, which also exemplify the ' hot spot' and ' non hot spot' 
situation. The first FGD was conducted with women from village G in a mountain 
rural area in North Aceh, which was well-known as one of the hot spots in Aceh 
and characterised by frequent armed clashes and the heavy presence of GAM 
fighters. The second was carried out with women from village U, in an urban 
slum coastal area in Banda Aceh, the capital city, which had much fewer armed 
clashes. 
In each FGD I used a Venn diagram to illustrate the types of social assets, 
their level degree of importance, and their intersections. What to discuss, why, 
and how the discussion was to be carried out, as well as why and how the Venn 
diagram was to be used in the discussion were explained prior to the 
discussion. The final decision on the conduct of each FGD was determined 
through discussion and negotiations between myself and the participants. The 
negotiations were especially concerned with how to exemplify types of social 
assets, measure their importance, and demonstrate the intersections of these social 
assets in terms of their importance. This further explained the different forms of 
Venn diagrams. Women from G village preferred to employ the term 
'connection', with arrows illustrating them, instead of intersection, see Figure 
6-13. The connections referred to participants involved in each institution. The 
two way arrows illustrated that participants involved in one institution could be 
found in the other related institution. The one-way arrows represented that 
participants involved in one institution could be found in the related institutions 
but not vice versa. In contrast to women from G village, women from U village 
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easily grasped what I meant by intersection and utilised the Venn diagram in the 
expected manner. 
Types of social assets were presented in as oval shapes, with their size 
showing their relative importance. There were, however, some discussions on 
how this could be measured considering that their importance could vary 
considerably between individuals due to their diverse experiences. The groups 
came up with the conclusion that the degree of importance cou ld be best 
explained by the benefits obtained from the social asset being considered. The 
women then discussed on how to measure benefits, and both groups apparently 
came up with the same logic that the number of participants involved exemplified 
the degree of benefit received. The rationale was that the more benefits offered, 
the more women were attracted to join. The size of the oval shapes therefore 
represents the number of participants involved, assuming that the bigger the 
number of participants the more benefits that could be obtained. The intersections 
i 11 ustrate the overlapping importance of these assets, meaning that these assets 
have similar levels of significance for the participants involved. 
The position of the ovals in the Venn diagrams was apparently also a 
matter of debate. I observed that during the discussions, women negotiated where 
to put them in the diagram, whether in the centre or in the periphery. A central 
position illustrates that the oval shape representing a particular social asset is 
considered the most important in their society. A peripheral position indicates it is 
less important. The negotiations clearly illustrated the power relations of these 
women. The women's group from G vi llage was clearly dominated by the group 
leader, who possessed a better educational background and higher socio 
economic status. The women from U village demonstrated more balanced power 
relations, with everyone contributing to the discussion. It was interesting to 
observe the interaction of these women in determining the location of certain oval 
shapes to best represented their importance. Several hands held the shapes at the 
same time and moved them in different directions. Some tried to pull an oval in a 
certain direction and position it in the location that they preferred, wh ilst some 
others pulled it in different directions . Once they realised that they were pulling 
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in different directions, they wou ld look at each other and start to discuss where 
they should locate the oval that could best represented its importance for them. 
4.2 Social Assets in Different Settings: Julo-Julo, Posyandu, 
and Takziah 
Figure 6-1 3 shows the types of formal and informal assets and their 
interrelationships according to women from village G. Five institutions were 
considered to play an important role, in the sense that women could obtain some 
benefits from their existence. These institutions were PKK or the Family Welfare 
Empowerment Programme, wh ich was basically formed during the New Era 
under Suharto to mobilise women 's votes for his party and inculcate state 
ideology; Julo-Julo (Ac.) - a local term for arisan (I) or rotating credit 
association; Posyandu - the integrated service post which provides basic health 
services for pregnant mothers, and lactating mothers and babies, and is run by 
PKK; Takziah - the Moslem association for social support, especially in times of 
crises such as death; Hude Besare (Ac.) (l ight of li fe)- the women's group 
formed and assisted by a local NGO for income generating activ ities; Pengajian, 
the study group to recite Qur'an (Ar.); and Wirid (1), the Qur'an Reading grou p 
which in village G was conducted on a weekly basis. 
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Figure 6-13 lnstitutions and their relationships according to women from 
village G, North Aceh 
Hu de 
Besa re 
(I) Note: (I) Result of FGD on 12 July 2004, (2) Hu de Besare =The Light of Life 
Source: FGD, 12 July 2004 
From Figure 6-1 3, it is apparent that Pengajian (I) and Wirid (I) were not 
on ly seen as the main source of socia l support, but also as the core of the 
women's social organisation. T he women said that Pengqjian was a matter of life 
and death to them. 
"Pengajian adalah pokok, ada/ah hidup dan mati. Ustadz memberikan 
pengarahan tentang cara hidup dan membantu menyelesaikan 
masalah"t'Pengajian is the main thing, is life and death. Ustadz [the 
Moslem scholar] gives [us] direction in life and helps in solving 
problems" . 
The women had regu lar Pengajian and Wirid meetings at which, the 
Ustadz (the Mos lem scholar leader) gave gu idance on good ways of living and 
how to solve life problems in an Islamic way. During the Pengajian, the women 
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collected some Rp I 000 per member as a donation, and give it to members who 
had suffered a death in the family. This Pengajian, therefore, was not only a 
benefit to the women spiritual ly, but also economically. 
Interestingly, in contrast to village G, women from village U did not 
perceive the pengajian as the core of their dail y life. The following Figure 6-14 
clearly indicates that the UBE - Usaha Bersama Ekonomi ( 1), i.e. an income 
generating activity group, was the most important element in their day-to-day 
coping strategies. A woman from the group, who was much more vocal compared 
to other members, stated clearly that pengajian was certainly important, but it did 
not really help to fill their empty stomachs. 
Figure 6-14 Institutions and its relations according to women from village U, 
Banda Aceh 
Posyandu 
Source: FGD on 8 July 2003 
This view has to be seen in the context of the village, which was in a slum 
area of Banda Aceh. It was newly establi shed vil lage, with residents mainly from 
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outside Banda Aceh. According to a sen ior resident that has lived in the area 
since the 1970s, the village was established in that decade. However, other senior 
residents maintained that the vil lage has been estab lished before the 1970s, during 
the Dl/T ll /N ll clash. ln either period, most of these people had fled from their 
places of origin due to the conflict. 
Living in the urban context of Banda Aceh, the women expla ined that it 
was harder to cope than in a rural area because nothing was freely provided by 
nature. To have clean water, for example, they had to buy it for around Rp 200 
per 5 to I 0 litres. Some women who had arrived in the 1990s due to insecurity in 
their villages, said that their lives had become more and more difficult 
economically compared to when they were still in their villages. 
In both vi llage G and village U, the PKK or the Family Welfare 
Empowerment Programme formed by the government was seen as providing the 
smallest benefit. This was because only those closely linked to the government 
system in the villages were invo lved in PKK. The rest of the society tended to 
'stay away ' from PKK and its activities. There were at least two main possible 
reasons for this. The first was the distrust of the people towards this institution. 
The PKK was established as part of central government policy, and those 
involved were volunteers, e.g. they were free labour, and not government public 
servants. Desp ite thi s, PKK was put under the control of the Ministry of Horne 
Affairs. Thus, it clearly represented the government desire to exercise control 
over civi l society. In other words, it was the embodiment of the central 
government at local level, especially for women. The second reason, the women 
were reluctant to mobilise th is institution as part of their social cap ital was a fear 
of being seen to be affiliated too much with the government. 
Posyandu, however perceived to have relatively similar of impo11ance in 
both vi llages a relatively simi lar degree of importance. Th is is despite of the fact 
that Posyandu is run by PKK. The possible reason for this is that Posyandu 
benefited pregnant mother, lactating mothers, and children, including prov iding 
immunisation. 
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Julo-Julo (Ac.), the local rotating credit association, sometimes also run 
by PKK. Similar with PKK, Julo-Julo also not seen as a central institution. 
However, since it is not a formal organisation, any group of women can initiate 
Julo-Julo without establishing a formal group. 
4.3 Bantuan (Voluntary Help) 
In addition to the social assets identifying in the two FGD, there were 
several other sources of support available to Acehnese civilians, especially for 
those survivors of the Military Operation. This support came from government, 
national and international NGOs, relatives or family members, and non family 
members. The government, through its ministry of social welfare, provided 
compensation to the survivors (I: Uang Diyat), as well as Rice for the poor (I: 
Beras Untuk Si Miskin - Raskin), and assistances under the Presidential Decree 
on Underdeveloped Villages (I: lnpres Desa Tertinggal - IDT). In addition , the 
provincial government had launched an excellent program called Gema Assa/am, 
which basically aimed at providing support for economic empowerment. 
However, it was common knowledge among the people of Aceh that 
many, especially from the ' hot spots', could not receive this help. One of my key 
informants from the regional development planning bureau (I: Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah - BAPPEDA) said that the Gema Assa/am 
program was beautiful and well planned, but the problem would always be in the 
implementation (I: pelaksanaan). The armed clashes were the main obstacles 
these programs had to face, along with not being able to deliver them survivors 
from the 'hot spots' who had been severely affected by the conflict. A desire to 
isolate this program, which involved a lot of money, from the GAM fighters, 
might also be a reason why it did not reach the most vulnerable groups. Another 
factor was the efforts of GAM fighters to prevent people taking government 
assistance. 
Neve11heless, due to their immediate needs, households tended to take the 
risk to obtain government support, as shown in the following Figure 6-15. 
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Figure 6-15 Support Sources by Types of Households 
Source: Survey Data, 2004 
c 
<I> 
E 
E 
~ 
0 (!) 
I 
<fl 
c: 
~ 
I 
~ 
Ql 
.s::. 
0 
fJ 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 N.nt:B'dHlatdd; 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
This is regardless of the risk of being questioned by GAM fi ghters. Some 
women admitted that they were often questioned on where and what types of 
assistance they were receiving, and there were times when they were advis~d not 
to take any support from the government. Responding to my question of how they 
would explain receiving government money when asked about it by the anti-
government parties, they said that: 
"Jni khan bukan salah kita. Kita dikasih, kita terima. Apalagi kita butuh. 
Ya khan? ... kita bilang aja bahwa kita dikasih, kita tidak minta. "/"This is 
not our faul t. We were given [the mo ney], we accepted (the money]. We 
were in need anyway, right? .. we would simply said that we were given 
[the money], we did not ask for [the money]." 
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One woman told me that whenever she was asked, she always replied that 
taking government money did not necessarily mean supporting the government. 
This clearly exemplifies women's rational economic choices and their effmts to 
be 'active survivors' by ' playing beautifully' (I: bermain cantik), to maintain their 
distance from both conflicting parties to protect their household security. 
As well as the government, Indonesian and international NGOs (usually 
through local NGOs), provided a wide range of support from economic to human 
rights protection. Unl ike the government, who could not reach the ' hot spots', the 
NGOs had more flexibility to move around. A government officer admitted that 
often they had to ask their assistance to deliver government support to the people 
in ' hot spots' . Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, with the implementation of 
martial law, the NGOs had to sign ificantly reduce their activities. 
Family members, especially children who had successfully migrated to 
other cities sent remittances to families back home. There is a tradition of male 
siblings helping their female sibling's households, suppo1t for which is usually 
delivered through their wives. Murni, for example, received money every 6 
months from the wife of her brother who worked at Exxon Mobile. Kumala was 
also given financial support from her brother's wife every month. 
Non family members - neighbours, friends, the workplace, or 
businesspersons (Ac., I: tauke)5 - were also part of the supporting system 
provided help that ranged from money, goods, and labour. Some neighbours in 
villages, for example, helped each other by donating agricultural products to the 
struggling households, for example, Aisyiah from village B who received charity 
from her neighbours in the form of agricultural products. The support, however, 
was usually secretly given to women with close kin involved in GAM due to the 
stigma of ' rebels' and 'disobedience ' carried by these women. Helping them 
could be perceived by the armed forces as helping GAM fighters, which could 
lead harsh punishment. 
5 There are different ways of writing the term. These include tauke, taoke, and taokeh. Steven and 
Scmidgall-Tellings (2004, p.998) translate this term as boss, foreman. In Aceh it refers to a local 
businessperson 
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4.4 Loans: an Inappropriate, But Necessary, Source 
Apart from using voluntary help (I: bantuan), loans (I: hutang) were also 
called upon . Azizah, a woman from village 8 , said that she received a loan (I: 
hutang) from a local businessperson (Ac. , I: tauki) for her farm activities. 
Interestingly, in most cases, loans (I: hutang) would not be perceived as such but 
as voluntary he lp (I: banluan), even when interest applied. Lending money was 
generally perceived as a sin because charging interest is not a llowed accord ing to 
Islam. Consequently, when interest was applied it would not be called, or 
considered as, usury but as simply returning a kindness (I: balas budi). This may 
be the reason why there was a tendency to perceive hutang as banluan. Atikah 
from village U, however, preferred to simply adm it to the payment of interest. 
She said: 
"Bunga itu riba. Dan itu sebenarnya tidak bo!eh. Tapi karena butuh 
tetap pinjam "l"lnterest is riba [usury]. And actually this is not al lowed. 
But because of need, I still borrow" . 
Rizkiah, from village P, which was 4 to 5 hours away from Atikah's 
village also preferred to perceive debts or loans for what they were, and to 
differentiate them from voluntary help (I: bantuan): 
"Na yang bantu, tapee /oen meutang ba syedara-syedara di lingka 
rumoeh. Meuse utang breueh bayee ngoen breueh, meusee utang peng 
bayee ngon tenaga. Menurut kamo hana brat, kareuna mantoeng ek 
meubayee ngoen tenaga. Keurija bak gobnyan "/ "There is some help, 
but I borrowed from neighbours. Rice debt wi ll be paid with rice, labour 
debts will be paid with labour. For me, it is not heavy, because it can be 
paid with labour. Working for them." 
The terms for the return of the loan varied from one debtor to another. 
However the usual practice was to return it after an agreed period, usually one or 
two days. Tolerance, however, would apply in the case of failure to return the 
loan by the agreed date. 
" ... kalo meminjam pada tetangga maka pengembaliannya setelah satu 
hari peminjaman, ka/o ada uang. Tapi kalo tidak ada menunda sampai 
tiga hari ... " (A woman.from U) 
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" ... if borrowing from a neighbour, it should be returned the next day, if 
you have money. If not, it can be postponed to three days ... " 
No formal written contract was applied and legal sanctions were rare. 
Mutual trust was the only foundation for these relationships, which under the 
conflict circumstances of Aceh was not easy to gain and maintain. Consequently, 
some women admitted that obtaining credit was not easy. Add ing to this is the 
reluctance of many people to obtain credit. There was a general principle among 
these women not to get into debt because of the fear of not being able to repay it 
(I: tidak mau terjerat hutang). Therefore, in most cases, women were careful in 
taking loans. This may explain why households tended to take government 
support when it was available. 
5 Fleeing from Insecurity to Poverty: A Case Study of Nur's 
Family 
N ur, a mother of three children, was one of the income generating activity 
group (UBE), group in the village of U, Banda Aceh that I met through my local 
NGO contact. In her late 30s, she looked much older than this, which is 
understandable given the hard life that she had had to go through, especially for 
the previous ten years, because of the conflict. She and her family originated from 
G, in the district of Pidie, a village which was classified as one of the 'b lack 
areas' i.e. areas with heavy presence of GAM. Consequently, security checks by 
the Indonesian military, which often ended up in physically violent and armed 
clashes, were not new phenomena for her, especially after the 1990s when the 
Military Operation was in force in the region. 
She married in 1989 when she was 18 years old, and delivered her first 
born daughter two years later in 1991. With her small family, she lived happily in 
her village until 1993 when the situation became, in her words, 'gawat sekali' (I) 
or very critical due to the military operation conducted by the Indonesian forces. 
The whole family decided to flee to L in South Aceh. 
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At the beginning, I thought it was purely the poor security situation of the 
entire village that she and her family had fled from. However, after getting to 
know each other better, she started telling me the secret of her family, which even 
her close neighbours in U, where they currently resided, did not know, and she 
asked me to keep it confidential. It was, apparently, not only due to the security 
situation, but also the threats that they received against her husband when he was 
recruited as a tracker (I: pencarijejak) for Indonesian military to find GAM 
fighters in the mountain area nearby their village. For this purpose, the husband 
had received special training from the Indonesian military. It did not matter 
whether the husband had voluntarily or involuntarily joined the Indonesian 
military; the fact that he had joined was a strong enough reason to put his and his 
family's lives at risk. 
It was not easy for Nur to remember when exactly her husband was 
recruited by the military, but it was not difficult to recall her struggle to keep her 
household running before 1993. Although there was only one child to feed, the 
cost of living was not low because she also had to send meal s to her husband. 
Together with many other women from her village, they usually sent meals to the 
forest where their husbands were assisting the Indonesian military to find the 
GAM fighters. Her eyes looked deeply sad and her face suddenly looked tired 
when she told me the story of how they had to support these husbands for months. 
"Not to mention the fear that we felt inside," she said. 
They stayed in L unti I around 1998 when the situation improved and she 
decided to go back to G with her two children. To her, it was better to live in her 
own village for she had a piece of land where she could make a living. In 
addition, she had her extended family that would be able to help her in time of 
need. Her husband, however, did not join her but went to Banda Aceh instead 
where he tried to make a living by joining a fi shing boat. At that time, she was 
thinking of simply settling down in G, her village of origin, and letting her 
husband stay in Banda Aceh. She said that she could always visit her husband in 
Banda Aceh since it was not possible for her husband to go back to G. 
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In mid 1998, however, not long after she arrived in the vi llage, her first 
daughter got very sick, w ith paratyphoid, and it took more than two days for her 
to see a doctor. The medical doctor was from Banda Aceh, and on ly came to the 
village when security permitted. According to her, this made her realise that it 
was better for her to jo in the husband in Banda Aceh. 
As a result, in 1999 she moved to Banda Aceh. Her struggle, however, did 
not end. Living in U, a slum coastal area of Banda Aceh, was totally different 
from living as a simple farmer in G. She felt that she had to sta1i from scratch. 
Adding to this was the fact that her husband' s income was very seasonal. There 
were times when she had enough money, but there were frequently times when 
she got nothing and had to borrow from the neighbour' s small stall for their dail y 
food. After some time of being in such an unpredictable income situation, she 
decided to make traditional cookies and sold them in small stalls nearby. Assisted 
by a local NGO, she started a small ' home industry'. 
To make these cookies, N ur had to wake up at 3 am every morning. She 
prepared fi ve types of cookies, and while preparing these, she also prepared 
breakfast for her family . At around 6 am, the cookies were usually ready and she 
sent them to the small stalls around the neighbourhood. Sometimes, some 
neighbours knocked at her door in early morn ing to buy some cookies for a take 
away breakfast and lunch for their husbands who were going to sea. 
Nur and her family, as with many others in U, lived in a wooden house 
that was built above the sea shore. The house was a very basic with one living 
room, which at night time was usually turned into a bedroom for her children, one 
bed-room for her and her husband, a kitchen, and a bathroom(!: kamar mandi). 
The house was in very poor condition, with no proper furniture, onl y two simple 
tables in the kitchen, and a carpet in the living room. T he only thi ng which might 
look ' fancy' and helped a little bit in beautifying her house was her 17 inch 
coloured television. The bathroom was not a real bathroom but a simple 
extension at the back of the house with a wooden partition as high as an adult 's 
shoulders. In the bathroom, was a medium sized water container and a ' toi let', 
which did not look like a toilet at all as it was a simple hole of 5 x 5 cm in the 
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wooden floor. Luckily, she had access to water and electricity from the 
government, for which she paid a reasonable price every month. Although the 
electricity was often cut off, it was still good for her to have it for it was 
important for her children for studying and watching television. 
The house was not her house. She rented it from a neighbour for around 
500 thousand IDR a year, or around 62.5 US$ (with 1$ = 8,000 IDR). She 
complained a lot about the rent. She kept on saying that the rent always increased 
every year, regardless of the fact that she was a longstanding tenant. It was only 
around 250 thousand IDR when she first rented it, and steadily increased every 
year. She said that she was tired of these increases and wanted to have her own 
house. She had bought some wood for the construction already, and was, at the 
time of the interview, seeking permission from the head of vi llage to build the 
house. 
Made of wood and built above the sea, the house could be very cold at 
night time. This was especially true because these types of houses, in order to 
reduce building costs, were usually built with some small gaps in between the 
wood. One could clearly see the water below the house through the wooden floor. 
No doubt the wind could enter from every single corner, including from below 
the house. I still remember how chilly it was at night time whenever I slept over 
in her house. 
This hard life in the urban slum made Nur always want to go back to her 
village. "But the village is not a secure place for us to live", she said. Many 
youngsters disappeared for no good reasons, either being kidnapped, or killed, or 
simply joining the GAM fighters. She kept on saying, " it 's such a same" (Ac.: 
sayang that). While telling me the stories she repeatedly said that she did not 
want to go through the awful experiences she used to have in the village again, 
for the burden would be too heavy for her both economically and 
psychologically. She also kept on saying, almost wondering to herself, about her 
hope for peace in the region so that she could make a living and raise her children 
as normall y as many other families in many other areas. 
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6 Conclusion 
The aforementioned analysis clearly suggests that the consequences of the 
vio lent political conflict encompass both the economic and non econom ic state of 
affairs of women and their households. ln the economic sphere, the conflict has 
resulted in not only livelihood difficulties, but also household impoverishment. 
The warfare strategies employed have ranged from psychological to physical 
attacks, and these have hindered the economic and other daily activities of these 
households, especially in rural areas. Both conflicting parties have brought 
nothing but poverty to these people. The double illegal taxation, for example, has 
depleted household resources. Furthermore, it has hindered households from 
establish ing small businesses which was an impo1tant coping strategy, especially 
of female-headed households. The Indonesian military counter insurgency 
strategy, which included cutting GAM logistics channels, was found to be another 
problem the Acehnese faced in maintaining household economy. It was not on ly 
GAM fighters that suffered from this strategy but also locals in general. Th is has 
led to local economic deprivation (I: 'penghancuran ekonomi local'). 
My data shows that women and men, however, experienced the 
consequences of the violent political conflict differently. Whilst the major 
complai nt of men was the limited mobili ty that hindered them from performing 
livelihood activities, women were more concerned about the limited job 
opportunities. Under martial law, civilian mobility was restricted as part of the 
effort to seizure GAM fighters. Since men were more suspect than women, this 
policy affected men more because they traditionally sought money further from 
home. However, the fewer limitations on women 's mobility did not necessarily 
mean more opportunities for gaining income. When they attempted to establish 
petty trading business to cope with their economic problems, they not only lacked 
capital but also a secure and healthy environment. 
In response to the conflict situation, different households had different 
ways of coping. There were found to be: moving out of the villages to safer areas; 
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migrating to big cities or even a foreign country such as Malaysia; and staying in 
the village and facing the situation. 
For those who opted to migrate, the whole househo ld or selected 
household members usually moved to big cities such as Banda Aceh. Even if the 
whole household decided to migrate, members often left in stages to avoid 
arousing the suspicion of the two con fli cting parties. The husbands or other adult 
male household members usuall y left first, followed by the rest of the household 
once the fo rmer had settled in the new location. 
Migration, which has been prominent in Acehnese history, has thus 
apparently become an important coping strategy during the conflict. Nevertheless, 
my findin gs indicated that fleeing to big cities does not guarantee a successful 
escape from insecurity and economic difficulties. Instead, households frequently 
become in the urban slum areas. Their shift from farming to the urban informal 
sector often entailed movement from one type of poverty to another. Sending 
household members overseas as migrant labour also found to break the poverty 
cycle since it involved quite a significant amount of money to cover the initial 
expenses such as ticket, passport, serv ice fee for the migrant labour agency, and 
funds to settle down before any remittances could be sent home. 
As I have shown, women have often become the backbone of the 
household , not only in the absence of their husbands, but also in male-headed 
households, because of the unpredictable nature of the occupations men were 
forced to pursue because of the conflict. Women became active agents in seeking 
support and mobili sing resources around them, especially soc ia l capital. 
T he increasingly important role of women in the public sphere led to 
changes in gender relations within Acehnese households. In the violent conflict, 
women extended their 'seeking rice' (Ac.:mita breueh) role in their household 
due to the absence of their menfolk or their inabili ty to provide for their 
household in the traditional way. 
The various social institutions (social assets) which helped women cope 
were also exp lored. My findings indicate that in the conflict ridden mountain 
areas, religious institutions were seen as more important than in the urban slu m 
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area of U in Banda Aceh, where local economic institution, were perceived as 
playing a more important role in supporting women. 
The social supports available were considered in terms of self-help 
groups, both government supported (posyandu) or religious supported (takziah), 
assistance or aid (bantuan), and loans. Of these three, government grants were the 
most frequently obtained by the households. Despite the risk that this could be 
seen by GAM as an anti-GAM stance. Women thus had to be pragmatic since 
their households could not survive without this assistance. At the same time they 
had to play beautiful (I: bermain cantik) and to employ their skill of 'lheukjago 
meuluet' (Ac.) so as not to antagonise either of the conflicting parties. This 
clearly exemplifies the rational economic choices of Acehnese women, effort to 
be ' active survivors', as well as their agency in household coping strategies. 
281 
Chapter 7 Moving Ahead: Challenging the 
Totality of Violent Political Conflict 
How women cope with their household daily livelihood struggle in 
situations of violent political conflict area is a neglected story. The literature 
on armed conflict situations is predominantly concerned with the political 
basis of conflicts. Neither academic nor non-academic works on conflict pay 
sufficient attention to the most vulnerable victims-women and their 
children- in their daily livelihood struggles. At a practical level , the voices 
of women survivors are not heard in the busy sounds of humanitarian and 
post-humanitarian activities. If the faint echoes of their voices penetrate one 
or two ears, to grip the listener's hearts, the problem of limited frameworks to 
engage their perspective emerges. This thesis has given space to these voices 
and the implications of attending to them. 
1 The Importance Of A Multi-Faceted Approach On The 
Study Of Aceh Conflict 
Aceh is rich from a number of perspectives. It is affluent in not only 
land and natural resources, but also culture and traditions. Its long history as 
an independent polity, the mixture of different ethnic groups, and the fierce 
resistance against Dutch colonial and Indonesian political rule are the basis of 
the richness, heterogeneity, and uniqueness of Aceh and the Acelmese. The 
heterogeneity of society in Aceh implies that in understanding violent 
political conflict in Aceh we cannot simply assume that the Acehnese are 
unified. Aceh is diverse in many different ways and necessitates an approach 
that accommodates both its diversity and its unique identity. 
Islam first reached Indonesian archipelago through Aceh during the 
11 111 century, hence it has been bequeathed a long Islamic tradition which 
finely compounds Islam and Acehnese traditions, as well illustrated in the 
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saying of ' the law and tradition are like a substance and its innate characters' 
(Ac.: adat ngon hukom, lagee zat ngon sifeut). The saying denotes the notion 
of' Aceh as Islam and Islam is Aceh', illustrating the mixture oflslarn and 
tradition as an integral part of contemporary Acehnese identity. 
Accompanying this notion of identity are the two vital components of 
gampong, or village of origin, and mother tongue. Intermingling this cultural 
identity with the long tradition of Acehnese sovereignty, especially the 
golden history of the Islamic sultanate of Iskandar Muda (1607-1636), has 
resulted in strong resistance against the outsiders' invasion. Adding to this 
complexity, the contemporary violent political conflict has created condition 
that have brought the ominous 'Madonna factor' (I:faktor Madonna) in to 
conflict with existing ' Islamic' values. 
Studies of the effect of conflict to the contemporary Acehnese society 
must address this complexity, sourced from its diversity, as well as the multi-
faceted phenomenon of violent political conflict, which entails numerous 
players, with differing aspirations and internal power struggles. Its multi-
layered effects range from the political to the personal life of the people. 
Studies of conflict need to al so recognise the important issue of women as 
' active survivors', a perspective lacking in scholarly works on the Aceh 
conflict. 
A multi-disciplinary approach is necessary in such circumstances, 
grounded in a historical account. This especially important considering the 
' historical continuity' and 'shared memory' (Robinson 200 I , p.218) of a 
number of violent political conflicts in Aceh which have given rise to what 
Juris (2005, p.415) termed a ' cultural template ' . 
In this regards, I have used a triangulation of conflict studies, women's 
studies, and development studies to address the nature, causes and impact of 
the current conflict in the lives of Acehnese. The triangulation has been used 
in addressing the contemporary contexts of the Islamic rhetoric of rebellion, 
violent political conflict, and ethno-nationalism in construction of Acehnese 
identity. The historical approach has allowed for a deeper analysis of its 
'generational' effects on the society. 
This broad-based approach to understanding shows the way for 
approaches to intervention where neither a security or conflict nor political 
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approach alone is enough to address the issue. A comprehensive package that 
encompasses overall sectors is needed. This has been lacking from previous 
solutions, including the recent peace agreement of GAM and the Indonesian 
government signed in August 2005, in which heavy attention was focused on 
the conflict actors, while the peripheral and indirect participants of civil 
society remained outside its terms. 
2 The Significance Of Four Effects Of The Conflict 
The multifaceted analysis of this thesis, grounded in fi eldwork 
engaging with the lives of the ordinary non-combatant Acehnese has revealed 
four important effects of the longstanding history of political violence in 
Aceh. First, is the 'extended-regenerated collective trauma,' the regeneration 
and expansion of the collective trauma and hatred that might very well lead to 
other grievances in the future. The second effect of the conflict is the awkward 
' sandwiched position' of Acehnese civilians. The Achenese use the analogy of 
being caught between 'pli'u' (Ac.) or grinding stones, to express their 
suffering. Related to the first effect, several generations have experienced the 
feeling of being trapped in between two powers that both victimise civilians. 
Being trapped in between two conflicting parties places limitations on their 
overall lives- politically, economically, and personally- but it also affects 
their psychological well-beings. 
The third effect is the destruction of the local economy (I: 
penghancuran ekonomi lokal), consequent on the disruption of people' s daily 
livelihood activities due to the harsh military approach, especially from the 
Indonesian military: the armed clashes, collective punishment, double illegal 
taxation, security checks and clearance, isolation, and the use of 'fence of 
legs' tactics. This leads to the fourth effect, the 'conflict poverty entrapment' , 
whereby the conflict leads to household impoverishment. This was 
exemplified in the case study of Nur's family, who escaped from one type of 
poverty only to be trapped within another, due to the conflict. The warfare 
strategies applied by both conflicting parties have brought nothing but 
devastation for households, especially the increasing number of female-
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headed households. These ordinary people do not benefit for a 'war 
economy' . 
In this context of suffering, the Acehnese people have also suffered 
from limited development and humanitarian assistance provided by the 
government, NGOs, and other concerned parties, such as the international 
donor communities. The conflict has hindered the delivery of development 
and humanitarian aid. Moreover, the Acehnese households have to also 
suffered from isolation and stigmatisation, particularly those who were seen as 
being affiliated to GAM fighters. Hence, the Acehnese households were 
exposed to, what Chambers ( 1995, p.188) termed the 'multi-dimensionality' 
of deprivation, encompassing poverty, social inferiority, and isolation. 
Acehnese households have multiple ways of coping with their difficult 
circumstances. As described in Chapter 6, women were the backbone of the 
principal household coping strategies, either with or without the absence of 
the husbands. The three principal strategies are: temporari ly evacuating the 
household out of the village to safer areas; migrating to big cities or even a 
foreign country such as Malaysia; or remaining in the village and adjusting 
everyday practices to the situation. The last strategy was especially applied by 
those who for economic or social reasons have no option but to stay and face 
the situation. Migration, which has been identified as a key cultural strategy 
in Aceh (S iegel, 1969), has become an important coping strategy in the 
current context of violence. Nevertheless, this coping strategy has not in 
general led to an improved economic situation, but rather household economic 
insolvency. Fleeing to big cities or to other countries does not guarantee a 
successful escape from insecurity and economic difficulties. Instead, migrants 
often found themselves trapped within new poverty situations in the urban 
slum areas, as their livelihoods shifted from farming to the informal sector. 
This further exemplifies the ' conflict poverty entrapment'. 
In the exercise of households coping strategies, social assets have 
played an important role as important sources of resilience. My study has 
identified three different kinds of institutional supports available: the self-he! p 
groups, including government-supported groups (I: posyandu) or religious 
groups (l : takziah); assistance or aid (I: bantuan); and Joans. These support 
institutions, however, have varying levels of importance for households in 
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different areas. In a mountain area, where armed clashes often occur, religious 
institutions were most significant, whereas in an urban slum area, economic 
institutions, such as income-generating groups, played a more important role 
than religious institutions. 
Of the three sources, the government aid was most commonly obtained 
by households. In the case of Aceh, the economic recovery package (such as 
Gema Assalam) and small schemes credit package were important measures. 
As in many other conflict areas, people's welfare and protection depend on 
the accountability of government authorities, rule of law and functioning 
judiciary system, as well as a functioning public service (Jaspars and Shoham, 
2002, p.7) to deliver assistances. In addition, obtaining government assistance 
entailed the risk of being seen as supporting the government and not GAM. 
However, while these programs of government assistance had weaknesses 
including some instances of corruption, several key informant admitted that 
such direct delivery of assistance is fundamentally a good approach that needs 
to be improved. 
In the complex politics of the violent conflict situation, the people 
have further developed traditional coping skills: to play beautifully (I : 
bermain cantik); to 'push the boat when the tide is high' (Ac.: Tulakjalo 
watee ie paseung) or to sensibly judge the place, time, and types of resources 
received; and to appropriately respond to and convincingly perform 
'contradictory roles' in accordance with the circumstances (Ac.: lheukjago 
meuluet). All these strategies necessitate two important proficiencies: a 
diplomatic manner - the ability to be engaged in a conversation without 
revealing one's own political stance; and intelligence to sensibly assess the 
degree of importance of an event. The way the Acehnese, especially women, 
exercise these skills expresses cultural values and norms and exemplifies the 
rational choices and efforts to be an 'active survivor' in household coping 
strategies. 
Women and men experienced the consequences of violent political 
conflict differently. The different effects have brought further changes in the 
gender relations within household. This is well demonstrated in the shift of the 
traditional roles of Acehnese women and men in regard to 'seeking money' 
(Ac.: mita peng) and 'seeking rice' (Ac.: mita breueh). The violent political 
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conflict has hindered men from performing their role ' seeking money' (Ac.: 
mita peng) and has consequently necessitated women extending their ' seeking 
rice' (Ac.: mita breueh) role to also assume the men's 'seeking money' (Ac.: 
mita peng) role. This might represent a fundamental transformation in 
Acehnese gender relations due to the long history of violent political conflict 
in the region. It has been observed in many other societies, that armed 
conflict and war often bring significant changes on gender relations. 
3 Aceh Beudoh: Reconstructing A Society 'Free From 
Violence' 
As the effects of violent political conflict are deep and encompass 
several generations, these issues need to be addressed in development 
assistance to build peace. Because of the ' extended-regenerated collective 
trauma' that has been carried by the society for generations, there is need for a 
psycho-social approach that will create conditions whereby the people can 
heal themselves from their trauma in order to develop a constructive way to 
respond to the 'cultural template of violence' . However, such approaches wi ll 
have no utility if the current peace deal cannot be maintained. Therefore, it is 
crucial for all parties concerned with peace building in Aceh, to have a strong 
political will to prevent the re-emergence of violent confl ict; only by 
addressing potential conflicts can a sustainable peace be reached. In this 
regard, the impacts of the compensation package associated with the peace 
contract between the Indonesian government and GAM on potential internal 
conflicts among the Acehnese will be crucial. 
'Aceh Beudoh' (raise up) may best explain what to do next to achieve 
a society ' free from violence' in Aceh. However, rebuilding the new society, 
after suffering from a longstanding conflict and the devastating 2004 tsunami , 
necessitates a multi-faceted approach. Considering the crucial role of women 
in household coping strategies, serious attention to the agency of Acehnese 
women is essential in the development framework. 
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Annex ·1 Law No 18/2001 on the Special Autonomy of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province 
UNDA.'iGllNDAt~G REPUBLIK L't'DONESL.\ 
NOMOR 18 TAHUN 2001 
OTONOMI KHUSUS 
BAGI PROVJNSI DAERAH ISTIME\VA ACEH 
SEBAGAI PROVINSI NANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALA .. 1\l 
DENGAN RAJBL~T TUR.-\,~ YANG l\IIAHA L.°'A 
PRESIDEN RE.PUBLIK INDOJlj"ESIA, 
Menimoong: a. bahwa sistem pemerintahan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia menu.mt 
Undaog-Undang Dasar 1945 mengakui clan menghormati satuan-satu:m 
Pemerintahan Damh yang bersifat khusus atau bersifat istimewa yang diatur 
dengan undang-undaug; 
b. bahwa salah satu lrarakter khas yang alami di dalam sej<llah perjuaugmi rakyat 
Aceh adalah adanya ketah:mau clan daya juaiig yang tinggj yaug ber!.umbel- pada 
pandangan hidup, br.il..icr sosial dan kema~yaiakatm det1<:,aan budaya islam 
yang kuat sellingga Daerah Aceh meujacb daerah modal bagi perju .. 111~ da!ain 
merebut clan mempertabankan kenlfJ'dekaa11 Negara Kesatuan Rqmblik 
Indones~ 
c. bahwa untuk memberi keweoang3Il yang luas dalam menjalankau pemerinrahan 
bagi Provimi Daerah Istimewa Aceh, dipandang petlu memberikau otonomi 
kbttsus; 
d. bahwa Undaug-undang Non10r 22 Tahun 1999 renting Pemerint.ahan Daerah 
setta undaog-undang Nomor 25 Talnm 1999 tenting Perimbangan Keuangan 
antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daer.ih dipan.dang belum menampung sepemihnya 
hal asal-usul. clan keistimewaan Provinsi Dae.rah Istimewa Acek 
e_ bahwa peJaks:aman Undaug-undang Nomor 44 Taln111 1999 1entuig 
Penyelenggaraan Keistimewaan Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh perlu 
disdaraskan d-iliu:n penyelenggaraan pemerintahan di Provinsi Daerah Istimewa 
Aceh sehaf;ll Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussala1.11; 
f. bahwa seln1btmgan deng;m halhal teisebut pada humf a, b. c, d.. clan e, 
pemberian otonomi khusus bagi Provinsi Daerah Istiruewa Aceh, perhi 
ditetapk:an de11gan u:adang-undang. 
Mengingat l. Pasal 1 ayat (l}. Pasal S ayat (1), Pa.531 18 B ayat (1), dan Pasal 20 ayat (1) 
Undang-UndangDasar 1945; 
2. Ketetapan 1\ifajeli<; PemlusyaW31'atan Ral..-yat Republik Jndon~-ia Nomor 
IVtMPR/1999 tenting Gari<>-Garis Besar Ha1uan Negara; 
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3. Ketel:tpan f\lfajdis Pemi.usyaw:iratau Ral.y.it Republik: Indonesia IV/IvlPR/~000 
tentang R.ekomenda.si lrebijak:m dal:nn Penyeleugg3ld.1ll Otouomi Daer.th: 
4. Ketetipan Majelis Pennusyawaratau Raky:rt Repubhk. Indonesia Nomor 
VIIIIMPR/2000 tenting uporan Tabl.lllall Lembaga-Lembaga Tinggi Negara 
pada Sidang Tahun.-u1 Majdir; Pamu~rawararan Ral.y.it Repul>lik Indonesia 
Tahun2000; 
5. Undang-undaug Nomor 24 Talnm 1956 tentang Pembentuk:an Provinsi Atjeh dan 
Perubahan Peraturan Propinsi Sumatera utara (Lembarau Negara Taln.ui 1956 
Nomor 64, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor !103): 
6. Undang-undang No. 14 Tamm 1970 tentmg Ketentuan-kete11n1a11 Pokok 
Kdmasaan Kehakiman (Lembarao. Negara Tahun 1970 Nomor 74, Tmnbahan 
Lembaran Negara Nomor 2951); 
7. Undang-undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999 tenting Pemerintahan Damh 
(Lembar:m Negara Tahm 1999 Nomor 60, Tambahan Lembaran Ne.gara Nomor 
3839); 
S. Undang-undang N0010r 25 Tuhtm 1999 tentaug Perimbangan Keu..mg:m antara 
Pemerintah Pusat clan Daerah (I..embaran Negara Tahuu 1999 Nomor 7'!., 
Tambalian I..embaran Negara Nomor 3848); 
9. Undang-undang Nomor 44 Tahun 1999 tentang Penydengg;araan Keistimewaau 
Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Areh (Lembaran Negara Tahun 1999 Nomor 172, 
Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 3893). 
Dengau Pel'setujuan Bersama 
DEWAN PERW AKILA.l'i RAKYAT REPUBLIK. ll\'DOl\"ESIA 
DAN 
PRESIDL"i REPl:~LIK Th'DOl\:""ESl.<\ 
i\llEl'vIUfUSKAN 
Menetipkan: l JNDA.i"'ITGUNDANG OTONOMI KHUSUS BAGI PROVINS! DAERAH 
ISTIMEWA ACEH SEBAGAIPROVINSINANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALAlvI 
BAB I 
KETENTIJAN UJ\-llJ").I 
Pa.sat I 
Dalaxu Undang-undang ini yang dimaksud dengan: 
1. Pemerintah Pusat, selanjutnya disebut Pemerimah, adalah perangkat Negara Kesatu;in 
Republik Indonesia yang tadiri atas Presiden bese:rta para Menteri. 
2. Provinsi Naoggroe Aceh ~ adalah Prm.insi Daerah Istimewa Aceh y'3Jlg diben 
Otonomi Khusti5 dalam kerangka Negara Kesatuan Repubhk Indonesia. 
3. Wali Nanggroe dan Tuba N:lllggroe adalah lembaga yang mernpakan sirulxil bagi pelestarian 
JX!nydenggaraan kehidupan adat, budaya, dan pemersatu masyarakat di Provinsi Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam; 
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4. Gubenntr Provin~i Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam adalah Gubemur Propinsi Daer:ih Istimewa 
Ac eh. 
5. Peme:rintah Daerah Prnvinsi. Nanggroe Aceh Darus.salam adalah Guheru.ur beserta per:mgkat 
lam pemerintah Daer.ah Istimewa Aceh sebagai Badan Eksdamf Proviusi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 
6. Dew3ll Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. adalah 
Dewm Peiwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Dae:rah Istimewa Aceh sebag;i.i Badan Legislatif 
Daer.ID y.mg dipi1ih mdalui pemiliban umum. 
7. M.ahkamah Syar'iyah Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam adalah lembaga perndilan yang bebas dari 
pengaruh dari pihak mana pun dalatn wilay.ih Prm~nsi Nanggroe Aceh Darm.s.<uam y<111g 
berlaku untuk pemehik agama. Islam 
8. Qanuu Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam adalah Peaturan Daerah sebagai pelaksanaan 
undang-undartg di wilayah Provins1 Nauggroe Aceh Darnssalam dalam rangka 
penyelenggaraan otonomi khusus. 
9. KabupJten, y.mg selanjutnya disebut Sagoe atiu oama lain. adalah Daernh Otonom dalam 
Prm-lnsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, y.1ng dipimpin oleh Bupati!Wali Sagoe atau tllln'l.."l lain 
10. Kota, yang selat~utnya disebut Banda atan nama lain, adaJah Daerah Otortom dalam: Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam, y,mg. dipimpin oleh Walikoti/W;:ili Banda atru 11ama lain. 
11. Kecamatui/Sagoe Cut atru nama lain adalah peranglrat daerah I<abup:rten/Sagoe cl:in 
Kota/Banda, y.mg dipimpin oleh Camat atau nama 
12 Muki.tn adalah kesatu.in masyarakat 1n1kum dalam Proviusi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam yang 
terdiri at.as gabungan beberapa gampong yang mempunyai batas wilayah tertentu clan liarta 
kekayaan sendiri, l:ierlcrouduk:a1 di bawah KecamatanlSagoe a.it atau nama lain, yang 
dipimpin oleh Jmum Mukitn atau nama lain. 
13. Gampong atau nama Jain :idalali kesatuan ma.syarakat hukum y;ing merupakan orgauis.·ifil 
pemeriutahan taendah langsung di b:awah nmkim atau nama lain yang menempali wi11yah 
tertentu, yang dipimpin oleh Keuchik at:m nama lain dan beIDak menyeleru!_gmikau um'i311 
ruruah tangganya sendiri. 
14. Lambang daera1i. ten:nasuk alam atau. panji kemegahan adaiah l.."Ullbang yang rnencerminkan 
kei~imewaan dau keklmsusan Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
BAB II 
SUSUNAN DA."'l KEDUDUKA!"'l 
PROVINSI NANGGROE AC:EH DARUSSALA..'I 
Pasal 2 
1) Wibyah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam dibagi dalam Kabupate11.'Sagoe a.tau nama lain 
dan KotatBanda atau nama lain sebagai daerah oronom. 
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(delapan puluh perren), pajak pengha.silan orang pnbadi sebes<1r 20"/o {dua puluh 
persen), penerimaan sumber daya alam dari sektor kehutauan sebesar 80"/o (delapan 
puluh perseu), pertambang:m umum sebesar 80"10 (delapan puluh persen), perikauan 
sebesar 80"10 (delapan puluh pelSCJl), pertambangan minyak bttnn sebesar 15% (lima 
bela.s perse:n), dau pertambangan gas a1am sebesar 3~/o (tig:a puluh persen): 
b. Dana Aloi.~ Umum yang ditetiplran sesuai ~<r.IIl peratur:m pamdang-undangau: 
d:m 
c. Dana Alokasi Khusus :yang ditetapkan ~1iai dengau peraturan pemudang-1.u1da11gan 
dengan memberikan prioriras bagi Provimi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
4. Peueriill<l<lfl dalaln rangka otonomi khusu.s, sebagaimana clinldksud pada ayat (l) butir c, berupa 
tunbahan penerimaan bagi Provinsi Nauggroe- Aceh Darussalam dari hasil sumber daya abm di 
wilayah Provin.si Nanggroe- Aceh Damssalam setelah dilmrangi pajak, yaim sebesar 55% (lii.na 
puluh lima persen) untuk pertunbangan miayak burui dan sebesar 40'% ( empat puluh persen) 
tuituk penrunbangan gas al.am ~lama delapan tilillll sejak berfalmnya undang-turlang ini. 
5. Mulai ttlum kesembilan setelah berlakuuya undaug-undang ini pemberian tambahan 
pe-nerima.m ~bagaim.m.a dimaksud pada a:yat (4) menjadi sebesar 35% (tiga puluh lima per~1) 
untuk pcrtamhangan miny.ik bumi dau sebesar 20"/o (dua puluh pemn) untuk pertambang.m gas 
al:uu. 
6. Perubagian lebib laujut penerii11.1all sebag;aimana dimaksud pad.a ayat (4) clan ayat (5) antara 
Provin~i Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Kabupaten, Kota atru nama lain diatur se:cara adil deng.111 
QamD.1 Provi.nsi Natlggro Aceh Darussalam. 
Pasal 5 
l) Provinsi Nanggroe A.ceh Darussalam dapat menerima bantuan dari luar negen setelah 
menheritahukaunya Kepada Pemerintah. 
2) Provinsi Nanggrne Aceh Damssalam dapat melakul.'111 pmjaman cfari sumber dalam negeri 
danlatau hiar negcri untuk: membiayai sebagaian angg.T<mnya. 
3) PiLtjaman dari sumber dalam negeri unruk Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darus&1.l.1m hans 
mendapat persetujuan. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam. 
4) Pinjaman dari sumber luar negeri lwtuk Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam h.11US mendapat 
persetujuan Dew.ut Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Daru~salam da n 
~nerintah dengan beipedoman pada peraturan yang berlakn. 
5) Keteotuan mengenai pelaksanaan. bantuan sebagaimana dimak.sud dalam pasal ini selai~1rtnya 
dtatur dcng:m Qairun Prowl51 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
Pasal 6 
(1) Pemerintah Provinsi Nanggroe A:ceh Daru.c;s.alam dapat me!akukan penyertaan modal pada 
badan usaha milik negara (BillvlN) yang hanya benlomilisi clan beroperasi di 1'il<1)'311 
Provinsi. 1'.'allgg1oe Aceh Darussalam yang besamya ditetaplmn bersama dengan 
Pemerintah. 
(2) Tata cara penyertaan modal Pemerintab. Provinsi Nanggroe Acel1 Darussalam, !>ebagaimana 
dimaksucl pooa ayat (1) dianu- lebih lanjut dengan Qanun Provimi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam. 
(3) Sebagaian peodapatm Pemerintah yang berasal dari pembagian keuntungan badan usaha 
milik negara (BillvIN) yang h:anya ber~ di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam p ng 
besamya di.tetapkan bernama antara. Pemerintah dan Pemerintah Provini;i Nang_g;roe Aceh 
Darns.salam diguaakan untuk peningkatan kesejabrenmn masyarakat di daeJ-al1 ya1.1g 
befsaugkutm_ 
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{delapan pulul.1 penen), paJak peugha.51lan orang pnbadi &ebesar 20% (dua puhtl1 
persen), penerimaan Sllmber daya alam dari sel..1:or kehutau.an sebesar 80% (defapan 
puluh persen), pertambaog:m umum sebesar 80"/o (defapan puluh persen). perikauan 
sebesar 80% (delapan puluh persen). pertambangan minyak bumi sebesar 15% (1ima 
bela.s ~), dan pertnnbang:m gas alam sebesar 30"/o (tiga puluh perse11); 
b. Dana Alobsi. Uruum yang ditel:lpkan semai dengan pernturan pemndang-nndangan; 
dan 
c. Dana Alokasi Klmsus yang ditetipkan sesuai dengan peraturan peru11dang-tu1da11gan 
dengan monberikan prioritas bagi Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
-l. Penerimaan dalam r.mgka otoncmi khusus, sebagaimana dimak>ud pada ayat (1) bullr c, berupa 
tambaban penerimaan bagi Pr()'\oitisi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dari basil sun.11.Jer daya alam di 
wilayah Provinsi Naoggroe Aceh Damssal:un setelah dil..i.irangi pajak, yaitu sebesar 55% (lima 
pufuh lima pe:rsen) untuk pertunbangan miny.ik bumi dan sebesar 40% (empat putnh per.sen) 
untuk peitnnbangan gas alam selama delapan tahun sejak berlakuuya undang-undang ini. 
5. Mu!ai tunm kesembil.an setelah berlakunya tuidang-undang 1111 pemberian tambahan 
penerimaan sebagaimana dimak.sud pacla ayat (4) menjadi sebesar 35% (tiga puluh Iiina persen) 
1mtuk pert<mibangan minyak bmni clan sdlesai- 20"/o (dua puluh peISen) mtuk pernnnbangan gas 
aL-nn. 
6. Pembagian lebih laajut penerimaan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (4) dan ayat (5) antara 
Provinsi Nauggroe Aceh Darussalam, Kabupaten, Ko1a at.au nama lain diatur secara adil deug.an 
Qanun Provinsi Nanggro Aceh:Daru;salam. 
Pasal 5 
l) ProvinsJ. Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dapat menerima bantuan dari luar negeri setelah 
mcuiJerilalrukaonya Kepada Pemerintah. 
2) Proviusi Nanggroe Aceh Imussalam dapat melakukan piojaman dari ~umber dalam negeri 
danfatau luar uegeri mtuk membiayai sebagaian angg;ir;mnya. 
3) Pit~amai1 dari sumber dalam negeri untuk Proviffi1 Natlggroe Atth Darussalam hams 
mendapat pasetujuan Dewan Pe:rwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Nang,_groe Aceh 
Damssalam. 
4) Pinjaman dari stUDber luar negeri m1tuk Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darus5alam harts mendapat 
persen~uan Dewan Pe1wakilan Ral...y.it Daerah Proviasi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan 
Pemerinrah dengan berpedoruan pada peraturan yang berlal"'ll. 
5) Ketentuan mengenai pelaksaman bautuau sebagaimana dimaksud dalam pasal ini sel.at~iutnya 
diatur dengan Qamm Provi.ru.i Nau...~ Aceh Darussalam 
Pasal 6 
(1) Pemeriutah Provinsi Nang_groe Aceh Darussalam dapat melakukan penyertaan modal pada 
bad.111 usaha mi1ik negara (BU!vJN) yang hanya berdornilisi clan berope!asi di wilayah 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam yang bes..111\)'-a. ditetapkan bers.m1a den,,.a:m 
Pemerinlah. 
(2) Tata earn penyertaan modal Pemerintah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, sebagaimana 
dimaksud pacla a:yat (1) diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qamu1 Provllisi Nanggroe Aceh 
Dam'lsalam. 
(3) Sebagaian pendapatlll Pemerintah yang berasal clari pembagian keuntungau badan m:ilia 
mi1ik negara (BUlVIN) yang hanya berope:rasi ci Proviusi Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam yang 
besamya. clitetapkan bersama antara Pemerintah dau Pemerintah Prminsi Nang_groe Aceh 
Damssalam digunaka11 wtuk peningkatm kesejahimlan mai;y.u-aklt di daerah yang 
bersangkutan. 
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Pasal 7 
1) Perubahan dan perliitungan Anggaran Pendaparnn dan Bel.mja Daerah Prm;ins1 Na11ggroe 
Aceh (APBDPNAD) ditetapkan dengan Qan\Ul Provin5i Nang.groe Aceh Dani.>salam 
2) Sekurang-lmrannya 30"/o (tiga puluh peisen) pendapatan sebagaimana dimaksud pada Pasal 4 
ayat (3) huruf a, ayat ( 4). clan ay:it (5) dialokasikan unnlk biaya pendidikan cli Provins1 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
3) Tata cara penyu~1man clan pelaksanaan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Bel.aitja Daerah Provuisi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (APBDPNAD). pernbahan clan perliitunga11llya 5erta 
pernug,gungjawaban dan pengawasannya diatur de:ngan Qouun Provi.t15i Nan,,,a.groe Aceb 
Darussalam_ 
BAB V 
LA.\IBANG TERMASUK ALAM 
DI PROVINSINANGGRO:E ACEH DARUSSALl.l\I 
Pasal 8 
1) Pro\.insi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dapat menentukan lambang Daerah, yang diclalamuya 
tennasuk a1am atau µmji kenlegilhan, yang mencenninkan kebillnewa.111 dan keldrususau 
Provinsi Nai:iggroe Aceh Darussalam.. 
2) L.1mbang Daerah, yang didalamnya tennasuk alam sebagaimana. dimaksud pada apt (1). 
bukan merupakan si.tnbol kedanlatan dan ti.dak diperlakukan !iebagai bemla:a kedaulatan di 
Pmvinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
3) Ketennl3ll .sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dau ayat (2) diarur lebih lanjut dalam 
Qamm Provinsi Nanggroe A.ceh Darussalam. 
BAB \il 
~IBAGA LEGISLATIF 
PRO:VINSI NAJ.'JGGROE ACER DARliSSALA .. \-1 
Pasal 9 
1) Kekuasaan Legislatif di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceb Darussalam dilaksanakan oleh Dewan 
Penvakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
2) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam ruempuuyai fungsi 
legisla.~ peuganggaran, dan pengawa5an lebijakan Dae.ral1 
3) Dewan Pern'3kilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe A<X'h Darussalam mempllllyai 
wewenang dalam pemilihan Guberrwr dan Wakil Gubemur sesuai clengan ln1dang-undang 
mt 
4) Dewan P-envakilan Ral-yat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam mempunyai hak 
augket dan hak mengajukan pemyataan penclapat 
5) Dewan Penvakilan Rakyat Daeral1 Provi.tisi Nang.._P,roe Aceh Damssalam mempllllyai 
kewajiban unluk mempemhanlcan dan memelihaf3 lreutuhan Negara Kesatuan Repubhk 
Indouesia.serta mewuju<lk:m demokrast clan kesej:ihrer.un masyarakat. 
6) Anggott Dewan Perwakilan Raky;lt Daerah Proviusi Nanggroe Aceh Dam~ 
mempunyai hak mengajukan peit.iny;ian, hak. menyampaikan usu! dan pendapat, serta hak 
inmuitas. 
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T) Jtunlah anggota Dewan Perwakilan Ral·yat Daer.ih Provinsi Na11ggroe Aceh Darns:.al..1U1 
paling bm1)iak 125% {seratus dua puhih lit11a perseu) dari yang diterapkan umiang-uooang. 
8) Pel.1hauaan keteutuan sebagairuana dimaksud pada ayat (1), ayat (2), ayat (3), ayat (4), ayat 
(5). ayat (6). dan ayat (7) diatnr lebih lai~ut deng:m Qanun Provinsi ~;inggroe Aceh 
Damssalam. 
BAB VII 
WAL! NANGGROE DA;.~ TUHA NANGGRO 
SEBAGAI P£NYELENGGARA ADAT, BLl>AY.-\. DA!~ PEMERSATU l\·l-\.5'YARAKAT 
Pasal 10 
1) \Vali Na11ggroe dan Tuba Nanggroe adaJah Lembaga yang mempabn simbol bagi. 
pe!estarian penyelengg,araan kcllidupan adat, budaya, clan pemasatu masyarakat di Pmvinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
2) \Vali ~anggroe dan Tuha Nanggroe bukau merupabn lembaga politik clan pemerint:than 
dalam Prm.<insi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
3) Hal-ha! sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) clan ayat (2) diatur lebih lai~ut dengan Qanll!l 
PrO\.insi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
BABVIll 
BADA.~ EKSEKUTIF PROVINSI NANGGROE ACEHDARUSSALA .. \i 
Pasal 11 
l) Lewbaga Eksekutif Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh D~n dilaksanakan oleh Gubemur yang 
chbantu oleh sear.mg \Vakil Gubernur clan perangkat Daerah. 
2) Gubemur Provimi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam bertanggung jawab dalam penetapan 
kebijabn keteruban. lretentr.unan, clan ke<ml3Il3Il diluar yang terlcait denocran tuga'> tdmis 
J..~ 
3) Gubenmr Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam breaJa jabataunya adalah juga wakil 
Pemerintah. 
4) Dalarn menjafankan tugas dan kewenangan sebagai kepa1a Daerah, Gubemur bertanggung 
j;r..vab kepada Dewan Perwak:ilan Rak1:at Daerah Provinsi Na11ggroe Aceh Damssalam 
5) Dalam kedudukan sebagai wakil Pemerintah, Gubemur berada di bawah clan bertang.guiig 
jawab kepada Presiden. 
Pasal 12 
1) Gubemur dan Wakil Gubern.ur Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darus.5alam dipilih secara langsung 
setiap 5 (lirua) tahun stl<a1i mela1ui pemilihan yaug demokratis. bebas. rah .. 1Sia sma 
dilaksanak:an secara j1tiur clan adi1. 
2) Seseorang y.mg dapat ditet1pk..'U1 menjadi calon Gubenmr clan ca1on \Vakil Gubemur 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam adalah warga ne<r,,,ara Repubuk Indou~1a dei1gan 
syara~sy;1rat 
a. menjalank:an syariat agamanya.; 
b. setia dan taat kepada Neg;ira Kesatuau Rep1iilik Indonesia clan Pemerintah yang sah.: 
c. be3:pendidikan sekurang-lmrangnya sekolah lanjutm tingkat atas a tau yang sederajat; 
d. bemnmr paling sedikit 35 (tiga JX.tluh fum) tahun; 
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e. sehat jasruani dan rohani: 
f. liclak pemah dihukum penjai-a k::irena mdakukan tindak pid;ma: 
g. r.idak sedang dicabut hak pilihnya berdasarbn keputusan pengadilan yang telah 
mempunyai kekual:ln hukum y:nig tetap~ clan 
h. tidak pemah menjadi w;icga uegara a:."ing. 
Pasal 13 
1) Pemtlihan Gubemur clan Walal Gubemur Provinsi N=_groe Aceh Dam~aru 
dilahanakan oleh Komisi Iudepeuden Pernilihan dan diawasi oleh Komi~ Pe11gawa;, 
Pemilihan. yang masing-masing dibe11tuk oleh Dewan Peiwakilan R..1kyat Daerah Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
2) Ang,gota Kornisi Jndependen Pemilihan terdin atas anggota Komisi Pemilii..111 l.7nmrn 
Republik ~a dan anggota masy.uakat 
3) Anggotl Komisi PO'lglll\'aS Pemilihan terdiri abs U11S1.lf anggo!a Dewan Pawakilan R.al.."Y'lt 
Daeral.1, uru,ur pengawa<; pemilu nasional, dan anggota masyarakat yang mdependen. 
Pasal 14 
1) Pemilihan Gubemur clan \Vakil Gubemur Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Damssafam 
dilaksanakan me!alui tihap-tahap: Pencalonan, peLiksanaan pemilihan. serta pengesahan 
h.1.'.il pemiliban clan pelanrikan Gubemur dan Wakil Gubewur. 
2) Tahap pencalonan, sd>agaimaua dimaksud pada ayat (1), dilaksanakm 1lll"hh11: 
a. pend.Utaran clan sel.eksi administratif pasangan bakal calon oleh Komisi Independen 
Pemilihan; 
b. pemapar.m visi dan misi ~aao bakal calan di depan Dewan Petwaktlan R.al..-y.u 
Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam; 
c. pene.tipan pasangan bak-al calo11 oleh Dewan Perwak:ilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi 
Nanggroe Acch Damssalam; 
cl kousultasi pasmgau bakal caloo oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi 
Nauggroe Aceh Darussalam. kepada. Pemerintah; 
e . Penetapan pasangan calon oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Pro..ii.1'il 
Nan!!_groe Acch Darussalam; dan 
f. Pendafta.ran pernilih oleh Komisi Independen. Pemilih..111 bers.im.'l dengan Pemerintah 
Provinsi N anggroe Aceh Damssalam. 
.3) Tahap pe1aksanaan pemilihaQ. sc-bagainl:aila dimaksud pada ayat (1), mdiputi: 
a. pemiliban pa~gan calon Gubcnur dan Wakil Gubemur yang dilaksanakan secara 
laugsung oleh masyarakat peruilih serentak. pada hari yang sarna disehuuh wilayah 
Pi.-oviusi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; 
b. Penghitung<'Ul ~1= se£ara transparan dau terintegrasi yang dilaksam1ka.n ole-h 
Komisi Jndepeoden Pemi1ihan; 
c. l\:nyerahail basil penghitungan suara oleh Komisi Indcpenden Pemilihan kep-ada 
Dewan Perwaki.la.n Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; clan 
d Pengesahan. basil perlutungan suara yang dilaksanakan oleh Dewan Perwalalan 
Rakyat Daer3h Pro\o-insi Nanggroe A.ceh Damssalam. 
4) Tahap pengesaltan dan pelantikan Gubenmr dan \Vakil GubenUJC tapilih rneliputi: 
a. penyerahan ha>il pemilih.111 oleh Dewan Pern•akifan Rakyat Daerah Proviusi 
Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam kepada Presiden me!alui Menreri Dalam Negen; 
b. pengesahan Gubemur clan \Vakil Gui.lemur terpihh oleh Presideu; clan 
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c. pdantikan Gubemur dan W:akil Gubemur Provinsi Nang.groe Aceh Damssalaru yang 
dilaksa11abn oleh Menteri Dafam Negeri alas mma Presiden dau pengangkatan 
surnpahnya y.mg dilakukan dihadapan Ketua Mahkamah Syar'iyah Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Dam..-salam da1am Sidang Pariptuna Dewai1 Perwalclan Rah.y.1t 
Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
S) Pengaw3sau proses pemilihan Gubemur clan Wakil. Gubernur Provmsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Dan1.ssalam. sebagaimana dimaksud dahm Pasal 12. Pasal 1.:3, dan Pasal 14, dil.il•ik.111 oleh 
Koruis.i Pengawas funilihan. 
6) HaJ.haI lain mengenai pemililian Gubemur dan Wakil Gube:mur Provinsi Nauggroe Aceh 
Darussalam y.mg behuu diatur dalam undang-undang ini dapat dian.l! lebih lanjut dalam 
Qanun Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
Pasal 15 
1) Pemilihan BupatiJ\Vakil Bupati dan WalikotarWakil Walikota atru nama lain dilaknk..'11. 
sesuai dengan ketentuan Pasal 12, Pasal l3. dan Pasal 14. 
2) Pelaksanaan lretentuan Pasal 12, Pasal 13, clan Pasal 14 disesu:iibn clerg;m kepentmgan 
pennh113l1 sebag;iimauadim.1ksud pad.a ayat (1) kecuali: 
a. penyerahan basil pemilihan oteh Dew'l!11 Penvalalan Rah.-yat Daerah Kabupa1en/Kota 
atau nama lain kepada Menreri Dalam Negeri mel.ahn Gubernur; 
b. pengesahan BupatiJWakil Bupati dan Wah1rotat\V<Kil Walikota atau narua lain 
tapilih oleh Menteri Dalam Neg~ dan 
c. Pelantikan Bupari!Wakil Bupati clan Walik.ota/Wakil Walikota atau nama lain o[eh 
Gubenmr atas uama tvlenteri Dalam Negeri d..111 peugang)ratan 5tuupalmya dilakulrnn 
di hadapan Ketua Mahlrarual1 Syar'iyah dalam Sidang Paripuma Dewan Pen\1"1olan 
Rakyat Daernh KabupatentKota atiu nama lain 
3) Penyesuaian sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) dianlf clalam Qamu1 Prm:iusi Nanggroe 
Ac.eh Damssalam 
Pasal 16 
1) Ketentuan sebagaimana climaksud dalam Pasal 12 dilaksamkan paling cepat 5 (lima) tahun 
stjak uudang-undang ini cliundingkan. 
2) Dalam hal ke-1entuan selx\gaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) belum dimungkink:ill 
pelaksanaannya, atas rekomeudasi Kornisi Jndependeu Pemiliban clan Komisi PengJwas 
Pemilihan, pemilihan Gubemur dan \Vakil Gubemoc dilakukan oleh Dewan Po.wakiL'lli 
Rah.y.it Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darns~am. 
BAB IX 
PEMil..ffi DAN BAK PL,rIILIH 
Pasal 17 
Pemilih adalah warga Negara Rfpublik Indonesia yang berdomisili di w1lay:ih Provinsi Nanggroe 
Aceb Damc;salam yang bemmur 17 (tujuh bela.s) tahun Ire atas atm yang sudah pemah rnkah dan 
h.1k pilihnya tidak sedang dic:ihut oleh pengadilan. 
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Pasal 18 
Peruilih di Provinsi Nauggroe Aceh Dam5salam. sebagaimana climaksud dalam Pasal 17_ 
mempuuyai bale 
a. memilih Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah; 
b. mengawasi proses pemilihan Kepa1a Daer.lb dan Wakil Kepala Daerah; 
c . mengajukan penankan kembali y·eca/l) anggota De\vClll Pern'3kilan Rak'y.U Daerah: 
d. mengajtikan pemberhentian sebelum babis Dla.5a jabatm Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala 
Daerah; 
e . mengajukan usulao kebijakan pe1aksanaan pemerintahan Daerah~ 
f. mengajukan usu1an penyempumaao dan pembahan Qan1u1 Provmsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam; dan 
g. mengawasi peoggunaan anggar.m. 
Pasal 19 
Hak-hak pemilih sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 18, diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qanun Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
PasaJ 20 
l ) Gubemur1Wakil Gubemur, Bnpatil\Vakil Bupati. dan Walikoti/Wakil Walikota atau uama 
lam dapat berlienti atru diberhmrikan ~oaimana dimaksud dalam ~tmdnig l1l1 dan 
sesua1 dengan peraturan perulldang-undang;rn. 
2) Anggota Dewan Peswakilan Raky.it Daerah Prmiiru.i dan Kabupaten/Kota atau nama lain 
dapat berhenti atau diberhfntikan sebagaimana dirnak:sud dalam undang-undangini clan 
sesuai deng;m peraturan perunda11g-1mdangan 
3) Ketentuan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ay;rt (1) dan ayat (2) diatur le-bih lanjut dengan 
Qamm Provlnsi Nanggroe Aceb Darussalam 
BAB X 
KEPOIJSIAN DAE.RAH 
PROVINSI NANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALA.\l 
1) Tugas kepolisian dilaks:makan oleh Kepolisi.an Daerah Provmsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam sebagai bagi:an dari Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.. 
2) Kepala Kepolisian Daerah Provinsi N:mggroe Aceh Darussalam welaksankan kebijakan 
telmis kepolisian sebagairnana dimaksud pada ayat (1) di bidang keamanao. 
3) Kebijakan meogenai keamamn Ptovinsi Nanggroe Acdl Darussalam chkoordmasikan oleh 
Kepala Kepolisian Daerah kepada Gubemur Provin.si Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
4) Ha~bal mengenai tugas fungsiooal kepolisian sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (I) di 
bidang ketertihan dan ketentraman masyarakat diatur 1ebih lanjut dengan Qamm Pro\insi 
Nauggroe Aceh Daruss:alam. 
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5) Pelalrs:maan tugas fungsiooal kepolisian sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (4) di btdang 
ketatiban dan ketentraman masyarakat dipertwggtmgjawabhn oleh Kepala Kepohslan 
Daerah kepada Qibemur Provmsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
6) Pengangkatan Kepala Kepolisian Daerah Provinsl Nanggroe Aceh Dan~alam dilakukan 
oleh Kepaia Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia c1engan persetnjuan Gubemur. 
7) Pemberlientian Kepa]a Kepolisian Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Ace11 Darussalam cltlakukan 
old1 Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indouesia. 
8) Kepala Kepolisian Daer.ID Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam bert:mggung jawab kepada 
Kepa1a Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia atas pembinaan kepolisian cb Provifili 
Nanggroe .t\ceh ~ dalarn kerangka pelaksanaan tugas Kepolisim Negara Republik 
Indonesia 
Pasal 22 
(1) Seleksi unmk menjadi perwira, bintira, dan tamtama Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia 
ch Prm>lnsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dilaksanahn Kepolisian Daer.ID Nanggroe Aceh 
Turussaiam dengan menipethatikan ststem hukum, budaya, adat tstiadat, dan kebi.Jakan 
Gubemur Provinsi Nanggroe Acd.1 ~-
(2) Pendidilcm dasar dan pelatiban umum clan pdatiban umum bagi. binrara dan tamtama 
Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesa di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dtOeri 
h.<uikullm1 muatan lakal, dan lulusamya dintamak:an mtuk penuga.san cb Provmsi Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam. 
(3) Pendidilcm dan pe:mbinaan perwira Kepolisian Republik Indooesia yang be.rasal dari 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dilak.sanakan secara. nasional oleh Kepolistan Negara 
Republik Indooesia. 
(4) Penempatan perwira, bintara dan tlmtl1lla Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia clan luar 
Aceh ke Kepolisian Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darus.sa1am dtlaksanak:an atas 
keputusan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia deugan mempematikan SIStem 
hulmm, budaya, dan adat isbadat cb daeiah ~
Pasal 23 
Ha~haJ mengenai JX'Ildidibn dan pembinaan anggota Kepolisian Negpra Republik Indonesia. 
dilaksanakan berdasarkan keputusan Kepala Kepolisran R.epublik Indonesia. 
BAB XI 
KEJAKSAAN 
PROVINS! NANGGROE AC:EH DARUSSALA..1\1 
Pasal 24 
(1) Tugas ke_iaksaan dilakukan oleh lrejaksaan Provinsi Naggroe Aceh Damssahun sebagai 
bagt.311 dan Kejaksaau Agung Republik: Indonesia. 
(2) Pengangkatan Kepala Kejaksaan Tirut:__gi Provimi Anggroe Aceh Darussalam dilakukan o1eh 
Jak.5a Agung deugan persetl.lJlian Gubemur Prcmnsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
(3) Pembedimtian Kepala Kejaksaan Tinggi di Provwsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam di1akukan 
pleh Jaksa Agoog 
298 
BAB XI 
l\>lAHKA1"\L;UI SY AR 'IYAH 
PROVINSIN~1'1GGROE ACEHDARUSSALAM 
Pasal 23 
(1) Peradilan Syariat Islam di ProvitlSi Nau.ggroe Aceh Darussalam sebagai bagian dan sistem 
peradilan nasional dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Syar' iyah yang bebas dari pengaruh pihak 
llllllllpull. 
(2) Kewenang;m Mahlcamah Syar'iyah sebagaimana diniaksud pada ayat (1), didasarkan atas 
syariat Islam dalam sistem hukum nasional, yang diatur lebih lanjut dengan Qanun Provins1 
Nanmoe Aceh Darus.salain 
(3) Kewenangan sebag;iimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) ch""berlaku!Gm bagi pemehik agama lslan1-
Pasal 26 
(1) Mahlcnnah Syar'iyah sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pa.sat 25 ayai (I) terdiri atas 
Mahkamah Syar' iyah Kabupaten.ISagoe dan Kota/Banda atau nama lain sebagai pengadilan 
tingkat pertama, clan mabk:amah Syar'iyah Prrpicsi sebagai pengadi1ai1 tingkat banding ch 
ibukota Pro"Vimi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.. 
(2) Mahkamah Syar'iyah untuk pengadilan tingkat kasas1 dilak:ukan pada tv!alikamah Agung 
Republik Indooesia_ 
(3) Hakim Mahkamah Syar'iyah d:iangbt dan dt"behe111ikan oleh Presiden sebagai Kepafa 
Negara atas usul Meuteri Kel1akiman setclah mendapat pertimbangan Gubemuc Provinsi 
Nanggroe. Aceh Darus5a1am dan Ketua. MahklnnalJ. Agung. 
BABXIII 
KETENTIJAN P.ER;\.l,IllAN 
Pasal 27 
Sengl-eta-wewemng antara Mahkamah Syar'iyah clan Pengadilan dalam linglmngan per.idiliu1 lain 
mmjadi wewemng Mahkamah Agung Republik: Indo!leSia untuk tingka.t pertama clan t111gkat 
terakh:ir. 
Pasal 28 
Susunan org;inisasi, perangbt Daei:ah, jabatan da1am pemerintahan Daerah, clan peraturan 
pernndang-nndangan yang ada tetap berlaku hingga chbeatuk Qamm Provins! Naiiggroe Aceh 
Damssalam sesuai dengan undaug-nooang iai 
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Pasal 29 
Semua peraturan perundang-undangan yang ada sepanjang tidak diatur dengan undang-uodaog 1111 
dinyatakan tetap berlaku di Pro•rinsi Nanggroe Ac& Darussalam 
Pasal 30 
Setm1a Peraturan Daernh yang ada dinyatakan sebagai Qanun Provi:nsi N~~oe Aceh Darussalam 
sesuai dengan yang dirnaksud dalam undang-undang ini. 
BAB XIV 
KETENTUA1'1 PERALIHAN 
Pasal31 
(1) Ke1e11tuan pelak:sanaan undang-undang ini yarg menyangk'Ut keivenangan Pemerintah 
ditetapkan deng;m Peraturan Pemenntah 
(2) Ketentuan pelaksanaan undang-undang ini yang menyangkut kewenangan Pemerintah 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Damssalam ditetapkan dengan Qanun ProVlllSi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 
Pasal 32 
Keteotuan pelaks.inaan undang-undang ini secara bertahap hams telah dlbentuk paling bmbat 
dalain masa satu tahun selelah undang -undang ini diundangkan. 
Pa~al33 
Perubah:an atas undang-undang ini dapat dilaknlcm dengan memperliatikan pertitnbai:igan Dewan 
Peiwakilan Ral.y.it Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
Pasal 34 
Undang-1utdang ini mulai berlaku pada tangga1 diundangkm 
Agar setiap orang mengetiliuinya, memerintahkan pengundangan undang-undang nu dengan 
penempatannya da1am Lemb:u:an Negara Repul.iik Indonesia 
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Annex 2 Law No 28/2003 On the Martial Law Security State of Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam Province 
PRE'.;>LDEN 
F\El"UBLIK INOON~SlA 
KEPUTUSAN PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA 
NOMOR 28 T AHUN 2003 
TENT ANG 
PERNYATAAN KEADAAN BAHAYA DENGAN TINGKATAN 
KEADAAN DARURAT MILITER DI PROVINS! NANGGROE ACEH 
DARUSSALAM 
Menimbang 
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA, 
a. bahwa rangkaian upaya damai yang dilakukan 
pemerintah, baik melalui penetapan otonomi khusus untuk 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, pendekatan terpadu 
dalam rencana pembangunan yang komprehensif, maupun 
dialog bahkan yang dilakukan di luar negeri sekalipun, 
ternyata tidak menghentikan niat dan tindakan Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM) untuk memisahkan diri dari Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia dan menyatakan 
kemerdekaaannya; 
b. bahwa dalam kondisi seperti itu, dan semakin 
meningkatnya tindak kekerasan bersenjata yang kian 
mengarah pada tindakan terorisme yang dilakukan Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM), tidak hanya merusak ketertiban dan 
ketentraman masyarakat, mengganggu kelancaran roda 
pemerintahan, dan menghambat pelaksanaan berbagai 
program pembangunan, tetapi semakin memperluas dan 
memperberat penderitaan masyarakat Aceh dan masyarakat 
di Provinsi Naggroe Aceh Darussalam pada umumnya; 
c. bahwa keadaan yang pada akhirnya dapat 
mengganggu keutuhan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia 
tersebut tidak dapat dibiarkan berlarut-larut, dan secepatnya 
harus dihentikan melalui upaya-upaya yang lebih terpadu, 
agar kehidupan masyarakat dan penyelenggaraan 
pemerintahan dapat segera dipulihkan kembali; 
d. bahwa sesuai dengan amanat Undang-Undang 
Dasar 1945 yang harus dilaksanakan Presiden untuk 
melindungi segenap bangsa dan seluruh tumpah darah 
Indonesia, dan sesuai pula dengan kewenangan 
yang dimiliki Presiden berdasarkan Undang-undang tentang 
Keadaan Bahaya, serta setelah mendengar dan 
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Mengingat: 
mempertimbangkan dengan seksama segala pandangan dan 
dukungan yang dinyatakan Pimpinan DPR RI, Fraksi-fraksi 
dan Komisi I serta Komisi II DPR RI , sebagaimana 
diputuskan bersama sebagai kesimpulan dalam Rapat 
Konsultasi antara Presiden dengan seluruh Pimpinan DPR 
RI , Fraksi-fraksi dan kedua Komisi tersebut pada tanggal 15 
Mei 2003, dan selanjutnya setelah mencermati 
perkembangan keadaan dan sikap Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM) pada hari-hari terakhir setelah Rapat Konsultasi 
tersebut yang tidak menunjukkan perubahan ke arah 
perbaikan, dipandang perlu untuk menetapkan Keadaan 
Bahaya dengan tingkatan Keadaan Darurat Militer untuk 
seluruh wilayah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; 
1. Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 Pasal 4 ayat ( 1 ), Pasal 10 
dan Pasal 12 sebagaimana telah diubah dengan 
Perubahan Keempat Undang-Undang Dasar 1945; 
2. Undang-undang Nomor 23 Prp Tahun 1959 tentang Keadaan 
Bahaya (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1959 
Nomor 139, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Nomor 1908) 
sebagaimana telah diubah dua kali, terakhir dengan Undang-
undang Nomor 52 Prp Tahun 1960 (Lembaran Negara 
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1960 Nomor 170, Tambahan 
Lembaran Negara Nomor 2113); 
3. Undang-undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian 
Negara Republik Indonesia (Lembaran Negara Republi k 
Indonesia Tahun 2002 Nomor 2, Tambahan Lembaran 
Negara Nomor 4168); 
MEMUTUSKAN : 
Menetapkan KEPUTUSAN PRESIDEN TENTANG PERNYATAAN KEADAAN 
BAHAYA DENGAN TINGKATAN KEADAAN DARURAT MILITER 
DI PROVINS! NANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM. 
Pasal 1 
Seluruh wilayah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam dinyatakan dalam Keadaan Bahaya dengan 
tingkatan Keadaan Darurat Militer. 
Pasal 2 
(1) Penguasaan tertinggi Keadaan Bahaya dengan tingkatan 
Keadaan Darurat Militer sebagaimana dimaksud dalam 
Pasal 1 dilakukan oleh Presiden selaku Penguasa Darurat 
Militer Pusat. 
(2) Dalam melakukan penguasaan Keadaan Bahaya dengan 
tingkatan Keadaan Darurat Militer, Presiden dibantu oleh 
Sadan Pelaksana Harian Penguasa Darurat Militer 
Pusat yang terdiri dari : 
1. Ketua Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik dan 
Keamanan. 
2. Anggota a. Menteri Koordinator Bidang 
Perekonomian; 
b. Menteri Koordinator Bidang 
Kesejahteraan Rakyat; 
c. Menteri Sosial; 
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d. Menteri Dalam Negeri; 
e. Menteri Luar Negeri; 
f. Menteri Pertahanan; 
g. Menteri Kehakiman dan Hak Asasi 
Manusia; 
h. Menteri Kesehatan; 
i. Menteri Pendidikan Nasional; 
j. Menteri Tenaga Kerja dan 
Transmigrasi; 
k. Menteri Permukiman dan 
Prasarana Wilayah; 
I. Menteri Agama; 
m. Menteri Perhubungan; 
n. Menteri Keuangan; 
o. Menteri Negara Komunikasi dan 
lnformasi; 
p. Panglima Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia; 
q. Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republ ik 
Indonesia; 
r. Jaksa Agung; 
s. Kepala Sadan lntelijen Negara; 
t. Kepala Staf Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia Angkatan Darat; 
u. Kepala Staf Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia Angkatan Laut; dan 
v. Kepala Staf Tenta ra Nasional 
Indonesia Angkatan Udara. 
Pasal 3 
(1) Penguasaan Keadaan Darurat Militer di wilayah Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dilakukan oleh Panglima 
Daerah Militer lskandar Muda selaku Penguasa Darurat 
Militer Daerah. 
(2) Dalam melakukan penguasaan Keadaan Darurat Militer di 
Daerah, Panglima Komando Daerah Militer lskandar Muda 
dibantu oleh : 
1. Gubernur Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; 
2. Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Daerah 
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam; dan 
3. Kepala Kejaksaan Tinggi Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam. 
Pasal4 
Terhadap Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam sebagaimana 
dimaksud dalam Pasal 1 berlaku ketentuan-ketentuan Keadaan 
Darurat Militer sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Undang-undang 
Nomor 23 Prp Tahun 1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya 
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sebagaimana telah diubah dua kali, terakhir dengan Undang-
undang Nomor 52 Prp Tahun 1960. 
Pasal5 
Segala biaya yang diperlukan dalam rangka pelaksanaan 
Keputusan Presiden in1 dibebankan pada Anggaran 
Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara dan Anggaran Pendapatan 
dan Belanja Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. 
Pasal6 
Keputusan Presiden ini mulai berlaku pukul 00.00 WIB tanggal 
19 Mei 2003 untuk jangka waktu 6 (enam) bulan, kecuali 
diperpanjang dengan Keputusan Presiden tersendi ri. 
Agar setiap orang mengetahuinya, memerintahkan 
pengundangan Keputusan Presiden ini dengan penempatannya 
dalam Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia. 
Ditetapkan di Jakarta 
pada tanggal 18 Mei 2003 
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK 
INDONESIA, 
ttd 
MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI 
Diundangkan di Jakarta 
pada tanggal 18 Mei 2003 
SEKRETARIS NEGARA 
REPUBLIK INDONESIA, 
ttd 
BAMBANG KESOWO 
LEMBARAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN 2003 NOMOR 54 
Salinan sesuai dengan aslinya 
Deputi Sekretaris Kabinet 
Bidang Hukum dan 
Perundang-undangan, 
Lambock V. 
Nahattands 
Source: http://www.ri.go.id/produk uu/produk2003/kp2003/kp28'03 .htm, 
accessed 14 September 2006 
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Annex 3 Summary of the VPC in Aceh from 1945 to June 2005 
Year 
1945, 
September 
15th 
1953 
1955 
1958 
1960 
Type of Incident 
Cumbok War (Perang Cumbok) 
0 It was led by Teuku Muhammad Daud Cumbok (1910), a son of 
Uleebalang from Cumbok Village. 
0 The first fight of pro vs anti Republic oflndonesia led by Ulama and 
Uleebalang respectively. 
0 The Uleebalang group was based in Bireuen (which was later known as 
the core ofGAM in the region, after Pidie, the previous core). 
0 The approximate number of casualties was 1500 people. 
DI/TIJ/NII fighting 
0 21 September 1953, Beureueh proclaimed his support on NII (Negara 
Islam Indonesia) and TIT (Tentara Islam Indonesia) lead by 
Kartosoewirjo. This was in response to the decision of the Indonesia 
Government to merge the two Provinces of Aceh and North Sumatra 
into one, with Medan (located in the former North Sumatra province), 
as the Capital City (Peraturan Pengganti UU no 511950). 
0 Beureub developed the 13 basic principles ofNII. 
0 He and continued his guerrilla fighting, widely supported by the 
Acehnese society, in the forest 
The 19 August Operation (Operasi 19 Agustus )-A military operation for 
the DI/TII fighters, followed by Batee Krueng Congress (Kongres Batee 
Krueng) on 23 September 1955. 
0 Around 64 Acehnese were shot death in a field, leading to the 
frustration of Sukarno's followers in the region. 
0 A special delegation was sent from Jakarta to have a peace dialogue 
with Teungku Daud Beureueh. 
PRRI/PERMEST A fighting: 
0 In February 1958 Daud Beureuehjoined the PRRI/PERMESTA. 
0 In December 1958, a meeting was conducted in Geneva, which Hasan 
di Tiro, the current GAM leader, attended as a young sympathizer. 
The 17 August Operation (Operasi 17 Agustus) and The Independence 
Operation, ( Operasi Merdeka ): 
0 The two operations were conducted by Soekamo to respond to the 
establishment of The Indonesian Unity Republic (Republik Persatuan 
Indonesia - RPI), on 8 February 1960 with Syafruddin Prawiranegara as 
President and Daud Beureueh as Vice President. 
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1970 - 1972 The establishment of The Islam Republic of Aceh (Republik Islam Aceh) by 
Beureueh and his followers, and the reformed DI/TII. 
1976 - 2005 The establishment of The Acehnese Freedom Fighters (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka - GAM) in 1976. The fighting of GAM vs TN1 - The Lndonesian 
Armed Forces (1976 to 2005). 
1990 - 1998 May 1990 to August 1998: The launch of Military Operations in Aceh, 
popularly known as DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer), during which the most 
horrified operation, the Red Net Operation ('Operasi Jaring Merah') was 
conducted: 
0 The most intense period was from 1990 to 1992. 
0 Some note that this is as per the request of Ibrahim Hasan, the Governor 
of Aceh at that period. Some argue that this was not the case. 
0 The approximate number of casualties was 4-5 thousand lives. 
7 August 1998: The Military Operation was lifted under Habibi 's 
administration (the Third President of Indonesia). 
1999 5 January to 5 March: The Wibawa Operation (Operasi Wibawa) with the 
approximate number of casualties was 730 civilians and 170 soldiers and 
policemen. 
2000 February 2000: The All Aceh Women Conference (Duek Pakat lnong Aceh) 
in Banda Aceh on, paiticipated in by around 450 women student activists, 
GAM partisans, government officers, NGO's activists. 
June 2000 - January 2001: The Humanitarian Pause (Jeda Kemanusiaan).1 
2002 May 2002: Malina approach, an economic compensation approach for GAM. 
2003 
18 May 2003: The COHA was finally ended: 
0 GAM refused to accept the deadline for the critical meeting set by the 
Gol and asked for a two days delay at the very last minute (GAM has 
asked several delays before) and also refused to accept the conditions 
set by the Gol for the peace agreement, i.e. recognition of the Unitary of 
Re ublic of Indonesia, as ecial autonom of Aceh, and an immediate 
1 According to other source the humanitarian pause was started in May 2000 and ended in 
April 2001 indicated by the deployment of security operations in Aceh (see Sukma, Rizal 
2004:viii) 
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Year Type of Incident 
2005 
disarmament. 
0 Around 26,000 troops were sent to Aceh (as of late April 2003, 
including the 2,000 who have arrived in early April 2003. 
19 May - June 2003: The Integrated Operation (Operasi Terpadu) and the 
Implementation of Martial Law (Darurat Militer), with its main motto 
'winning the mind and heart of the People.' 
- Period ofrelative peace 
Sources: Kontras, No 283 Year V, 11-17 March 2004, p.7; Tempo, Special Edition 17 
Agustus, ' Mengapa Aceh Berontak", Edisi 18-24 Agustus 2003; Republika Online, Senin, 
29 January 1996, 'Separatisme dan Makar Pada Tahun-tahun Revolusi'. 
http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1996/0 I /29/0002.html accessed in January 
2002; Arifin, Heru B. 2003. 'Sejarah Asal Mula GAM (1): Lahir Karena Penindasan dan 
Pelecehan Tanah Adat'. http://www.balipost.co.id/balipostcetak/2003/5/20/p2.htm accessed 
in May 2003.; 'Aceh Menyuguh Susu, Rakyat Menuai Air Tuba,' http://www.pikiran-
rakyat.com/cetak/0503/26/teropong/lainnya03.htm accessed in May 2003 ; rec. 1999. 
'Indonesia's Shaky Transition'. ICC, ICG, "Aceh: How Not To Win Heats and Minds' in 
Indonesia Briefing. July 2003; lCG, "Aceh: Why The Military Option Still Won't Work" in 
Indonesia Briefing, 9 May 2003; Interviews; Yusuf, M. Djali. 'Perekat Hati Yang Tercabik'. 
Yayasan Ulul Arham. 2002 . 
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Annex 4. The Colonial's War and Insurrection in the 19th and 20th 
Century 
Incidents (War and Period Region Approximate 
Insurrection) in a Number of 
chronological order* Casualties 
Perang Tondano (The 1808 - 1809 Manado, Sulawesi 
Tondano War) 
Perang Thomas Matualesia 1817 Saparua, Maluku 
(The Thomas Matualesia 
War) 
Perang Palembang (The 1819 - I 821 Palembang 
Palembang War) 
Perang Paderi (The Paderi 1819- 1933 Minangkabau Not more than 
War) 20,000 
Minangkabaun were 
killed. 
Perang Diponegoro/Perang 1825 - 1830 Yogyakarta 200,000 Javanese, 
Jawa (The Diponegoro/Java 15,000 Dutch 
War) Soldiers were killed 
Perang Aceh (The Aceh 1873 - 1904 Aceh 60,000 -70,000 
War) Acehnese, more 
than 7,000 Dutch 
soldiers were ki lled 
Pemberontakan Petani 1888 Banten 
Banten (the Banten Farmers 
Insurgence) 
Pemberontakan Pajak 1908 Sumatera Barat 
(Belasting) (The tax (West Sumatara) 
insurgence) 
Pemberontakan Komunis 1926/27 Sumatera Barat 
(The Communist (West Sumatra) and 
Insurgence) Ban ten 
Source: Zed, Mestika, 2002, p.23 
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Annex 5. Declaration of Independence of Acheh Sumatra (Ac.: Surat 
Peunjata Keulai Atjeh Meurdehka) 
English version 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF ACHEH-
SUMATRA 
Acheh, Sumatra, December 4, 1976 
To The peoples Of The World: 
We, the people of Acheh, Sumatra, exercising our right of self-determination, 
and protecting our historic right of eminent domain to our fatherland, do 
hereby declare ourselves free and independent from all political control of the 
foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java. 
Our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent 
sovereign State since the world begun. Holland was the first foreign power to 
attempt to colonize us when it declared war against the sovereign State of 
Acheh, on March 26, 1873, and on the same day invaded our te1Titory, aided 
by Javanese mercenaries. The aftermath of this invasion was duly recorded on 
the front pages of contemporary newspapers all over the world. The London, 
TIMES, on April 22, 1873, wrote: "A remarkable incident in modern colonial 
history is reported from East Indian Archipelago. A considerable force of 
Europeans has been defeated and held in check by the anny of native 
state ... the State of Acheh. The Achehnese have gained a decisive victory. 
Their enemy is not only defeated, but compelled to withdraw. "THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, on May 6th, 1873, wrote: "A sanguinary battle has taken 
place in Aceh, a native Kingdom occupying the Northern portion of the island 
of Sumatra. The Dutch delivered a general assault and now we have details of 
the result. The attack was repulsed with great slaughter. The Dutch general 
was killed, and his army put to disastrous flight. It appears, indeed, to have 
been literally decimated." This event had attracted powerful world-wide 
attention. President Ulysses S.Grant of the United States issued his famous 
Proclaniation of impartial Neutrality in this war between Holland and Acheh. 
On Christmas day, 1873, the Dutch invaded Acheh for the second time, and 
thus begun what HARPER'S MAGAZINE had called "A Hundred Years War 
of Today", one of the bloodiest, and longest colonial war in human history, 
during which one-half of our people had laid down their lives defending our 
sovereign State. It was being fought right up to the beginning of world war II. 
Eight immediate forefathers of the signer of this Declaration died in the 
battlefields of that long war, defending our sovereign nation, all as successive 
rulers and supreme commanders of the forces of the sovereign and 
independent State of Acheh, Sumatra. 
However, when, after World War II, the Dutch East Indies was supposed to 
have been liquidate, - an empire is not liquidated if its territorial integrity is 
preserved, - our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, was not returned to us. Instead, 
our fatherland was turned over by the Dutch to the Javanese - their ex-
mercenaries, - by hasty flat of former colonial powers. The Javanese are alien 
310 
and foreign people to us Achelmese Sumatrans. We have no historic, political, 
cultural. economic or geographic relationship with them. When the fruits of 
Dutch conquests are preserved, intact and then bequeathed, as it were, to the 
Javanese. the result is inevitable that a Javanese colonial empire would be 
established in place of that of the Dutch over our fatherland. 
Achch. Smnatra. But, colonialism, either by white. Dutch, Europeans or by 
brown Javanese, Asians, is not acceptable to the people of Acheh. Sumatra. 
This illegal transfer of sovereignty over our fatherland by the old, Dutch, 
colonialists to the new, Javanese colonialists, was done in the most appalling 
political fraud of the century: the Dutch colonialist was supposed to have 
turned over sovereignty over our fatherland to a "new nation" called 
"indonesia". But "indonesia" was a fraud: a cloak to cover up Javanese 
colonialism. Since the world begun, there never was a people, much less a 
nation, in our part of the world by that name. No such people existed in the 
Malay Archipelago by definition of ethnology, philology. cultural 
anthropology. sociology. or by any other scientific findings. "lndonesia" is 
merely a new label. in a totally foreign nomenclature, which has nothing to do 
with our own history, language, culture. or interests; it was a new label 
considered useful by the Dutch to replace the despicable "Dutch East Indies", 
in an attempt to unite administration of their ill-gotten, far-flung colonies; and 
the Javanese neo-colonialists knew its usefulness to gain fraudulent 
recognition from the unsuspecting world, ignorant of the bi story of the Malay 
Archipelago. If Dutch colonialism was wrong, then Javanese colonialism 
which was squarely based on it cannot be right. The most fundamental 
principle of international Law states: Ex injuria jus non oritur. Right cannot 
originate from wrong! 
The Javanese. neve1iheless, are attempting to perpetuate colonialism which 
al I the Western colonial powers had abandoned and all the world had 
condemned. During these last thirty years the people of Acheh, Sumatra. have 
witnessed how our fatherland has been exploited and driven into ruinous 
conditions by the Javanese nee-colonialists: they have stolen our properties; 
they have robbed us from our livelihood; they have abused the education of 
our children; they have exiled our leaders; they have put our people in chains 
of tyranny. poverty, and neglect: the life-expectancy of our people is 34 years 
and is decreasing - compare this to the world's standard of 70 years and is 
increasing! While Acheh, Sumatra, has been producing a revenue of over 15 
billion US dollars yearly for the Javanese neo-colonialists, which they used 
totally for the benefit of Java and the Javanese. 
We, the people of Acheh, Sumatra, would have no quarrel with the Javanese, 
if they had stayed in their own country, and if they had not tried to lord it over 
us. From no on, we intend to be the masters in our own house: the only way 
life is worth living; to make our own laws: as we see fit; to become the 
guarantor of our own freedom and independence: for which we are capable; 
to become equal with all the peoples of the world: as our forefathers had 
always been. In short, to become sovereign in our own fatherland! 
Our cause is just! Ow- land is endowed by the Almighty with plenty and 
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bounty. We covet no foreign tenitory. We intend to be a worthy contributor to 
human welfare the world over. We extend the hands of friendship to all 
peoples and to all governments from the fom corners of the earth. 
In the name of the sovereign people of Acheh, Sumatra. 
Tengku Hasan M.di Tiro 
Chairman, National Liberation Front of Acheh, Sumatra, and Head of State. 
Acheh. Sumatra, December 4, 1976 
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Acehnese version: 
SURAT PEUNJATA KEULAI ATIBH MEURDEHKA 
Atjeh, Sumatra, 4 Desember, 1976 
DEUNGON NAN ALLAH 
KEU BANSA-BANSA DONJA, SALEuEM: 
Kamoe, Bansa Atjeh, Sumatra, ateueh neuduek Hak bak peuteuntee nasib 
droe lagee bansa-bansa laen, dan ateueh neuduek Rak kamoe bak peulindong 
tanoh pusaka endatu, deungon njoe kamoe peunjata droe kamoe meurdehka 
dan lheueh nibak bandum ikatan keukusaan politek nibak peurneurintah aseng 
di Djakarta, Djawa. 
Nangroe pusaka endatu kamoe njoe na saboh Nanggroe njang sabe 
meurdehka dan meudeelat mulai donja teudong, Keuradjaan Beulanda 
nakeueh keukuasaan aseng njang phon that djak tjuba djadjah kamoe, watee 
djipeunjata prang ateueh neugara Atjeh njang meurdehka dan meudeelat, bak 
uroe 26 Mart, 1873, dan bak uroe njan ladju djipeu-ek prang ateueh kamoe 
deungon djibantu le sipa-i Djawa . Peu keuneulheueh niba.k seurangan 
Beulanda njoe ka meutuleh bak on phon dalam surat-surat haba ban saboh 
donja. Dalam surat haba Inggreh THE LONDON TIMES, uroe 22 April, 
1873, meutuleh: "Saboh keudjadian njang meunarek that hate dalam 
seudjarah peundjadjahan rnoderen ka ta deungo teudjadi di pulo Hindia Timu. 
Saboh armada njang raja lageena njang teudong nibak bansa Erupa ka 
geupeutalO prang uleh saboh teuntra neugara asai disinan .... Neugara Atjeh. 
Uleh bansa Atjeh ka geuteumeung saboh keumeunangan njang peuneutoih 
that . Musoh Atjeh kon ka talo mantong, teutapi ka pajah plueng bandum." 
Dalam surat haba Amerika, THE NEW YORK TIMES, bak uroe 6 Mei, 
1873, meutuleh: "Saboh prang njang meulabo darah ka teudjadi di Atjeh, 
saboh keuradjaan njang mat kuasa ateueh pulo Sumatra rot baroh. Uleh 
Beulanda ka djipeu-ek prang ateueh ureueng Atjeh, dan djinoe ka geutanjoe 
teurin1ong haba peu hasedjih. Seurangan Beulanda njang ka geubalah le 
ureueng Atjeh deungon geusie djih rame lageena. Panglima Beulanda ka 
geupoh mate dan teuntra-djih ka djiplueng bandum pula p-pingkui. Meunurot 
keunjataan, teunta Beulanda keubit-keubit hantjo meudeudak." Keudjadian 
njang luwa biasa njoe, ka meunarek peurhatean donja njang raja lageena, trok 
'an uleh uleh Presiden Ulysses S. Grant dari Amerika Sjarikat geupeuteubiet 
saboh Surat Peunjata Dong Teungoh Njang Ade ( Proclamation of Impartial 
Neutrality) dalam prang antara Beulanda deungon Atjeh njoe. 
Bak uroe 25 Desember, 1873 ( uroe lahe Nabi Isa ) uleh Beulanda ka djipeu-
ek prang njang keu dua ateueh Atjeh, dan deungon njan mulai treuk peu njang 
uleh madjalah A,_merika HARPE~'S MAGAZINE, ka geuboh nan "PRANG 
SIREUTOH THON MASA NJOE" , saboh prang pew1djadjahan njang paleng 
trep dalam seudjarah manusia, njang dalam prang njan siteungoh nibak bansa 
Atjeh ka geubrie njawong geuh nibak peutheun Neugara kan1oe njang 
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meurdehka dan meudeelat. Prang njan geusambong trok'an watee bitjah Prang 
Donja keu- dua. Lapan droe nibak endatu njang teken Surat Peunjata njoe 
reubah mate sjahid dalam seueh p r a n g njang panjang that njan, bak 
peutheun keumeurdehkaan bansa dan Neugara, bandum sibagoe Wali 
Neugara dan Panglima Thjik Angkatan Prang Ncugara Atjeh nJang 
meurdehka dan meudeelat. 
Teutapi, watee lheueh habeh Prang Donja keu-dua dan Hindia Beulanda 
djipeugah ka djibubar - saboh keuradjaan hana bubar meunjoe wilajah djih 
mantong djipeulahra lagee sot - Nanggroe A~jeh hana djipulang keu kamoe 
Atjeh, tcutapi ka djibri uleh Beulanda keu Djawa - Lamiet djih deungon 
djimeukomplot ngon peundjadjah-peundjadjah Barat laen di Asia Tuenggara 
njoe. Bansa Djawa njan na saboh bansa aseng keu kamoe bansa Atjeh. Kamoe 
hana hubongan seudjara, hana hubongan politek, hana hubongan budaja, hana 
hubongan ekonomL dan hana hubungan bumoe detmgon awak njan. Watee 
hase peunaklokkan dan peundjadjahan Beulanda teutap djipeulahra bandum. 
dan lheueh njan djibri lagee pusaka keu bansa Djawa - Jagee meunankeuh 
njang ka djipeulaku - maka akibatdjih handjeuethan akan teudong 
peundjadjahan Djawa bak teumpat djidong peundjadjahan Beulanda, teutapi 
peundjadjahan njan, bob uleh bansa Beulanda Erupa njang meukilet puteh 
atawa uleh bansa Asia Djawa njang meukilet mirah, hana mungken 
geuteurirnong uleh bansa Atjeh. 
Meunurot Hukom lnternasional dan Hukom Sjarikat Bansa-bansa. maka 
wadjeb ateueh Beulanda supaja dji pulang Hak Deelat ateueh Nanggroe Atjch 
njoe keu kamoe bansa Atjeh. Beulanda hana hak djih bak djidjak bri deelat 
ateueh Nanggroe Atjeh keu Djawa atawa keu "Indonesia" sabab "Indonesia" 
njan nakeuh nan njang djipeuna-peuna mantong. mangat djeuet dji t6p-t6p 
peundjadjahan bansa Djawa. Mulai phon d6nja njoe teudong hantom na saboh 
bansa di Asia Tuenggara njoe njang meunan lagee njan. Meunantjit. meunurot 
'eleume bansa-bansa ( ethnology ), 'eleume basa ( philology ), 'eleume asai 
usui budaja ( cultural anthropology ), 'eleume seudjarah (history ), dan 
'eleume masjarakat (sociology ) hana saboh "bansa Indonesia" njan di Asia 
Tuenggara njoe. Nan "Indonesia" njan hana laen nibak saboh merek baro, 
dalarn basa gob. njang hana meuhubong sapeue deungon seudjarah, basa, 
budaja, peue lom deungon keupeuntengan kamoe Atjeh, Sumatra. Ulch 
Bculanda merek baro "Indonesia" njan dj ingui sibagoe geunantoe nan II 
Hindia Beulanda" njang gob bantji njan. Uleh kawom kolonialis Djawa pih 
djiteupeue rajek guna nan pura-pura njan.mangat djeuet djitop-top 
kolonialisrne Djawa. dan mangat djeuet djiteumeung peungakuan donja luwa 
njang hana teupeue sapeue peukara seudjarah pulo-pulo Asia Tuenggara njoc. 
Meunjoe peundjadjahan Beulanda hana beutoi dan salah, maka 
peundjadjahan Djawa njang trang-trang dj ipeudong ateueh neuduek 
peundjadjahan Beulanda njan pih salah tjit. Dalam hukom Internasional ka 
geukheun: ex injuria jus non oritur. Hana keu'adelan meu-asai nibak 
keudjahatan, hana buetbeuna djeuet meudong ateueh buet salah! 
Bahthatpih meunan, bansa Djawa njan mantong tjit ~juba-tjuba peudong 
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peundjadjahan djih ateueh kamoe A~jeh. Sumatra, pada hai bandum nanggroe 
peundjadjah Erupa - lagee Beulanda, Peurantjeh, f nggreh. SpanjoL dan 
Portugeh -ka han ek le keumah peubuet buet njan dalam abat njoe. Dalam 
masa 30 Thon njang akhe njoe, ka meukalon uleh kamoe bansa Atjeh, 
pakriban tanoh pusaka endatu kamoe ka djirampok, djipeurusak dan 
djipeureuloh uleh sipeundjadjah Djawa; harta pusaka bansa kamoe ka djih 
tjue; buet hareukat bansa kamoe ka djih peureuloh; peundidehkan aneuk 
kamoe ka djih peusisat; ureueng-ureueng bakoe kamoe ka djih let nibak 
nanggroe; bansa kamoe ka dji-ikat deungon rante keuzaleman, djipeugasien 
dan hana djipadoli: hudep bansa kamoe ka rhot rata-rata 34 thon; pakriban 
njoe meunjoe tabandeng deungon ukoran donja njang 80 thon! Meunjanpih 
maken siuroe maken kureueng, padahai Atjeh, Sumatra. peutamong peng 
keudjih leubeh 15 miljar dollar Amerika djeueb-djeueb thon njang mandum 
djiangkot keudeh u Djawa peukaja droe-djih .. 
Kamoe Atjeh hana meudjak mita-mita pake deLmgon bansa Djawa meunjoe 
awaknjan djiduek di Nanggroe droedjih; meunjo awaknjan hana djidjak 
djadjah kan1oe dan djidjak rneulagak lagee Tuan' dalam rumoh kamoe. Mulai 
uroe njoe, kamoe meukeusud djeuet k.eu ureueng Po di nimoh droemeuh: 
meunjo kon meunan hudep njoe hana meuguna; djeuet meupeugot hukom dan 
atoran droemeueh - kon lagee keupeuntengan Djawa; djeuet keu ureueng 
njang djamin keumeurdehkaan droemeuh: njang kamoe leubeh nibak 
kcumah; djeuet keu sabab mulia deungon bansa-bansa laen dalam donja: 
lagee endatu karnoe tjit sabe meunan! Paneuk djih: mulia dan meudeelat 
ateueh Tanoh Pusaka Endatu droe! 
Peurdjuangan keumeurdehkaan kamoe njoe punoh keu'adelan. Kamoe hana 
meudjak tjok nanggroe gob - lagee Djawa djak tjok nanggroe kamoe. 
Nanggroe kamoe ka Neubri uleh Allah punoh dew1gon harcuta njang le 
lageena. Kamoe meukeusud bri bungong djaroe njang meumakna keu 
masjarakat donja, dan kamoe preh peungakuan nibak bansa-bansa njang meu-
adab. Kamoe bri djaroe rneusahbat keu bandum bansa dan keu bandum 
ncugara ateueh rhueng donja ! 
Ateueh nan bansa Atjeh, Sumatra, njang meurdehka dan meucleelat. 
Tengku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro 
Keutuha 
Angkatan Atjeh Sumatra Meurdehka 
Wali Neugara Atjeh. 
A~jeh. Sumatra. 4 Desember, 1976 
Source: http://www.asnlf.net/topint.htm, accessed 27 August 2006, 2. l 8pm 
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Annex 7. Household Economic Survey 
A. Household Structure 
1. The household structure of respondents 
Household Age Fl Educational Types of Jobs Income per month/week/day Remarks 
members M attainment (Reasons for 
Before After Before After 1999/2000 changing types of 
1999/2000 1999/2000 1999/2000 jobs and other 
necessary remarks) 
Husband 
Wife 
151 child 
211d child 
3rct child 
......... 
.. ....... 
.... .... . 
......... 
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2. Is there any household members that are recently moving out of (leaving) 
the house? 
If so, 
a. Who are they? 
b. Since when did they move out? 
c. Why? 
d. Where do they stay now? 
e. How do you communicate with them? 
f. What do they do? 
g. Do they send money home? How often do they send money home? 
If not, 
a. Are there any members of household that are planning to migrate 
(I: merantau)? Who are they and why? 
b. When do they plan to migrate (I: merantau)? Where to and why? 
B. Socio-Economic Needs, Difficulties and Sources of Support of 
Households - Before 1999/2000 
3. List types of household needs before 1999/2000 in accordance to their 
priorities. 
a . . .... .. ... . 
b. 
c .............. . 
d. 
e ......... . . ... . 
f. 
4. What kind of economic and other difficulties that your household were 
facing before 1999/2000? 
5. How did you respond to the difficulties mentioned above? Did you face 
any obstacles in responding to these difficulties? What kind of obstacles? 
6. Were there any external supports to your households to encounter these 
difficulties? 
If yes, 
a. What were the types of supports that you received (aid/debt/others)? 
318 
b. Who provided or offered these supports (government, NGOs, INGOs, 
neighbours, close friends, family, others)? 
c. Were you able to take these supports? If not, Why? 
d. How did you and other household members make the decision? 
e. Did you consult with non-household members? Who were they 
(friends, neighbours, government officers, informal leaders, others)? 
Why? 
f. If the support that you received was: 
1. a loan, what were the loan arrangements? 
11. an aid, what were the requirements for obtaining the aid? 
7. Before 1999/2000, did you ever sell any properties to meet household 
needs? If no, go to number 8. 
a. What types of properties that you sold, when did you sell it, and 
why? 
b. Did you have any other alternatives apart from selling your 
properties? If so, what were these alternatives and why didn't you 
take it? 
c. How did you and other household members make the decision? 
8. In the period ofbefore1999/2000, Did you managed to save? 
a. If so, how did you save? (put money in the bank, gold, or other goods) 
b. If not, what was the main reason of not been able to save? 
9. How did you and other household members make the decision? 
C. Household Economic Needs, Difficulties and Sources of Supports-
After 1999/2000 
10. List types of household needs after 1999/2000 in accordance to their 
priorities. 
a . . . .... . ... . 
b. 
c. ····· · ···· · ··· 
d. 
e. . ...... . ..... . 
f. 
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11 . What kind of economic and other difficulties that your household were 
facing after 1999/2000? 
12. How did you respond to the difficulties mentioned above? Did you face 
any obstacles in responding to these difficulties? What kind of obstacles? 
13. Were there any external supports to your households to encounter these 
difficulties? 
If yes, 
g. What were the types of supports that you received (aid/debt/others)? 
h. Who provided or offered these supports (government, NGOs, INGOs, 
neighbours, close friends, family, others)? 
i. Were you able to take these supports? If not, Why? 
J. How did you and other household members make the decision? 
k. Did you consult with non-household members? Who were they 
(friends, neighbours, government officers, informal leaders, others)? 
Why? 
l. If the support that you received was: 
1. a loan, what were the loan arrangements? 
11. an aid, what were the requirements for obtaining the aid? 
14. After 1999/2000, did you ever sell any properties to meet household 
needs? If no, go to number 8. 
a. What types of properties that you sold, when did you sell it, and 
why? 
b. Did you have any other alternatives apart from selling your 
properties? If so, what were these alternatives and why didn't you 
take it? 
c. How did you and other household members make the decision? 
15. In the period of after 1999/2000, Did you managed to save? 
c. If so, how did you save? (put money in the bank, gold, or other goods) 
d. If not, what was the main reason of not been able to save? 
16. How did you and other household members make the decision? 
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E. Expectations (Hopes) for the future of the household: What kind of 
expectations (hopes) for the future of your household members? Do you have 
any plan on how to achieve these expectations? If not, why? 
Note: This survey was translated in both languages of Bahasa Indonesia and 
Bahasa Aceh, through the help of my local contact. 
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Annex 8. List of Questions for Key informants on 
Acehnese Culture, Traditions, and Economic Activities 
1. The general society's culture and tradition : 
a. What are those main elements that characterised the culture and 
tradition of the Acehnese? 
b. What are changes experienced by the society today and what are main 
sources of these changes? 
c. What is the kin system of the Acehnese? Does this system maintained 
out of the region? 
d. How are women's role and position in the nuclear family and kin 
system ? What are the men-women relationship in the nuclear family 
and kin system? 
e. What are women's role and how are their positions in society? 
f. In what kind of public activities do women have important role? What 
are those role? 
2. What are the effect of conflict at personal, household & extended 
family and community levels? 
3. How people cope with the situation? Where they usually seek for help? 
How do they obtain help? 
4. The social support and safety net : 
a. The available social support and safety net in time of difficulties : 
i. What sorts of social supports available for families? 
11. What is the arrangement of this support? 
Ill. How to obtain this support? 
1v. Do people ttust on this support? If not, why? Did people trust this 
support before? When did it change? 
v. Is there any changes of the arrangement of such supports 
nowadays? In what ways? Why do these atTangements change? 
What factors influence the changes? 
vi. Do women have equal access to this support? 
vii. What is the arrangement for such support 
b. The available social support and safety net for women : 
1. Are there any social support and safety net system specifically 
addressed to women? 
11. What kind of social support and safety net system do women have? 
111. How is the arrangement in these social support and safety net 
system? 
1v. Is there any changes of the arrangement of such supports 
nowadays? In what ways? Why do these arrangements changed? 
What factors influence the changes? 
c. The effect of conflict on the social support and safety net 
1. How does the conflict effect the followings: (negatively/positively 
1. the kinship system 
2. the social safety net 
3. trust and coalition building (and rupturing) 
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4. social joining (and abandonment of social groups/neworks) 
5. social protection (and risk). 
11. What kind of effect does the conflict bring about to the followings? 
1. the kinship system 
2. the social safety net 
3. trust and coalition building (and rupturing) 
4. social joining (and abandonment of social groups/neworks) 
5. social protection (and risk). 
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